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Abstract 
Autobiographical writing acquired increasing importance 
during the apartheid period, with greater numbers of 
autobiographical texts being published by a more 
representative range of South Africans across race, class 
and gender categories. This thesis analyzes the 
implications of shifts in autobiographical production, i n 
English, during the years 1948-1994 through the examination 
of selected texts. The readings are informed by 
poststructuralism, modified by information about indigenous 
black South African cultural practices, as well as by input 
supplied by some of the autobiographical texts themselves. 
This theoretical approach may be referred to as a "pratique 
de m~tissage" (Glissant). 
The texts selected for close reading are from a field of 
over 120 autobiographical texts. They were chosen for 
their ability to illustrate important trends 1n South 
African autobiographical writing, specifically with regard 
to the three constituent parts of autobiography: autos, 
bios, and graphe. The chapter dealing with the depiction 
of self interrogates the hierarchized discourses of male-
biased humanism in Roy Campbell's Light on a Dark Horse 
(1951). In Ellen Kuzwayo's Call Me Woman (1985) I analyze 
the melding of the conceptual frameworks of indigenous 
black cultures and Western individualism by which the 
autobiographical subject is defined. Breyten Breytenbach's 
The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist (1984) is read 
as an exploration of the postmodernist decentred self. In 
the chapter focusing on the portrayal of life experiences, 
I examine the ways in which the narrator of Albert 
Luthuli's Let My People Go (1962) seeks to secure the 
reader's approval of his version of recent South African 
history; while the analysis of the sub-genre referred to 
here as worker autobiography is principally concerned with 
the politics of life-writing . In Chapter 5, I look at how 
Godfrey Moloi's My Life: Volume One (1987) uses the 
discourses of popular American movies of the 40s and 50s in 
order to validate a self victimized by racism, and also at 
the ways in which Lyndall Gordon's Shared Lives (1992) 
probes the limits and possibilities of biography through 
autobiographical speculation. In general, apartheid 
autobiography moves away from individualism to contribute, 
through various means, to social and political change. 
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Self, Life, and Writinq in Selected South African 
Autobiographical Texts 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
{F}reedom lies in our capacity to discover the 
historical links between certain modes of self-
understanding and modes of domination, and to resist 
the ways in which we have already been classified" and 
identified by dominant discourses. This means 
discovering new ways of understanding ourselves and 
each other, refusing to accept the dominant culture's , 
characterizations of our practices and desires, and 
redefining them from within resistant cultures. 
Jana Sawicki 
The time has come, then, to record the end of a way of 
life and, more elusive, the truncated lives of women 
who were shaped by a warped society yet who were, all 
the same, portents of the future. 
Lyndall Gordon 
Unveiling lS not reduction but passion. 
Philippe Sollers 
The past 46 years have been momentous ones ln South 
Africa's history: ln 1948 the Afrikaner Nationalist 
Government came into power and embarked on a process of 
institutionalised racism!, the relentless denial of human 
rights for the majority of South Africans. 1994 saw this 
process grind to its inevitable halt when South Africa's 
first democratically elected government swept into power. 
{
The narrative of apartheid's rise and fall must be told, 
not only in the broad strokes of a national history, but 
, f 
also in the finer details of individual life-stories. As 
Lyndall Gordon notes, anthropological and sociological 
studies, important as they are, may simply demonstrate "the 
hopelessness of factual knowledge" and, for all their 
rigorousness, often strike one as "empty of human truth" 
(Gordon, 1992:129). 
Autobiographical writing serves as an important 
corrective. It represents the refusal of individuals to be 
1 
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The autobiographical 'I' 
and the right to history and 
place" (Willis, 1985:213). While the relationship between 
lived experience and textual versions thereof is highly . 
codified, and not to be collapsed into a simple referential 
model, autobiography has much to offer the student of 
history and culture. ~ch writing presents itself as a ( 
species of history, a history which confronts the 
partiality of interpretations of reality and explores the 
private dimensions of public policy. 
It is a need to testify to the experience of apartheid 
which motivates a great many South African autobiographers. 2 
Increasing numbers of South Africans, across more 
representative class, gender and race lines, are recording 
their life stories. In this, autobiographical production 
reproduces the struggle for democratization. Greater 
numbers of South African and non-South African readers are 
reading these avowedly factual personal accounts. In the 
apartheid period autobiography aGhieves unique significance 
for the genre, as it is currently defined, contests 
apartheid's obsession with group identity and concomitant 
erasure of individuals. Perhaps in part due to recognition 
of this, autobiographical writing has attracted increasing 
attention in the last decade or so . Autobiographies and 
quasi-autobiographies by South Africans seem to b~ far less 
frequently regarded -- or to regard themselves -- as the 
poor relations of fictional, poetic, and historical texts 
(and I speak here of their general reception, not only of 
their status in academic circles) . 
Indeed, in many cases purportedly factual accounts of - -life in apartheid South Africa have come to be regarded as 
more valuable than fictional accounts ~ For instance, the 
p~blishers of Jay Naidoo's Coolie Location (1990) claim ln 
their advertising leaflet that the tradition of 
autobiography is "even more central than the novel in South 
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Africa's literary culture ,,] The fact that the 
autobiographical writings of Ellen Kuzwayo, Breyten 
Breytenbach and Christopher Hope have been honoured with \ 
literary awards is another indication of the recently 
improved status of the genre. At the less rarefied end of 
the audience scale another mark of the genre's widening 
importance is the emergence of the worker autobiography 
(which I discuss in Chapter 4) in which scholars and 
researchers act as facilitators for illiterate persons to 
narrate aspects of their lives. Such texts are frequently 
proposed for use as teaching texts for adult literacy 
programmes, reducing the reliance on the more usual 
Eurocentric texts. Thus it is not only those who regard 
South Africa's racism as an inexplicable horror of the 
twentieth century who see the importance of these records 
of life under apartheid, those who have lived through these 
horrors wish to testify and to hear the testimony of other 
victims. As Genette has observed, a culture "manifests 
itself as much in what it reads as in what it writes" 
(cited by Scholes, 1974:11). 
South African autobiographical writing in this period 
encompasses 
ritualised sets of discourses ... which give rise to a 
certain number of new speech-acts which take them up, 
transform them or speak of them, in short, those 
discourses which, over and above their formulation, 
are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said 
again. (Foucault, 1981:56) 
Many testimonies to experiences of apartheid, particularly 
of its victims, have this status; V1Z., they have become 
seminal discursive constructs, mutating yet iterative, 
resonating across a range of fields of activity and 
disciplines. It is changes like these in the role played 
by South African autobiographical writing that make a study 
of the genre particularly interesting at this time; as 
poststructuralists and postmodernists contend, 
"significance is a quality not of the thing itself but of 
the human activity taking place around it" (Klinkowitz, 
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1988:3}. 
Autobiographical texts not only participate ln the 
struggle for equality by representing the demographics of 
the South African population more accurately (they reflect 
the growing momentum of the struggle as well as 
contributing importantly to that struggle), they are also 
of particular interest now because there have been 
noteworthy shifts in approaches to the genre~ Implicit in 
my analyses is the desire "to determine why particular 
semantic codes gain precedence or relinquish ground in the 
social formation" (Nussbaum, 1989: 13). G-n other words, 
autobiographical writing in all its diversity is read as 
body of texts which encode important information about th 
culture and its people~ The relationship is oblique and 
opaque, but it is there nevertheless. Social change 
impinges on textual production; texts effect some shifts in 
the social formation. I have referred above to the worker 
autobiography of the 1980s, a sub-species which has all but 
disappeared in the 1990s. Remarkable, too, is the South 
African prison autobiography which has achieved recognition 
from many quarters as a sub-genre. (Breytenbach's The True 
Confessions of an Albino Terrorist which is discussed in 
Chapter 3 is an example). Generic mutations such as these 
and those found in Kuzwayo's Call Me Woman (discussed in 
Chapter 3) and Gordon's Shared Lives (Chapter 5) invite 
analysis because of what they can tell us about shifting 
discursive formations in South Africa, about how these 
constitute 'self' differently, and what sort of writing 
about South Africanness is required and/or valued. 
Felicity Nussbaum's remarks are apt: as was true of early 
attempts at autobiography in England, contemporary South 
African autobiographies are indeed important instances of 
"self -wri ting, [which] for men and women, is part of the 
conquest over meaning and the contest over the power to 
name the real" (1989: xxi) . 
4 
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In autobiography the writer declares her or his authority 
over the right to declare the meaning of experience; 
frequently the South African autobiographical subject, in 
writing personal history, is righting falsified 
national (ist) history. 
The meaning of experience is perhaps the most crucial 
site of political struggle over meaning since it 
involves personal, psychic and emotional investment on 
the part of the individual. It plays an important 
role in determining the individual's role as social 
agent. It affects both where and how the individual 
acts and whether her action is based on a consensual 
acceptance of the meaning and effects of an action, on 
conscious resistance to them or on the demands of 
other external necessities. The power of experience 
in the constitution of the individual as social agent 
comes from the dominant assumption in our society that 
experience gives access to truth. (Weedon, 1987:79-
80) 
Autobiography's rise in status in the hierarchy of genres 
of contemporary South Africa is clearly due to popular and 
academic concern for information about lived realities, 
particularly those of marginalized people who can become 
autobiographers or autobiographical subjects (of mediat~d 
autobiographical texts) when they couldn't aspire to be 
'writers'. There has recently been a massive groundswell 
of sensitivity to the silences of the impoverished, the 
oppressed, and to academia's collusion in this silencing by 
speaking for these unempowered masses. Moreover, in 
academic circles autobiography comes ln from the cold 
because of the theoretically validated (as well as 
politically defensible) attention to micro-politics, rather 
than grand narratives. 
Contemporary literary theories have also contributed to 
autobiography's growing centrality in that the current 
interrogation of notions of identity, experience and 
textuality has facilitated a dissolution of traditional 
disciplinary boundaries 3 which has, in turn, led to a re-
assessment of what it is that constitutes the proper object 
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of study in a given field. Thus while the autobiography 
was largely excluded from literary studies on the grounds 
that it was a species of history rather than Literature (I 
use the capital letter advisedly) 4 -- or was neither, being 
situated somewhere in between -- it has now acquired a 
somewhat privileged place (in academic enterprise, if not 
in undergraduate syllabi) as a prime site for analysis of 
culturally sanctioned responses to material relations. I 
am not arguing that autobiography is now worthy of 
consideration as 'Literature' (I do not justify my 
attention to certain texts on the grounds of their being 
, grea t ' or ' uni versally true'); nor am I claiming that 
South African autobiographical writing is sufficiently 
'objective' to command the serious attention of historians 
and social scientists. The poststructuralist 
deconstruction of the exclusive couple creati vel factual 
writing invalidates these claims, and contributes 
frui tfully to the interrogation of particular texts, in 
part because of a loosening of disciplinary boundaries. 
Ancillary to this is the weakening of the fiction / fact 
hierarchy across disciplines; indeed, contemporary theory 
interrogates the very foundations of this division, 
rendering its truth-value extremely problematic. And 
autobiography, as it is currently read in academic circles, 
colludes with the subversion. 
The title of this dissertation reflects the three 
definitive parts of the genre: AUTOS -- the self; BIOS --
the life; GRAPHE the writing; and points to my concern 
with subjectivity, material practice and experience, and 
language and textuality, in texts which are commonly 
identified as records of life stories. The three areas of 
concern are pivotal in current theorising which informs a 
variety of disciplines including literary studies, Black 
studies, history, philosophy, cultural studies, 
anthropology, and, of course, gender studies. Ideas which 
were, in previous decades, transparent and unproblematic 
6 
have come to be used "under erasure"s, or in scare quotes 
(to indicate the inadequacy of acccepting such notions at 
face value) or, at least, self-consciously. More will be 
said about this in the chapter on theory and in subsequent 
chapters. It is the newly acquired centrality of these 
questions in current debate that accounts in large part for 
the recent massive upsurge in critical and theoretical 
interest in the genre of autobiography. Under the 
influence of theorists like Althusser, Lacan, Foucault and 
feminists like Kristeva, scholars' notions of discrete 
individuals acting independently in a clearly separable 
social context have eroded, to be replaced by theorisations 
of subjects being subjected to, but capable of acting upon, 
their complex and unstable discursive circumstances. 
Autobiography, then, as the textual encoding of the subject 
and the social, comes to be seen as bearing much greater 
significance than the humanist, expressive-realist view of 
it as a body of texts about individuals' lives would have 
admitted. And what I hope to achieve in this study is a 
profoundly political analysis of textual practices employed 
in South Africans' life-writing. 
The autobiographical genre, as presently understood, is 
a particularly provocative type of textual product at this 
juncture. Its provocativeness lies in the necessity 
dictated by current conceptualisations of the genre -- of 
such texts to work with and through charged notions such as 
individuality, reality, truth, history, representation and 
so on, in what is arguably a more compelling and forthright 
way than other genres such as fiction and drama. One 
simply cannot write about oneself without some conception 
of what it 1S about personal experience that is important, 
and about what it is in the plethora of detail 1n the 
experience of being that will best define for others the 
essentials of that experiencing subject. Nor can one write 
about one's life in a purportedly truthful way without 
conceptualising distinctions between truthfulness and make-
7 
believe. And the act of writing for a readership 
necessarily implies a sense of what is appropriate iri 
written form, what can and / or should be said, and what it 
means to say such things . It must be noted, too, that 
apartheid effected a prolonged crisis of uncertainty on 
almost all of its peoples, forcing South African 
autobiographers to attempt to forge selves that were worthy 
of telling about, to subvert official versions of reality 
and thereby redefine the real, to generate ways of telling 
that might fit the tale . 
In Derrida's discussion of autobiography entitled 
Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics 
of the Proper Name he remarks, "As you know, all these 
matters are currently undergoing a reevaluation all 
these matters, that is to say, the biographical and the 
autos of the autobiographical" (1985:5) . Critics and 
theorists who work in the field invariably find as Olney 
did that, "it is all too typical indeed it seems 
inevitable that the subject of autobiography produces 
more questions than it answers, more doubts by far (even of 
its existence) than certainties" (Olney, 1980:5). 6 
Autobiography studies are embroiled in uncertainties, but 
these do not detract from our recognition that 
autobiographies have been and are produced, and that they 
serve specific needs in accordance with their generic 
classification. And perhaps it is ln part because 
questions are often more useful than answers, that the 
study of autobiography is so challenging. 
The recent popularity of autobiography studies has been 
well documented by scholars like James Olney. 7 He remarks 
that while some critics date the production of the first 
autobiographies to as far back as the fourth century B.C., 
theoretical and critical literature about autobiography, 
"began, in effect, in 1956, which is not even yesterday but 
only about an hour ago as such matters must be judged" 
8 
(ibid. :6-7). 8 It is noteworthy, too, that a journal dealing 
exclusively with "auto / biography studies" carne into being 
less than ten years ago. 9 In South Africa, interest in 
autobiography has begun to catch up with American and 
European trends; an unprecedented number of papers on the 
genre were offered at a recent (1990) AUETSA annual general 
conference. 10 
This dissertation comprises an introduction, a chapter 
outlining the theoretical field and its implications for 
this study, and one chapter each on 'self', 'life' and 
'wri ting' which focuses on selected texts, and finally, 
some conclusions. Such divisions bear the mark of 
arbitrariness in that, in practice, theory is everywhere, 
and the three aspects of autobiography are mutually 
constitutive, and hence indivisible, as will be apparent in 
the analyses of individual texts. Sign systems are 
producti ve of subj ecti vi ty and the discursive relations 
which structure the social formation, including the textual 
practices of that social formation. Experiences of self 
and life likewise shape textual practices; and the 
mul tiplici ty of texts which inform a social formation 
inevitably shape experiences of self and the patterns of 
our lives. The divisions I use as rubrics for chapters 
should not be construed as a failure to recognise the 
complexity of the whole but rather as an attempt to achieve 
a workable organisation of material and foci for analyses. 
The reading of autobiographical texts involves 
an awareness that criticism -- understood as analysis 
of the historical conditions which bear on the 
creation of links to truth, to rules, and to the self 
-- does not mark out impassable boundaries or describe 
closed systems; it brings to light transformable 
singularities. (Foucault, 1984:335) 
Thus I have eschewed the construction of mono logic 
arguments about this diverse body of texts which collapses 
difference into all-embracing generalisations. Nor has my 
approach to each text been consistent: rather I have 
allowed the interpretive strategies to emerge from the 
9 
texts themselves in a kind of theoretical and 
methodological pluralism (the range of theoretical 
positions adopted are broadly compatible; more detailed 
explanations follow in Chapter 2). My readings aim to 
explore the discursive constitution of autobiographical 
subjects and texts, t o consider the significances of these 
discourses for an understanding of the South African social 
formation at specific junctures. While the selection of 
texts has been deliberately informed by a wide-ranging 
survey of South African autobiographical production in 
English In the last 46 years, each section focuses on 
specific texts chosen for the differences I see in them. 
Perhaps some prefatory explanations regarding my working 
definitions are necessary. The term 'South African' is 
used rather loosely here to include autobiographies by 
people who were born in South Africa as well as those who 
were born elsewhere but who define themselves as South 
African or describe their experiences in South Africa. 11 In 
such cases, 'South African' refers to the second aspect of 
the genre's defining nomenclature, viz. bios (life), where 
texts deal with the lived experiences of the 
author/narrator/protagonist while in South Africa (never 
overlooking the arbitrariness of this geographical legacy 
from colonialism). My reading of these texts as a body of 
'South African' writing seeks to reaffirm the indissoluble 
links between all who were subject to this national 
nightmare, whether categorised as members of the oppressor 
or oppressed classes and also to contribute -- in spite of 
cogent arguments against the use of such arbitrary 
historical national demarcations -- to the reclamation of 
a (diverse) national identity which is important in the 
healing process of nation-building. It is as well to bear 
in mind that very many of the autobiographers were denied 
South African citizenship when they wrote their texts; they 
are now part of the process of building a unified South 
African nation. 
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Furthermore, as indicated, this study is confined to an 
examination of South African autobiographical writing 
published in the apartheid period. This momentous epoch in 
South Africa's history and in the history of global racism 
begs scrutiny. 1948 is the earlier limit also because the 
only comprehensive survey of South African autobiographies 
-- an annotated bibliography by Ushpol -- concludes with 
tex ts published in 1951; it seems appropriate to begin 
close to where he left off. And concluding this study with 
the present has been a fortuitous necessity: 1994 has at 
last seen South Africa ' s first democratically elected 
government installed. An era has ended. Published life-
stories reveal important details -- however obliquely -- of 
the progress and effects of the Nationalists' apartheid 
policy. 
It must be noted, however, that while political 
developments in this period are obviously crucial in the 
constitution of identity, material relations, and the 
control of textual production (race classification 
determining geographical living space and mobility, 
educational opportunity, employment opportunities and --
more often than not -- class), the politics of apartheid 
have not been isolated as the only important factor 
influencing self , life, and writing. That it is a prime 
factor, is nonetheless, beyond dispute. 12 
To return to the defining criteria, the survey lS 
confined to texts in 'English published in the period 1948 -
1994; many of the texts were written some time before but 
originally failed to find publishers (Rose-Innes' s 
Autobiography and Kadalie's, My Life and the leu: 
Autobiography of a Black Trade Unionist in South Africa, 
for example), while others (like Leipoldt's Bushveld 
Doctor) have been reprinted in this period. The exclusion 
of unpublished autobiographies (whose number is impossible 
to estimate) seems to me not to be too problematic as I am 
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primarily interested in an analysis of texts that have 
functioned, or still are functioning, within the broad 
contexts of societies of readers at large. 
The term 'autobiographical' as adjective is used 
deliberately for I have wanted to survey the field in its 
diversity, including texts which hover on the margins of 
conservative definitions of the genre; I have sought to 
consider challenges to mainstream autobiography. Thus 
included are texts which are not actually penned by the 
person whose life is the subject of the text, as is the 
case in j oint-authored autobiographies like Albert 
Luthuli's Let My People Go (Chapter 4). Incorporated, too, 
are texts which are autobiographical in form (they use the 
first-person pronoun in the voice of the subject of the 
life-story and are purportedly true accounts) but which 
were not written by the subject of the tale, or even, in 
some cases, motivated by the subject. Examples are Part of 
My Soul (Winnie Mandela), Poppie by Elsa Joubert (neither 
of which have been selected for detailed analysis) and We 
Came to Town, one of the worker autobiographical 
anthologies analyzed in Chapter 4. Also of uncertain 
status as autobiography is Lyndall Gordon's Shared Lives 
(Chapter 5), a text which at times declares itself to be a 
biography. 
All texts which are purportedly true accounts 13 of some 
life experiences of the autobiographical subject were part 
of the initial survey, not only those texts dealing with a 
whole life, from cradle to the brink of the grave (such as 
Alan Paton's two volume autobiography, Towards the Mountain 
and Journey Continued). Few South African autobiographies 
deal with the entire life, and few cover every aspect of 
their lives even in the limited period which the narrative 
may encompass. For instance, 'political' and 'career' 
autobiographies usually include only the most cursory 
references to significant personal attachments. Luthuli's 
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autobiography and Boberg's The Boberg Story are exemplary. 
Thus generic criteria have been used very flexibly, 
including texts which do not always conform simultaneously 
to the three terms auto/bio/graphy of the genre. The 
debate concerning the definition of the genre continues. 
It is a debate which is entered into in the chapter on 
textuality (Chapter 5). For the moment, suffice it to say 
that since generic categories are used to define texts by 
readers, writers and publishers alike, an analysis which 
aims to explore the functions of texts in their 
social / historical contexts cannot justifiably denounce 
genre as theorists like Paul de Man (1979) and Robert Elbaz 
(1988) have done, nor can it use generic definitions with 
a strictness which a general readership does not 
acknowledge. As long as a text has seemed to adhere to 
certain crucial generic practices (and these differ across 
the range of texts) and to 
accepted as autobiographical, 
overall survey. At all times 
present itself and/or be 
it has been admitted in the 
this study has aimed to keep 
to the fore the awareness that genres are not constant, 
discrete and isolatable textual entities but are part of 
the fabric of cultures and as such are influenced by other 
cultural practices and are involved in a significant degree 
of give and take with other genres. Generic practices are 
not only subject to varying degrees of transformation but 
may appear and disappear within the totality of material 
practices of a social formation. Autobiography, as 
Spengemann reminds us, must be viewed historically, 
not as one thing that writers have done again and 
again, but as the pattern described by the various 
things they have done in response to changing ideas 
about the nature of the self, the ways in which the 
self may be apprehended, and the proper methods of 
reporting those apprehensions. (1980:xiii) 
Furthermore, recognition of generic categories by 
researchers will depend upon the sorts of in.formation 
sought in texts, and the theoretical models being used. 
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The initial research has been as comprehensive as 
possible: in order to gauge the degree of centrality or 
marginality of particular types of texts, and to consider 
shifts in autobiographical textual production over time, it 
was necessary to have some overview of autobiographical 
production in general. I have attempted to read as widely 
as possible within the field (as it has been loosely 
defined) in English14 published in the period 1948 to 1994. 
The confinement of my study to English texts has meant 
that, "[b]ecause the path of creativity is particularly 
tortuous for those who must straddle the interval between 
different and hierarchised cultural universes" (Lionnet, 
1989:21), the writers have divergent relationships to the 
language, style and mode of discourse: a source of great 
interest. However, in spite of efforts at inclusiveness, 
there are certain to be some autobiographical texts which 
I have not encountered, partly because libraries rarely 
classify texts as autobiographies, and some which were 
excluded because of the exigencies of time. I believe that 
these are, however, relatively few in number. Individual 
texts are assessed in the light of broad trends in 
autobiographical writing. 
Some seventeen texts have been selected for close 
attention out of a field of over 120 texts. Against this 
overview, the choice of specific texts for detailed 
analysis was motivated in part by a desire to demonstrate 
the diversity of the field: where Breytenbach and Gordon 
write self-reflexive -- at times, almost deconstructive --
autobiographies, Campbell and Moloi write what they insist 
is ' the truth', transparently encoded 1n text. Where 
Breytenbach, Gordon and Campbell write texts which would 
sit quite happily on university English department syllabi, 
Moloi's and many of the workers ' autobiographical texts are 
wri t ten in simple or profoundly unconventional English. 
(In Moloi's case, English 1S mixed with Zulu, Xhosa, 
tsotsi-taal, Afrikaans, and Sotho). And where Luthuli's 
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autobiography challenges racism on the grounds of moral and 
logical indefensibility (while it tends to sideline gender 
and treat genre as self-evidently transparent), Kuzwayo's 
interrogates race, gender and genre far more profoundly --
if unconsciously -- as cultural constructs. 
This study crosses gender, race and class lines for such 
groupings are neither stable nor are they necessarily and 
invariably more meaningful than others. Race, gender, 
class, nationality, ethnic allegiance -- all of these are 
consequential, for as localized systems of social 
organisation they are, as Rubin (1975) argues, ways of 
distributing power; however, Bozzoli points out the 
pitfalls of a reliance on structuralist notions of society 
comprising neatly encapsulated systems of race, class, and 
gender (1991:239) (also Diamond and Quinby, 1988:198). 
Gender is not always -- or indeed generally -- construed as 
the primary signifier for social organisation by South 
African autobiographers, and in order to explore the 
fluctuations of definitions of gender identities, gender 
has had to be examined as a system which interpellates 
women and men. Furthermore, consideration of texts 
authored by women and men was necessary so that the debate 
about gender and genre could be entered into in an informed 
way (see Chapter 5). Individual texts traverse class 
groupings: texts by members of the educated black elite, 
like Luthuli, rub shoulders with those by illiterate black 
subsistence farmers; autobiographies by those who are 
clearly part of the hegemonic class and who wish to be 
perceived thus (Campbell is an obvious example) as well as 
texts by (or about) people who have been oppressed into 
virtual oblivion (e.g. industrial and domestic workers) 
have been incorporated. 
Race has also been treated as an unstable signifier: 
although race has been a prime signifier in South Africa, 
not all individuals belonging to a specific race group 
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define themselves primarily in terms of their official race 
classification. Many defy racist discourse precisely by 
refusing their given racial classification. All labels are 
used provisionally, and with great care to prevent reifying 
them; this tentativeness is vindicated when one lS reminded 
of the historical contingency of concepts such as race: to 
James Rose-Innes and others of the early decades of this 
century 'racism' meant the antagonism between Afrikaans and 
English (white) South Africans, not colour prejudice. 
(Boris Wilson uses the term this way too). Lionnet reminds 
us that, 
Twentieth-century science has shown that it is 
impossible to define with any kind of accuracy the 
genetic frontiers that might permit the classification 
of humans into a set of well-defined "races" .... I 
would go so far as to argue that in the absence of 
scientific or experiential grounding, it is language 
that conditions our concept of race and that the 
boundaries of that concept change according to 
cultural, social, and linguistic realities. (1989:12) 
And of course we know how changeable cultural, social and 
linguistic interpretations are. This study thus includes 
autobiographical writings in English by black and white 
South Africans.ls Because I wanted my sample at least to 
come close to a resemblance of the general population of 
South Africa, more texts by (or about) black South Africans 
than by whites (even though there are more autobiographies 
published in English by whites than by blacks) are singled 
out for close reading. 
But this decision to include works by blacks brings us to 
the question of white academics seeing fit to comment on 
the lives or works of blacks, a question which has reached 
rather emotive heights of late at conferences and in 
academic journals such as Agenda and Journal of Literary 
Studies. It is therefore incumbent upon me as a white 
South African whose experience has, without my consent, 
functioned as part of black South Africans' oppression, to 
justify my inclusion of black-authored texts. My aim is 
not to "cover up national oppression by artificially 
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integrating the oppressor and the oppressed into a 
democratic alliance" (Nkululeko, cited by Welz, Fester and 
Mkhize, 1993:10). I am trying to do the opposite: race and 
racism are interrogated as cultural constructs, by probing 
the multiple and shifting sites of oppression. My 
"strategy of resistance to the totalizing languages of 
racism [is, as it must be,] based in the attempt to create 
a counter-ideology by exposing rhetorical conventions" 
(Lionnet, 1989:16). The analyses will demonstrate that the 
aim is to probe -- not dissolve -- difference, bearing in 
mind that difference is unstable, and does not operate on 
one plane only. 
Nor are the readings offered in a spirit of confident 
assertion but rather as explorations borne out of a desire 
(which I know my own limited experiences will always 
frustrate in greater or lesser measure) to understand. 
Nkululeko asks: 
Can an oppressed nation or segment of it, engaged in 
a struggle for liberation from its oppressors, rely on 
knowledge produced, researched and theorized by 
others, no matter how progressive, who are members of 
the oppressor nation? The same question put in 
another way is: can the right of a people to self-
determination in the production of knowledge be 
overlooked and liberation attained for them through 
knowledge produced by others? (cited by Welz, Fester 
and Mkhize, 1993:10) 
This is an important question. My own response is no, no-
one, least of all oppressed and silenced peoples, should 
rely on 'knowledge' produced by academics like myself. But 
they do have the right to ignore or challenge what is said, 
just as I have the right to contest others' readings or, 
perhaps more importantly , non-responses. Many black 
writers have said that they wish to assert their right to 
tell their own stories; my whole-hearted endorsement of 
this position is what motivates me to take heed of, indeed, 
show respect to (in the best way I know), their stories. 
The point is to magnify their audibility, not snatch away 
the microphone. 
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I will never fully understand what it means to be 
impoverished, black, illiterate: but I do believe that by 
paying attention to the life stories of the oppressed I am, 
in a small way, helping to erode the gap between academic 
activity and activism. Academic analysis is never a 
substitute for the testimonies of the oppressed (Funani, 
1992:65-6). The time has indeed come for Africans to speak 
for themselves (66); by giving the testimonies of the 
oppressed the serious attention they deserve, academics are 
validating this project. Funani's attack on a white woman 
academic has general (and thus personal) relevance: 
The time has come for us to speak for ourselves. If 
Fouche wants to help, we would dearly appreciate it if 
she could go home and liberate her own people with her 
research and efforts. The country is in desperate 
need of that right now. (1993:57) 
White academics cannot "help" by discussing only works by 
white South Africans for an exclusively white readership; 
such distortions cannot be construed as liberatory, as a 
contribution to non-racialism in the 'new South Africa', to 
mutual understanding, to confronting our shared humanity 
and our differences. The totalistic use of racial 
categorizations is both politically and theoretically 
(though these are not discrete entities) indefensible; as 
Sawicki says of pluralism in theory, "the obvious path for 
resistance to take is to provide alternative mappings of 
specific regions of the social field" (1988:188). Paying 
attention to the testimonies of those who are "more often 
simply obj ects of theory" (188) means a dissection of 
Manichean accounts which fallaciously reduce the complex 
multi-faceted struggles across innumerable battle-fields to 
one duel. 
The argument against white academics writing about the 
experiences of blacks has broader implications, for it is 
based, in part, on the assumption that people whose 
experience lS divergent cannot communicate their 
experiences to each other (see Fouche, 1993:40). This 
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reifies apartheid's crude and cruel system of 
categorization which is in opposition to what many of the 
autobiographers themselves were attempting to achieve, i.e. 
to share their life experiences with those who do not, but 
should, know about such things. That whites like myself 
are included ln the implied readership of a great many 
autobiographical texts is made quite clear. Moreover, to 
follow the argument to its logical conclusion would perhaps 
entail the exclusion of autobiographical writing by white 
South African men, as well much of that by white South 
African women. For instance, Lyndall Gordon's experiences 
are, in important ways, very different from my own: I was 
born a generation later, have never lived in Cape Town, or 
studied at Columbia or worked at Oxford, and I am not 
Jewish. But I have learnt a great deal from her text and 
those of other women and men, black and white; moreover, I 
trust that my analyses of these texts are not without some 
value, if only to fuel debate. 
Texts were chosen, too, if they seemed to exemplify a 
particular trend in autobiographical production. I also 
sought to bring to light some hitherto ignored texts which 
I believe make an important contribution to the genre. 16 
Representatives of popular autobiographies (the worker 
autobiographies) as well as texts which are marginal to 
main trends (such as Lyndall Gordon's) are examined. This 
study interrogates some of the discursive networks that 
structure particular texts so that traditional hierarchies 
of value, the established canons, are challenged. A 
further consideration has been the text's ability to 
provide illustrative material for important theoretical 
questions. Theory has been "deployed to question the 
reciprocal relations of representation and reality, the 
production of subjectivity and human agency, and the 
contradictions of ideology" (Nussbaum, 1989:13). Just how 
theoretical concerns have informed my practice, and what 




Chapter 2: Theoretical approach 
The world of 'theori z ation' is a grim one, haunted by 
mad scientists breeding monsters through 
hybridization, the hunted ghosts of a hundred isms, 
and the massive shadow of the subject surging up at 
every turn. 
Meaghan Morris 
There is no theory that is not a fragment, carefully 
prepared, of some autobiography. 
Paul Valery 
It has become commonplace amongst proponents of literary 
theory to declare that there is no practice without theory 
(Belsey, 1980: 4) . This is .largely in response to the 
previous generation of literary critics who, schooled in 
" \r-~'O~ the Leavisian and/or the New Critical tradition, argued 
6'.)<;.. ,.. that the practice of criticism and larger, philosophical 
questions were indeed separable. Leavis insisted that the 
two should remain discrete activities, that the sensitivity 
of response required of the critic is incompatible with the 
philosopher ' s (or theorist's) systematic explanation and 
defence of the abstract "ethical, philosophical and 
aesthetic choices" which motivate critical assumptions 
(1958: 211) . The counter-argument points out that every 
critical judgement, every reading, is conducted in 
accordance with a set of assumptions about the text and the 
manner in which it should be interpreted, assumptions 
regarding what should be read and how, what social role 
texts have, and so on; in short, ln accordance with 
"ethical, philosophical and ... aesthetic choices" (Leavis, 
1958;211) . Attitudes to such broad issues need not be 
clearly formulated. Most readers would -- as Leavis seems 
to do -- consider the reading activity to be 'natural'. 
Nevertheless, analysis of the differing reading strategies 
of different communities , or of one group over time, will 
reveal varied responses to texts which are based upon 
shifts in attitude to fundamental questions. The demand 
that literature (the very term is now highly problematic) 
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"be in serious relation to actuality, ... be in relation to 
life" (Leavis, 1958:215) is not only not a universal 
requirement but is wide open to interpretation. 
Since no reading is innocent of theory, then, analysts 
commonly foreground their theoretical orientations in order 
to attempt to confront what might otherwise remain 
unconscious biases in readings, and also to alert others to 
the implications of the interpretive strategies employed. 
It is with this in mind that I review some of the ideas of 
key theorist'S whose work has had the greatest impact upon 
my own, thereby clarifying my own broadly feminist and 
poststructuralist1 theoretical approach, an approach which 
lS a "pratique de metissage" (Edouard Glissant cited by 
Lionnet, 1989:4) employing as it does a version of 
poststructuralist epistemology and ontology, as well as a 
feminist politics, while nevertheless remaining open to 
cultural creolisation. 
)f ~ Discussion of theoretical orientation is necessary also 
because contemporary theory has only recently begun to 
infiltrate English departments in South Africa, and has had 
seemingly little impact upon readings of autobiographical 
te:x;ts. While many university English departments include 
one or two South African autobiographies (usually black-
authored) In their syllabi, these texts are usually read 
mimetically, as transparent encodings of an unproblematic 
'real'. While such efforts are undoubtedly important for 
they respond to the explicit political aims of many 
autobiographical texts, my own manifestly theoretical 
reading strategy offers a revision of these conventional 
liberal readings. Contemporary theories fruitfully 
challenge common-sense notions concerning identity and 
social relations, and also cultural production. Aesthetic 
activity is seen to be implicated in questions of power 
relations; it is not some untainted realm of idealistic 
creation. But then neither is commentary on art; like all 
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kinds of knowledge-making intellectual endeavour lS 
intricately involved in issues of political, economic, and 
ideological import. This is particularly significant in 
relation to the role of the intellectual in South Africa. 
The charge has been made by Cecily Lockett (1990:3-4; 8) 
that contemporary theory is in some respects inappropriate 
to the reading of South African cultural production since 
its difficulty makes it inaccessible to the vast majority 
of the population, and also because it invariably reads the 
cultural text in ways which are contrary to popular 
readings. While these charges may be valid, it 
nevertheless seems to be inappropriate for an academic to 
apologise for the difficulty (and hence exclusiveness) of 
the ideas that she works with: as de Reuck argues, "one 
Jcannot step out of the world of ideas but must subject the 
. conceptual web in which we find ourselves situated to the 
~ contemporary debate" (1990:30). Poststructuralism has also 
been accused of paralysing political action because of its 
I insistence on the complexity of social relations (its 
refusal of simple notions of 'the struggle' or 'the 
I 
oppressed') . But I hope to demonstrate that these 
complaints may be countered with evidence of the profundity 
of the poststructuralist analysis, a profundity which 
cannot be attained through acceptance of common-sense or 
popular ideology and which is indeed germane to academic 
study (what else are academics for if not to think deeply 
about this world and our placEV in it?). Instead of 
disabling political action , poststructuralism can 
interrogate social relations rigorously, offering the 
theoretical means for much more precise and exact 
understanding of subjects and their social circumstances so 
that change at fundamental, crucial levels is made 
possible. 
Poststructuralist theory, however, is not unified2 : 
significant differences are apparent along with thematic 
and conceptual convergences. Discourses (including 
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theoretical ones) have woven into them gaps (what is not 
attended to, the unspoken) , inconsistencies, and 
contradictions. 
[T]he premises of poststructuralism disallow any 
denominative, unified, or 'proper' definition of 
itself. Broadly , however, it involves a critique of 
metaphysics (of the concepts of causality, of 
identity, of the subject, and of truth), of the theory 
of the sign, and the acknowledgement and incorporation 
of psychoanalytic modes of thought. In brief, it may 
be said that post-structuralism fractures the serene 
unity of the stable sign and the unified subject. 
(Young, 1981:8) 
This chapter considers aspects of the works of principal 
contributors to the poststructuralist movement (Saussure, 
.Barthes, Althusser, Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and of the 
l 
key feminists de Beauvoir, Kristeva and others) which are , 
especially germane to my project, but then identifies those 
features of their theories which seem problematic. This 
adoption of poststructuralist theory is 
disinterested than any o t her interpretation: 
no more 
my concern 
throughout is the usefulness and defensibility of aspects 
of the theoretical paradigm specifically for the reading of 
South African autobiographical texts. 
(i) The Saussurean legacy 
Antony Easthope remarks upon poststructuralism's 
relationship with structuralism: "The prefix 'post-' is 
serious not casual for post-structuralism gets its 
intellectual force by being both after structuralism and 
because of it, because of the limitations discovered in 
structuralism's project" (1988:23) . Since 
poststructuralism relies upon structuralist precepts, I 
shall begin with a brief adumbration of aspects of 
Saussurean linguistics crucial to structuralist theory and 
practice. 
Instead of focussing upon specific utterances (parole), 
Saussure argued that the proper object of linguistics 
should be the examination of the language system (langue) 
2 4 
which governs utterance and which can be inferred from 
specific instances of usage. It is this identification of 






is Saussure' s 
identification of the sign as the basic element of 
linguistic structures. Saussure argued that a sign 
comprises two aspects, the signifier (the "sound-image") 
and the signified (the concept); the relationship between 
the two being arbitrary or unmotivated, but conventionally 
determined (Barthes, 1967:50-51). Easthope explains the 
import of Saussure's argument that the signifier and 
signified are brought together only through convention: 
If the signified was derived either immediately or 
ultimately from the referent, then presumably ... all 
words would 'have exact equivalents in meaning from 
one language to the next' [Saussure, 1959:166]. They 
don't. Meanings emerge from the community of meaning 
and reach out to referents in the extra-discursive (or 
they may not, since quite a lot of meanings make 
perfectly good sense to us ' wi tch', , centaur' , 
, God' etc. even if they can' t be attached to 
anything at all outside language). It is not the 
case ... that likenesses strike consciousness from the 
external world; it is the case rather that meaning 
issues from the linguistic system. (1988:25) 
Saussure, furthermore, remarked upon the purely 
differential, relational nature of language, arguing that 
in language there are only differences without any positive 
terms. This insistence on the instability of meaning and 
on the lack of positivity in language, undermines for 
structuralists and poststructuralists notions of definitive 
readings and denies that meaning can be innocently 
prescribed by common-sense or disciplinary convention. 
Moreover, the rejection of the common-sense notion of the 
'naturalness' of words and meanings, of the transparency of 
language and other sign systems, has enabled students of 
literature and culture to consider much more critically the 
relation between the signifier and signified, and the 
implications of this unstable relationship. 
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Since the sign is meaningful only ln relation to other 
signs in the system, the user must co-operate with the 
language system and function according to its rules and 
conventions. Barthes describes a language as: 
a social institution , it is by no means an act, and it 
is not subject to any premeditation ... the individual 
cannot by himself create or modify it; it is 
essentially a collective contract which one must 
accept in its entirety if one wishes to communicate. 
Moreover, this social product is autonomous, like a 
game with its own rules, for it can be handled only 
after a period of learning. (1967:14) 
Language is "that which divides reality" (Barthes, 
1967:64). All perceptions of the 'real' are mediated by 
language and culture. This rej ection of the humanist 
conception of language as capable of expressing fundamental 
truths about an objectively discernible reality leads to an 
anti-humanist theorization of the individual as a cultural 
product which is a site of meaning, not the origin: the 
self is subject to changes in convention just as language 
and other sign systems are. 
Such an insight into the nature of being is obviously 
profoundly important to cultural studies. This model 
subverts mimetic interpretations of autobiography as the 
creative expression of a unique, autonomous individual 
which manifestly reflects real experiences. Since the 
autobiographer's perceptions and identity are shaped by the 
social systems in which she operates and with which she 
must co-operate ln order to make meaningful utterances, it 
is this relationship which becomes the proper obj ect of 
study . Autobiographical texts are thus read as textual 
reworkings of apprehens~ons of reality which are themselves 
fundamentally conventional . 
Seeing that meaning is a cultural product, it is no 
longer possible to deny relevance to social and cultural 
issues in the process of textual criticism, as the previous 
generation of critics informed by the principles of New 
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Criticism and Leavisian 'practical criticism' would have 
alleged. The autobiographical text encodes the social, and 
acts upon the social. The author in this view neither 
creates nor controls meaning. Furthermore, for an author 
to compose an autobiographical text, she has to have 
learned what it is that the culture understands by that 
appellation. Acknowledgement of the complex and 
fluctuating tissue of socially mediated conventions which 
are enabling of autobiographical writing frees the study of 
the texts from narrow 'literary' concerns (which usually 
overlooked it, anyway, as inferior literary product) and 
enables the interrogation of autobiography as cultural 
product. 
(ii) Barthes: structuralism and beyond 
Roland Barthes' work led increasingly to an 
acknowledgement of the limitations of the structuralist 
proj ect3 • In Elements of Semiology Barthes endorses a 
structuralist theoretical paradigm, but he also intimates 
a critique of the structuralist programme when he 
recognizes that structuralist discourse itself could become 
the object of explanation (Selden, 1985:74). 
Nothing in principle prevents a metalanguage from 
becoming in its turn the language-obj ect of a new 
metalanguage. . . . We might say that society, which 
holds the plane of connotation, speaks the signifiers 
of the system considered, while the semiologist speaks 
its signifieds; he therefore seems to have the 
objective function of decipherer (his language is an 
operation) in relation to the world which naturalizes 
or conceals the signs of the first system under the 
signifiers of the second; but his objectivity is made 
provisional by the very history which renews 
metalanguages. (Barthes, 1967:93-4) 
This decisive insight4 recognizes that the scientificity of 
structuralism "the objective function" of decipherment -
is merely a provisional status contingent upon the 
discourses which buoy it up. Therefore science, or truth, 
are not absolutes but products of discursive practices. 
The usual interpretation of South African autobiographies 
as truthful documents is thus seen not only to be based on 
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a falsely simplistic notion of 'truth' but also to obscure 
the network of cultural assumptions which make such 
interpretation possible, their social and political 
implications. 
absolute. 
And critical writing is provisional, not 
Barthes argues in the essay "The Death of the Author" 
(first published in 1968) that "the whole of the 
Linguistically, the enunciation is an empty process .... 
author is never more than the instance writing, just as I 
is nothing other than the instance saying I" (1989:116). 
The very title of Barthes' autobiography, Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes, indicates the complicity of textuality in 
the constitution of identity and reality. s Barthes' 
application of Saussurean linguistics to a 
reconceptualisation of the author radically undermines 
common-sense acceptances of autobiographies as simple 
records of the unproblematic 'real' experiences of 
individuals. The autobiographical subject is the subject 
of, and subjected to, the autobiographical text; slhe is 
not equivalent to the material being whose name is appended 
to the title page. Barthes explains why it is that the 
author's creative control of the text is a myth: 
The 
the writer can only imitate a gesture that is always 
anterior, never original. His only power is to mix 
writings, to counter the ones with the others, in such 
a way as never to rest on anyone of them. Did he 
wish to express himself, he ought at least to know 
that the inner "thing" he thinks to "translate" is 
itself only a ready-formed dictionary, its words only 
explainable through other words, and so on 
indefinitely .... (1989:117) 
autobiographer can thus only construct an 
autobiographical subject which conforms in important 
respects to what is culturally current. Convention is not 
merely peripheral, as is contended in much expressive 
realist criticism which stresses the revelatory nature of 
stylistic features with regard to an unproblematic author 
(see Catherine Belsey, 1980:7-14); current cultural codes 
set the parameters for all textual encodings of selfhood. 
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S/Z departs from 'classical' structuralism too in that 
the text is no longer perceived as an objectively 
definitive object which an independent reader can 
according to 'scientific' principles dismantle 
(1974:10). Barthes maintains rather that the "'I' which 
approaches the text is already itself a plurality of other 
texts, of codes which are infinite or, more precisely lost 
(whose origin is lost)" (1974: 10) . The reader is a 
"deceptive plenitude [which] is merely the wake of all the 
codes, " whose indi viduali ty or particularity "has 
ultimately the generality of stereotypes" (1974:10). This 
problematization of the reader is decisive to 
poststructuralism. The reader is no more an autonomous 
individual than the writer. Readers can only read in terms 
of the discourses which constitute them. 
The self-sustaining objective structure of the text 
requires and must correspond to an equally self-
sustaining subject. Structuralism becomes transformed 
into post-structuralism when the structures of the 
text are seen to be always structures in and for a 
subject (reader and critic). The text of 
structuralism is intransitive, that of post-
structuralism transitive. (Easthope, 1988:33) 
The interrogation of the reader is crucial, too, to the 
reading of South African autobiography. The reader, be she 
an 'ordinary' member of the public or an academic, can only 
interpret a text in ways which are culturally possible. 
And texts are not written in a creative vacuum but for 
certain types of readers (the "generality of stereotypes"). 
Thus analysis of a text 1S also analysis of a reading 
community. Features of the implied reader will be 
indicative of the specific configurations of discourses 
current at a given time. 
For Barthes, as for all poststructuralists, reading is 
conceived of as active process, not passive consumption. 
Reading does not merely uncover a fixed stable meaning: 
the space of writing is to be ranged over, not 
pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning 
ceaselessly to evaporate it, carrying out a systematic 
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exemption of meaning. In precisely this way ... 
writing, by refusing to assign a 'secret', an ultimate 
meaning, to the text (and to the world as text), 
liberates ... an activity that is truly revolutionary 
since to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end, to 
refuse God and his hypostases -- reason, science, law. 
(Barthes, 1989:117) 
Barthes argues in S/Z that the task of the reader is to 
explore each and every "site of the signifier" so as "to 
ascertain the code or codes of which this site is perhaps 
the starting point (or the goal)" (1974:12). The task is 
to avoid the construction of "an ultimate structure" 
(1974:12) and to renew "the entrances to the text" 
(1974:13), to seek a plurality of meaning and avoid the 
illusory goal of a final signified. One argues not that 
this autobiography means this, but that this autobiography 
is constituted by these discourses (among others) and 
functions in these ways (among others). The "dilatory 
movement of the signifier cannot be stopped" (Barthes, 
1974:123): i.e. autobiography and other 'factual' genres 
(like literary criticism) cannot achieve their aimed-for 
transparency. The profoundly metaphorical nature of 
language, the importance of its material properties (sound 
and writing), are not overlooked. 
Realism in fictional and factual texts "consists not in 
copying the real but in copying a (depicted) copy of the 
real" (Barthes, 1974:55); the literary system pervades all 
instances of its usage. This new attention to the 
signifier leads to a re-examination of the fact/fiction 
classificatory divide for if the signifier and its 
conventions structure all uses of language then there can 
be no transparent use of language referring to or 
expressing independent reality. Autobiographies can only 
depict a recognizable 'real' if they conform in significant 






The conventions of 
cul tural networks are 
fundamental in the analysis of such texts. No text is a 
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discrete entity: 
, What founds the text is not an internal, closed 
accountable structure,'... but rather the study of 
'the outlet of the text onto other texts, other codes, 
other signs, what makes the text is the intertextual, , 
the interwoven strands of which the critic must sort 
out. (Klinkowitz, 1988:49) 
Intertextuality embraces all of the codes and conventions 
by which culture operates; it is not merely a reference to 
the mutual influence of written texts upon each other. 
Analysis of autobiographical writing cannot confine itself 
to the examination of other autobiographical texts, but 
must consider a host of systems of signification (such as 
fictional writing, journalism, history, poli tical 
narratives, music, movies, fashion and so on) which enable 
autobiography to exist as a genre, and which shape its 
forms and delimit its meanings. 
Barthes' project grows from an initial interest in the 
dynamics of writing to the textual character of existence 
as a whole (Klinkowitz, 1988:44,48). He exposes the 
'natural' as social construct, involving fictionalisation 
in which 
stereotypes are produced as fictive artifices but are 
then ' consumed as innate meanings.' The critic's 
semiology uncovers this fictive impulse and restores 
it as a matter for appreciation, at the same time 
protecting society from the delusion which would be 
worked upon it. (Klinkowitz, 1988:48) 
That this occurs has been painfully obvious to South 
Africans; and in uncovering the "fictive impulse" in 
racism, the semiotician attempts to remain sensitive to the 
supporting discursive networks upon which racist delusion 
relies, and to a new regime of truth, a new set of 
stereotypes, which will step into the breach. 
(iii) Althusser: the ideological interpellation of the 
subject 
Aithussser's theorization of the role of ideology in the 
structuration of subjectivity, "an account of the subject 
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as effect rather than cause" (Easthope, 1988: 17), is an 
important elaboration of earlier critiques of the humanist 
conception society/individual as discrete entities. 
Althusser's work, while not without flaws stemming largely 






demonstration that individual consciousness implies some 
idea of a collective consciousness and that, by the same 
token, the notion of the social formation makes sense only 
if conceptualized as an abstract entity derived from 
observable instances of its operation in individual and 
collective behaviour. His work also raises the question 
(which Foucault takes up more powerfully): who stands to 
gain from the institutional and ideological systems 
functioning in a given social formation at a particular 
time? 
In the seminal essay "Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses" (1971) Althusser argues that the social 
formation interpellates subjects (rather than influences 
individuals) by means of ideologies which emanate from and 
support ideological state apparatuses. Ideological state 
apparatuses -- religious, political, educational, legal and 
cultural institutions as well as the mass media and the 
family6 
ideology" 
"function massively and predominantly by 
(1971:145), each in their own peculiar way 
(1971:154) to promote the reproduction of the relations of 
production i.e. the ideology of the ruling class. 
Ideologies, A1thusser argues, are not simply idea systems 
or sets of doctrines but have real material existence in a 
variety of social apparatuses in which subjects live; they 
are "the very condition of our experience of the world" 
(Belsey, 1980: 5) . 7 ISA's" interpellate" subjects so that 
the subject (mis)recognizes her/himself as such according 
to the subject positions offered by institutions and its 
representatives. Consciousness is therefore a function of 
ideological subjection; it is "not the origin of social 
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relations but their effect" (Weedon, 1987: 27) . By 
encouraging individuals to accept ideology as natural and 
obvious (Althusser, 1971: 172), indeed, by ensuring that 
individuals define themselves in terms of the criteria 
established by ideology, ISAs ensure that "the subj ects 
'work', they 'work by themselves' .... They are inserted 
into practices governed by the rituals of the ISAs" 
(1971:181) . 
Althusser's sustained ambiguity in the use of the term 
subj ect allows for the theorization of individual 
sUbjection (and the failure to perceive this subjection) to 
the social process being coincident with a degree of 
individual freedofi. ISAs serve to process the individual 
so that he "is interpellated as a (free) subject in order 
that he shall submi t freely to the commandments of the 
Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his 
s ubmi s s ion" ( 1971 : 182) . 
ideology is that, 
One of the crucial effects of 
the individual assumes that she is the author of the 
ideology or discourse which she is speaking. She 
speaks or thinks as if she were in control of meaning. 
She 'imagines' that she is indeed the type of subject 
which humanism proposes rational, unified, the 
source rather than the effect of language. It is the 
imaginary quality of the individual's identification 
with a subject position which gives it so much 
psychological and emotional force. (Weedon, 1987:31) 
Althusser's "linking of ideology with material interests 
and its integral role in the reproduction of specific forms 
of power relations in society" (Weedon, 1987:27) 
facilitates a re-vision of politics and the individual's 
role in the political/economic structures in which s/he 
lives. His shift away from the economic determinism of 
orthodox Marxism to a more complex theorization of the 
social formation enables a clearer understanding of the 
symbiosis of ideology and material relations and the part 
of the subject therein (Dowling, 1984:64-66;68-71;82-83). 
This decentering of the social and the subject is a key 
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poststructuralist concept which has particularly momentous 
implications for the reading of autobiography: individual 
choice, in life and in text, is circumscribed within the 
parameters set by the specific social and linguistic codes 
operating at a particular historical juncture. There is no 
inherent essence or core personality which -- independently 
of social circumstance -- determines what one 1S or how one 
lives. Expressive realist readings which look to the 
autobiographical text to provide a window on another's life 
are shown to be collaborating with the dominant ideology of 
humanist individualism. The autobiographical text is about 
more than its protagonist / subject; it is about a host of 
ideological (or discursive) systems which inform the text, 
the subject and the context in which these operate, and the 
reading community which the text addresses. Analysis may 
consider the autobiographical text as material and 
ideological product which functions in specifically 
productive ways wi thin a social formation. Autobiographies 
serve to promote specific ideologies; and this is as true 
of texts which are politically "correct" as it is of texts 
that co-operate with ideologies of racism, sexism and so 
on. 
(iv) Lacan: on subjects and signifiers 
I 
Jacques Lacan's work has contributed to the simultaneous 
elaboration and undermining of structuralism as theory and 
methodology (Lemaire, 1977:1-2; and Leitch, 1983:11). 
Lacan's re-readings of Freud, although deliberately lacking 
in linearity of argumentS, have acquired something of the 
cohesiveness of a theory in the course of their 
appropriation by theorists in a variety of disciplines 
(Davis, 1983:861) 
Lacan's most important contribution to poststructuralist 
theory has been his revision of the Freudian decentering of 
the subj ect in terms of a re-appraisal of Saussurean 
analyses of the relationship between signifier and 
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signified. There lS, Lacan argues, an "incessant sliding 
of the signifying chain over the waves of the signified" 
which manifests itself in "the autonomy of the signifying 
chain from the signified" (cited by Lemaire, 1977:45). 
According to Lacan, people are subjected to the order of 
the signifier because "there is no thought without language 
(langage) , [and so] knowledge of the world, of others and 
of self i s determined by language (langue)" (Lemaire, 
1977:52-53). Socio-cultural and linguistic symbolisms 
impose themselves with their structures as orders which 
have already been constituted before the infans makes her 
entry into them. Entry into the symbolic order, into the 
social, means that lived experience is mediated by the 
symbolic order, which is dominated by the signifier. There 
is therefore no hope for any individual of gaining total 
mastery of symbolism: " the human being is an effect of the 
signifier rather than its cause" (Lacan, cited by Lemaire, 
1977:68) . 9 
The symbolic order is constitutive of sUbjectivity in the 
sense that the distinction between self and other is 
possible only with the entry into the symbolic order. 
Edmond Ortigues (cited by Lemaire, 1977:52) explains that 
the symbolic individualizes by differentiating between self 
and other; and inside the self it differentiates between 
interiority and the expression of that interiority (through 
discourse the social "I" of speech and behaviour). 
Lacan reasons that since reference to self, desire, life, 
can only be made through the symbolic register, it will 
always be susceptible to all the distortions inscribed in 
the very principles of the 'symbolic', conventional 
dimension of group life. This means that the subj ect' s 
relationship to her/his own body is a mediated one. 
All that remains of desire, of natural reproduction, 
of the physiology of bodies is symbols, laws, concepts 
or even ideologies. Marriage, family, stereotypes of 
heterosexual relations, fidelity, etc., are, at the 
symbolic level, the inevitably reductive and partially 
arbitrary preferential crystallization of lived 
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biological and physiological experiences which are 
infinitely numerous and which are henceforth 
inaccessible as such . ... (Lemaire, 1977:57-58) 
Moreover, for Lacan, the unconscious is not the site of 
some uncontaminated, essential 'self'. Lacan argues 
(1977:234) that the unconscious, which is masked by the 
conscious, is structured like a language and follows the 
laws of the signifier: 
the signifier acts separately from its signification 
and without the subj ect being aware of it. As a 
constituent element of the unconscious, the figure, 
the literal character of the signifier, makes its 
effects felt in consciousness without the mind having 
anything at all to do with it .... (Lemaire, 1977:38) 
It is impossible, Lacan argues, to return across the 
initial divide separating the real from thought or symbol 
in consciousness, or to locate with precision the connexion 
which mythically unites the original text of the 
unconscious with the subject's imaginary. "A fortiori, it 
would be unthinkable that one could 'in truth' make the 
logical connexion between the signifier and the subject's 
bodily and physiological lived experience" (Lemaire, 
1977: 45) . 
Lacan's theorization of the formation of the unconscious 
and the Oedipal complex accounts for inexplicable 
behaviours in individuals -- dreams, slips of the tongue, 
and so on -- which a cogito ergo sum philosophy is unable 
to explain. 
I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not 
think ... [or more properly] I am not wherever I am the 
plaything of my thought; I think of what I am where I 
do not think to think. (Lacan, 1977:166) 
One of the characteristics of language is that it evokes a 
thing, a reality, by means of a substitute which it is not; 
evoking, in other words, its presence against a ground of 
absence. 10 This allows the subject to refer to herself as 
distinct from her surroundings, and explains how the entry 
into the symbolic entails a split in the subject. Lacan 
provides an account of subjectivity as the unstable product 
36 
of contradiction and conflict, and while we may have a 
sense of our own identity and feel that we are the source 
from which our thoughts emanate, these experiences are 
inconsistent; we in life and in text -- continually 
struggle to find a continuity to our being (Henriques et 
al, 1984:275). Thus instead of attributing inconsistencies 
in the text to inadequate authorial control of the medium, 
a poststructuralist reading would regard such to be quite 
compatible with extra-textual subjectivity as well as with 
textual renditions thereof. Such a reading would not seek 
to explain away contradiction and incongruity but might 
instead foreground disjunctions as being especially 
significant indicators of the configuration of subjectivity 
and the intertextuality of cultural production. 
Although an attempt to gain some measure of objectivity 
is one of the primary requirements for the genre of 
autobiography, Lacanian theory undercuts notions of 
empirically provable observations of an independent real 
for it denies that affect and cognition are separable, or 
that apprehensions of the real can be divided from the 
symbolic orders ln which we act and react (often 
unconsciously). Lacanian theory, furthermore, provides an 
account of the gender system and goes some way (but not far 
enough, as we shall see) to distancing gender-based power 
relations from biological determinism. Following Levi-
Strauss, Lacan argues that the prohibition of incest 
functions as the structure underlying the apparent 
organisation of societies (1977:65-66). Due to the 
promotion of exogamy which occurs through the resolution of 
the Oedipus complex, the family structure manifests a 
transcendence of all natural order by the establishment of 
Culture (Lemaire, 1977:61-63). 
Gender-differentiated meanings (and thus the positions 
differentially available in discourse) account for the 
content of gender difference.... Power difference 
(imaginary as well as real, intimately linked in the 
psyche with the early desire for the Other) is both 
the cause and effect of the system of gender 
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difference and provides the motor for its continuous 
re-production. (Hollway, in Henriques et al, 
1984:228) 
Lacanian theory situates gender at the heart of all 
subj ecti vi ty, and provides the conceptual means for the 
probing of gender constructions, the positing of self and 
Other, in autobiographical writing. However, one cannot 
simply accept tout court that the Lacanian account can 
explain non-European subjectivities. Students of South 
African culture (and other non-Europeanized cultures) have 
yet to explore the implications of the Lacanian model for 
those subjects whose cultural rites of passage may be 
markedly different. 
(v) Derridean differance 
So decisive is Jacques Derrida's deconstructionist 
cri tique of central structuralist principles that some 
commentators on contemporary literary theory erroneously 
equate poststructuralism with Derridean deconstruction. 11 
Derrida's account of differance refines the linguistic 
assertion that languages function as sign systems in which 
differences between elements (signifiers and signifieds) 
function constitutionally and definitionally, and no 
element has a fixed, or even stable, essential value. 
Derrida's qualification of this structuralist precept lies 
in his insistence that, 
meaning is nowhere punctually present ln language, 
that it is always subject to a kind of semantic 
slippage (or deferral) which prevents the sign from 
ever (so to speak) coinciding with itself in a moment 
of perfect, remainderless grasp. (Norris, 1987:15) 
Meaning is thus simultaneously 'differential' (unlike or 
dissimilar in nature, quality, or form) and 'deferred' 
(delayed, postponed) . Derrida explains that while 
"Differance is neither a word nor a concept" (1973: 130), it 
"could be said to designate the productive and primordial 
constituting causality, the process of scission and 
division whose differings and differences would be the 
consti tuted products or effects" (137). 12 
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This Derridean insistence on the play of differance 
stakes out a new freedom of possibility for 
poststructuralism: 13 
The Insistence of the Figure. Signs displace and 
substitute; we inhabit a world of tropes and devices. 
Literal language does not exist, except for the 
illusion of it. 
No language can have a literal ground. Consequence. 
No exit from the aberrations of reference. The ground 
always collapses. 
A "literal interpretation" is an effect derived by 
single-minded reduction of grammatical, figural, and 
semantic oscillations in a writing. 
Neither author nor critic can ultimately control the 
free play of signifiers in disseminating reference. 
No one escapes the chains of figurality, the flights 
of signifiers, and the network of differences in a 
writing. We confide always in images. (Leitch, 
1983:57-8) 
We find evidence of this in autobiographical writing, in 
the simplest texts such as Sibambene, which attempt a 
transparency, an innocence of referent~ality, as well as in 
more 
True 
fraught accounts of selfhood, 
Confessions. Attempts 
such as Breytenbach's 
to locate in the 
autobiographical text a reality or a stable meaning which 
is free of the differential play of language, are bound to 
failure. The readings of selected texts which follow seek 
to foreground the materiality of the text: its discursive 
components, its pictorial accompaniments. The 'real' is 
interrogated, not as something independent of text, but as 
textual construct. Critical readings of autobiography, by 
the same token, can never claim to be free of the play of 
the signifier; the best that analysis can hope to achieve 
is some degree of consistency and validity in terms of 
those theoretical paradigms which make most sense at the 
time. 
[The text] is not an autonomous or unified object, but 
a set of relations with other texts. Its system of 
language, its grammar, its lexicon, drag along 
numerous bits and pieces -- traces -- of history so 
that the text resembles a Cultural Salvation Army 
Outlet with unaccountable collections of incompatible 
ideas, beliefs and sources. The 'genealogy' of the 
text is necessarily an incomplete network of conscious 
and unconscious borrowed fragments. Manifested, 
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tradition is a mess. 
(Leitch, 1983:57-8) 
Every text is intertext. 
Derrida's deconstruction of the boundaries between 
li terary and philosophic discourse strengthens the 
poststructuralist dissolution of disciplinary and generic 
boundaries. His close analyses of the 
network of articulated themes and assumptions whose 
meaning everywhere links up with other texts, other 
genres or tropics of discourse .... It is enough (he 
argues) to disqualify any reading that would confine 
its attentions to "philosophy" or "literature" and 
seek to close off all contaminating influences from 
outside its own sUbject-domain. Writing, in short, is 
intertextual through and through. But this should not 
be taken as a licence for that other kind of wholesale 
"intertextuality" that rejoices in simply riding 
roughshod over all such generic distinctions. For it 
is precisely this "stratified" character of language -
- the fact that it has been endlessly worked over by 
specific genealogies and logics of sense -- which now 
demands such a corresponding effort of "prudent, slow, 
differentiated" reading. (Norris, 1987:25-26) 
My readings of South African autobiographical texts 
deconstruct the intersecting discursive networks, the 
"logics of sense", which make the genre possible and 
important. I investigate the interrelationship of 
autobiography and other (factual and fictional) ways of 
encoding experience (Moloi's use of movie discourse 
provides an interesting example), but I do not ignore the 
fact that these texts define themselves as 
autobiographical. Instead I ask, what are the implications 
of these texts defining themselves thus? 
Derrida insists that no text can control or even be 
conscious of the tropes which are always invested with a 
potential for disruption. 
Deconstruction neither denies nor really affects the 
commonsense view that language exists to communicate 
meaning. It suspends that view for its own specific 
purpose of seeing what happens when the writs of 
convention no longer run. (Norris, 1982:128) 
A deconstructive reading explores the strategies and 
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defensive tropes by which a text either confronts or evades 
the texts that precede it. It interrogates the metaphors, 
my themes , chains of implication which are demonstrably 
there to be read but which are usually overlooked on 
account of their irrelevance to the central issues. It 
often focuses upon footnotes or parenthetical details or 
even marginalia (Derrida, 1979:131-132) thus resisting the 
"homogenizing pressure of received ideas" (Norris, 
1982:184). (In line with this I look at, amongst other 
things, layout and illustration in Sibambene, at cover 
design in True Confessions, and at the role of photographs 
in Thula Baba and Shared Lives). "[Deconstruction] points 
to those blindspots of argument where a text generates 
aberrant meanings or chains of disruptive implication that 
work to undermine its manifest 'logical' sense" (Norris, 
1987:163). A deconstructive reading is closely tied to the 
texts it interrogates; indeed, Derrida argues that 
deconstruction is always already at work in every text, 
even in the deconstructive reading itself. 
Like Barthes and Foucault, Derrida also interrogates the 
function of the authorial signature. In the essay entitled 
"Otobiographies: The Teaching of Nietzsche and the Politics 
of the Proper Name" Derrida explores the way that the 
proper name of the author acquires meanings determined by 
readers' reception of the writings themselves, a reception 
which can never be controlled by authorial command. Thus 
one finds, for instance, that the names of well-known 
writers or famous people can impel readings of the 
autobiographical text which exceed the textual inscription 
of identity. Moreover, the proper name "is not to be 
confused with the bearer" for its structure ensures that it 
"exists and is meant to exist without the bearer of the 
name. Thus every name is the name of someone dead, or of 
a living someone whom it can do without" (1985:53). This is 
relevant to a reading of autobiographical texts which 
almost always attempt to conceal the ontological divisions 
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between textuality and life, thereby endeavouring to create 
the illusion of textual transparency through which the 
subj eC,t' s identity may be glimpsed as a solid obj ect. But 
often, in spite of efforts to the contrary, the textual 
name eludes simple identification with the narrator and 
protagonist, and acquires a host of additional 
significations. Furthermore, the author's name is part of 
the meaning system of the text; it is not peripheral, 
irrelevant. 
Names usually elicit stereotypical associations with 
regard to race, ethnicity and gender, and thus function in 
very special ways in the production of meaning in the 
autobiographical text. Derrida discusses, too, the often 
ignored impact of the qualities of the proper name as 
signifier, as sound-image. For one thing, the proper name 
is "inscribed -- structurally and a priori -- in a network 
where it is contaminated by common names" (1985:107). The 
name then, can (and usually does) have significance beyond 
-
its local/individual instantiation and its legal and social 
implications; apart from the synechdochic values of the 
name of an author of a body of works, the name must always 
participate 1n the play of meaning which associated 
signifiers may lend it. 
Important as his work has been to poststructuralism, the 
"radical free play" (Leitch, 1983:237) of Derrida's more 
recent writings 1S a cause of much discontent amongst 
theorists (myself included) 14 and has important (negative) 
political implications. It is an issue over which the 
paths of Derrida and Foucault diverge. 
(vi) Foucault: the subject of power 
Foucault's analysis of power and its effects in even the 
smallest units of the social formation cause him to deliver 
an implicit attack on Derrida and others who accept "the 
sovereignty of the signifier" and "the reduction of 
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discursive practices to textual traces; the elision of 
events produced therein and the retention only of marks for 
a reading" (Young, 1981:50) . 15 Foucault calls for the 
restoration to discourse of its character as an event, 16 as 
implicated in the specificities of historically grounded 
power relations. His concern with language and discourse 
provides a model for the examination of the inter-
relationship of the discursive and the non-discursive in 
South African autobiographical texts, and of the 
implications of this relationship for the construction of 
'truth' and 'knowledge' which function importantly in the 
distribution of power in the social formation. 
For Foucault, a discourse is a regulated system of 
statements whose unity is "above and beyond books, texts '. 
authors, through time" (Henriques et al, 1984:105). It is 
independent of the "proximity of epistemological validity, 
scientificity, or truth" (Smart, 1985:40). The rules which 
govern what is sayable or considered valid wi thin any 
discourse, 
are not confined to those internal to the discourse, 
but include rules of combination with other 
discourses, rules that establish differences from 
other categories of discourse (for example scientific 
as opposed to literary, etc.), the rules of production 
of the possible statements The systematic 
character of a discourse includes its systematic 
articulation with other discourses. In practice, 
discourses delimit what can be said, whilst providing 
the spaces the concepts, metaphors, models, 
analogies for making new statements within any 
specific discourse. (Henriques et al, 1984:105-6) 
Foucault notes, too, that "discourses must be treated as 
discontinuous practices, which cross each other, but can 
just as well exclude each other and be unaware of each 
other" (quoted by Young, 1981:50). Discourses concern 
specific areas of activity or practice. Discourses (like 
autobiography) are grounded in historically specific 
material relations such as "forms of production, social 
relationships, political institutions" (Foucault, quoted by 
Smart, 1985:42), the non-discursive domain providing "the 
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external conditions of possibility" which give rise to the 
appearance of a discourse and which fix its limits (Young, 
1981:50). It is "in discourse that power and knowledge are 
joined together" (Foucault, 1980:100). Discourses are not 
either dominant and accepted or excluded and dominated. 
Rather the world of discourse comprises, 
a mutiplicity of discursive elements that can come 
into play in various strategies .... Discourses are 
not once and for all subservient to power or raised up 
against it, any more than silences are. We must make 
allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby 
discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of 
power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a 
point of resistance and a starting point for an 
opposing strategy. (Foucault, 1980:100-101) 
Foucault rejects the notion of ideology because "it 
always stands in virtual opposition to something else which 
is supposed to count as truth" (1984:60). While my 
readings are deeply influenced by Foucault, I have not 
avoided the term ideology: I use the term to mean a belief 
system which has its own politics of truth (but which is 
not in opposition to the Truth). Instead of seeking truth 
vs ideology, analysis concerns itself with "seeing 
historically how effects of truth are produced wi thin 
discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false" 
(1984:60) . 
Each society has its regime of truth, its "general 
politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse 
which it accepts and makes function as true; the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means by 
which each is sanctioned; the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; 
the status of those who are charged with saying what 
counts as true. (Foucault, 1984:72-73) 
A poststructuralist reading of autobiography seeks to 
uncover the mechanisms whereby each text establishes its 
truthfulness, and may explore some of the political and 
economic implications of these tactics. Analysis asks, 
what kinds of texts are being published in South Africa at 
a particular juncture? What kinds of personal testimonies 
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are valuable at anyone time, what kinds of truths about 
individual lives is the reading public willing to accept? 
For Foucault "there is no knowledge without a particular 
discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be 
defined by the knowledge that it forms" (1972:183). 
Knowledge, therefore, cannot be verified or disputed in 
absolute terms of truth or falsehood, science vs ideology. 17 
Rather, 
the problem of a search for guarantees concerning 
knowledge has always been inscribed in the struggle 
around the legitimacy and authority of the kinds of 
principles, interpretations, analyses and descriptions 
of the social and material world that provide the 
discursive bases for action. (Henriques et al, 
1984:110) 
Foucault does not reject all "knowledge" 
constructions predicated upon power-struggles; 




autobiographies to be read as sources of knowledge on 
personal experience. Autobiographers are not simply 
deluded: the analyst rather examines the implications that 
such claims have for the analysis of South African cultural 
production: what kinds of interpretations are 
autobiographical texts offering as "discursive bases for 
action"; what is the nature of the historical specificity 
of the material and discursive conditions which make 
possible the specific constructions of reality? (See 
Smart, 1985:141). Nor are my readings offered cynically as 
interpretations which are merely academic exercises of 
indifferent validity; they are indeed implicated in the 
power-knowledge nexus, but they are founded carefully on 
theoretically validated precepts, and carry the guarantees 
which contemporary theory may provisionally lend. 
Foucault examines the various historical relations 
between forms of knowledge and forms of the exercise of 
power for there can be no general theory which applies 
universally to knowledge/power relationships. In line with 
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this, I interrogate the specificities of individual texts; 
I do not attempt to make generalizations. 
We must not look for who has the power ... and who is 
deprived of it ... ; nor for who has the right to know 
and who is forced to remain ignorant. We must seek 
rather the pattern of the modifications which the 
relationships of force imply by the very nature of 
their process.... Relations of power-knowledge are 
not static forms of distribution, they are "matrices 
of transformations." (Foucault, 1980:99) 
Power is not the property of a centralized group (state, 
dominant class etc), but is rather a strategy: 
Power's condition of possibility ... must not be sought 
in the primary existence of a central point ... ; it is 
the moving substrate of force relations which, by 
virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states 
of power, but the latter are always local and 
unstable. (Foucault, 1980:92-3) 
One should not conceive of power relations as a "binary and 
all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled" (94), 
al though "the manifold relations of force" (94) do 
occasionally create the conditions for major dominations 
and rebellions (such as in apartheid South Africa). Even 
when the South African State seemed to be most crushingly 
in control, it had constantly to reinforce its position of 
power, and had to remain vigilant at all times, for 
resistance was ever-changing, and ever-present. Power had 
to be exercised; it was not, and is not, something one can 
possess and hold. Foucaul t provides theoretical 
justification for resisting the strong temptation for 
analysts of apartheid to prioritize race or class as prime 
signifiers in the distribution of power. Texts do not 
necessarily conform to stereotypical models of racial 
identi ty and the distribution of power (black does not 
necessarily equal victim, or white, oppressor), and they 
may function in unexpected ways In the production of 
knowledge. Just how fruitful a Foucauldian genealogical 
analysis can be -- and what unforeseen findings it can 
yield -- is evidenced in my discussion of Moloi's My Life, 
a text which reinforces and resists hegemonic power 
relations in surprisingly complex ways. 
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"Where there is power, there is resistance" (Foucault, 
1980:95): resistance is everywhere in the power network, 
not simply as reaction but inscribed in relations of power 
as "an irreducible opposite" (96). Power relations are 
immanent in all types of relationship (sexual, economic, 
knowledge-generating etc) and "have a directly productive 
role" (9 6) in the practices of individuals and 
institutions. 
If power were never anything but repressive, if it 
never did anything but to say no, do you really think 
one would be brought to obey it? What makes power 
hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact 
that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says 
no, but that it traverses and produces things, it 
induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. 
It needs to be considered as a productive network 
which runs through the whole social body, much more 
than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression. (Foucault, 1984: 61) 
Over and above the "massive binary divisions" (1980:96) the 
critic can explore this complex of widely dispersed power 
relations as I do in texts as different as Campbell's Light 
on a Dark Horse and Moloi' s My Life. The discussion of 
worker testimonies ln Chapter 4 examines the 
repressive / productive nexus in the researcher-subject 
relationship. An examination of South African 
autobiographical writing, furthermore, can look beyond the 
obvious cultural and political repression of the majority 
and consider some of the enabling effects of the 
interaction between Europe and Africa. Transitory, 
unstable power relations have, ln the last few decades, 
resulted in a proliferation of South African 
autobiographical texts, most conspicuously by black South 
Africans; and analysis of these shifts in trends of textual 
production reveals much about power and resistance in 
contemporary South Africa . We find, for example, that the 
primarily narrative structuration of contemporary 
autobiographical writing -- even by black South Africans --
is not simply the negative effect of a dominant culture 
imposing its own practices on the marginalised. Rather, 
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partial submergence of traditional non-narrative 
auto / biographical forms can be considered in terms of the 
possibilities afforded narrativized autobiographical texts 
in a world which deals in commodities; such texts are often 
accorded great polemical force and hence political 
effectiveness due ln large part to their adoption and 
adaptation of the generic norms of the dominating culture. 
This is because these texts are more likely to be published 
than those which employ a traditional approach, and they 
therefore reach a much larger South African and 
international readership. 
Since "relations of power are not in a position of 
exteriority to other types of relationships" (96) but are 
everywhere, power and attendant resistance are mobile and 
transitory, fostering groupings and divisions, "furrowing 
across individuals themselves, cutting them up and 
remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in 
their bodies and minds" (96). Foucault conceives of the 
body itself -- as well as discourses inscribing sexuality 
and the body -- as being implicated in the power/knowledge 
network. 
The relationship between the body and discourse or 
power is not a negative one; power renders the body 
acti ve and productive. Sexuality and identity can 
only be understood, then, in terms of the complicated 
and often paradoxical ways in which pleasures, 
knowledges, and power are produced and disciplined in 
language, and institutionalized across mUltiple social 
fields.... The body does not give knowledge that is 
then merely transmitted by an essentially neutral 
language and allowed or disallowed by a centralized 
form of prohibition . Discourse makes the body an 
object of knowledge and invests it with power. 
(Martin, 1988:9) 
Foucaul t examines strategies which invest the body with 
meaning and argues for the cultural and historical 
specificity of bodily experience, what Foucault refers to 
as a "political economy" of the body (1984:172-3). 
Sexuality and race, therefore, are not fundamental features 
of identity borne of biology, they are products of culture 
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and history and are thus to be located in power relations. 
"Neither wholly a source of domination nor of resistance, 
sexuality is also neither outside power nor wholly 
circumscribed by it. Instead, it is itself an arena of 
struggle" (Sawicki, 1988:185). The relevance of this to a 
study of autobiography, a type of writing that deals with 
experiences of the body in culture, is clear: the 
specificities of the discursive constitution of sexuality 
and race in each text are minutely examined as arenas of 
struggle, as sometimes separate, sometimes intersecting 
discourses. 
All categories of the natural or the normal, as well 
as the unnatural or abnormal, are exposed as social 
constructs.... [Foucault's] methodological 
deconstructions explode the self-evidence of 
constituted meanings , defy the acceptance of received 
categories as exhaustive, and the cost at which such 
coherence and solidity are effected. The point from 
which Foucault deconstructs is off-center, out of 
line, apparently unaligned. It is not the point of an 
imagined absolute otherness, but an 'alterity' that 
understands itself as an internal exclusion. From 
that perspective, it is possible to grasp and 
restructure the organization of our bodies, psyches, 
and lives through discourse. (Martin, 1988:10) 
Martin's concluding point about the posi ti ve changes 
which might ensue from Foucauldian analysis is noteworthy, 
hingeing as these changes do on Foucault's consistent 
scepticism. Foucault emphasises the conditional and 
tentative status of knowledge, "knowledge as perspective" 
(1984:90), and its strategic importance in the network of 
power relations (1984:76 ff). Thus all analyses should 
make explicit "their grounding 
place, their preferences in 
unavoidable obstacles of their 





identifies a "political economy" of truth (Diamond and 
Quinby, 1988:x-xi) and argues against polemics and grand 
alignments. He contends that 
the forms of totalization offered by politics are 
always, in fact, very limited. I am attempting, to 
the contrary... to open up problems that are as 
concrete and general as possible, problems that 
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approach politics from behind and cut across societies 
on the diagonal, problems that are at once 
constituents of our history and constituted by that 
history. (1984:375-6) 
For Foucault, "everything is dangerous" (quoted by Sawicki, 
1988:189), no theoretical or political model is free from 
possible abuse. Sawicki observes: 
Foucault's theories do not tell us what to do, but 
rather how some of our ways of thinking and doing are 
historically linked to particular forms of power and 
social control; his theories serve less to explain 
than to criticize and raise questions. His histories 
of theories are designed to reveal their contingency 
and thereby free us from them. (1988:189) 
In line with Foucault , my analyses seek to give 
"expression to subjugated forms of knowledge and a voice to 
histories which have been submerged, concealed, silenced" 
(Smart, 1985: 61) . This means an opposition to the self-
evident, the 'natural'; and part of the strategy for 
achieving such disruptions of the 'normal' is the recovery 
of the marginalized. 
(vii) The feminist project(ory) 
The feminist movement has been an important part of 
European intellectual culture at least since Simone de 
Beauvoir's enormously influential The Second Sex was 
published in 1949. Decades before Foucault, Lacan and 
others demonstrated the political expediency of dominant 
conceptions of the 'natural', de Beauvoir exposed the 
cultural constructedness of subjectivity, and explored the 
notion of identity as process. de Beauvoir remarks upon 
how women are relegated to power-less roles, and how this 
powerlessness is itself used to justify their inferior 
status. 1S But, she adds, "the significance of the verb to 
be must be rightly understood here; it is in bad faith to 
give it a static value when it really has the dynamic 
Hegelian sense of 'to have become'" (1968:23). She argues 
that the failure of 
intellectuals to grasp 
leading contemporary European 
the implications of the gender 
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system is due to the fact that they were themselves 
beneficiaries of this system: 
It is, in point of fact, a difficult matter for man to 
realize the extreme importance of social 
discriminations which seem outwardly insignificant but 
which produce in woman moral and intellectual effects 
so profound that they appear to spring from her 
original nature. (de Beauvoir, 1968:25) 
Anticipating Lacan, de Beauvoir theorizes the alterity of 
woman. Woman lives in a world, 
where men compel her to assume the status of the 
Other. They propose to stabilize her as object and to 
doom her to immanence since her transcendence is to be 
overshadowed and forever transcended by another ego 
(conscience) which is essential and sovereign. The 
drama of woman lies in this conflict between the 
fundamental aspirations of every subject (ego) -- who 
always regards the self as the essential -- and the 
compulsions of a situation in which she 1S the 
inessential. How can a human being in a woman's 
situation attain fulfilment? (1968:27) 
Among the most important contributors19 to the European 
feminist intellectual project has been Julia Kristeva whose 
collection of essays entitled Recherches pour une 
semanalyze appeared in 1969, the same year in which she 
first published in the influential journal Tel Quel, 
joining the editorial board in 1970. That year Barthes 
declared: "Julia Kristeva always destroys the latest 
preconception, the one we thought we were comforted by, the 
one of which we could be proud" (cited by Roudiez, 1980:1). 
While de Beauvoir describes woman as Other, as the lesser 
half of a couple, for Kristeva feminine difference is not 
lack but a positive "Otherness". "Feminini ty is ' the 
repressed term by which discourse is made possible', what 
Julia Kristeva refers to as the semiotic" (Mary Eagleton, 
1986:204). Difference in this sense is not restricted to 
the opposition of male and female; it 1S that which is set 
outside of the established system. In Kristeva's theory, 
the semiotic is closely connected (but not equivalent) to 
femininity. As Terry Eagleton explains (1983:188) it sterns 
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from the pre-Oedipal phase and is thus bound up with the 
mother's body. The semiotic is like a flow of 'pulsions' 
or drives; it is a rhythmic pattern which can be seen as a 
form of language, though it is not yet meaningful. When 
the child enters language, 
this heterogeneous flow must be as it were chopped up, 
articulated into stable terms, so that in entering the 
symbolic order this 'semiotic' process is repressed. 
This repression, however, is not total: for the 
semiotic can still be discerned as a kind of pulsional 
pressure within language itself, in tone, rhythm, the 
bodily and material qualities of language, but also in 
contradiction, meaninglessness, disruption, silence 
and absence. The semiotic is the 'other' of language 
which is nonetheless intimately entwined with it .... 
The semiotic is fluid and plural, a kind of 
pleasurable creative excess over precise meaning, and 
it takes sadistic delight in destroying or negating 
such signs. It is opposed to all fixed, 
transcendental significations; and since the 
ideologies of modern male-dominated class-society rely 
on such fixed signs for their power (God, father, 
state, order, property and so on), such literature 
becomes a kind of equivalent in the realm of language 
to revolution in the sphere of politics. (Eagleton, 
1983:188-189) 
The semiotic can be construed as a 
borderline of the symbolic order; and in this sense 
the 'feminine' could equally be seen as existing on 
such a border. For the feminine is at once 
constructed within the symbolic order, like any 
gender, and yet is relegated to its margins .... On 
this view, the feminine -- which is a mode of being 
and discourse not necessarily identical with women --
signifies a force within society which opposes it. 
(Eagleton, 1983:190) 
And although the symbolic is entered and engaged by males 
and females, it is referred to as the "paternal function, 
grammatical and social constraints" (Kristeva, 1980a: 7) . 
Ann Rosalind Jones notes that 
Kristeva sees maternity as a conceptual challenge to 
phallogocentrism: gestation and nurturance break down 
the oppositions between self and other, subject and 
object, inside and outside .... (Jones, 1985b:86) 
Thus although neither the semiotic nor the symbolic can 
simply be equated with female and male respectively, 
Kristeva's theory suggests that there are correspondences. 
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The work of de Beauvoir, Kristeva, Cixous and other 
feminists fostered the growing awareness in the West that 
gender was socially constructed (not natural), and 
therefore could be reconstructed or deconstructed. It is 
this fundamentally feminist conception which informs 
the ideas of 
( in 
key varying degrees) 
poststructuralists. 






profound influence of the feminist 
movement which can be detected in much contemporary theory. 
This (incompletely developed) feminist tendency is implicit 
in the analyses of male hegemony in the works of some 
structuralists (like Levi-Strauss) and is evident in the 
work of poststructuralism's founding fathers: in Lacan's 
rereading of Freud, in Derrida's deconstruction of 
phallocentric discourse (Jones, 1985b:80-112) , and in 
Foucault's analysis of the social construction of sexuality 
(Diamond and Quinby, 1988 :x) . But while early 
poststructuralist writing generally interrogates 
subjectivity, sexuality, power relations, and material and 
discursive practice, it tends to disregard the obvious 
pervasiveness of male dominance and female subservience and 
neglects to consider strategies for liberation from gender 
systems. 21 The feminist impulse in later poststructuralist 
practice22 is thus a necessary corrective: 
feminism is of vi tal importance, and not only 
because it is a social movement which demands 
equity for a majority of the world's population, 
as if that were not enough.... [It is] a 
radically new conception of human and social 
relations. Thus feminism is not merely an aspect 
of cultural studies, but one of its structuring 
principles.... Secondly, feminism is important 
as it is a model of a new kind of politics ... 
[it] has done what Foucault said political theory 
has not done: it has cut off the head of the 
king; it no longer regards power as something 
that can be gained by the capture of sovereignty. 
Feminism seeks a more massive change in human 
relations than marxist theory has usually 
proposed .... (Shumway, 1989:109-110) 
Feminism -- embracing a mUltiplicity of tactical approaches 
fortifies the poststructuralist interrogation of the 
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humanist individual "man", puncturing the supposed 
neutrality to reveal the bias towards white, upper class 
males. It confronts (with varying degrees of success) the 
interconnectedness of class, race, gender and anti-
imperialist struggles , 23 but most importantly: "Feminism is 
a politics. It is politics directed at changing existing 
power relations between women and men in society" (Weedon, 
1987:1). 
As is evident in my discussion of Kristeva's work on the 
symbolic and the semiotic, feminism has refined the 
poststructuralist interrogation of the role of language in 
the constitution of sUbjectivity; it is discourse which 
entrenches male hegemony &hich must be resisted, subverted, , . 
mocked. (See Cixous, i n Jones, 1985b:85). For Cixous and 
Irigaray, this is to be achieved by a c elebration of 
women's difference; 24 they call for the joyous inscription 
of female plenitude, and for the disruption of the symbolic 
order, "by dislocating 
punning outrageously 
Courtivron, 1980:33). 
most likely does not 
syntax, playing with the signifier, 
and constantly" (Marks and de 
Irigaray notes that, "Women's desire 
speak the same language as man's 
desire, and it probably has been covered over by the logic 
that has dominated the West since the Greeks" (1980:107). 
Thus some feminists refuse to take the language of 
patriarchy seriously. 
You, Dora, you the indomitable, the poetic body, you 
are the true 'mistress' of the Signifier.... Now, 1-
woman am going to blow up the Law: an explosion 
henceforth possible and ineluctabl~; let it be done, 
right now, in language. (Cixous, 1980b:257) 
And in their own textual jouissance Cixous and Irigaray, 
along with other feminist writers (like Woolf) have 
dissolved the boundaries separating the genres by 
intermingling essay, autobiography, fiction, narrative, 
polemic; by writing prose which plays with language and is 
close to poetry; by refusing to pretend that "objectivity" 
can transcend the autobiographical. Similarly, Lyndall 





My own readings are informed by materialist feminist 
politics. The fluid configurations of gender have to be 
probed with great sensitivity. This is especially true of 
South Africa, a country with enormous cultural diversity 
(Malay Muslims, Xhosas, Jews, Zulus, Afrikaners, 
Portuguese, Tsongas, English, 'Coloureds,' Hindus of Indian 
descent, and many more), but with one common denominator, 
viz., the oppression of women. The forms that this takes 
range from the extremes of desperate poverty, abuse and 
rape (many have claimed that South Africa's rape statistics 
are amongst the highest in the world) to job discrimination 
and sexual harassment. 
Renewed attention to the signifier in culture (a feature 
of poststructuralism) is espoused by many feminists. 
Kristeva's deconstruction of the biological links between 
the laws of logic (usually, but not necessarily, male) and 
the free play of language (usually, but not necessarily, 
female), can be complemented with Gayle Rubin's exploration 
of the contradictions of woman as slgn (the dominant 
cultural inscription) and woman as person2 5 in her feminist 
critique of Levi-Strauss, Freud, Lacan and Marx. Rubin 
finds that across a range of diverse cultures, women 
function predominantly as gifts in order to secure male-
bonding in kinship systems. Marriages are 
a most basic form of gift exchange, in which it is 
women who are the most precious of gifts.... The 
result of a gift of women is more profound than the 
result of other gift transactions, because the 
relationship thus established is not just one of 
reciprocity~ but one of kinship. (Rubin, 1975:173) 
Kinship organizes social relationships; it is a way of 
distributing power among men. "As long as the relations 
specify that men exchange women, it is men who are the 
beneficiaries of the product of such exchanges -- social 
organization" (Rubin, 1975:174) This materialist emphasis 
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of the non-discursive relations which are implied by and 
encoded within the discursive informs my own feminist 
interpretations. 
In his assessment of women functioning primarily as 
signs, Levi-Strauss argues that women are like words but 
are also, less importantly , speakers (Rubin, 1975:201). In 
their attempts to return to women the voices silenced by 
cultures, feminists have confirmed and given political 
impetus to the poststructuralist impulse to attend to the 
marginalized. Feminism investigates, and thus goes some 
way to valorizing, genres and texts which have been side-
lined; it resurrects ignored female-authored texts. 
Feminism deconstructs hegemonic hierarchies, knowledges, 
and "objective" analytical practices; it is also "alert to 
the omissions, gaps, partial truths and contradictions 
which ideology masks -- it attends to the silences" (Greene 
and Kahn, 1980:22) . My reading of Roy Campbell's Light on 
a Dark Horse is perhaps the most obvious example of such a 
strategy; I consider the implications for gender politics 
of what Campbell does not say about his wife (and other 
women) in his life story. Feminism and gender studies have 
added impetus to autobiography's growth In popularity 
amongst academics 
deconstructs centres, 
for, like poststructuralism, it 
highlights the obscure, accords 
experience and micro relations the attention they deserve. 
Feminism does this not only because such practices have 
generally accepted theoretical validity at this time, but 
more importantly, because such practices contribute to the 
empowerment of women. 
The respect accorded experience can be seen to arise from 
feminism's emphasis on the "politics of the personal" 
(Weedon, 1987: 5) . Feminism insists that personal 
experience is the site of struggle and the key to social 
transformations. 
In the twentieth century, after suffering through 
fascism and revisionism , we should have learned that 
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there can be no socio-political transformation without 
a transformation of subjects: in other words, in our 
relationship to social constraints, to pleasure, and 
more deeply, to language. (Kristeva, 1980b:141) 
This "politics of the personal" provokes us to question the 
effect of all that we do, believe, and say on prevailing 
power relations for subjectivity is not fixed, but is 
"precarious, contradictory and in process, constantly being 
reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak" 
(Weedon, 1987:33) Feminist theory (again, coinciding with 
poststructuralism) holds that power relations are In 
constant negotiation and contestation, even while it 
male-dominated acknowledges the potency of the 
structuration of social formations. Thus for feminists, 
there is no essential truth about the gender system, but 
this does not mean that consistent awareness of difference 
prevents unified resistance by women. Arguing for the 
adoption of strategic essentialism, Martin notes, 
We cannot afford to refuse to take a political stance 
'which pins us to our sex' for the sake of an abstract 
theoretical correctness, but we can refuse to be 
content with fixed identities or to universalize 
ourselves as revolutionary SUbjects. (1988:16) 
Political activism is regarded as necessary, but this does 
not negate a healthy scepticism regarding the grand 
political gesture; 26 it is how one lives that is important 
if social relations are to be transformed. In her 
introduction to Desire in Language, Kristeva states: 
Dissenting from all political power groups, be they in 
the government or in the opposition, the 
intellectual's position should be one of continuously 
challenging all orthodoxies.... I am quite dedicated 
to the feminist movement but I think feminism, or any 
other movement, need not expect unconditional backing 
on the part of an intellectual woman. (Kristeva, 
1980a:9-10) 
Like poststructuralism, feminism constantly interrogates 
its mUltiple theoretical facets; unlike poststructuralism, 
it always does this with practical, political efficacy in 
mind. In their goal to deconstruct oppressive power 
relations (be these of gender, race, class, creed or 
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whatever), feminism (particularly) and poststructuralism 
are concerned not to mirror the race for power. 
poststructuralism with feminism's directedness (using 
these terms to refer to loose aggregates) offers what I 
hold to be the most sound explanatory theory for identity, 
discursive and material relations; and it also is 
especially useful as a theoretical instrument by which to 
probe and perhaps dissolve disciplinary boundaries and the 
boundaries of text and context. For students of 
autobiography this is especially pertinent. As not quite 
literature, not quite history, political science or law or 
sport, or whatever field is focused upon (even though 
libraries rather inexplicably see fit to catalogue the 
texts in accordance with the primary sphere of activity of 
the author), autobiography -- as currently conceptualized 
and practised challenges generic and disciplinary 
divisions; my theoretical position allows me to interrogate 
the intersections, rather than forcibly excluding what 
fails to fit in with the discipline of literary studies as 
it has sometimes been narrowly defined. In South Africa 
(and elsewhere) autobiographical writing has often 
functioned to empower, to proclaim the presence and voice 
of those who have been denied recognition as proper human 
beings because of their race, class and/or gender. Its 
role in the fluid distribution of power in the discursive 
and non-discursive relations which comprise contemporary 
South Africa 1S analyzed in terms of shifting gender, 
class, and race configurations. And my choice of texts for 
close scrutiny has in part been motivated by a decision to 
further validate texts which make visible those who have 
been obscured or cast as Other in discursive and material 
relations. In other words, this study makes no claim to 
objectivity or political neutrality. Moreover, in my 
desire to empower through the interrogation of power 
relations I have deliberately avoided an overarching grand 
thesis, which uses individual texts merely as illustrative 
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material. Rather I have endeavoured to explore each text 
in the spirit of essay, not assertion. 
(iii) Problematizing the poststructuralist problematic 
poststructuralism, as has been noted, is a movement 
comprising diverse and sometimes dissentient writings which 
generally have in cornmon the decentring of the subject, the 
interrogation of language and ideology/power, the 
dissolution of the notion of transcendant truth. I say 
"generally" for there are disagreements even amongst 
founders of the movement: as has been noted, Derrida and 
Foucault have criticised each other's approaches, and both 
have cri ticized Lacan and Al thusser . Althusser's 
insistence on a scientific marxist knowledge which is "by 
definition a subjectless discourse" (Althusser, 1971:171) 
which transcends ideology27 and Lacan's structuralist 
psychoanalytic approach are denounced by Derrida and 
Foucault on the grounds of there being no metatheory such 
as is claimed in marxist and psychoanalytic discourse. I 
support this criticism. 
Despi te important philosophical differences between 
Marxism and liberalism regarding human sociality, both 
ideologies partake of the Enlightenment's uncritical 
acceptance of science and reason as the sole means for 
discovering truth and knowledge. It is thus ironic 
that Marxism, which purports to challenge the value 
system of the dominant class, has nonetheless readily 
adopted that class's notion of scientific control. 






Oedipal complex and 
of the 
related 
developmental phases (see Lemaire, 1977:1-3,7; and Lacan, 
1977: 65-66), does not include adequate reco"gnition of 
shifting cultural and historical influences. Lacan argues 
that the unconscious exists universally in all humans, its 
content being closely linked to existing social 
interdictions (Lemaire, 1977: 58-59); his acknowledgement 
that both the Oedipus complex and the family will be 
subject to local formal variations is somewhat 
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parenthetical. Lacan's theorisation of all subjectivity as 
comprising layers of structures: the conscious, 
preconscious and unconscious (Lemaire, 1977:3) is indeed 
generally given as a universal and transhistorical truth 
(see Lemaire, 1977:58, 81, 189-190), denials by Lacanians 
like Juliet Flower MacCannell notwithstanding (in Davis, 
1983:913). That Cathy Urwin (Henriques et al, 1984:286 
ff.) finds it necessary to modify Lacan's account 
apparently confirms my criticism. This universalising 
tendency is particularly problematic if one pursues the 
implications of Lacanian psychoanalysis as fundamental to 
postructuralist theory. 




one thing the 
metaphorically 
the writings 
contention that the 
seems to me to be 
(see Sheridan's "The 
translator's note", 1977:xi). The following passage 
illustrates the confusion between physical and metaphorical 
phallus: 
The phallus is the privileged signifier of that mark 
in which the role of the logos is joined with the 
advent of desire. 
It can be said that this signifier is chosen 
because it is the most tangible element in the real of 
sexual copulation, and also the most symbolic in the 
literal (typographical) sense of the term, since it is 
equivalent there to the (logical) copula. It might 
also be said that, by virtue of its turgidity, it is 
the image of the vital flow as it is transmitted in 
generation. (Lacan, 1977:287-288) 
Lacan's consistent insistence on the law being associated 
with the father and desire with the mother corne close to 
biological essentialism (see Leitch, 1983:29-32; 236-237) 
and the patent sexism (manifest too in the masculine 
universal) is especially troubling because it is largely 
disavowed by Lacan and Lacanians (Lemaire, 1977:86,88). 
What is overlooked in Lacan's own discourse is precisely 
the power of the signifier: the use of the phallus in a way 
that blurs the bodily and the symbolic, 2 9 the sexism in 
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continual focus on male development, 30 the uses of "father" 
and "mother" all acquire a force which cannot be 
dissipated by simple (infrequent) denials of their 
literalness. This phallocentricism is intensified by 
Lacan's deterministic treatment of gender development. 31 
Perhaps most troubling of all is the sense that in order 
to accept Lacanian psychoanalysis as a workable theory, one 
has to commit an act of faith. As Lacan himself states: 
"One is either taken by what they [my writings] formulate 
or one leaves it" (in Lemaire , 1977:14). I am afraid that 
I fall outside the either / or: since Lacan theorizes much 
which was hitherto unexplained in theory, I am "taken" by 
Lacan's theories, but provisionally, and sceptically. By 
lessening the reliance on psychoanalysis some 
poststructuralists like Henriques et al (1984:318) claim to 
have resolved the problem; I am not convinced that this is 
nearly as easy as is implied . 32 As I have indicated, my 
main concern has to do with the application of Eurocentric 
theory to African discourses and the subjects which these 
interpellate. As far as I can ascertain, there has been 
very little work in this field. Thandabantu Nhlapo's essay 
in Putting Women on the Agenda and, to a lesser extent, 
Mary Maboreke's (in the same volume) deal with the 
constitution of gender in black Southern African cultures 
and open the issue of cultural specificity in familial and 
gender relations, as do (using different discursive 
paradigms) Noni Jabavu, Ellen Kuzwayo, Godfrey Moloi and 
other autobiographers; however, much more work needs to be 
done before there are sufficient grounds for a radical 
revision of key poststructuralist explanation. My analyses 
of autobiographical texts try to achieve a sensitivity to 
the specificities of the textual constitution of 
subj ecti vi ty. My own cultural limitations mean that I 
cannot speak authoritatively about non-Westernized 
indigenous South African cultural practices; nevertheless, 
I can apply a finely discriminating theoretical paradigm to 
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my reading of these texts. I submit that much of the 
poststructuralist theorization of the role of language in 
the constitution of subjectivity is probably valid, too, 
for indigenous South African cultures, but precisely to 
what extent I am unqualified to say. 
Another charge against poststructuralism concerns its 
claims to be subversive and revolutionary; these, it is 
argued, are merely based on self-congratulatory illusion 
(there is in some overtly theoretical texts a holier-than-
thou attitude33 ) since poststructuralism, as a complex and 
difficult body of writing, is of interest only to 
academics. Paul Smith, for instance, quarrels with 
poststructuralist conceptions of the subject which "have 
tended to produce a purely theoretical 'subject,' removed 
almost entirely from the political and ethical realities in 
which human agents actually live" (1988 :xxiv) . This 
criticism is not without foundation; for even the most 
sophisticated theorist will probably act as if she were 
indeed an autonomous individual. Most people 
particularly those operating within Western narrative 
traditions -- tend to construct histories of themselves 
(whether formally or informally) as if they were 
continuous, unified entities with stable characters, 
personalities or natures (all the taboo notions of 
humanism). Furthermore, we are held accountable, and hold 
others accountable, in a legal system which operates in 
terms of a humanist conceptual framework. Try as we might 
to be theoretically correct, academics nevertheless still 
want personal recognition for articles produced and enjoy 
the acclaim that accompanies the notion of authorial 
originality rather than the anonymity implicit in Barthes' 
insistence that all writers merely rewrite the already 
written! Academics and theoreticians cannot, therefore, 
simply claim to have "at last come out on the far side of 
a humanist (or anthropocentric) ideology" (Norris, 
1987:219). One cannot ignore , 
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the simple fact that no case can be argued, no 
proposition stated -- however radical its intent 
without falling back on the conceptual resources 
vested in natural language. And that language is in 
turn shot through with all the anthropocentric, 
'metaphysical' meanings which determine its very logic 
and intelligibility. Any claim to have broken once 
and for all with the humanist 'sciences of man' is a 
claim which can only be self-deluding and devoid of 
critical power. (Derrida, cited by Norris, 1987:219-
220) 
Allied to this is the charge that poststructuralism is so 
circumspect in its avoidance of seeming to pose as 
metalanguage or to have grasped the 'truth', that many of 
its seminal texts are deliberately obscure and thus 
obfuscate any argument. 34 The difficulties of Lacan and 
Derrida are legendary, and, may be encountered, too, in the 
works of some of the other key poststructuralist figures. 35 
These involutions have no doubt contributed to ' ivory 
tower' elitism. Furthermore, because of the ascendency of 
theory across a wide range of disciplines, there 1S a 
growing imbalance 
theorists in the 
of power 
academy. 
between theorists and 
Many feminists argue 
non-
most 
cogently that much contemporary theory is a potent 
instrument for the fortification of existing (sexist and 
racist) power-knowledge relations, potent especially since 
it parades as the contrary. (See Cecily Lockett, 1990:8, 
15) . That there is some validity in these accusations 
leads me to reject certain predominantly deconstructive 
strains of poststructuralism. 36 It is my contention, 
however, that feminist and Foucauldian approaches obviate 
some of these difficulties by demonstrating the importance 
of strategic essentialism (i.e. the adoption of a position 
as though this were an essential feature of one's being) 
and of analytic argument which accepts its provisionalitYi 
which insists on sceptical self-scrutiny and consistently 
seeks new strategies by which its usefulness as a tool for 
change may be strengthened. 
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(ix) The argument for poststructuralist enquiry into South 
African autobiographical texts 
While I adopt a broadly poststructuralist approach, I 
choose not to identify myself as 'a poststructuralist' 
principally because that may imply a willingness (which I 
do not have) to "let thought coagulate into systematic 
doctrine and become the vehicle of some moralistic truth" 
(Kritzman, 1988:xvii-xviii) . Like Foucault, I want to 
leave open the possibility of writing differently in future 
years, to question present positions; I do not want to have 
to apologise for not saying the same thing over and over 
again. Nevertheless, poststructuralism offers profound 
insights which have yet to be superseded (as they must be) 
by other theoretical paradigms. The marriage of 
poststructuralist theory with the practice of strategic 
essentialism can be effective in the fight against 
injustices like racism, sexism, imperialism and class-based 
exploi tation. As Diamond and Quinby observe, "It seems 
clear that the intersection of poststructuralist, anti-
humanist strategies with feminist analyses provides the 
possibility for a materialist critical practice and 
political struggle" (1988:17). 
The pluralist approach adopted ln this study selects 
aspects of theoretical models which seem valid and realigns 
these in relation to a feminist politics; it also attempts 
to take into account specific (for these must not be 
homogenized) African conceptions of self, context and text. 
As mentioned earlier, ,a more fitting term for my 
theoretical position 
to African cultural 
given my attempts to be receptive 
constructions is "pratique de 
metissage" (Edouard Glissant, cited by Lionnet, 1989: 4) 
which refers to hybridization, transculturation, 
transmutation, reciprocal influence and explores 
indeterminacy, fragmentation and diversity. Involving as 
it does the collapse of Manichean categories (1989:15-18), 
"metissage is the fertile ground of heterogeneous and 
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heteronomous identities as postcolonial subjects" (8). 
Within the conceptual apparatuses that have governed 
our labelling of ourselves and others, a space is thus 
opened where multiplicity and diversity are affirmed. 
This space is not a territory staked out by 
exclusionary practices. Rather, it functions as a 
sheltering site, one that can nurture our differences 
without encouraging us to withdraw into new dead ends, 
without enclosing us within facile oppositional 
practices or sterile denunciations and disavowals. 
For it is only by imagining nonhierarchical modes of 
relation among cultures that we can address the 
crucial issues of indeterminacy and solidarity .... 
(Lionnet, 1989: 5-6) 
Metissage marks a deviation from European poststructuralism 
but it is consistent with poststructuralism' s spirit of 
scepticism and openness to non-hegemonic constructions. It 
is a form of bricolage -- a reading practice which refuses 
to attempt uniformity or complete coherence -- which is of 
fundamental importance for the understanding of 
postcolonial cultures. 
Poststructuralism's traversal of traditional disciplinary 
boundaries is also particularly generative for the study of 
autobiography (as Driver's work demonstrates), a genre 
which seems not to have fitted comfortably into any 
particular discipline: autobiography may be read through 
any or all of philosophy, history, anthropology, 
psychoanalysis, cultural studies, gender studies, literary 
studies, socio-linguistics. Such a pluralism can help to 
avert a tendency to essentialize or stereotype. This is 
particularly important since political efficacy promotes 
the simplification of the lines of political struggle. In 
South Africa, apartheid and patriarchy have endorsed "a 
system In which stereotypes are produced as fictive . 
artifices but are then 'consumed as innate meanings' 
[Barthes] " (Klinkowitz, 1988:48). In the complex, 
hybridized cultural mix that constitutes contemporary South 
Africa the fracturing of the sign, of · these "fictive 
artifices", is especially pertinent since the dominant 
interpretations tend to be self-perpetuating; and a 
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Manichean approach obstructs rigorous analysis . Looking 
for slippages between signifier and sign, a 
poststructuralist reading e xamines specific instantiations 
of subject positioning (of implied authors, narrators, 
protagonists and readers real and implied) and the 
implications for the deployment of power relations ; Thus 
Moloi's 'self' is not s i mply to be read through the 
discourses of Sotho cuI ture (the linguistic group from 
which his name derives) and black urban slums which provide 
the locale for much of t he narrative: the plurality of 
discourses which constitute the autobiographical subject 
include these but also those of Zulu culture, Christianity 
and popular American gangsterism (amongst others). The 
theorization of the split subject opens the way for a study 
of the uneasy conjunct i on of subject positions which 
autobiographies -- by virtue of their co-operation with 
current generic norms usually attempt to meld 
seamlessly. The attempts to conflate real author (i. e. 
writer; see Rimmon- Kenan , 1983) , narrator and 
protagonist(s) are seen to be the result of wilful refusals 
to acknowledge the instances when these strain to separate. 
Cultural and textual conventions implicit in compositional 
trends are exposed in a way that they are not in readings 
informed by an expressive- realist model which elides the 
differences of subject positions (Coullie, 1991:5). (More 
of this in Chapter 3). The refusal of the obvious means 
that revolutionary or contestatory groups (such as anti-
sexist and anti-racist organisations) are not necessarily, 
or in all respects, liberatory, for neither power nor 
oppression are properties or inherent characteristics of 
groups or individuals . South African autobiographies often 
reveal surprising examples of just how misleading 
stereotypes can be, 37 particularly since they cannot take 
into account the rapidly changing power configurations in 
contemporary South Africa. 
South Africa has had 46 years of an apartheid reglme; 
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Foucaul t' s argument that "the intellectual is no longer 
commissioned to play the role of advisor to the masses and 
critic of ideological content, but rather to become one 
capable of providing instruments of analysis" (Kritzman, 
1988:xii) is apposite. "The role of the intellectual," 
Foucault argues, 
is not to tell others what the? have to do. By what 
right would he [sic] do so?.. The work of an 
intellectual is ... , through the analyses that he 
carries out in his own field, to question over and 
over again what is postulated as self-evident, to 
disturb people's mental habits, the way they do and 
think things, to dissipate what is familiar and 
accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions and on 
the basis of this reproblematization (in which he 
carries out his specific task as an intellectual) to 
participate in the formation of a political will (in 
which he has his role as a citizen to play). 
(Foucault, in Kritzman, 1988:265) 
The intellectual, then, does not bring objective knowledge 
to the unknowing masses but rather combats, from unexpected 
quarters, the forms of power in which intellectual activity 
is embedded. The intellectual is neither a-political nor 
the arch political savant but is "an expert ... politicized 




everyday struggles and conflicts, the most 
and profound of which in modern society 
that of truth" (Smart, 1985:67) . 
Poststructuralism's consistently oppositional, sceptical 
attitude is valuable to intellectuals and the broader 
communi ty which they serve. 
never can be, ivory towers. 
Universities are not, and 
They are implicated in 
knowledge-making which is vital to the functioning of the 
social organisation. And if the knowledges produced by 
universities are informed by poststructuralist 
oppositionality and scepticism, they have a good chance of 
being positive. 
[The] role of theory is therefore not to formulate a 
global analysis of the ideologically coded, but rather 
to analyse the specificity of the mechanisms of power 
and to build, little by little, "strategic knowledge." 
"What we have to present are instruments and tools 
that people might find useful. By forming groups 
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specifically to make these analyses, to wage those 
struggles, by using these instruments or others: this 
is how, in the end , possibilities open up."... If 
power is dispersed in a mUltiplicity of networks, 
resistance can only be realized through a series of 
localized strategies. (Kritzman quoting Foucault, 
1988:xiv-xv) 
The poststructuralist insistence on the primacy of the 
signifier and thus on the importance of rigorous language 
analysis is valuable, too, if one is concerned, as I am, 
with the wider political implications of textual practices. 
Given the brutal force of South African State politics on 
the lives of individuals, the way that texts can affect 
broader political events is clearly of great importance. 
Current cultural practices from a mUltiplicity of 
identifiable (yet not 'pure') cultural groupings, the 
languages (which have been a site of struggle in South 
Africa for most of her troubled past, and continue to be 
contested), and generic norms, the dispensations of reader-
power and publisher-power, determine the range of options 
facing writers, as well as the range of responses likely to 
be evoked in readers. No text is held to be transparent. 
Criticism is freed from its sometime largely evaluative 
function. 
A materialist cultural interpretive practice insists 
that we read not only individual texts but literary 
histories and critical discourse as well, not as 
reflections of a truth or lie with respect to a pre-
given real, but as instruments for the exercise of 
power, as paradigmatic enactments of those struggles 
over meaning. (Martin, 1988:18) 
Certainly, my concern is not to demonstrate which texts are 
worthy of attention or preservation but rather to 
investigate how they function in the social formation, what 
they tell us about social relations and about individual 
(socially sanctioned) perceptions of the self. The critic 
is not "the complete reader ... the ideal reader" (Leavis, 
1958: 212); a reading is '" A statement of mistrust' [which 
is, as Derrida argues] . .. 'neither true nor false: it is 
rather in the nature of a permanent hypothesis'" (Norris, 
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1982:106) . But of course there are limits to this 
suspension of pretension to validity; eventually even a 
poststructuralist will have a point to defend. Insistence 
on specificity does not lead to a paralysing plethora of 
detail in analyses: 
Of course, on the basis of specific theoretical 
analyses one can make generalizations, iden tify links 
between forms of oppression, and locate patterns of 
domination. Thus, one can evaluate the relative 
practical values and dangers of particular tactics of 
resistance . (Sawicki, 1988:188-9) 
So while I do not offer my readings of South African 
autobiographies as the only ways to interpret the texts; 
neither do I offer them as interpretations of indifferent 
validity. My loosely poststructuralist approach 
interrogates conceptions of self, life, and writing in ways 
which, I trust, "illuminate, clarify, and decipher" 
(Diamond and Quinby, 1988:xiii), even while interpretations 
are, of necessity, partial (in both senses of the word) . 
This dissertation seeks to "render problematic the demands 
of one [discourse] in relation to others" and to the 
"cracks and fissures [of discursive formations] that will 
not permit monolithic ideological constructs" (Wicomb, 
1990:36). The materialist approach explodes the text: "it 
is not the dictionary's (closed) definitional power that 
the text possesses, but its infinite structure" (Barthes, 
1974:120); it interrogates the text's "politics of truth", 
and probes the" 'political economy' of the body" (Foucault, 
1984:172). Foucauldian genealogy examines the role of the 
body for, 
The body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by 
language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a 
dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a 
substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual 
disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, 
is thus situated within the articulation of the body 
and history. Its task is to a body totally imprinted 
by history and the process of history's destruction of 
the body. (Foucault, 1984:82-83) 
In short, this theoretical pluralism enables fundamental 
analysis of what we are, how we are, how we come to 
69 
understand ourselves and our places in the world, and how 
these experiences may be encoded in text. 
poststructuralism's inbuilt self-reflexivity is a partial 
safeguard against its easy co-optation to existing power 
structures. 
The 'best' theories do not constitute a very effective 
protection against disastrous political choices; 
certain great themes such as 'humanism' can be used to 
any end whatever.... I do not conclude from this that 
one may say just anything within the order of theory, 
but, on the contrary, that a demanding, prudent, 
'experimental' attitude is necessary; at every moment, 
step by step, one must confront what one is thinking 
and saying with what one is doing, with what one is. 
(Foucault, 1984:374) 38 
Poststructuralism's resistance to dogmatism is an important 
strength for it makes researchers and academics question 
their own lives and motives, their 'truths' as they are 
inscribed in analyses. And while it may not always cause 
us to change for the better, it offers encouragement for 
greater self-consciousness and thus a more keen sense of 
personal accountability. Furthermore, Foucault's analyses 
of the complexity of power/knowledge relations have had the 
effect of politicizing theory. Sawicki observes that 
Foucault, rather than offer a grand theory himself, 
subjected modern theories ... to historical reflection 
in an effort to render them problematic in the present 
by focusing on the ways in which they have been linked 
to domination and oppression. Given his skepticism 
about grand theory, and his emphasis on the 
heterogeneity and fragmentation of the social field, 
he is led to a theoretical pluralism of sorts. For if 
difference is distorted and obscured in totalistic 
theories, the obvious path for resistance to take is 
to provide alternative mappings of specific regions of 
the social field. In other words, theoretical 
pluralism makes possible the expansion of social 
ontology, a redefini tion and redescription of 
experience from the perspectives of those who are more 
often simply objects of theory. (My emphasis, 
1988:188) 
This theoretical creolization 1S consistently and 
radically challenging. 
70 
In the first place, the call for theoretical and 
practical pluralism is based on the implicit 
assumption that a power-free society is an abstraction 
and struggle a ubiquitous feature of history. Those 
engaged in struggle can expect the changes they bring 
about to take on a different face over time. 
Discourses and institutions are ambiguous and may be 
used for different ends. Second, and correlatively, 
a Foucauldian sexual [or race or class or other] 
politics does not aspire to control history or to 
bring about global transformation all at once. There 
is no single vision of life "after the revolution." 
Yet, one need not have an idea of utopia to recognize 
and struggle against injustices in the present. And 
if there is a vision implicit in this approach, it is 
one of a democratic and heterogeneous society. 
(Sawicki , 1988:189) 
An open-ended, amoebic poststructuralist/feminist 
problematic challenges existing material and conceptual 
structures and enables the researcher to explore 
marginalized discourses and subj ects . It theorizes the 
role of discourse ln material relations and ln the 
consti tution of the subj ect, while insisting upon the 
reality of experience, on the materiality of the body, on 
the relations between power and knowledge relations in 
which the poststructuralist researcher is just as 
implicated as the subjects of her investigations are. 
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Chapter 3: Subjectivity 
As you know, all these 
undergoing a reevaluation --
is to say, the biographical 
autobiographical. 
matters are currently 
all these matters, that 
and the autos of the 
Jacques Derrida 
To most people at some point it comes home that inside 
our skins we are not made of a uniform and evenly 
distributed substance, like a cake-mix or mashed 
potato, or even sadza , but rather accommodate several 
mutually unfriendly entities. It took me much longer 
to ask the real question: what effect on our 
behaviour, our decisions, may these subterranean 
enemies have? That lake of tears, did it slop about, 
or seep, or leak, secretly making moist what I thought 
I kept dry? 
Doris Lessing 
Our reason is the difference of 
history the difference of time, 






As I have said, although we may have a relatively stable 
sense of our own identity and feel that we are the entirely 
rational source from which our thoughts emanate, these 
experiences are far from constant and cannot necessarily be 
captured at will. Self is a process, a site constituted 
"within power relations within particular historical 
moments" (Nussbaum, 1989: 10) for interpretations of 
experience. The de-centred subject controls neither 
consciousness nor the unconscious. 1 Culture, history and 
language speak in and through the subj ect, shaping the 
subject's reasoning powers. "Language ... ensures that all 
of the members of a group inhabit the same psychic 
terri tory, and regiments the exchanges which take place 
between them" (Silverman, 1983:180). The subject is thus 
subjected to the social, but is also the agent of action 
and may thus initiate change. 
Although they can be theorised in like ways, textual and 
material subjects are not interchangeable or equivalent. 
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The subject who writes and the autobiographical subject are 
not simply equivalent. "There is in fact no cornmon measure 
between what is spoken and what is lived ... " (Lemaire, 
1977:6) . The refractions of the 'real' are mUltiplied in 
the autobiographical text: perception is conventionally 
determined; and narration is governed by yet more sets of 
prescriptions and expectations. Emile Benveniste 
distinguishes between the 'I' who speaks and the 'I' who is 
spoken; there is a split between the speaking subject and 
the adumbrated subject of the enunciation (Nussbaum, 
1989: 31-2) . Flesh and blood authors, and their life 
experiences 
realms are 






protagonists linguistic constructs are usually 
separated by time lapses (narration comes after the events 
that are being narrated); protagonists may change over 
time, may -- in fact -- comprise a variety of sometimes 
contradictory subject positions (Renza, 1980:268-295). The 
autobiographical subject is a function of the text, and as 
such is subject to a whole host of pressures pertaining to 
texts, such as what is publishable (who is reading what 
when), what various functions a genre might be held to 
perform at a given time, what styles or approaches are in 
favour amongst particular kinds of readers, and so on. 
Although some insistence on verifiable 'truth' about the 
writer / autobiographical subject as s/he is encoded as 
narrator and protagonist lS a feature of all of the 
autobiographical texts examined in this study 2 , analysis 
separates material person, the writer, from textual 
constructions of the autobiographical subject (which is a 
composite of narrator and protagonist(s)). Barthes' 
autobiographical narrator reminds us of the constructedness 
of the character which structures the first-person 
narrative: 
I try, little by little, to render his voice. I make 
an adjectival approach: agile, fragile, youthful, 
somewhat broken? No, not quite; ... For all these 
voices, the right metaphor would have to be invented, 
the one which, once encountered, would possess you 
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forever; but I fail to find any such thing, so great 
is the gap between the words which come to me from the 
culture and this strange being .... (1977a:67-8) 
And later he expounds on the infeasibility of the 
autobiographical project; language, he says, is "a final 
alienation" for he could not express emotions: "he felt 
more than excluded: detached: forever assigned the place of 
the witness" (86). And Derrida in the "Roundtable on 
Autobiography" refers 
thing" (1985:72) ln 
to autobiography as "a terrible 
which the writer confronts the 
impossibility of telling about the self. 
Few South African autobiographers explore the self in 
this way. Most employ a humanist paradigm and portray 
themselves as authors/autho.rities in control of unified 
identity. While my own theoretical position opposes this 
conception, it is not my intention to deconstruct these 
texts in order to demonstrate the falsity of their position 
but rather to show how discourses interact to comprise the 
subject, and to explore some of the broader implications of 
the specific configuration of discourses within particular 
texts. Significantly, it seems to me that in the majority 
of autobiographical texts examined generic norms are a more 
fundamentally powerful influence on the textual 
(re)presentation of the self than are individual 
differences. By and large the texts of very different 
people exhibit the enormous importance of conformity to 
some or other species of generic convention (there is not 
only one kind of South African autobiography); this is true 
even in those texts which seem to want to foreground the 
subject's uniqueness, like Roy Campbell's or Zola Budd's. 
Analysis may thus foreground the social implications of the 
precise constitution of the autobiographical subject -- I 
do this in my analyses of Campbell's and Kuzwayo's 
autobiographies so that stylistic features are 
considered as indices not simply of individual character 
but of discursive and non-discursive practice in the wider 
social formation. 
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[T]he analysis of the subject in the autobiographical 
text aims not to tease out the influences of the 
society on an independent individual, but rather to 
foreground the complexity of the textual codification 
of those discourses which constitute the social 
formation and the subjects who are produced and are 
productive therein. (Coullie, 1991:9) 
Since no discourse can be private and "Subjectivity ... is 
merely the wake of all the codes which constitute me" 
(Barthes, 1974:10), analysis of the textual constitution of 
the subject entails concomitant interrogation of the 
social; "the traditional division of individual/ society 
dissolves in favour of a recognition that these are 
mutually constitutive" (Coullie, 1991: 9) . 
Textual responses to generic convention betoken shifts in 
the social formation. Thus textual analysis is not mere 
academic exercise: it involves interrogation of 
fundamentally important "cultural codes" (Nussbaum, 
1989:15). Consider the implications of the current 
employment of narrative in autobiographies by black South 
Africans in the light of the fact that this is a departure 
from traditional black auto / biographical poetry. 3 While one 
may distinguish between biographical praise poems (i. e. 
those which are composed and performed by the poet about 
someone else) and those which are largely autobiographical 
(i.e. composed, for the most part, and performed by the 
subject of the poem) I use the typographical ambiguity of 
auto/biographical to refer to the latter because, as we 
shall see, the performing subject is not solely responsible 
for the content. It is these auto/biographical poems that 
are germane to this study. The crucial shift in the 
textual practice of black South African autobiographers to 
a Westernized narrative mode denotes profound change in the 
ways that subjects are interpellated -- ln the ways that 
subjects are shaped by the cultures in which they live, and 
in the ways that subjects perceive of themselves and their 
places in the world. Importantly and never forgetting 
that there are divergences and differences within each 
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broad category -- the constitution of the autobiographical 
subject in traditional auto / biographical praise poetry is 
fundamentally different from the autobiographical subject 
of narrative autobiography. The subject of a narrative 
autobiography is pivotal and unified in as much as ,the 
linguistic indicators of the 'I' cohere around this central 
narrator and 'character'. The narrative autobiographical 
subject often involves objectification of the self for the 
telling involves the construction of an adjectival 
framework for the autobiographical subject (this person has 
these attributes), and usually rests upon the ideology of 
individualism. On the other hand, the subject of the much 
looser non-narrative autobiographical praise poem is 
interpellated in a much more fractured way, so that there 
is no central controlling presence which acts as textual 
authority in quite the same way as in a narrative. The 
self of the praise poem is dispersed across the community's 
reading of that subject: lines of other people's praise 
poems may be incorporated, and passages composed by others 
about the autobiographical subject may also be included. 
So the narrating 'I' is not the author/authority for the 
self as it is in a first-person narrative. Moreover, the 
absence of a narrative structure means that interpretations 
of the autobiographical subject will be freer and multi-
faceted (narrative usually provides an interpretive 
structure which contains meaning) . 
Consider the implications of this mutation in 
practice in the light of demographic and 
textual 
cultural 
transformations in South Africa: in the wake of the massive 
urbanisation resulting from apartheid's bantustan and 
migrant labour policies, tribal culture and the extended 
family have, for millions of black South Africans, eroded. 
This, coupled with the growth of capitalism, Westernised 
education and Christianity all of which foster 
individualism -- has resulted in shifts in the constitution 
of the subj ect, of self. Self as inseparable part of 
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community (the living community as well as the unending 
lineage of ancestors) -- the traditional relational self --
has largely given way to the 
autonomy and gratification. 
Africa over the last four and 
individual seeking personal 
Social upheaval in South 
a half decades has resulted 
in radical (but uneven, multifaceted) changes in the 
constitution of the self, transformations which are 
manifested In shifts in autobiographical practice. As 
Foucault has said, 
[i] t is not just in the play of symbols that the 
subject is constituted. It is constituted in real 
practices -- historically analyzable practices. There 
is a technology of the constitution of the self which 
cuts across symbolic systems while using them. 
(1984:369) 
Discursive and non-discursive 
textual production so that 
construct a textual self which, 
configurations impinge on 
the autobiographer will 
firstly, she is able to 
conceive of (i.e. the language and culture can accommodate 
such a conception of selfhood), and secondly, will find a 
readership. And of course, only those whose lives are of 
interest -- in terms of prevailing political, economic and 
discursive conditions -- will achieve visibility in print. 
Massive social transformation since 1948 has, of course, 
impacted on autobiographical production: its increasing 
politicization and democratization will receive more 
detailed attention in Chapter 4. 
And what of fluctuations In the ways In which these 
selves are textually encoded? The narrativized, unified 
self although certainly the predominating conceptual 
model is not treated uniformly, nor is it without 
competing constructions of the au'tobiographical subj ect. 
The autonomous self, with a consistent core character, 
gives way in some texts to the stereotype whose experiences 
are selected in terms not of significance for the person's 
life, but rather as instances illustrating political or 
sociological concerns; In other texts the decentred 
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postmodernist self is (dis) located across the text's linear 
logic, and in yet others the self which straddles seemingly 
incompatible discourses and cultures is situated between 
recognizable codes , negotiating transformation. The 
autobiography as record of personal achievement is joined 
by autobiographical accounts of nullity, brutal 
deprivation, mere survival. 
Selves are, of course, defined negatively (I am not like 
these others) as well as positively (I am ... ), and there 
are significant textual modifications in this respect also. 
A hierarchizing tendency is evident in all autobiographies 
studied; it serves to define self and Other in ways that 
will be familiar or acceptable to targeted readers. The 
specific configurations in particular texts indicate how 
meanlng and worth are 
culture. For Campbell, 
apportioned to individuals in a 
in keeping with the ethos of his 
time, women and people of colour are personae non grata, as 
are effeminate men, socialists, republicans, and a whole 
host of others. His disdain for them denotes his 
superiority. It seems to me that the white South African 
autobiographer's implied construction of blacks as Other 
(blacks are almost non-existent in the autobiographies of 
Goudvis, Attwell, Evenden, and others) gives way in some 
recent texts to a stronger sense of certain white South 
Africans as Other (Breytenbach, Kitson, Joseph and Hope 
exemplify this). And black autobiographers do not 
necessarily define themselves ln opposition to whites 
either: Moloi defines himself principally by showing that 
he is not a rural traditionalist (and, of course, he 
implies that he is superior); Indres Naidoo distinguishes 
between prisoners and Boers, and ANC and PAC supporters, 
the first of each pair being defined as better. In many 
autobiographies -- Rian Malan's springs to mind -- there is 
an increasing uncertainty ln the identification of the 
Other. This is perhaps not surprising in the 
autobiographies by white South Africans who could not 
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identify with the 'White Tribe' or its policies, but who 
were yet kept isolated from people of other race groups 
because of de facto apartheid. 
The interpellation o f the reading subject in 
autobiographical writing may also encode much important 
information about a culture . Readers approach texts from 
within the discursive and material circumstances which 
interpellate them as subjects: the "'I' which approaches 
the text is already itself a plurality of other texts ... " 
(Barthes, 1974:10). Texts might co-operate with or subvert 
(or both) these constructs . We need to consider what sort 
of reader is implied in a particular text, and what might 
be inferred about the ideological and material (economic 
and political) circumstances which are implicated in such 
practices. Kuzwayo's Call Me Woman, for example, marks a 
very important change in this regard. Previous 
autobiographies and quasi - autobiographies by or about black 
South African women tended to address a white readership so 
as to explain how a localized black culture might be 
experienced. Noni Jabavu ' s The Ochre People and Drawn in 
Colour, Carol Hermer's The Diary of Maria Tholo, and Elsa 
Joubert's Poppie all serve to translate, in a manner of 
speaking, the subject's experlenc~s to white readers. 
Kuzwayo's text, however , addresses black South Africans, 
and in this way records the positive shift in self-
perception of black South Africans that has been evidenced 
most obviously in political activism. The fact that Call 
Me Woman speaks to a black readership denotes, too, the 
shift in broad configurations of power in South Africa from 
white to black. (I say this even though the 1980s saw a 
brutal increase in State repression, for it was in this 
decade, as Ronnie Kasrils and others have said, that 
grassroots political activism became most insistent.) The 
hailing of a black readership in effect recognizes that it 
is black South Africans' opinions which matter; they are 
the ones for whom the story i s told. 
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The three autobiographies analyzed in this chapter 
represent different textual explorations of being. Broadly 
speaking, Roy Campbell's Light on a Dark Horse exemplifies 
extreme humanist individualism; Ellen Kuzwayo' s Call Me 
Woman departs significantly from this tradition; Breyten 
Breytenbach's The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist 
explores the decentred subject of a postmodern aesthetic 
while insisting, nevertheless, that this is a true story 
about the author whose name and photograph appear on the 
covers. These three texts are of interest because each 
explores the question of 
autobiographical subject. 
the relative autonomy of the 
While Campbell's self is 
presented as the highly individualistic, autonomous author 
of his own 'real-life' adventure, the subject of Kuzwayo's 
autobiography is depicted as an un-exceptional victim of 
racist and sexist oppression. Campbell's subject 1S 
portrayed as free; Kuzwayo' s as struggling to attain a 
small measure of freedom . Breytenbach's subject 1S 
fractured; freedom and subj ectedness are variously 
.explored. And whereas Breytenbach's text explicitly sets 
out to probe the contradictions inherent in experience and 
in the textual encoding thereof, Campbell's and Kuzwayo's 
attempt to excise contradiction to a large extent. 
However, as Derrida has shown, each text contains within it 
the seeds of its owri deconstruction. Whether these texts 
are attempting to portray -- or to privilige -- a unique, 
autonomous self (Campbell), or an unexceptional self 
subjected to social oppression (Kuzwayo), or a disjunctive, 
dispersed self (Breytenbach) , my analysis of the 
intersecting discourses in them reveals contrary tensions 
and in so doing tells us something about how the social 
traverses and dissects the subject of the text. 
One key site for the intersection of the social and the 
subject in South Africa is race, and these texts have been 
chosen because they confront, explicitly (as in Kuzwayo and 
Breytenbach) or implicitly (as is more often the case in 
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Campbell) the implications of race for the subject of the 
autobiography. While I am, as I have said, conscious that 
to classify texts according to the race of the author is a 
dangerous practice, for one thing because it could act to 
reinforce the importance of race as a signifier, I find 
that an analysis of South African autobiographical writing 
can hardly avoid some discussion of race since in even the 
most recent autobiographies, race still functions as an 
important determinant of the identity of the writing (and 
reading) subject. Significantly, white (usually men) 
autobiographers in the earlier decades of the period 
covered in this study tended to treat race as irrelevant, 
seemingly in attempts (conscious or unconscious) to make 
believe that racism had no part in their experience of 
South African reality (Malherbe, Boberg, Evenden and 
Duffield spring to mind) As we know, most cosmopolitan 
communities were by and large complicit in this duplicity, 
whereas in last two decades international pressure on South 
Africa has increasingly refused to allow the issue to be 
hidden. Nowadays most South African autobiographers 
confront and challenge their racial identities: 
Breytenbach, Hope (White Boy Running), Mathabane and Goonam 
are amongst those who foreground race as prime signifier in 
the very titles of their autobiographies 4 while others 
interrogate race and racism throughout the text (Malan, 
Mphahlele, Kitson, de Villiers, Bernstein, and Heard 
exemplify this) . 
The ideologies of racism, sexism, nationalism, and so on 
invite us to conceive of these hierarchical divisions as 
obvious and immutable, but history and autobiographical 
writing prove otherwise. Race is the discursive 
inscription of meaning on material bodies: "The... body 
itself is social" (Barthes, 1977a: 124) .5 What we are is 
obviously determined in large part by the meaning and worth 
accorded our material bodies. And if one b ears in mind the 
special significance accorded the author's name in 
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autobiography, indications of the author's race and gender 
will probably affect readers' interpretive strategies, as 
well as the more fundamental decision of whether to read 
the text or not (Coullie, 1991:12). 
Campbell's autobiographical subject displays the 
unswerving certainty of the white male conqueror who is 













Breytenbach's subject is resonant with contradiction; he is 
white, but identifies with black South Africans (hence the 
albino in the title). 
nevertheless that he 
Fighting against racism, he finds 
cannot justify a freedom struggle 
which pretends that race has not shaped identity. Finding 
that his mother-tongue does not make possible the 
distinction, he writes in English so as to position himself 
as an African rather than an Afrikaner. (In Afrikaans the 
word Afrikaner means Afrikaans-speaking; its etymological 
root refers to African origins, however, and Breytenbach is 
alluding to this). 
In his attempts to efface race, Breytenbach's text can be 
seen to represent "the way forward"; one hopes that South 
Africans will someday be able to regard racial 
categorisation as an historical curiosity. It is important 
to point out, however, that even though race is a seemingly 
obvious signifier functioning in the distribution of power 
and privilege in contemporary South Africa, its range of 
meanings is not predictable. Race, like all social systems 
of organization, is a means of apportioning power, but this 
does not necessarily happen in the obvious ways of white 
oppressor / black victim, nor does race function in 
isolation from other systematic features of the social 
organisation. Like Bozzoli's Women of Phokeng, my study 
has attempted to question two extremes of approach: 
the 'victimology' that caricatures black South 
Africans as the somewhat pathetic objects of 
82 
, 
colonialism, racism, oppression, poverty, patriarchy, 
and capitalism; and the converse of this -- the 'rah 
rah' approach, which makes romantic, celebratory, and 
teleological assumptions about black South African 
consciousness and struggle. (1991:239) 
We might consider, for instance, the fact that while 
Campbell's autobiographical subject displays all the 
certainties of the white man and Kuzwayo's illustrates the 
difficulties and hesitancies of a black woman, 
Breytenbach's explores the uncertainties of a white man who 
rejects apartheid and racism. For Breytenbach and other 
anti-apartheid whites like Benson, Hope, Malan, and Joseph, 
their white skin is a source of discomfort and dilemma, as 
well as privilege. ( BY the same token it is apparent in 
autobiographies like Mathebane' s Kaffir Boy, Modisane' s 
Blame Me On History and many others that simply being black 
may imbue the autobiographical subject with a measure of 
moral superiority) This use of race by the victims of 
racism to appropriate a position of power illustrates 
Foucault's point that power should be conceived of as a 
relationship, rather than a property. 
Race and gender systems are functions of language and 
culture which are crucial in the shaping of identity for 
South Africans in their specific linguistic, cultural and 
geographical positions. I have thus sought to interroga.te 
the precise configurations of gender in the textual shaping 
of the subject in Campbell's and Kuzwayo's autobiographies 
in particular. These texts exemplify most strikingly the 
feminist insistence that the personal is political, for 
self-presentation in each is intimately bound up with the 
specific constructions of masculinity and femininity which 
prevailed for these autobiographical subjects. 
The arrangement of texts here Campbell, Kuzwayo, 
Breytenbach -- does not represent either an ascending scale 
of excellence, or past, present and future trends. The 
humanist subject such as we find in Campbell's 
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autobiography has dominated South African 
autobiographical writing in English in the last four and a 
half decades, and continues to do so. Kuzwayo's 
autobiography might be said to represent a small number of 
texts which indicate a new kind of autobiographical 
subject, one which adapts Western practice to (black) South 
African experience, but I do not believe that it is a 
direction which will supersede the more usual expressive-
realist narrative autobiography. And Breytenbach's 
postmodernist practice, his celebration of mUltiple 
selfhood constructed in the act of writing, is not likely 
to be often repeated. These texts have been selected and 
arranged in this way because they exemplify three 
approaches to the problem of exploring the self in 
autobiography, approaches which can, justifiably, be 
identified as treating the project with an increasing sense 
of its equivocality. 
***** 
Roy Campbell's Light on a Dark Horse, first published in 
1951, subscribes emphatically to the ideology of the 
individual. The vigorous narrative style serves to 
underline the claim of the hero's exceptionality. 6 The 
publisher's comments are apposite: "This rip-roaring 
autobiography catches the full flair and flavour of a man 
much larger than the life of his times" (back cover, 1971). 
The narrator would, I think , have approved of such a 
description of himself. Setting himself apart from 
ordinary people, he was, he says, " the first man to torry 
a buffalo on horseback on African soil" (1971: 3 5). As a 
boy, he staged spectacular octopus fights, hunted wild pigs 
(which are reputedly extremely dangerous) and other 
animals, and from adolescence was a crack shot. He was an 
exceptionally accomplished naturalist at a very young age 
(115-6). Later, he worked as a stuntman "doing all sorts 
of acts such as falling from high places, eating fire, and 
chewing up glass" (243) . He jousted in Provence and was a 
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bull-fighter in Spain. He broke horses in and~ "[e]xcept 
for climbing my horse up the flagpole... did every 
reasonable trick within a circus rider's or a bullfighter's 
repertoire" (326). He risked life and limb to shelter 
monks during the Spanish Civil War, and was "the unique 
case in history" of a foreigner being permitted to exercise 
"the right of a master-fisherman in the most exclusive 
trade - freemasonry in the world" (292 ) ( i . e . the French 
fishing industry). Always better than ordinary men, as a 
soldier his charge-sheet was "kept stainless throughout the 
war, till [his] discharge with ' Mili tary Conduct: 
Excellent'" (237). 
Not just a man of action, the hero is also a successful 
poet and writer. His exceptional abilities thus allow him 
to see through the sham of Bloomsbury when others cannot, 
and appreciate the true worth of Toledo (he is one of two 
of all foreign visitors to Toledo who are gifted enough to 
perceive this!) (329) . When he falls in love, it is with 
a "most beautiful young woman" (244) who, along with her 
friend, was an unparalleled source of inspiration to many: 
No other contemporary women ever had so much poetry, 
good, bad, and indifferent, written about them or so 
many musical compositions dedicated to them, or had so 
many portraits and busts made of them -- as those two 
girls between them. (247-8) 
That this is a superlative hero lS conveyed, too, in the 
construction of the narrator's vantage point on reality as 
stable, secure, and exceptionally perspicacious. His 
opinions, expressed with supreme confidence, are given 
freely and with scant regard for moderation on a whole 
range of sUbjects. 7 The narrator makes pronouncements about 





narrator, there is no question but that his 
superior intellect and sensibility are the 
his knowledge of reality and of himself. 
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Personality is construed as a function both of inherited 
characteristics and autonomous personal response. In the 
first chapter, entitled "Forebears", the narrator recounts 
many anecdotes about his relatives, all of whom are 
exceptional and rather eccentric individuals. In keeping 
with the 'common sense' notions of inherited personality 
traits, this chapter establishes (both implicitly and 
explicitly) a core set of characteristics which readers can 
associate with the narrator/ protagonist. This first 
chapter functions in part, then, to establish the reader's 
expectations for the rest of the autobiography. 8 
Reality and self are held to be independent, discrete, 
stable and knowable. In one example of his certainty that 
an objectively discernable reality can be grasped, 
Campbell's narrator says, "From the very beginning my wife 
and I understood the real issues in Spain" (322). The 
"real issues" are phenomena which may be apparent to anyone 
who is willing and able to look with (it is implied) a 
measure of detachment. Such conviction regarding the 
division between self and other allows the narrator to 
perceive of his opinions as being due to independent 
thought: there is no sense of their being shaped by current 
discursive practice. If we recognize that "the 'knowledge' - - - - - -
that the human subiect possess~s about itself figures 
within discursive systems of power that are available at a 
given historical moment" (Nussbaum, 1989: 15), then the very 
fact that Campbell is able to construct ~uch an 
autobiographical subject becomes indicative of features of 
the distribution of power in the social formation of the 
These are features such as patriarchy and 
---~ colonialism and rac ism, all 
II\structural~to heap confidence 
such as Campbell. 
of which may be seen 
and might upon a white male 
Campbell's text makes manifest the intersection of a host 
of discourses which serve to bolster the discourse o f the 
86 
humanist individual. This means that Campbell's narrator 
is no less the subj ect of prevailing discourses than is 
anyone else, even though he presents himself as a super 
individual who often swims against the tide of popular 
opinion. As Bozzoli observes in Wom'en of Phokeng, 
[e]ach fragment of identity ... has a history, and a 
link with a prevailing discourse. Each fragment is an 
inherent tradition which was once derived from a 
particular past situation, socially created, and yet 
brought into idiosyncratic and individual expression 
by its incarnation in ... the 'self' of each particular 
[person]. (1991:241) 
Some of Campbell's narrator's more obviously controversial 
opinions belong to discourses or ideologies which are 
presently under attack: the ideology of 'character' (i.e. 
of the humanist individual) is the basis for the ideologies 
of masculinity (coupled with sexism and homophobia), and of 
national and class and race-based prejudices. 
Extreme individualism dominates the narrative, but it is 
dependent upon the subordinate discourses listed above and 
their associated ideological implications. The text's 
celebration of masculinity is crucial; in terms of the 
hierarchization of discourses in the text this is without 
doubt most important. Right from the outset9 , the narrator 
defines himself as a soldier and adventurer and the 
subsequent account of his actions further style him as the 
masculine ideal: skilled sailor, bullfighter, expert 
horseman, SWlrnrner, marksman, and so on. As a mark of his 
excellence the hero "lost interest in hunting with guns as 
being too dull, having experienced the hand to hand stuff. 
[He had] often before and since then gone into a wounded 
bushbuck and fought it out with a knobkerrie" (78). He 
quells horses, fish and women: 
None of my very best horses were ever too easy to 
break in: and on the human plane I like there to be 
some tension in the harmony so that it never grows 
stale, 
Only that beauty shall be mine 
That never slacks the strain, 
A fighting salmon on the line, 
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A snorter at the rein (249). 
He inspires undying loyalty in his underlings, implying 
that they too recognize his superiority. Pillay, a servant 
of Indian extraction, bids him farewell: 
Deair Master you are the man talking true and honest 
in this World, every Indian and native saying you are 
the god in this world I am very sorry that I lost you 
I am thinking you all the time in my mine. (180) 
The hero masters his world from a very young age. 
Untamed Africa affords him a wealth of opportunities for 
ultra-masculine adventures in which physical and mental 
strength are pitted against great odds. He learns to 
understand (and hence subjugate) the bush and its 
inhabitants. "After I was eleven I could bring down a 
charging buck and knew most of the answers of the Bush .... 
In those days all I needed , to take a wild beehive, was a 
hoe or an axe ... " (65). It is mastery, in its senses of 
sovereignty and specifically masculine dominance, that 
Campbell's autobiography celebrates. 1o 
It is fine to see nature in its rugged grandeur, just 
as it is fine to see a nice-looking but unbroken 
horse. But the supreme treat is to see the ruggedness 
of nature dominated by skill: the precipitous slopes 
terraced into orchards; and the horse completed with 
a fine rider . (325) 
The conquest must, however , be benevolent and 'civilized' 
(in the European tradition) . The ideal man must, in fact, 
be a benevolent dictator . 
The hero has to master h i mself too. Constantly exposing 
himself to fear and danger, he asserts self-control by 
overcoming these. A particularly amazing example comes 
near the end of the text. When arrested by soldiers in the 
Spanish Civil War · (men who have, he believes, killed in 
cold blood two civilians -- an adolescent boy and an old 
woman) Campbell refuses to put up his hands saying, "Would 
they please excuse me, but my British ancestry made that 
impossible, and that to dismount at their orders was the 
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very utmost damage I could do to my self-respect" (347). 
Campbell is then severely beaten; one of the men crashes 
his rifle 
several times across my nose and lips, so that the 
blood splashed on to the wool of the sheepskin on my 
saddle. . . . I stood at attention each time I could 
recover my balance, staring into the man's inflamed 
eyeballs. I knew I was saving my life, and that my 
way of taking this sort of punishment contemptuously 
was interesting both men. (347) 
This is supremacy of rationality over physicality at its 
most extreme. 
Further evidence of his (masculine) power over the 
material world is his mastery of language: 
I am able to address the barrack-square as a 
Sergeant-Major, and explain the parts of a machine-
gun, speaking as one ranker to another, in English, 
Swahili, or Chinyanja; I can address the English 
Society at Oxford or Cambridge from the same platform 
as T.S.Eliot, or Sir Osbert Sitwell: confer 
ceremoniously in flowery Zulu or Sintabele with 
delegations of headmen: I can join a knot of stokers 
in a pub in Glasgow or Liverpool as one of them: I can 
lecture in French or Castilian to the Universities of 
France or to the Ateneos of Madrid and Barcelona: I 
can give a talk to the Portuguese people, from the 
B.B.C., in Portuguese, on street-warfare, Civil 
Defence, and fire-fighting, as I did in 1941 ... and 
feel equally at home in the Sergeant's Mess or at the 
high table at Magdalen College. (62) 
Mastery of discourse means mastery of self and social 
situation (which is defined as interaction of men with 




refer to an objectively 
and thus control of the 
latter means a concomitant increase in the subject's 
ability to refer to, and thus manipulate, the real. Of the 
interview with four critics, Campbell notes: 
though they pulled a great many feathers out of me, 
they all agreed that the remarkable thing in my verse 
was a familiarity with the physics, chemistry, and 
biology of the natural and mechanical universe: and a 
knowledge of animals, fish, ships, engines, guns, 
machines, which no other modern poet possesses. It 
helps one manipulate words deftly. . .. This knowledge, 
which is of infinitely less importance than spiritual 
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knowledge, nevertheless enables you to give form and 
obvious meaning to what would otherwise remain obscure 
and difficult. (285-6) 
Campbell's hero transcends his circumstances using all 
the means at his disposal (including language). His 
certainty in the rightness of his superiority never 
falters. Consider the incident early in his marriage which 
is part of the process of breaking his wife in. 
Though we were happy, my wife aDd I had some quarrels 
since my ideas of marriage are old-fashioned about 
wifely obedience and in many ways she regarded me as 
a mere child because of being hardly out of my teens. 11 
But any marriage in which a woman wears the pants is 
an unseemly farce. To shake up her illusions I hung 
her out of the fourth-floor window of our room so that 
she should get some respect for me. This worked 
wonders.... My wife was very proud of me after I had 
hung her out of the window and boasted of it to her 
girl friends. 
This infuriated them, as their young men always 
gave in to them: and they got no excitement or 
'polarity' . But it was five or six years before we 
broke each other in to our complete satisfaction and 
I wore the pants for good. (253-4) 
It is noteworthy that she labours under illusions while his 
grasp of reality is axiomatic. The hero's circus-master 
act with the unruly performer is performed so that she may 
have an opportunity (unbidden as it was) to share in what 
he sees as his incontestable apprehension of 'the truth'. 
In order to ensure that his wife may see things from his 
(unassailable) viewpoint (and thus accept her subordinate 
position), he has -- literally and figuratively -- to shake 
up her illusions. So sure is his sense of the greater 
rights which he must enjoy because of masculine 
superiority, that he happily boasts of his use of physical 
might to subj'ugate his wife. His confidence, one realizes, 
is quite independent of her eventual compliance. He simply 
is right. His masculine might is a symptom of that. 
This conviction that male dominance is the result of 
inherent superiority, physical and intellectual (and no 
doubt spiritual), informs the narrator's critique of "the 
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smug little Sunday School world of Bloomsbury 'queerness'" 
(263). The problem, as the narrator sees it, is that these 
men do not conform to the masculine ideal. That these 
"males [are] under the domination of females" (263) cannot 
be blamed upon the females for, one can infer, females are 
underlings and cannot be expected to know better unless 
they are taught by real men. 
This state of affairs ... is absolutely the fault of 
the husbands. No woman will ever forgive a husband 
who does not give her a thoroughly good hiding when 
she knows she has deserved one. On the contrary, she 
will hate and despise him, and make a fool of him at 
every turn and corner, if he does not behave like a 
man. ( 2 63 - 4 ) 12 
The dogmatism of the language is obvious in words like 
"absolutely", "ever forgive~, "a thoroughly good hiding", 
"hate and despise", and "at every turn and corner". The 
discourse of sexism relies on unchanging absolutes. A man 
is an ideal which transcends individuals, but it is an 
ideal to which all males should aspire and which some, like 
Campbell, can attain. 
Moreover, the text' s foregrounding of the public 
achievements of its hero can be seen too to be a function 
of the discursive construction of the masculine subject. 
The gender system has perpetuated itself in many social 
formations by affording men (active) positions in the 
social domain, while restricting women to private (passive) 
roles. This distinction might be detected in the textual 
constitution of gendered subjects too: it is not uncommon 
to find in South African autobiographies that women-
authored autobiographies depict subjects who are 
introspective, more acted upon than acting (e.g. Kuzwayo), 
while those authored by men portray extroverted subjects 
whose deeds structure the narrative (e.g. Campbell). But 
Breytenbach's autobiographical subject disproves the rule 
for he is engaged in a deep exploration of self and 
experience. What he thinks is more important than what he 
does, or than what is done to him. 
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Although Campbell's autobiography clearly construes the 
attempt to be 'a man' to be a matter of choice for males, 
it serves to exemplify my earlier point about discourses 
, J pre-existing subj ects' participation in them: the 
,\)~t{T' hero / narrator is spoken by the discourse of masculine 
~( idealism and rationality, and sexism. The insistence on 
tradition (his views on marriage, for example) evidences 
the way in which discourses, which involve both linguistic 
and material attempts to define reality, speak (through) 
the subject. These discourses intersect with the social 
organisation of material beings so that masculinity and an 
attendant mastery are defined, determined and confirmed. 
Campbell's text as artefact is a product of these 
intersecting discourses . It is, furthermore, 
(re)productive in that it reproduces these ideologies. 
That material circumstance and linguistic form are 
mutually reinforcing is especially striking in Campbell's 
autobiography. As is suggested by the passage describing 
how beneficial the man's use of physical force can be to 
his relationship with a woman (Campbell, 1971:263-4) the 
language used in all sorts of situations expresses forceful 
mastery. Another example may be found when the hero feels 
himself forced to criticize "the smug little Sunday School 
world of Bloomsbury 'queerness'" (263). "Many of the male 
retinue of these great Matriarchies felt a surreptitious 
gratitude that I had struck such a resounding blow against 
the 'degrading' tyranny under which they live" (my italics; 
263). While "the Bloomsburies shrink with horror" (263), 
Campbell rallies to battle. His choice of words reinforces 
the image of himself as the fearless warrior, fighting to 
right wrongs. He always acted, he tells us, "with the 
greatest chivalry", taking for his role model "that mirror 
of Chivalry, the Red Cross Knight, in the Faery Queen" 
(264), thereby implying that he 1S the ", masculinist' 
Messiah" (263) who assails the citadel from without. Apart 
from Campbell, Mr Mortimer "was the only one with the 
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courage and honesty to describe the state of things in 
those days" (263). That this was a ~ for real men (who 
are rare) who can apprehend "the state of things" is 
implied when the narrator tells us that Mr Mortimer, 
"deserves a Bloomsbury D.C.M.!" (263). 
Ideology is apparent also in what is not said. Confining 
the discussion to the examination of the fashioning of the 
discourses of masculine superiority, we might note the 
narrator's frequent failure to name the women in his life. 
More significant than the metonymic reductiveness of his 
descriptions of young women as "pigtails" (67, 115) is the 
narrator's marginalisation of his wife. The chapter 
entitled "Marriage" is astonishingly consistent in its 
shadowy treatment of Mary Campbell. Virtually nothing is 
said about what she says, thinks or does; 
directly only once, and this is to 
acquiescence to Campbell's mastery of her. 
she is quoted 
indicate her 
She says only 
"Yes" (254). Mary's textual insubstantiality is due, too, 
to the fact that she is hardly ever actually named, and on 
those rare occasions when she is named she is never the 
subject of the sentence. The narrator himself (in his own 
voice, not quoting others) 13 uses her name only twice, in 
both instances making his relation to her clear: she is his 
fiancee or wife. His only use (in the entire text) of 
Mary's full maiden name occurs when he is describing his 
victory over rival suitors: 
Van Dieren, and a sculptor, whom we nicknamed 
Sennacheribs, had been hanging around for weeks, 
vainly, on the doorstep. They were furious that I was 
accepted as a fiance the day after our meeting. Van 
Dieren had already dedicated some of his music to Mary 
Jarman, and Sennacheribs was running after her friend, 
although at that time she gave him no encouragement. 
But I turned up on the second day, with a special 
marriage licence, upon which I had spent my last two 
or three pounds: and I installed myself at once. (245) 
It is not entirely clear that the Mary Jarman referred to 
is Campbell's fiancee (since her friend's identity is 
unspecified the vagueness is increased), for in the 
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preceding passage the only reference to her by name is 
Wyndham Lewis's description of her as "'the very beautiful 
Mary Campbell'" (244) . In both this instance and that of 
the passage quoted 
sentence and her 
above, Mary 
identity 
is not the subj ect of a 
is given incidentally. 
Furthermore, she is not the subject of either paragraph; 
she is merely the obj ect of men's attentions. The only 
other time the narrator himself uses his wife's name, the 
name is again not given prominence (" I went to find 
Augustus John and Mary", 257). Both before and after they 
are married Mary Campbell is usually referred to as "my 
wife" . 14 She is also referred to as "this one" (244); as 
one of "the girls" (245) or one of the "young ladies" (244, 
245); as "the girl I married" (247) or "this girl" (249, 
252), the "young woman" (244) or "this woman" (249). From 
the time that their first child is born (259) she becomes 
even less substantial in the narrative as she is usually 
subsumed into the effacing "we". Mary Campbell is reduced 
to the margins of the narrative; she is much more ghostlike 
than most of the male characters 1n this chapter whose 
subj ect, and title, are "Marriage"! 15 
This stable, humanist individual, the narrator! 
protagonist, is the centre of rationality; the power which 
he enjoys as a male is thus justified. Also symptomatic of 
this discursively and materially hierarchized world are 
ideological 
stereotypes. 
constructions of national and racial 
Of the former one might refer to the 
narrator's pronouncements on the French and Spanish (271), 
the English and Germans (310) and a whole host of others. 
Concerning racial stereotyping, the narrator is just as 
confident. "There is no doubt", he avers, "that the 
average native is socially inferior to the white man" 
(163). 16 The use of ( the masculine universal) in this~ 
statement 1S not merely symptomatic of the linguistic 
practice of a bygone era. It is the white man who is the 
ideal to which black men should aspire. (Black women do 
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not, it seems, figure at all). One of the narrator's 
horribly crude objections to black-white liaisons 
illustrates the point: 
I think it is silly to interbreed, though I have no 
colour prejudice. Hybrids are rarely any good, except 
in the case of a donkey stallion and the mare of a 
horse. When super-annuated English society-tarts take 
up negro lovers, it is generally a sort of perversion 
like the exaggerated feeling for dogs and cats. I 
knew one who went negro in order, as she said, to 
'study conditions amongst the negroes'. Having 
selected the negro with the largest 'condition' she 
could find, she brought him to Europe. I knew this 
couple and they happened to call on me in a Levantine 
port .... I was working in this town in partnership 
with three very deeply-coloured Saracen-like gentlemen 
and they were highly indignant when they saw me 
sitting at the same table with a negro. I explained 
it away by saying it was an aunt from South Africa 
wi th a dear old faithful servant. It did not help 
matters when she started wiping his nose for him in 
front of everybody, and then putting his tie straight. 
(162-3) 
Part of the narrator's disapproval stems from the negro's 
total lack of manly self-assertiveness. To begin with, she 
selected him, which is of course an inversion of the male 
choosing a mate. The subversion of gender roles 
exacerbates what is, for the narrator, an unacceptable 
blurring of racial divisions. While the narrator presents 
these as quite different lssues, Campbell's racism is 
clearly partly due to the perceived failure by some members 
of other race groups to observe the proprieties of the 
'real man' (white, European), proprieties which are not 
even acknowledged to be relative. Of course racism, 
without an attendant sexism, also informs much of the 
narrative (see e.g. 220, 243, 184, 311, 340). 
discourses of sexism and racism are, as a rule, 





Paternalism means a simultaneous impulse to exclude 
(people of colour and women are deemed inferior) as well as 
an impulse to include (people of colour and women should 
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aspire to the standards of white males). It is thus both 
a spurning and (usually less markedly) an embracing of 
subordinates. I have discussed the dismissive tendencies 
in Campbell's narrative regarding women and people of 
colour, but might add that this is further evidenced in the 
text in the reductiveness of the terms for women ("girls") 
and black men ("boys"), in the marked marginalisation of 
women throughout the narrative, and in the dismissive 
accounts of zulu culture (47). "Native" beliefs are 
generally treated as rather curious superstitions; consider 
the deprecation of polygamy (27), indigenous medicine (47 
and 54), and Mali's "vision" which the narrator tells us 
confidently was, in reality, merely a dream (132-3; 149; 
152; 159). 
But there is also evidence of the contrary impulse, the 
desire to include. This is only really evident in relation 
to race, perhaps for the obvious reason that although a 
woman might try to be like a man, she can never actually 
become a man, whereas a black male can at least be 'a man'. 
Campbell's hero shows his respect for other men of colour 
(and thus diverges from the expected forms of racist 
discourse) in his fluency in zulu language and lore and in 
his rej ection of municipal laws that protect European 
sensibilities from being offended by traditional Zulu dress 
(38) . Although contemporary readers might gasp 
disbelievingly, the narrator asserts that he has "no colour 
prejudice" (162); he lS, he says, quite prepared to "defy 
public opinion, even at its most frantic, as in the case 
of ... the Colour Bar in South Africa" (83, also 261). But 
his defiance is couched in terms that illustrate the 
~ontra~y tendencies. of ~missive exclusion and benevolent I 
lncluslon: "there lS no doubt that the average native is ~ 
socially inferior to the white man, but he should not and 
cannot be prevented artificially from becoming his equal, 
for the good of all concerned" (163). 
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As has been explained, the subject may determine the form 
that his utterance will take by adopting subject positions 
from amongst those offered by sometimes contestatory 
impulses within one discourse or from contradictory 
discourses, for the subject of discourse is also the 
subject of action. (Foucault and Paul Smith have argued 
this most cogently). In keeping with a poststructuralist 
paradigm, we can analyze the inconsistencies within and 
between discourses to uncover the interstices for 
individual choice from within the range of options 
delimited by culture and history: Campbell's narrator 
shifts from judgemental to benevolent paternalism, 
presumably due to some conscious decision-making on his 
part. 
Now while the discourses such as those of sexism, racism, 
national and class prejudice (in that hierarchical order) 
can be seen to intersect in this text, it should be noted 
that the effect of mutual reinforcement is not consistent 
between discourses, nor is a particular discourse 
necessarily internally consistent. More to the point, the 
interpellation of the subject by the variety of ideology-
laden "discourses will not be monologic. 
This is why, when we speak today of a divided subject, 
it is never to acknowledge his simple contradictions, 
his double postulations, etc.; it is a diffraction 
which is intended, a dispersion of energy in which 
there remains neither a central core nor a structure 
of meaning .... (Barthes, 1977a:143) 
Henriques and co-authors argue that the material individual 
is conceived of as a subject which 
is the effect of a production, caught in the mutually 
constitutive web of social practices, discourses and 
subj ecti vi ty; its reality is the tissue of social 
relations.... [Analysis]... must refer to the 
specificities of the different practices in order to 
describe the different subject positions and the 
different power relations played out in them. It 
cannot simply speak of a specific subject's behaviour 
and attitudes or ascribe in advance the subject's 
position according to class or gender. (1984:117) 
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The textual constitution of the implied reader deserves 
attention because it is this addressee who functions to 
secure or anchor the narrating subject. When the implied 
reader's attitudes appear unremarkable to the real reader 
of the text then one can be sure that this is because the 
real reader's ideological positions coincide with those 
implied by the text. Campbell's implied reader is a white 
male who applauds masculine adventurism. We know this, in 
part, because of the narrator's confidence in all of his 
opinions, including sexist and racist ones. He addresses 
the narratee in an almost conversational way as when he 
begins a sentence with "Naturally" (52), and with the 
rather chatty "As I've said before, ... " (217). That the 
addressee is a young (white) male is evident, for example, 
in this rare direct address to the reader: 
If you, my reader, at any future date find yourself 
sitting there with your arm round some young beautiful 
living torso, ... -- whoever you are, say a Grace for 
me and my beloved and my friends, for we also knew 
what you know, 
Yet, though knowing naught, 
Transcended knowledge with our thought. (215-6) 
And he adds on the next page: "But if you want the thrill 
of cowboy life, with real wild horses and cattle, you don't 
have to go to the Far West for it" (217). 
The implied reader, then, is appreciative of the ethos of 
the archetypical male adventurer. The reader lS also 
interpellated as a stable, rational individual who will 
derive sufficient vicarious pleasure from the narrated 
adventures perhaps to wish to emulate these, but at any 
rate, not to seek a greater degree of introspection on the 
part of the narrator. Narratorial stability is echoed in 
the narratee's stable individuality. And it is perhaps 
this which accounts for some of the narrative's appeal: the 
reader lS securely held in the grip of the narrative. 
There is no suggestion of uncertainty or equivocality or 
disagreement. Although I do not know of the term being 
applied to autobiography, it seems to me that Campbell and 
98 
many others1 7 write what might be referred to as class' 
realist autobiographies, for they deny , as other classic ----
realist texts do, that there is any reality outside of th~ 
tex~ c~ruction of it , and they tend to seek to 
o~ure-the materiality of the text, the process of its 
pro~ction. 
Where Campbell's autobiographical subject speaks with the 
voice of confident authority, proclaiming in every 
utterance the speaker's absolute right to exercise the 
freedom he has to determine who he is and how he lives, 
Kuzwayo's subject speaks with a voice which seeks 
tentatively to define a self and a life, but who makes no 
grandiose demands for either. Nevertheless, it is, I 
think, fair to say that whi le Campbell's narrator in many 
respects simply rehearses the discourses which prevailed at 
the time, and which constitute him as an arrogant 'man', 
Kuzwayo's more hesitant subject exercises greater freedom 
in that she breaks new ground in terms of the discursive 
consti tution of the autobiographical subj ect. This may 
seem to be an odd thing to say about someone who is clearly 
the victim of mUltiple forms of oppression, but I say this 
because, in terms of a Foucauldian theorization of 
identity, 
freedom lies in our capacity to discover the 
historical links between certain modes of self-
understanding and modes of domination, and to resist 
the ways in which we have already been classified and 
identified by dominant discourses. This means 
discovering new ways of understanding ourselves and 
each other, refusing to accept the dominant culture's 
characterizations of our practices and desires, and 
redefining them from within resistant cultures. 
(Sawicki, 1988:186) 
Perhaps because Campbell lived when an era was dying, 
whereas Kuzwayo lives in one which is in transformation, 
Kuzwayo seems, in fundamental respects, to exercise greater 
freedom of choice with regard to defining herself than 
Campbell. She has purpos i vely to resist and create new 
interstices for being, while Campbell may simply take 
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advantage of what the social formation offered the white 
men of his time on a plate. 
***** 
While the subject is afforded choices and 
responsibilities in the incompatibilities and 
incompletenesses of discourses, the parameters for these 
personal freedoms are delimited by history and culture. 
Thus the autobiographical subj ect is less a function ..3 f I 
i~i~syncrasies than a function of history and culture. ~ 
Clearly Light on a Dark Horse is dated. It is not just 
that Campbell held some offensive views; it would be more 
valid to argue that the text encodes positions which, for 
many, are no longer tenable and literally unspeakable. 
Ellen Kuzwayo's autobiographical subject, on the other 
hand, culls a new discursive position for herself as a 
black South African woman. The very title, Call Me Woman, 
indicates this redefinition of the female subject. 
Refusing the passivity and dependence of female 
sUbjectivity in traditional black ideologies, Kuzwayo 
portrays a self who can speak in the imperative, even if 
she does so rarely. Although this ability to command is 
not one which consistently characterises the 
autobiographical subject, its presence, especially 1n the 
prime position of title, indicates Kuzwayo's attempt to 
assert her right to self-definition. Dorothy Driver notes 
that feminist critics have argued that, 
one achieves voice -- or attains subjectivity as an 
individual -- at the point where one recognises the 
ways in which one has been subordinated by a political 
system, and thus made to fit a political category at 
odds with one's own experience of and aspirations in 
the world.... Subjectivity (or voice) depends on 
placing oneself as cognitive subj ect in language. 
This means recognising the ways in which one has been 
constituted in terms of specific discourses and thus 
dissociating oneself from them while at the same time 
claiming a particular and different place within 
language. (1991a:91-93) 
Kuzwayo's dissociation from dominant ideologies 1S only 
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partial, and her autobiographical subject is unexpectedly 
unassuming. Ironically , while exposing the horrors 
experienced by victims of apartheid, the text also contains 
within it echoes of apartheid's attempts to silence and 
erase black South Africans , especially black women (because 
they are considered to be less useful to the economy), by 
exploring an autobiographical 
self-effacing. This is true 
subj ect who is remarkably 
even though its explicit 
project is to celebrate black South African women. 
Kuzwayo is not defining herself as the individualist of 
Western liberal feminism , but nor is she subject to and of 





and different place wi thin 
insists on her status as 
"blackwoman" 18 , where race and womanhood are not 
contradictory. Kuzwayo's title speaks to those racists who 
have positioned her as a voiceless, disenfranchised black 
"girl" (49, 250); it also speaks to traditionalist blacks 
who seek to ensure that black women remain subordinate to 
their menfolk. 
Kuzwayo's autobiography depicts a self which co-operates 
\
With ~he Western norm of the narrating and narrated self as ! 
~extual epicentre, but it is also at odds with this ~ 
autobiographical practice insofar as KU4wayO'S 
autobiographical self 1S almost a palimpsest of the 
innumerable selves of South African black women. Although 
structurally central, Kuzwayo ' s story is not consistently 
the pivotal point of the text for it is usually presented 
as the story of one life, one self, among m~ y, not as the 
only true centre of interest. In its challenging 
conjunction of aspects of traditional black discursive 
practice with Western narrative norms, Kuzwayo's text marks 
a cultural clash, not only of textual conventions, but also 
of conceptions of the subject. 
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Call Me Woman combines autobiography and biography. 
Kuzwayo narrates the key events of her life as is 
conventional in Western autobiography (the form which has 
dominated South African autobiographical writing in the 
last 46 years), but she also devotes a large portion of the 
text to the naming and praising of many other black South 
African women. A..-biographical impulse is an important l 
feature of traditional autobiographical praise poems 
izibongo or lithoko (Gunner, 1984:63). Kuzwayo's text, 
however, differs from traditional black practice in that 
where traditionally the individual reciting her own praise 
poem will include lines and phrases which have been 
composed by others about her (thus she includes others' 
biographical material about herself), Kuzwayo records 
biographical details about herself and others. The 
publisher's cover notes testify to this: 
This remarkable autobiography refuses to focus only on 
the author.... In telling her own personal and 
political story over 70 years, Ellen Kuzwayo speaks 
for, and with, the women among whom she lives and 
works. Their courage and dignity remain a source of 
wonder. 
The organisation of Call Me Woman reinforces this 
biographical impulse and represents an important departure 
from both traditional black and Westernised 
autobiographical forms: parts one and three of the text --
which do not focus principally on the autobiographical 
subj ect -- frame the narration of Kuzwayo' s life story. 
The result is a fracturing of the focus. 
The first and third parts are more documentary than 
autobiographical. Part one, entitled "Soweto" , describes 
living conditions for black South Africans presumably for 
the uninformed non-South African reader (see, for example, 
5) . Documenting the appalling poverty and social 
disintegration accompanying the relentless progress of 
apartheid, Kuzwayo deplores the fact that black South 
Africans have been left "without direction or a patt~rn to 
follow: a tragic state of affairs" (13). Concluding the 
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first section with the 1976 riots and the brutal murder of 
Steve Biko and others, the narrator returns again and again 
to what these catastrophes have meant to black women. Her 
principle interest is in "how other black women have 
managed to survive the horrible conditions thrust on them" 
(21). Kuzwayo applauds these women -- the humble domestic 
workers and the defiant illicit liquor-brewers alike: to 
her they are all "great mothers of South Africa" (23). 
The third and last part is principally concerned to 
record women's contributions to "the Struggle". Again, 
this is more documentary than autobiography. And although 
the central part of the text in many other respects 
conforms to mainstream Western autobiographical practice 
(it is a prose narrative with an authorial narrator, as 
opposed to non-narrative poetry of the traditional black 
praise poem), the framing device which situates Kuzwayo's 
life story (parts one and three) has the effect of 
depersonalising the autobiography. 
This effect is reinforced by the juxtaposition, before 
the text proper begins, of a chronological list of 
significant events in Kuzwayo's life and a like chronicle 
of major political events in South Africa from just before 
Ellen's birth to 1984 (the time of writing). She is thus 
presented as merely one victim of this national nightmare. 
Further detracting from the achievements of the 
autobiographical subject, are the lists of names of all 
black women medical doctors and lawyers (up to 1982) which 
conclude the text. The photographs which are printed in 
the text contribute, too, to this fracturing effect: 14 
relate to Kuzwayo and her family; the other 10 are of a 
generally documentary nature (7 are of important black 
women). The text, then, in narrative technique, content 
and structure, serves as a blending of narrative and non-
narrative (here in documentary form) (auto) biographical 
forms, the effect being to create an autobiographical 
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subject who provides an interesting measure of social 
change. 
Even the central part 
own life 
of the book which deals with 
Kuzwayo's refuses to privilege the 
reminds us that her autobiographical subject. 
special and 
Kuzwayo 
story is not that her achievements are 
important because she is a black woman, not because they 
represent personal victories. Of her role in the movie 
"Cry The Beloved Country" she comments :"We made a mark for 
ourselves, for the youth clubs and, above all, for black 
womanhood" (143). 
herself: 
Often she shifts the focus away from 
Let it be known that the trauma I went through in the 
three years my son was banned to Mafikeng is nothing 
unique. It is the torture and suffering of hundreds 
of black parents. Mothers in particular have endured 
such torments .... (193) 
Of her failed marriage she observes: 
Day by day I realised I was being humiliated and 
degraded, an experience I have in recent years come to 
realise is suffered by many wives the world over, 
within different races, cultures and religions. At 
that time I believed I was singled out as an 
individual .... (124) 
Kuzwayo's text, then, is 'selling' not only her life 
story but ~m~RY to the lives of black South African 
,--
women. Kuzwayo's studied vagueness in the narration of the 
crucial breakdown of her first marriage (see 123-127) 
crucial in that it alters her life utterly and completely -
- is symptomatic of this refusal to sell a narrated self, 




frame (part two of the 
fundamentally 
text) , it is 
noteworthy that the momentous breakdown of her marriage, 
which means social stigma for Kuzwayo as well as the loss 
of her two sons, is discussed in obscure terms: 
I had to face the reality that marriage did not mean 
the pinnacle of life, but was its stark beginning. It 
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was a harsh, shocking discovery for me. . .. My first 
pregnancy engaged my thoughts and in a way sheltered 
me from some of the things which would otherwise have 
unsettled me: things which were happening under my 
nose in my own house. I either pretended I did not 
see them or I refused to believe what I saw .... [My 
two sons] protected me, as it were, from the daily 
harsh and hurting experiences I was exposed to. 
My image of married life was far removed from 
torture I was exposed to. I went through 
physical and mental sufferings.... Even now, I 




To readers who expect autobiographies to conform to the 
conventions of the realist novel the evasiveness is very 
disturbing. (See, for example, Daymond, 1987:21-22.) 
Although those familiar with narrative autobiography 
usually expect some information to be withheld (Campbell 
and Paton, for instance, merely hint at extra-marital 
affairs), we do not expect the missing information to be 
crucial to the narrative, as is the case in Call Me Woman. 
The narrator simply requires that readers offer her their 
trust as an act of faith. This is an important difference 
from Campbell's which, exemplifying the mainstream Western 
autobiographical subject, commodifies the self as a clearly 
delineated and defined product: The Macho Adventurer, The 
Master. 
Another feature of Kuzwayo's text which distinguishes it 
from other narrative autobiographies, and which relates to 
my earlier point about self-effacement of the 
autobiographical subject, is the use of focalisation. 
Usually, South African autobiographical writing follows in 
- -
the Western tradition and uses the narrator in the 
present of writing (narrating self) or in the past of the 
story (character self) -- as focalizer. 19 Instead of using 
the autobiographical subject, past and present, enunciating 
and enunciated, as the text's centre of gravity, Kuzwayo 
not only decentres the text by shifting the focus onto 
other black women, but also often speaks not specifically 
as Ellen Kuzwayo but as a black woman. 20 Kuzwayo, in other 
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words, departs from Western tradition when she positions 
the autobiographical subject as a non-individualised black 
woman. Consider, for example, the narration of Steve 
Biko's death: 
According to the Daily Despatch, Steve Bantu Biko, in 
the company of his friend Peter Jones, left his mother 
at 7.00 pm on 17 August 1977, his jacket hung casually 
over his shoulders. His last words to her were, 'Mom, 
I'm coming back.' Two days later both young men were 
detained in Grahamstown. His mother first knew of his 
detention on 20 August. When Alice Biko learnt that 
her son was detained at Port Elizabeth, as any natural 
mother would, she sent him a change of clothes. All 
attempts by his family and lawyers to see him were 
refused by the security police. Imagine the mental 
torture of being denied permission to see your son, 
when you know he needs you most. This is the 
experience and suffering of many black mothers. (47) 
This lS focalized by Kuzwayo as a black mother ("as any 
natural mother would"; "imagine the mental torture"), as 
well as by Alice Biko (Biko's mother) with whom the 
narrator empathizes. The narrator then generalises the 
experience to all black mothers whose children have been 
victims of apartheid violence: "This is the experience and 
suffering of many black mothers" (47). (It is noteworthy 
that she refers to "mothers", not "parents".) 
While other autobiographical narrators might, 
occasionally, use characters other than themselves as 
focalizers, this is not common, and it happens 
inconsistently. Kuzwayo, on the other hand, uses this 
technique rather frequently. Moreover, while 
autobiographies usually focus upon the autobiographer (as 
character and narrator) and her experiences, Kuzwayo' s 
frequently uses other black women or their experiences as 
the obj ect of focalization. 21 For instance, although 
Kuzwayo and her experiences are the focalized in the 
central autobiographical part of the text, in the first and 
final parts other black women and their circumstances are 
generally the objects of focalization. The significance of 
this for the discussion of subjectivity lies in the 
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narrator's blurring of the defining outlines of an 
individualistic self in a text in which she is focalizer 
and focalized inconsistently. 
Kuzwayo presents herself not so much as the 
representative, or archetypical black woman22 -- for this 
means to claim to be extra-ordinarily typical -- but rather 
as one of many. The consistent humility of Kuzwayo' s 
autobiographical subject seems incompatible with a claim to 
be able to stand for the group. Even in those instances 
when the narrator does indicate that her experiences are 
shared by other black women, the claim serves to detract 
attention from the autobiographical subject, not to 
aggrandize it. It is to say "I am one of the group, not 
unique, " rather than "I can represent the group for I am 
typical" . This is an important distinction; perhaps one 
related to the specific instantiations of the gender system 
experienced by Kuzwayo. For where someone like Mathabane 
seeks to define personal circumstances as typical and 
representative (hence the title, Kaffir Boy), Kuzwayo 
presents her experiences as her own, but as not uncommon 
(hence Call Me Woman) . 
The subject is thus textually constituted, in part, by 





out of which traditional Western 
practice emerges 
tradi tional black 
subject as one of 
but also, more 
discourses which 
the community. 
Traditional praise poems define identity in terms of 
ancestry and relationship (Gunner,1984:59). The subject of 
a praise poem is identified by the relation of the names of 
the ancestors (usually from the patriarchal line), the clan 
names of the individual, and the individual's praise names. 
Now although Call Me Woman does not appear consciously to 
evoke key features of izibongo or lithoko, traditional Zulu 
and Sotho auto/biographical forms, it does depict the self 
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as part of a conununity and insists that the meaning of 
identity is not individually defined. The naming of other 
black South African women functions, in part, to define the 
autobiographical subj ect: she is one of that conununi ty. 
Knowing them, and her relation to them, helps us to know 
her (for example, 99, 148, 149). Moreover, the notion that 
one's praise poem invested one with an aura of inunortality 
-- because it would be recited after death, almost as a 
prayer, to conununicate with the ancestors or shades 
imbues, in altered form, Kuzwayo's autobiography too. But 
instead of bestowing inunortality on herself through the 
text, Kuzwayo conunemorates other black South Africans, 
particularly women. 
In conunon with what Elizabeth Gunner refers to as the 
essential character of Zulu izibongo of "eulogy and 
identification" (1984:83), Kuzwayo lauds individual black 
women and, in so doing, praises them all for those referred 
to by name function as representatives. 
passage exemplifies this nicely: 
The following 
Women somehow seem to cope with the pressures [of 
social disintegration] more successfully than men. 
Take, for example, the case of one woman who drives a 
taxi for a living.... [Mrs Esther Seokelo's story] is 
an unusual but significant example of the invaluable 
contribution made by black women towards the 
development of their conununity and country. (51-2) 
Kuzwayo is autobiographer, as well as imbongi (praise 
singer), using the examples of other black women to inspire 
others, just as the traditional praise poet does (Gunner, 
1984:70): 
The physical activities of a people can be temporarily 
contained, but the spirit behind that movement lives 
on forever. That alone, if nothing else, should be an 
inspiration for the black women. . .. When I look back 
over the history of women in South Africa ... I find 
myself amazed allover again, first by the 
extraordinary disabilities under which the women of my 
country have had to struggle, and then by the spirit 
with which so many of the challenges have been 
overcome. (Kuzwayo, 1985:259) 
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Campbell is an individual who stands out clearly in the 
crowd and 1n the text. Discursive contradictions are 
banished from the text (as far as possible) so that the 
hero may be delineated with unwavering certitude. 
Kuzwayo's text participates in the humanist conception of 
the individual when she presents the autobiographical 
subj ect as a more or less stable, rational being whose 
principle characteristic is an unwavering concern for the 
c ommunity (114), but it departs from this tradition when it 
defines self relationally and when it allows contradiction 
and uncertainty to surface: "Perhaps I should also not rule 
out the possibility that my observations were more in my 
mind than real. Did I observe what I wished and hoped to 
see?" (171). This is a self who is problematized, having 
to work at finding stability: 
At that point the gravity of the problem of the 
Zoutspansberg residents hit me between the eyes. I 
was speechless. I could not account for my own 
feelings of guilt about this situation, much as I told 
myself I was not to be blamed for it. (170) 
When Campbell's hero is confronted by people who do not 
share his opinions he dismisses them. ~uzwayo's sense of { 
self is much less a function of essential self-knowi;dge 
than of relationship. Her uncertainty when she leaves W 
prison is a moving example of how SUbjectivity 1S in 
process, and must continually be re-adjusted. She uses the 
telling phrase "to collect myself" (217) for she finds that 
her perceptions are "confused" (216). Detention has 
destabilized her sense of self and resulted 1n an 
incapacitating dread : 
I longed to get [home], but somehow I was frightened -
- very much frightened -- though I could not say what 
I was really afraid of . ... Trying hard to collect 
myself, I finally managed to step out of the car and 
stood for a few seconds... half-happy to be home, 
half-paralysed with unaccountable fear. (217) 
The reason for the panic becomes apparent once it is clear 
to her that the worst will not be realised: Kuzwayo had 
been terrified that the community might suspect and reject 
her. Once her own sense of self has been vindicated by the 
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community, she can accept that the negative conceptions of 
her held by police and prison officials have proven false. 
But the intensity of the effort to try to maintain an 
identity which she could believe in causes complete 
breakdown: 
That group [of neighbours] finally ended the fears I 
had had about the reaction and attitudes of my people. 
I had received outstanding support and acceptance on 
my return from detention and I survived and thrived on 
that.... The strangest thing was that I could not as 
much as much as stand up from that couch to go to bed 
that night. Suddenly the resistance I had put up in 
detention, both emotional and physical, deserted my 
system without warning. I collapsed without passing 
out, and spent the night on the couch. When I came 
to, the next day, I was not the same Ellen I had been 
twelve hours earlier. (218, my emphases) 23 
Kuzwayo's sense of self is unstable and vulnerable, due 
in large measure to the devastating effects of apartheid: 
on the micro scale, its demeaning of the worth of every 
black South African; on the macro scale, its destruction of 
traditional communities and value systems, evidenced also 
in the breakdown of the family . (Kuzwayo's sense of self is 
destabilised, too, when her aunt rej ects her (107 -8) ) . 
Fanon argues that colonialism and attendant racism lead to 
a radical uncertainty of self: 
Because it is a systematic negation of the other 
person and a furious determination to deny the other 
person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces 
the people it dominates to ask themselves the question 
constantly: 'In reality, who am I?' (1973:200) 
. 
Violently irreconcilable interpretations of her identity 
result in vulnerability and uncertainty: 
As I observe people's perceptions of me in the 
communities where I move, and then place my findings 
against the cold attitudes and harsh responses I get 
from government departments, I am completely thrown 
off balance. While I really believe that my community 
and country accept me as an asset, my government sees 
me not only as a liability but as a threat. 
During the last ten to fifteen years, I have been 
able to serve my community in many different ways .... 
I am amazed when I observe the power, strength and 
self-confidence that are born of involvement in work 
on behalf of one's own hard-pressed people. (221) 
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Kuzwayo does not present her self as a sort of self-
contained commodity because this is a subject which 
confronts its dependence upon social networks. Mary 
Maboreke describes gender based differences In the 
interpellation of black South African subjects: 
Africans in general and African women in particular 
identify themselves through a maze of relationships; 
namely, mother to so-and-so, daughter of so-and-so, 
wife of so-and-so, etc, in which 'so-and-so' is always 
a man. African women are never viewed as separate 
individuals but rather as appendages of a man. Almost 
all Africans see themselves as an integral part of a 
big and complex machine called 'the family'. The 
individual alone is seen as almost useless and 
certainly powerless. African women feel this 
powerlessness when removed from the family wheel, and 
so attach themselves to the family organism even more 
'tightly. The obligation this family membership 
generates is the price women pay for membership of 
their family. 
Societies such as ours are tightly structured, 
stratified, hedged in by prescriptions, by the primacy 
of the communal good over individual rights and 
interests. (1991: 228-9) 
Thandabantu Nhlapo makes a similar point: he comments on 
the "non-individual nature" of African marriage, adding 
that "group interests are framed in favour of men" 
(1991: 113) . 
[The] African value system does not perceive women as 
separate entities but always as adjuncts to the 
family. A woman's personhood is lost in the group 
much more than a man's is subsumed under the so-called 
community principle. (1991:120) 
Although Kuzwayo's autobiographical subject is defined 
relationally, the primary relationship is less pivotally 
that of the family than that of the community. This text 
thus marks a shift not only from traditional Western 
individualism, but also from traditional black 
constructions of the female subject. So that while 
Kuzwayo's autobiographical subj ect lS informed by some 
Western norms, it is not defined in individualistic terms; 
conforming to traditional black social norms insofar as 
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this is a self defined by a community, the text, 
unexpectedly, deviates from the norm in that the community 
is not dominated by men, but by black women, be they 
lawyers or humble pavement hawkers. 
Kuzwayo claims the right to define herself by redefining 
the community to which she belongs, not by rej ecting 
community to insist on individual autonomy. Identifying . 
herself as a mother, she redefines this too: this is a 
woman who must struggle against oppression and poverty, a 
fighter who must fight precisely because of her role as 
nurturer. She shows that there is no contradiction here. 
Driver makes a similar point (1991a:93), and argues also 
that critical analysis of the specific configuration of 
one's social circumstances is a necessary step for women to 
achieve greater self-control: "women's voices cannot emerge 
as 'their own' without interrogating the various structures 
by which they have been defined, which includes 
interrogating the family itself" (1991a:93). 
The breakdown of her first marriage is crucial because 
Kuzwayo 1S forced thereby to construct an independent 
identity, without the stays of a close and stable set of 
traditional familial relationships. In fleeing her 
husband's home and in thus detaching herself from that 
network of self-defining relationships, Kuzwayo (who has 
already broken with her own family, 97ff) has to turn to 
her estranged natural father and his family. 
Unfortunately, she finds that she is unable to recapture a 
sense of belonging: "when I came back from Saulspoort and 
needed someone to help me out, I did not feel free, in this 
new home, to seek the help I needed" (134). She stays 
there only two months. It is through her teaching and 
community work, and the friends that she makes, that 




Gordimer says of Kuzwayo: 
[She] is history in the person of one woman.. .. She 
represents ... wholeness attained by the transitional 
woman. . . . [She] is not Westernized; she is one of 
those who have Africanised the Western concept of 
woman and in herself achieved a synthesis with meaning 
for all who experience cultural conflict. (1985:xi) 
It seems to me that there is much validity in this 
assessment of a textually constituted subject which breaks 
with the conventions of both Western and indigenous culture 
in important respects. Kuzwayo's autobiographical subject 
is indeed "transitional" as Gordimer argues, from a 
traditional black economically stable community to 
fragmented, "proletarian dormitories" (xi) However, I 
want to argue that Kuzwayo is not in transit, so to speak, 
from traditional black notions of the subject to Western 
modes of construing being; rather she represents a specific 
instantiation of the transformation of both into something 
which is new and different. Kuzwayo' s autobiographical 
subject represents one possible response ln terms of 
sUbjectivity to the shifts in the South African social 
formation and her text does not represent an incomplete and 
unsuccessful assimilation of the standards and conventions 
of Western autobiography. The autobiographical subject is 
the transitional product of a complex fabric of social 
discourses, constituted in the space between the frames. 
Perhaps it is necessary to stress that autobiographical 
writing by black South Africans should not be conceived ~f - - -----
as originating in praise poems and then striving to achieve -the standards and practices of Westernised forms. All 
forms of textuality and the construction of sUbjectivity 
are under unrelenting, but inconsistent, pressure from 
divergent discursive and material circumstances. As 
conditions ln the social formation shift, so will textual 
codifications change. We can see this sort of pressure on 
popular (Western) music which has resulted in attempts by 
whites to adapt to black practice, e.g. Johnny Clegg and 
Savuka, Mango Groove, and Paul Simon on "Gracelands". 
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south African autobiographical writing has some instructive 
instances of textual responses to cultural turmoil. 
Consider, for instance, the anthologies of autobiographical 
sketches which have been so popular over the past ten years 
or so (a more detailed discussion follows in Chapter 4): 
these usually treat the narrating and narrated subject in 
ways which diverge from conventional Western and 
traditional black norms. For one thing, the narrator and 
her narrative are usually produced jointly by the 
researcher and the interviewee, and these life stories 
often have more than merely narrative interest. Many, for 
instance, are intended to function as texts for literacy 
classes. If we are to learn something from these texts, we 
must be keenly attentive to the specificities of their 
responses to social and discursive pressures. 
It is important, too, that analysts acknowledge the 
-;;;> mpermanence of generic 'essentials' ) interrogating how and 
why changes occur, and what these may signify. Many texts, 
for example, fail to conform to the definitive criteria 
that Daymond cites (1987) . 24 Christopher Hope's White Boy 
Running, for instance , conforms more closely to what 
Daymond identifies as a black cultural impulse to "personal 
testimony" which is "not really autobiography" (1987: 18) . 
Ruth Gordon, E.G.Malherbe, Alan Paton, Guy Butler, Ernie 
Duffield, and Roy Campbell (to name but a few) do not 
perceive or present the self as representative, nor does 
suffering seem to be their motive for writing. And worker 
autobiographies rarely include "specificity of detail". 
Conventions change even for those who are producing what 
might be called mainstream autobiographies. 
Autobiographical subjects inevitably change because 
material and discursive interpellations of the subj ect 
undergo constant transformations in reaction to uneven 
pressures from different aspects of the social formation. 
Conventions cannot statically conform to "the impetus 
immortalised in the title of one of the greatest of all 
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suggestion that there is 
she says that Kuzwayo 
a Western 
"is not 
sufficiently Western to write autobiography quite as we 
expect it to be" (22) This "we" is a fiction; there are 
many different expectations abroad even for those who are 
familiar with Western norms (compare, for example, Barthes' 
autobiography with Maxine Hong Kingston's). South African 
autobiographical writing shows that the pressures upon 
texts, from the social formation and from other texts, are 
not linear but multi-faceted, uneven, and inconsistent. 
These tensions and tendencies are perhaps most importantly 
encoded in the textual inscription of subjectivity. 
Call Me Woman is one answer to Bozzoli's question about 
South Africa's oppresslve system: "What happens to 
consciousness when the forces of structure and agency are 
so unevenly balanced?" (1991:2). Bozzoli reminds us that 
the balance between, on the one hand, social structures 
which determine people's lives and, on the other, free 
choice of action on the part of subjects, will be dependent 
on where we stand in relation to social power. While for 
the South African ruling classes, "self-consciously 
designed and promulgated ideologies are common" (2), for 
the powerless, consciousness 
The 
has rarely attained a similarly deliberate 
character ... the facts of alienation and oppression 
have meant that the ordinary person has infrequently 
been drawn into a vision of herself as capable of 
exerting power beyond a limited sphere. Consciousness 
here has been formed within and against structures, 
rather than above and around them. (2). 
autobiographies of Campbell and Kuzwayo are 
illustrative. Kuzwayo's opposition to the discourses of 
racism and sexism (e. g. 32) is contained, and contains 
within it, conservative leanings: she must have a family 
of her own (144); she perceives herself as someone who must 
serve (e.g. 46, 48, 73, 114). She applauds the gains which 
have been made by black women against patriarchal 
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limitations, but seems to harbour some ambivalent feelings 
in this regard as she discusses the resultant social 
tensions (261-263). 
Kuzwayo's text manifests the fractures and dissonance to 
which the individual is sUbject; thus, 
[t]he complexities involved in understanding the terms 
'resistance' or ' opposition' are considerable when one 
perceives people as being so intricately enmeshed in 
different types of domination that opposition to one 
type may involve collaboration with another. 
(Bozzoli,1991:14) 
Kuzwayo's autobiographical subj ect tries to change the 
systems of apartheid and traditional patriarchy from within 
the confines of the role of server. The text's conclusion 
shows this: 
The black women in South Africa ave shown outstanding 
tenacity against great odds. We shall never give in 
to defeat.... The commitment of the women of my 
community is my commitment -- to stand side by side 
with our menfolk and our children in this long 
struggle to liberate ourselves and to bring about 
peace and justice for all in a country we love so 
deeply. 
The old Setswana proverb has come alive with a 
fresh meaning for me at this point: 
Mmangoana 0 tshwara thipa ka fa bogaleng 
It means: 
, The child's mother grabs the sharp end of the 
knife' . 
Nkosi Sikelel' i Afrika 
God Bless Africa. (263) 
Autobiographies which conform to the general trend of 
Western narrative autobiography, like Campbell's and most 
other South African autobiographies produced in the last 
four decades, present the autobiographer/narrator as the 
authority of self and text, the latter as a transparent 
reflection of the former. Kuzwayo's is different in that 
a unifying narrative, controlled by a stable narrator, is 
subordinated structurally to the non-narrative mosaic of 
other black women's lives. The textual constitution of the 
subject is different, too, in that Kuzwayo's self is 
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unstable, tentative, and 1S presented as an adumbration of 
other "selves", those of other black South African women. 
***** 
Most South African autobiographies written in English in 
the last 46 years concentrate attention upon the bios, the 
record of lived events. Most are personal history rather 
than personal history. Breyten Breytenbach' s The True 
Confessions of an Albino Terrorist is exceptional in its 
exploration of the subject as textual construct, the 
writing process as part of the experience of, and 
construction of, (a) being. The autobiographical self is 
presented more in the spirit of a question than a 
statement. Although the narrator repeatedly declares "I am 
the writer" 25, his insistence conforming to normative 
expectations of Western-style autobiography that the "I" of 
the text represents the (extra-textual) author and 
(narrative) hero, the text also insists that such 
assertions are based on fictions, fictions of narrative 
shaping and generic convention, as well as more fundamental 
fictions concerning the nature of being, the constitution 
of sUbjectivity. The text explores sUbjectivity and its 
textual encoding; it announces itself as an autobiography, 
but shows that postmodernist scepticism 1S enabling of 
deeper insights into the complexities and secrets of being. 
It fractures the "I". " , I' continually makes itself over 
and over again, reposits itself as a displaced, symbolic 
witness of the shattering where every entity was dissolved" 
(Kristeva, 1980:163-4). 
The title, The True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist, 
resonates with ambiguity. Claiming to conform to the 
conventions of the confessional autobiography while 
simultaneously mocking such claims, the text also exploits 
the novelistic use of the conventions of the confessional 
autobiography. Thus "true" implies sincere, unembellished, 
factual; but it recalls other "true" narratives like 
117 
Gulliver's Travels, Moll Flanders and Tom Jones, an 
impression reinforced by the obviously imitative summaries 
which introduce each of the two parts of the book. For 
instance, the Preface to Part One reads: "being the 
veritable account in words and in breaks of how a foolish 
fellow got caught in the antechamber of No Man's Land" 
(11) . 
But the play on the word "true" does not negate its 
conventional significance for autobiography. Throughout ~ 
the text there runs a strand in the narrative which serves 
primarily to inform the reader. 26 And at the end of the 
narrative, the first of six "Notes" is largely concerned 
with the status of the text as a truthful document. 27 The 
confession 
had to become the reflection of a search for what 
really happened, and for the identity of the 
narrator. ... My account of what happened is neither 
objective nor complete. I have consciously left out 
much that I knew about, or now know about.... I don't 
think there is any total objectivity ever. There must 
be, however, I believe and I try, a constant attempt 
at remaining fully aware under all circumstances, 
which again means that there are choices to be made 
and responsibility to be taken for the awareness and 
for the choices. I have attempted as closely as 
possible to describe only that which I experienced or 
saw ... I tried always to remain clear and to penetrate 
to a feeling for truth in what I heard and learnt from 
others ... behind every name there's a real person .... 
And I have not 'invented' or transposed any event. 
(338-9) 
The text is thus "true" since it informs In conventional 
ways; it is subjectively true and aims for "a feeling for 
truth"; but it is also "true" in new interrogative ways: 
the narrator uses the term in inverted commas (156, 158). 
Moreover, it is "true" in that it is a textual construct 
conforming to many important discursive conventions 
regarding fictive "truth": "The fools -- don't they know 
that truth is a convention?" (36). Finally, it satirises 
"truth" as constructed by the apartheid regime, especially 
the "truth" that B}:"eytenbach is the "terrorist" menace to 
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society, while his captors are upholders of justice. The 
narrative is thus true in many senses obj ectively, 
subjectively, factually, fictionally, and ln the Derridean 
sense of truth under erasure. 
This can be said, too, of the second word in the title, 
the "Confessions". The text is far more frequently 
indictment than confession; moreover, when the narrator 
does confess there is no orgy of self-abasement in the 
tradition of Rousseau; nor does he confess to the charges 
of the apartheid state (his plans to facilitate the 
overthrow of the white Nationalist government are discussed 
freely, rather than admitted to or confessed) . 28 Instead, 
when he confesses in a spirit of self-reproach he confesses 
to the "guilt of the survivor" (27), to his humanity, and 
to his need to comply even when he hates what he complies 
with (66; 169-71), to "participate in his own undoing .... 
Worse, far worse, that he ended up looking upon his 
tormentor as a confessor, as a friend even. This 
development is so profoundly unnatural that it makes him 
sick of himself" (343). 
I do not know whether what I aim for will be any 
better but I do know that this [apartheid state] is 
unacceptable and that it will have to be destroyed to 
make it possible for the other -- maybe better -- to 
take its place. And I know that I am lazy ... my knees 
are weak ... I genuflect so easily .... (239-40) 
This is confession, in the usual sense and, like most 
confessions, Breytenbach's text offers narrative excuses 
and is thus self-justifying -- which, as de Man remarked 
about Rousseau's Confessions, serves to "exculpate the 
confessor, thus making the confession (and the confessional 
text) redundant" (quoted in Norris, 1982: 107) . But the 
word "Confession" is also used ironically and the irony 
undercuts (but does not negate) this deconstruction of the 
'sincere' confession. This is, then, a confession, but the 
fact that it is also the parodic echo of other "true 
confessions" adds another dimension of meaning to a laden 
term. 
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The reference to himself as an albino serves to draw 
attention to the author / narrator's white skin, while 
disclaiming identity with whites of European descent. It 
is in part an ironic commentary on the etymological roots 
of the word Afrikaner (viz African). Breytenbach distances 
himself from Afrikaners by referring to them by the 
derogatory term used by prisoners and black South Africans; 
he warns the reader, "Don't ever trust a boer. His two 
faces are the result of a tragically flawed culture" (161). 
Thus in his refusal to be identified with Afrikaners ("I do 
not consider myself to be an Afrikaner. To be an Afrikaner 
in the way they define it 1S to be a living insult" (280)), 
he claims identity with black South Africans by implying 
that his whiteness is an accident of biology, not a matter 
of racial or cultural alignment. "I know what it is like 
to be black in a white country", he says (27), and half 
expects black security policemen to identify with his 
chosen role as freedom fighter, perhaps to perceive his 
'race' as albino. He hails his other self, "Mr 
Investigator", as his 
dark mirror-brother. We need to talk, brother I. I 
must tell you what it was like to be an albino in a 
white land. We are forever united by an intimate 
knowledge of the depravity man will stoop to. Son of 
Africa. Azanians.... I hear you chuckling, you who 
are Black. . .. (260) 
But the narrator also insists that race cannot be ignored: 
The gulf between Black and White, or between Whites 
and all the others, is so enormous that in fact we are 
strangers to one another. The only common ground we 
share is Apartheid. But we interpret the ground 
differently. We are conditioned, each in his own way, 
by the privileges and the iniquities of the system. 
To pretend differently would be taking and mistaking 
one's desires for reality. (73-4) 29 
So on another level the claim to be an albino, an honorary 
black, is ironic. 
Lastly, his adoption of the regime's term to describe all 
who challenge the legitimacy of the Nationalist government 
as "terrorists" further underscores the ironies which 
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resonate in the rest of the title. 
You feel like laughing. Mr Investigator? You 
splatter. What? Am I not a terrorist then? No, no, 
no, don't get me wrong. I'm not denying that. I've 
accepted it. Mea culpa. (I am guilty in any event. 
All that's still lacking is the crime to fit the 
guilt. I'm sure you can help me there, Mr Eye.) I 
was accused of being a terrorist, I was brought before 
the courts in terms of the Terrorism Act, I was 
convicted of being one, I was sentenced as a 
terrorist, on my jail ticket where it asked 'sentence 
or crime' it was written, carefully, 'terrorism'i 
therefore, because this is the way we do things in No 
Man's Land, therefore I am indeed a terrorist. But at 
the time when these interrogations were going on it 
was still a secret to the minds of my young [activist] 
friends. (38) 
True Confessions exposes some of the horrors perpetrated by 
state employed terrorists. Breytenbach is a convicted 
terrorist, but he isn't a terrorist for he does not 
terrorise. 
This insistence on the plurality of meanlng evidenced in 
the title informs the text's exploration of selfhood. This 
inquiry is predicated both upon the narrating subj ect' s 
interpellation as an Afrikaner who seeks to undermine the 
Afrikaner apartheid State (racism had become increasingly 
virulent during the author's lifetime), as well as upon the 
specific conditions prevailing in the prison. The refusal 
to define himself simply as one kind of man is, to some 
extent, brought about by ironies of his sentence as a 
terrorist, while the very people (his Afrikaner people) who 
subject him to terrorist tactics are cast (in the prison 
system and in the social formation) as beyond reproach. 
The confessing self is the site for the convergence of many 
(sometimes intersecting, sometimes contestatory) dimensions 
of significance. The expressive realist author, the 
humanist source of truth of experience, is present but not 
as god-like master of the discourse or of self. As 
Kristeva says, "[Y]ou do not take place as such, but as a 
stance essential to a practice" (1980:165). This authorial 
voice is one among many. Thus the text is presented as a 
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source of information about a material being whose 
photograph is printed on the back cover30 , the photograph 
serving to set the seal of authority on the text as 
autobiography by indicating that the image depicts the 
writer, the "real author" in narratological terms, and the 
narrator and protagonist of the narrative. 
This writer is the "terrorist" who entered South Africa 
on a false passport. The writer's experiences provide the 
narrative structure for the text: the narrative begins with 
his arrival in South Africa and subsequent entrapment, and 
ends with his departure from South Africa to freedom. As 
might be expected, especially by novel readers, the hero 
also develops, undergoes transformation, as a result of his 
experiences so that there is greater convergence between 
narrator and protagonist at the end of the narrative. 31 
This is hinted at early in the text when the narrator 
indicates a subsequent loss of innocence: "You see, I was 
a travelling salesman in dreams and illusions" (24) The 
narrative is the medium by which the past selves of the 
protagonist and the narrating self are woven together; and 
since this is a narrative in print form, the author's name 
is part of the fabric. But the conjunction is by no means 
total for the text explores not a composite or finite self 
as 'character', but an experiencing self, a self in process 
(and, of course, an important part of that process is the 
process of recording/writing). Barthes' autobiographical 
narrator says of himself: 
All this must be considered as if spoken by a 
character in a novel or rather by several 
characters. For the image-repertoire, fatal substance 
of the novel, and the labyrinth of levels in which 
anyone who speaks about himself gets lost the 
image-repertoire is taken over by several masks 
(personae), yet distributed according to the depth of 
the stage (and yet no one -- personne, as we say in 
French -- is behind them). (1977a:119-120) 
The experiencing self experiences not only immediate 
sensation but also memory of past sensation; these cannot 
be neatly separated. So strong 1S the link between 
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remembered self and narrating self in True Confessions that 
it is the need to purge the narrating self from the 
ugliness of recollected experience that provides the 
principal motive for writing. "Now I must get rid of the 
unreality. I must vomit. I must eject this darkness" (27) 
the narrator says; and, 
[t]he only comfort I allow myself is the thought (or 
the hope?) that recollecting all the events will also 
allow me to put them out of mind forever. I am hoping 
for a purge. (That is why it is so important to 
dredge up everything: what one leaves behind will, 
like the bloodsucking head of the louse you remove 
from your skin, start festering.) ... Is the need to 
vomit the surfacing past a rash on the brain? (151-2) 
The narrating self is a collage of past and present selves. 
Experience in the present is an uneven assemblage of past 
experiences and present subject positions (though these 
are, of course, densely interwoven and not necessarily 
separable). In the "insert" which shifts from the time of 
the narrative (story time) to the time of the act of 
narrating, the narrator finds himself seeing and feeling 
Africa, in Paris: 
Down in the kernel of the city there's the old City 
Hall .... I look up and like a memory another vision 
superimposes itself. Already now I know that there 
will be this blotting nostalgia, other scenes 
darkening under what the eye sees at the moment. The 
slight blue, the sniff of wind in the air, and the 
green figures having the shapes of movement make me 
remember that wild and desolate coast along the 
Atlantic Ocean with the primeval wind sailing over the 
dunes bending the grass to prayer, and that same light 
blue allied to white. I can taste it on my tongue. 
When later I walk up the hill again there is a folding 
into evening and outlines fading fast. Winter. But 
the light grows daily.... Everywhere, allover town, 
there has been a renewal.... There's life behind the 
facades. . .. People are living there .... 32 Contrast it 
with that other place in No Man's Land having the 
attributes and gestures of life but in fact being a 
labyrinth of death. In the thin alleys leading off 
these streets the lampposts start revealing the first 
yellow globes of darkness .... Suddenly I lmaglne a 
rattling noise and again falls open in that lnner man 
which never forgets a memory of an image of dusk-
coloured grey with a verdigris glow over the mountains 
and he listens to the whirring sound of the 
gallinaceous birds with slate-blued white-spotted 
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plumage that lived around the prison. (174-5) 
The "I" is a concatenation of selves, and of memories \ / 
(constructions) of past selves. And these selves are V 
always implicated in the discursive representations of self 
that culture and history make available. As Norris 
observes, "there is no privileged ground of reflection from 
which thought could ever organize or control the flux of 
temporal experience .... Perception is always already 
representation" (1982: 47 -8) . Telling of the present of 
writing involves telling of the past (which is part of the 
present) . Telling of the past, however, 1S no less 
problematic, for the discourse will always be coloured by 
the present of the narration. The narrator prefaces the 
narrative with a meditation on this: 
And then, this same process is an open-ended one; I 
can hear the ec.hoes. As it continues this 
jumbletalk, this trial -- I can go on searching, and 
I can hear the reverberation of my own voice. I'm 
sitting here -- I have this little instrument . in my 
hand; I have the earphones on my head and I speak to 
you and I listen to the voice corning back. And I 
learn from these words the reality as it is being 
presented at the moment of emitting the sounds. That 
is perhaps as close as I can corne to what the identity 
is considered to be. That is as close as I can corne 
to the truth. Here I am. Here the truth is also. 
I hope, Mr Investigator, that that is what you expect 
of me. Because, you know, you could force me to deny 
whatever I say immediately after having said it; and 
you could probably force me to start allover again. 
I can tell you in advance that if I were to do that it 
would corne out differently; it would be different; I'd 
no longer be there; I'd be somebody else as 
sincere, as keen to help, as obsessed by the necessity 
to confess. (13 -4) 33 
And this brings us to the text's insistence that while the 
"I" is Breytenbach, free in Paris, and also Galaska, 
undercover agent, and Breytenbach, prisoner, it is also 
most importantly a construction of the text. The above 
passage concludes: 
But let us push him back into the darkness of non-
existence and let us go forward with what we have in 
hand at the moment. May I be your humble servant, Mr 
Investigator? Listen to me. I shall confess. (14) 
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The "him" to be pushed back is a self not yet created, not 
yet discursively or textually constituted. It is the self, 
the other "I" who would, at a different time and in a 
different text, tell a different story about a self the 
same but different. 
The "I", then, is a platform for subject positions for 
the autobiographical subj ect; the reader is expected to 
attribute these subject positions to Breytenbach, the 
material being (the link being secured by the author's name 
and photograph). But due cognisance must be paid to the 
impossibility of the fixing of the textual and extra-
textual subject for the text makes it clear that images and 
names provide the necessary security for identity only 
wi thin certain contexts. Breytenbach' s name and 
photographic image reinforce the autobiography's claim to 
be about a real person, specifically this person, but they 
do so in parenthesis, so to speak. True Confessions 
explores the inherent instability of the sign, be it 
linguistic, pictorial, or even the material body. Thus the 
text opens: 
The Name you will see under this document is Breyten 
Breytenbach. That is my name. It's not the only one; 
after all, what is a name? I used to be called Dick; 
sometimes I was called Antoine; some knew me as Herve; 
others as Jan Blom; at one point I was called 
Christian Jean-Marc Galaska: then I was the Professor; 
later I was Mr Bird: all these being the labels 
attached to different people. Because, Mr 
Investigator, if there is one thing that has become 
amply clear to me over the years, it is exactly that 
there is no one person that can be named and in the 
process of naming be fixed for all eternity. (13) 
Thus although the "I" is the textual anchor linking the 
author's name and image and the narrating and narrated 
subjects, it is an unstable link, even within the text. 
(And between text and extra-textual self the links are even 
less dependable). This point is illustrated graphically by 
the fact that the small photograph of the author on the 
back cover is subordinated visually to the larger drawing, 
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executed by Breytenbach himself, on the front cover. 34 This 
drawing is, essentially, an illustration of and for this 
text, depicting as it does two likenesses of the author, 
examining an open book. While the photograph is part of 
the 'documentary' claim of autobiography, the drawing is an 
extension of its fictiveness, its nature as textual 
composition. The two men in the drawing are clearly 
intended to resemble Breytenbach (we recognise the clipped 
beard, the large nose, the silvered short hair from the 
photograph): yet, unexpectedly, these two men are in 
warder's clothes. Illustrating the text's play on the 
narratee, Mr Investigator, as the author's second self 
(see, for example, 72, 96 where this is abbreviated to "Mr 
I" ) , the cover drawing underscores the narrator's 
insistence on the intimacy between the prisoner and captor. 
Thus Mr Investigator is both the reader and also the author 
as auditor, interrogator of self, a facet of the self who 
lS In some senses akin to those who imprisoned him (he is 
also called "Mr Interrogator" (101) and "Mr 
Investerrogator" (165)). There is a common bond -- wrought 
by their cultural and linguistic identity as Afrikaners but 
also by their close and mutually dependent relationship in 
prison -- between narrator and jailors: they are "people 
like you and me. That is what makes them so horrible and 
so pitiful .... I believe the torturer is as depraved by 
his acts as the one who is tortured" (339). The torturer 
must destroy the detainee, 
because the dismantlement has revealed vis-a-vis, a 
brother-I, a mirror-image or only a miserable human-
conditioned pile of flesh and faeces which is 
unbearable and needs to be done away with; there is 
thus already the tendency to identify with the other 
(and the roles can be inverted) and the blind desire 
to force a solution to and resolution of the 
irreducible contradictions -- precisely because you 
cannot accept the (self)-image revealed to you, nor 
the knowledge that never the twain shall meet. (341) 
And, "The two of you, violator and victim (collaborator! 
violin!), are linked forever perhaps, by the sad knowledge 
of what people are capable of. We are all guilty" (343). 
126 
There are thus ambiguities in the front illustration's 
ambiguous treatment of a self and a mirror image 
(indicating that the self is not unified), of self and 
enemy, prisoner and warder. These ambiguities are 
reinforced by the wing apparent on the back of one of the 
men in the drawing, evoking the cliches of jailbird and 
bird on the wire. These cliches also inform the text: the 
protagonist is called "Mr Bird,, 35, "Professor Bird" (165) 
and "Bangai Bird" (308). But the text refuses to allow 
these cliches simple or stable meanings: 
what is my name? You choose it. Take your word. A 
name is exactly the absence of definition. I've told 
you that I'm called Bird, Mister Bird if you don' t · 
mind, which means the jail bait. I've also explained 
to you how I involuntarily took a vow of not using 
words, because the words cluttering up the spaces on 
the other side of the walls of my cell were like birds 
without wings. Can you imagine anything more obscene 
than a bird with no wings? And yet it is exactly what 
I'm giving you here. I'm stuffing this confession of 
mine with all the other wingless birds. Perhaps it is 
the stuffing coming undone which brings with it 
unasked for visions of wings and sand and sea, and 
others of tame guinea-fowl mocking us from beyond the 
walls, moving through the evening becoming more opaque 
in their ever-repeated mating dance. Sounds, lmages, 
birds, insects, wirds and borms and names the 
mUltiplication and manifestation of nothing. (178) 
Again the cliche is subverted, turned inside out: prisoners 
who are hanged experience "the indecency from man to man of 
handcuff and hood and rope and trapdoor the earth 
falling for ever away: we are the wind and we are the 
birds, and the singing, singing of weighted ropes ... " 
(216) . 
The wing in the drawing is a token wing; it is clearly 
non-functional. When the protagonist wishes to flee the 
prison, he fails: "Needless to point out that none of these 
flights ever got off the ground" (295). But this is not 
only a jailbird's wing, it is also stylised in the manner 
common in depictions of cherubic angels. And these angels 
are warders. The chapter dealing with the warders is 
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ironically entitled "Some Angels" (part two, Chapter 4); 
and the narrator tells us that, "Prison is just another 
heaven" (151) manned by "guardian angels" (287). (See also 
171, 235, 287.) But this heaven is a hellish place in 
which representatives of the apartheid state are God's 
earthly incarnations, God being the "Interstigator" (215). 
Jailbird and "angel" converge, or at least face parodic 
versions of themselves in each other. The narrator 
explores the psyche of the interrogator by parodying his 
voice: 
Do you mind that I ask, I ask, I ask? Don't you know 
that its necessary? That it can never be any 
different?.. you and I entwined and related, 
parasite and prey? Image and mirror-image? .. 
I know already. I always know. But I must prove. 
You are the confirmatiop. You prove. You are of my 
making. I am the controller. I slit open, and then 
I sculpt. You make sense of my anxieties. You flesh 
out my dreams.... I love you so. I need you so. 
Don't you see? You permit me relevance, you give me 
my outline. You give me status. You make me accept 
myself. You make me feel that I know I am! Come, I'm 
your father confessor. Together we are the embodiment 
of the reality of my thoughts, my wishes, my 
anguishes, my existence. In me you are as safe as 
death. I have the two faces.... Through you I touch 
eternity. Through you I see that the looking-glass is 
true. (56-8) 
Things are not as they seem; meanings obscure meanings 
which, in turn, cover other meanings. Thus while the 
prisoners are held captive by their jailors their captivity 
is usually temporary -- they migrate when their season in 
"Paradise" is over; the jailors, however, are themselves 
imprisoned within the compound (223). Warder/jailbird face 
each other in a pictorial exploration of the precept which 
the narrator assures the reader is a crucial one by which 
to live as a prisoner: 
you have to lmpose a moral discipline upon 
yourself, sensing and avoiding the crude 
simplifications and dichotomies the authorities try to 
have you conform to. Always remember the simple truth 
that denying the humanity of the person facing you is 
a sure-fire way of diminishing yourself. Keep away 
from the slothful slotting of 'them' and 'us'. I'm 
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not talking about moral rectitude -- it is an exigence 
of awareness, a consciousness tool for survival. (282-
3 ) 
The angels' cherubic hands point, in the drawing, to the 
blank pages, pages which the "controller" (57) will fill 
with the co-operation of the detainee: 
I am the controller .... You must open up, go open. 
You must just say. Say that which I must hear. Tell 
that which I know.... I nose around in your psyche. 
You are my excursions to wanton cellars. You are my 
book. I create your past. Your future is in my 
hands. I leaf through all the painfully constituted 
files on your comings and your goings, the records of 
your thinking and the organigramme of your 
associations. We are never free of one another 
again.... Come, I'll show you who you are. Look in 
this mirror, look. I bring you the image. Look how 
nai ve you are ... 
Accept what I give you. Be rich! 
references I create for you! (57-8) 
Occupy the 
Interrogators, the narrator tells us wryly, "are very keen 
connoisseurs of literature. In their impatience they will 
intercept a manuscript between author and publisher. They 
may even read a book before it is written!" (157). 
Breytenbach's jailbird's life is a tabula rasa. 








interrogators are godlike in the way they use the process 
of destruction to create a new identity for the detainee. 
The narrator reminds us that, 
the purpose of detaining and grilling and convicting ~ 
and then holding people, is to disorientate them, to < 
destroy their sense of themselves and the whole field 1 
of unquestioned awareness of the surrounding world, ~ 
the whole cloth of relationships with other people, 
all the tentacles of grasping and undertaking ideas, 
and finally to burgle and to burn down the storehouse 
of dreams and fantasies and hopes. (28) 
Identity is a function of context. On capture, the'1 
narrative of identity has been brutally interrupted: 
I couldn't control my body. I was shivering, my legs 
were shaking; I couldn't even quieten my lips ... ·. I 
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lay there in the unreal tumbling condition between 
sleep and wakefulness, with the broken film slapping 
in my head. (31) 
This is more than an evocative description, for the text 
explores just how fundamental narrative is to the 
constitution of the self. Change the story and the hero 
changes too. Change the protagonist's name, and you change 
his identity. And once sentenced, "You are issued now with 
your prison identity" (126). This involves fundamental re-
definition: "I was born. As prisoner 436/75 .... No longer 
are you Mr Breytenbach, if you ever were; you are now the 
fucking dog, the bandi e t, the mugu, the mother's cun t " 
(128) . Instead of being someone who has a right to a 
proper name and the uniqueness of identity which this 
implies, Breytenbach finds that he becomes the archetypical 
prisoner, a caricature of a person. This destruction of 
the familiar self is reinforced by the grinding away of 
individuality effected by the repetitive, colourless 
samenesses of prison life and the lack of responsibility 
and choice (123-32 and 143). 
The self as type rather than as individual is manifested 
textually in the loss of the "I" into the blurred referents 
of the "you" (28-31). The autobiographical becomes 
biographical; the autos is referred to in the second 
person. Narrator and protagonist are split asunder. 
Reader and protagonist begin to converge. As a result of 
isolation, for instance, 
parts of you are destroyed and these parts will never 
again be revived. You are altered in your most 
intimate ways exactly because all objectivity is taken 
away from you. You watch yourself changing, giving in 
to certain things, becoming paranoic, staring at the 
wall, living with an ear to the door and yet cringing 
at the slightest noise, talking to the ants, starting 
to have hallucinations -- without ever being able to 
ascertain the extent of these deviations or this 
damage precisely because you have nothing against 
which to measure it. And this damage is permanent 
even though you learn to live with it .... (130) 
Paradoxically, the "most intimate" aspects of identity are 
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distorted "exactly because all objectivity is taken away 
from you"i exploring the postmodernist theorisation of th: 
self, the text shows that even at its most basic and 
private, the self is a function of the social context. 
Loss of a recognisable frame of reference results in loss 
of recognisable selfhood. But this loss involves a 
paradoxical gain: "You learn how things, appearances, fit 
together. About illusion. About stopping and space and 
you yourself just one vibrating pretence among many" (131). 
There is no humanist core 'character', no intimate inner 
self, which is independent of discursive and material 
circumstance. 
True Confessions explores the ways in which the prison 
experience is both intensely personal, yet utterly 
impersonal, typical, and depersonalising, because 
dehumanising conditions are part of the system to which all 
prisoners are subjected in varying degrees. (Of course, 
this is true, too, of the apartheid society which is both 
intensely individual and comprehensively collective). Thus 
when freed, Breytenbach returns in his dreams to the 
prison, to find "a throng of I's, of convicts all lining up 
for food" (218). And when confined to the visual limits of 
the cell, the prisoner finds that, 
[t]he ears become the most important sense organs. 
You use your ears the way a bat employs its radar --
to situate yourself, to detect danger, to find some 
security in this environment you cannot escape 
from. . .. But at other times you wake, you listen, and 
the rumours you hear are indecipherable. Your ears 
lead you up blind alleys -- they do not interpret. 
The noises confuse you. They are the exteriorization 
of your confusion. You want to shout to identify 
yourself, to pin yourself down. What is this? Where 
am I? Am I awake? Your silence is sucked through the 
bars. You fight for sense.... Your mind lives 
outside you. The whole world has burned down. (220) 
The eyes are no windows to the soul, they "can be open like 
the looking of mirrors" (217) as are the eyes of the men in 
the drawing i these are eyes rendered "useless from the 
despair of having seen too much ... of never having truly 
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seen anything at all ... " (239); these are the eyes of birds 
(176), of ill-omen (153). To look into the eyes of another 
is to see the self and the world without reflected. (In 
the author's drawing one of the men's mirror eyes is 
clearly outside the fence) We constitute each other and 
the world. No-one is an autonomous entity. 
Identity is unstable and multifaceted. The outlines of 
the self are blurred, and are as much defined by others as 
by oneself. "You are the only one who can never see 
yourself except as an image; you never see your eyes unless 
they are dulled by the gaze they rest upon the mirror or 
the lens" (Barthes, 1977a:36, original italics). Identity 
is the mask worn for oneself and others at a particular 
point in time; identity is the sum of masks worn, held 
together by the "I". So while, "They were looking for 
bombs ... I was hanging on to the fragmentary scenario of my 
identities" (331). These masks are labelled (13, 20) and, 
as the term mask implies, hide other selves. Thus 
Breytenbach, as Galaska, is arrested and describes his 
first confrontation with South African security personnel 
as "mask to mask" (24), not face to face. 
Beneath the masks there is no essential naked self, 
stripped of illusion: 
How does one survive? I did not survive. This is 
important to point out. True, there is a sum of 
attributes which can be called by name. ' Come out, 
Breyten Breytenbach!' you may want to call; and from 
the gloom, wrapped in words as if in cheesecloth, 
Bangai Bird will emerge. (He has the smell of writing 
on him; he is utterly deconstructed to stuttering 
utterances. ) 
It is important that you consciously (I'd be apt to 
say 'personally') assist at the putting down of the I. 
That is if you wish to parry destruction, to 
unsurvive. (As if 'survival' were going to inquire 
after your wishes!) The I not only as a concept of 
(para) physicali ty, as a screen of illusions, as a 
hole-ness -- but in its most mundane manifestations. 
You are the way: the walking and the walk, not the 
walker. The I which blocks the view must disappear by 
'deconception' for a sense of movement to be 
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actualized -- a feeling of metamorphosis. (308) 
This exploration of selfhood entwined in the textual re-
call of past experience involves journey rather than 
destination i i t involves the creation of a past self, 
present (writing) self, and also impacts on future identity 
for the text is material construct with implications for 
the writer in the world of legal responsibilities and 
material consequence. The consecration of significance in 
discourse, the construction of an autobiographical self, is 
especially important. When leaving his cell for the last 
time, the narrator's most intensely felt emotion is not for 
his imminent freedom, but for his written work. "All that 
mattered was the manuscripts. under my arm. If I could not 
take them with me I was gOlng to refuse to leave the 
premises" (324). In the texts is the "I" that he has 
created/preserved as a bulwark against the utter 
destruction of self which incarceration promotes. It is 
this textual self as well as the texts as products to which 
he clings. Text is both nothing and something: 
You write your mind. That is perhaps, Mr 
Investigator, why or how I have become so sensitive to 
living structure. Also to the objective existence of 
that which has been exteriorized. (I'm not saying 
exorcised!) That you are not only writing your past 
but also your future: you are cutting open new lanes 
to the heart of nothingness but you are also papering 
over cracks and blocking off routes. (160) 
What is found in the process of writing is a part of the 
instance of seeking. Talking into the microphone, 
earphones feeding sounds into his ears, the writer/narrator 
records: 
I speak to you and I listen to the voice corning back. 
And I learn from these words the reality as it is 
being presented at the moment of emitting the sounds. 
That is perhaps as close as I can corne to what the 
identity is considered to be. That is as close as I 
c orne to the truth. Here I am. Here the truth is 
also. (13) 
Truth of self, of experience, of text, 1S evanescent. 
Mr Investigator, I hope you realize that it's not easy 
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for me to talk to you like this, with an open heart. 
I'm trying to stick to a simple principle: to tell 
everything, hodge-podge, be it a clapper-clawing or a 
whining, whichever way it comes. Naturally I I:ave 
forgotten a lot I wouldn' t be human otherwlse. 
That is why I try to structure my mind -- the one 
incident carries the echoes of others -- like death. 
There is no composition like decomposition .... The 
further you go the more you realize that there are no 
finites; just movements of the mind, only processes. 
(151) 
Self is verbal, not a noun or set of adjectives. "You 
know that we're always inventing our lives. You know that 
what I'm confessing now is also the instantaneous invention 
of what might have happened" (17). The "true identity" 
(19) can only be spoken of ironically. It is to be White 
in a Black country (73-4; 94); it is to be "black in a 
white country" (27, 260), to identify with the oppressed; it 
is to justify the lives of the oppressors and interrogators 
(56-9); it is to be an invisible agent, an actor (in both 
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senses of the word) (81ff; 91); it is to be lover, son, 
brother; it is to be the writer and the scribe (163); it is 
to be written; it is to be Galaska and Breytenbach and 
Klong and Dick and Professor and Mr Bird. It is to be 
Johan, awaiting death (170). To be "I" is also to be "you" 
(e.g. 128). 
Dominating the text is "Mr Investigator", another self, 
born at the very moment when Breytenbach's entrapment by 
the security police seems inevitable (118). The narrator 
confronts Mr Investigator in an effort to scrutinize and 
exorcise this self and the associated experiences. Mr 
Investigator is his "dark mirror-brother" (260); but he is 
also the enemy36, and more often, the reader, a reader drawn 
into the text's probing of the fractures of self (17). 
Unable to turn to friends, Breytenbach must turn to an 
invisible reader, mirroring his sense of absence (the 
empty, mirror eyes of the cover illustration)3?, so that the 
"I" of the enunciation becomes "you", the addressee. 
Extending the poststructuralist insistence that the "I" can 
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only be defined in its difference from the "you,,38, the 
narrator defines both "I" and "you" in terms of similarity 
as well as difference. 
You who come out are free, and yet there is the you 
which disappears into the twists of mindless mind-
seeking forever. Who comes forth then? Is there 
really a you? Isn't there, in the final instance, 
only an amorphous but all-encompassing investigator? 
You hover over the red ruins (which look like a 
child's watered-down sandcastle from up here) and you 
search for the you, in the same way that it has always 
been waiting for you. The one is the liberator of the 
self. I imagine an I .... 
I write to no one, inventing an I who may mouth the 
words that I can neither swallow nor spew out -- they 
are the stones of the labyrinth, with the mortar of 
silences. (238-9) 
Writer and reader are, like detainee and interrogator, 
locked in a mutual embrace, reflecting each other in mirror 
eyes, each constituting the other. The auditor, Mr 
Investigator, becomes "Mr Eye" (201); he is the author's 
self; he is the reader's self. He is the man in the cover 
drawing whose eye is not imprisoned within the fences. The 
prisoner, the writer, the narrator, the addressee, the 
reader -- as points (sometimes converging) on a continuum 
of being -- are defined and given identity in the process 
of writing. 
In spite of the difficulties of confession, the narrator 
acknowledges that in the process the "I" will change, as 
will the "you" of Mr Investigator: "But we must go on, 
mustn't we, Mr Investigator? See, now that I've told you 
about all of this, I can forget it. One must burn! Maybe, 
once I'm finished, there will finally be neither you nor I 
left ... " (153). Of course, this is true in the sense that 
these are textual constructs and when the text ends these 
characters remain encased within the pages. However, the 
narrator's concluding words imply that not only is the text 
completed but the exorcism has been successful too, the 
characters are no longer needed: "It is done ... " (334). 
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But writing is as much a form of imprisonment as a means 
to freedom: 
Writing becomes for me a means, a way of survival .... 
But at the same time I soon realize that it becomes 
the exteriorization of my imprisonment. My writing 
bounces off the walls. The maze of words which become 
alleys, like sentences, the loops which are closed 
circuits and present no exit, these themselves 
constitute the walls of my confinement. I write my 
own castle and it becomes a frightening discovery: it 
is unbalancing something very deeply embedded in 
yourself when you in reality construct, through your 
scribblings, your own mirror.... Because in this 
mirror you write hair by hair and pore by pore your 
own face, and you don't like what you see. You don't 
even recognize it. It won't let you out again .... 
[Author's ellipsis] Who am I? Where and who was I 
before this time? (155-6) 
Writing is the mirror (161) and like a mirror, its images 
are without substance (178); this is the Lacanian split 
self mirrored over and over again. The autobiographical 
subject is a function of the autobiographical text; notions 
of a simple reflection of reality in autobiography explode 
in a mUltiplicity of signs and signifying systems. 
Ruptured, dislocated subject positions are sometimes 
intersecting, sometimes isolatable, disconnected, 
contradictory. Exploring past selves, present selves, and 
even opening the spaces for possible future selves (160), 
True Confessions admits to its own silences, the unsayable 
being defined in the process of telling: 
It is all coming back in bits and pieces, Mr 
Investigator. I am vomiting words, I have the sour 
taste, I'm trying to hold on to the tread. These 
things surface from somewhere intimate, and yet I do 
not know them. If I were to know my own nature well 
I should be knowing universal nature .... 39 See here, 
I hold it in my hands. I have the black gloves. And 
silences. Salient incidents remain like shards in the 
mind. I dare not remove them from fear of provoking 
a bleeding that can never again be stopped. (This is 
a confession, not a saga). I don't know if I have a 
mind. I dare not look into it -- it is so sore. I'm 
tired of talking to you. (296-7) 
Motives may be too obscure to define (86-7), or may simply 
be unknowable: 
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(How much of my trip was to impress people like him? 
How much of it was an attempt to force a break in the 
contradictions in which I was caught up: the dreamer 
ensnared by political work -- neglecting his art --
and suffering from it; the exile who had never 
accepted the finality of his exile, whose roots were 
still in South Africa; the man, becoming a European, 
writing in an African language, with the world evoked 
by it, which no one around him understood? How much 
of it was suicidal? Or repentant homecoming?) (95) 
And, in a final note on the text, the author/narrator avers 
that it was not his intention "to take revenge on a system 
or certain people", but adds, "at least, I don't think it 
was" (339). Moreover, gaps are inevitable because of the 
vagaries of memory (151) and the materiality of text. 
Textuality makes its own demands ("It was my intention to 
produce a political text -- if it turned out to be more 
'literary' than expected it can only be because I couldn't 
help it. It is the lability of the job, it lS the 
seductiveness and the life of the word" (339)); it has its 
own limits (e.g. the Prisons Act, 135); it must take 
cognisance of the fact that it, unlike fiction, may 
implicate living people (162); there are limits of space in 
a publishable book (200, 271, 273); and textuality creates 
its own realities (156; 165). 
But just as writing creates selves the 
autobiographical subject (s), the reading subject it 
destroys the self too: "The I is out. It is outside the 
walls .... If it can be written about, it doesn't exist" 
(241); "to write is to celebrate death" (37). Exploring 
the poststructuralist notion of writing as absence4o , the 
te~t encodes an "I" which no longer exists and which never \ 
eXlsted anyway, ~textual "I" being an imperfect, 
sg19logicall dis inct approximation of a~ ungraspable 
reali ty. The narrating "I" comments on the paradox of 'VI 
-----'::""d • 
lscourse and text: the narrating self of the present (the 
self of the enunciating) lS vague, unclear, whereas the 
narrated self (the self of the enunciation) is clearly 
defined. Life when converted/translated into text acquires 
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clarity as it ceases to be. 
I'm home now, maimed, diminished, splayed, with my 
vision impaired, my horizon narrowed, my reference 
points vague, obscure; and yet there is this total 
clarity even if it's only at the level of language, 
which is the surface, which is the superficial, which, 
by the definition of language, must disappear to be 
allowed to exist (26) . 
Writing is lifeline and snare. It is necessary for 
survival (159); but, as Dampies (a fellow prisoner) had 
tattooed around his neck: "'my last words is a rope around 
my neck'" (165). 
Language obscures and it reveals (171); but it is not 
detached from material existence. Discourse imbues the 
body with meaning, and . determines the material 
circumstances of a life. This is evidenced in a variety of 
ways in True Confessions. A whole dialect develops in 
prison, needed to construct and reflect -- to produce and 
re-produce -- material conditions (226-9). One tragic tale 
is told of a 'Coloured' accountant, sentenced to SlX years 
imprisonment for fraud. His failure to engage in prison 
discourse thereby acknowledging the strict hierarchy 
encoded therein results in his physical and 
psychological destruction . His crime against the prison 
system is committed soon after he is interred: "he made the 
error of addressing a White warder as meneer (sir) and not 
as baas (master)" (269). The authorities feel that he has 
to learn that he is not "a mister". First, his glasses are 
broken; then his false teeth are stolen; his clothes 
follow. He is beaten up. And finally, he is robbed of his 
identity as a man: he is raped and turned into a wyfietjie 
(a little wife) (272). 
Discourse is used to create fictions that may be the 
seedbeds for reality. Of his friend and mentor in the 
underground movement, Curiel, the narrator recounts the 
manner in which Curiel's assassination was prepared for. 
Smear articles appeared in a magazine, and as a result 
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Curiel was placed under house arrest by the French 
authorities. Although he was released when the accusations 
proved groundless, the propaganda had succeeded in creating 
"a climate which would permit his extermination" (51). 
Life, and as we have seen, death too, are inextricably 
bound up with identity as discursive construct. The 
narrator himself experiences this in his second trial when 
his life must bear the marks of fictiveness (236). 
Race in South Africa is encoded in discourse, which 
itself reproduces hierarchical relations. True Confessions 
tells of how a prisoner of indeterminate race had to be 
classified so that he could be confined in the appropriate 
section of the prison. The person obviously wished to be 
classified white so that he might receive better food and 
treatment. But when the frustrated sergeant asked, "'Now 
tell us what the hell you are -- Black or White? And the 
man answered, 'But of course I'm white, my baas'" (127), 
his language gives him away. His use of the discourse of 
servitude marks him as black, when his skin does not. 
***** 
Learning about the subject of autobiographies is 
important for we may thus become more aware of how it is 
that we are ourselves positioned as subjects: 
To know oneself is to study the intersubjective 
processes of articulation and interpretation by which 
we emerge as part of the world ... as Barthes says, 
"the fundamental ethical problem is to recognize signs 
wherever they are i that is to say, not to mistake 
signs for natural phenomena and to proclaim them 
rather than conceal them". (Culler, 1975:264-5) 
As the social organisation undergoes radical transformation 
we see shifts not only in the kinds of texts that are being 
produced but also in the kinds of subjects that are being 
constructed. This lS extremely important, for we are 
perhaps in the unique position of witnessing fundamental 
social change and concomitant (sometimes contributory, 
sometimes consequent) textual revolution. While earlier 
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autobiographical texts employ the discourse of rationality 
in their titles (e.g. Mist of Memory, Bernard Sachs, or 
Memories & Sketches, Rosenthal, or The South African 
Autobiography, Plomer, to name but a few), some recent 
texts refuse the seemingly simple transparency; they mimic 
instead the voice of the Other, or they parody the 
discourse of idiocy. Donald Woods' Asking for Trouble, 
Rian Malan's My Traitor's Heart, Mathebane's Kaffir Boy, 
Goonam's Coolie Doctor, Jay Naidoo's Coolie Location, 
Hope's White Boy Running, and, of course, Breytenbach's The 
True Confessions of an Albino Terrorist all do this in one 
way or another. 
New conceptualisations of subjectivity are manifest for 
new ways of being are now possible. "If 'women' and 'men' 
are categories produced by social, historical, political, 
and economic factors, then individuals are less the source 
of their own meaning than the place where clashes to 
control meanings of words occur" (Nussbaum, 1989:134). We 
see this in Kuzwayo's and Breytenbach's texts; consider, ~ 
too, the autobiographical subjects of Makhoere's No Child's ~ 
Play and of the host of autobiographical anthologies which 
emerged, principally in the 'eighties, to celebrate in text 
the hitherto invisible members of the black working class. 
In these texts illiterate people have been enabled by 
researchers to write themselves (and their selves) into 
history. Fanon writes of this in characteristically 
extravagant terms: 
Decolonization never takes place unnoticed, for it 
influences individuals and modifies them 
fundamentally. It transforms spectators crushed with 
their inessentiality into privileged actors, with the 
grandiose glare of history's floodlights upon them. 
It brings a natural rhythm into existence, introduced 
by new men, and wi th ita new language and a new 
humanity. (1973:28) 
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Chapter 4: Life 
History, Stephen said, is a nightmare from which I am 
trying to awake. 
James Joyce 
[N]othing is more 'real', we think, than a date. 
Roland Barthes 
What, have you not lived? 
Lyndall Gordon 
The period 1948-1994 covered in this study is a 
particularly significant period for autobiographical 
writing since it is a time when crude State control aimed 
to regulate the lives of all South Africans, with brutal 
effects for black South Africans. As in eighteenth-century 
Britain, "Economic developments and social dislocations 
related to the Industrial Revolution and the resulting 
population shifts from rural areas to urban centers began f / 
to disturb the equilibrium maintained by the force of / 
centuries of tradition" (Pomerleau, 1980:29). The social 
impact of South Africa's "Industrial Revolut"ion", which is 
usually identified as occurring after the discovery of 
diamonds, was overshadowed by the egregious forced removal 
of indigenous peoples from tribal lands l and the creation of 
dehumanising black ghettos, rural and urban. Since the 
subject and the social are mutually constitutive, social 
engineering on the scale experienced by South Africans in 
the last fifty years in particular, is, as we have seen, 
accompanied by radical shifts in conceptions of the self. 
Lives, too, change as the social context undergoes radical 
transformation, and individuals who write their life-
stories seek, over time, to address different issues. The 
South African life-story in this period lends itself 
increasingly to (often implicit) reflections on the import 
of this life for a national history. My interest in this 
chapter is in the intersection of autobiographical writing 
and history. What can autobiographical writing tell us 
about history, if we know that the texts cannot be regarded 
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as mimetic, and if we treat their claims to factuality with 
scepticism? How can autobiographical texts secure the 
reader's conviction that this is a kind of historical 
document, that it is not fictional? How does the 
autobiographical text aim to secure the reader's sense that 
its interpretations are 'true'? This chapter explores the 
autobiographical texts of Albert Luthuli and of a number of 
black South African workers as species of history-writing. 
Significan~ly , most of the English-language 
autobiographical texts published by South Africans since . 
1948 place the emphasis not on the exploration of self 1 
(autos), nor on experimentations with the medium~ 
-------------(graphe), (although important innovations do occur), but on 
the documenting of experience, the life (bios). South ~ 
-African autobiographical production shows that life-writing 
need not be intimate or introspective. Moreover, in those 
texts where the autobiographical subject's life is treated 
as representative, as stereotypical, the autobiography is 
not even a markedly personal mode of writing. 2 Thandi Moses 
observes that "the times we are living in -- the suffering, 
oppression, violence, deaths and detentions have 
resulted in people putting their personal problems on hold, 
and concentrating on the national problems they experience 
as people" (Daymond and Lenta, 1990:75). And Fanon argues 
that "the mobilization of the masses through the war of 
liberation introduces for each man ideas of common cause, 
national destiny and collective history" (1973: 73 -4). This 
emphasis on the historical value of the autobiographical 
text and on the prototypical status of the autobiographical 
subj ect is obviously due to the horrors through which 
millions of black South Africans have had to live; there is 
a need to testify, to bear witness, a need which meets with 
a corresponding need in readers to explore the minutiae of 
individuals' lived experience of apartheid. And this need 
to testify is not confined to black South Africans: in the 




assertive mode of autobiographical narration (this is who 
I am; this is what I have done) increasingly fails to 
dominate white life-writing, as more and more 
autobiographers employ an exploratory, less certain, mode 
of narration. 
If the autobiographical text, in whatever form, is to 
succeed in impressing upon its readers its sincerity, its 
validity as testimony, then it has to be seen to conform to 
norms concerning how the culture defines historical 
accuracy. tobiograph , as a sp~ies of history, _ briEgs 
with it all the problems of history-writing. It has not 
-~-~----only to conform to prevailing conceptions of what counts as 
worth knowing (and thus recording) but also dominant 
notions of the formal constraints of 
documentation. As Paul Jay has observed, 
innovations in autobiographical literature" can be 
"with parallel developments in historiography" (1984:108) 
In this chapter some of the worker autobiographies 
from that same disciplinary impulse: Facing the 
(Keegan) results from a project to record "a people's 
history" (ix); and Women of Phokeng is part of that same 
project. Others share important features in common with a 
like group of historical texts which aim to record history 
from the grass roots. Moreover, many autobiographies b 
black South Africans are explicitly attempts to rewrite 
South African history. These attempts are necessary since 
South Africans who have any education at all would almost 
certainly have been educated, if one can use the 
this context, through a system which deliberately set ou 
to misinform about the past .) I examine in this chapter one 
~ --------autobiographical text which aims to set the history records 
straight, Albert Luthuli' s Let My People Go. Patrick 
Lekota's is, however, probably the most extreme example. 
Moreover, "the methodological decisions that an 
autobiographer makes are historiographic as well as 
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literary, novelistic, and poetic ones" (Jay, 1984:108-109). 
In autobiography, as in history, names and dates serve to 
anchor the narrative in detail which can be validated from 
within a network of authenticating institutions and 
practices. The name of the author has a very important 
function in autobiographical writing; it unifies the text 
and anchors it in the material realities of South African 
experience, usually specifying race, language group of the 
author (Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho, English or Afrikaans and so 
on), and gender. In autobiography, the proper name 
"represents an attempt to inscribe the unique in the system 
of language" and requires that it be read as 
untranslatable, as if it "were nothing but pure reference". 
It must also, however, be assimilable to "any word that is 
caught up in a linguistic and genealogical network where 
meaning already contaminates non-meaning" (Levesque, 
1985:93) Foucault's argument in "What is an Author?" is 
too complex to be adequately treated here, but his 
assertion that the proper name is not pure and simple 
reference, being "more than an indication... a finger 
pointed at someone, it is the equivalent of a description" 
(1984: 105), is pertinent. In autobiography, the proper 
name functions in concert with personal pronouns, adverbs 
of time and place, and verb conjugation to refer to "the 
spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the real speaker's 
discourse ... [t]he author is the principle of thrift in the 
proliferation of meaning" (1984: 112, 118); the "author-
principle limits [the chance-element in discourse] by the 
play of an identity which has the form of individuality and 
the self" (1970:59). 
The autobiographer has to attempt to persuade the reader 
that the writer (represented by the proper name), or, at 
the very least, the interviewee, is the same person as the 
one who is characterized in the text. And she has to 
convey some sense that the material of the narrative has 
its grounding in verifiable fact. In the autobiographies 
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studied in the previous chapter, it was seen that in texts 
as diverse as Campbell's Light on a Dark Horse, Kuzwayo's 
Call Me Woman, and Breytenbach's The True Confessions of An 
Albino Terrorist, the autobiographical subject is 
decentred, discontinuous, each text disrupting even 
against the explicit textual project the self's 
"pretended continuity" (Foucault, 1984: 88). But what of 
the texts' treatment of the social and historical context 
for the self? Most autobiographical writing inscribes 
history as a continuous and graspable linear development. 
In South Africa, the primacy of biography in 
autobiographical texts depends on pragmatic notions of 
history and reality, of the coherence of self and the 
innocence of narrative and text. Few South African 
autobiographical texts "abandon the illusion that 
experience is discrete and isolate or that time is linear, 
with neatly separated points of reference" (Kolodny, 
1980: 244) . It seems to me that this is because many 
autobiographies present themselves as one person's 
experience of History, rather than one person's own unique 
history. Relying on the authenticating discourses of 
serial, entire journalistic time, they reduce experience to 
order. Nevertheless, if single autobiographical texts do 
not always contribute significantly to the disruption of 
fictional continuities, taken together they disperse 
meanings and fragment monologues. 
Furthermore, in their attempts to achieve the status of 
testimony, many South Africans tell the life story in 
unembellished prose, which may underscore its truthfulness, 
its lack of artifice. Some (those which are not penned by 
the autobiographical subj ect) have to rely on this, on 
conveying a sense that the researcher has faithfully 
recorded the straightforward answers of the 
autobiographical subj ect, when they cannot rely on the 
reader's knowledge that this narrative is straight from the 
horse's mouth, so to speak. In this chapter, of the 13 
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texts considered only 2 (Qabula's and Tom's) conform to the 
norm of autobiographer as writer, narrator, protagonist, 
and this points to at least two important issues: first, 
black autobiographers often cannot actually pen their own 
autobiographies -- because they are barely literate or 
illiterate, or because a life of poverty ill affords 
individuals the motivation or leisure time to compose their 
memoirs, or because they are too involved in the struggle 
for liberation to devote time to writing. Second, the fact 
that someone else may assist in the documenting of a life 
or portion thereof indicates again the point that it is the 
record of experience (bios) that takes precedence over 
personal explorations of subjectivity (autos) and over 
experiments with the medium (graphe). And this brings us 
back to the style of writing: in such cases a plain 
narrative, brief and to the point, may serve to stress the 
series of significant events (usually in terms of a theme) 
in the interviewee's life. 
Autobiographical texts have adopted a variety of forms, 
indicating a diverse range of responses to State and other 
power relations. Varied as they may be, however, what-
unites these texts is an insistence on the part of readers 
that autobiographers undertake to communicate accurate 
information about the autobiographical subj ects. "The 
relation of autobiographical discourse to the real is 
opaque, highly codified, and politically charged; it is 
entangled in the material reality of lived experience" 
(Nussbaum, 1989:xiii). As Gusdorf (cited by Olney, 
1980: 21) and others (e. g. Finney, 1985: 57) have argued, 
autobiography records the truth of sUbjective experience 
(which in terms of historical fact may well be false); now 
al though this is a notion deriving from humanism (the 
individual has a core or essence that is her fundamental 
truth), it nevertheless has some validity in terms of my 
own theoretical position. For truth is subjective, in that 
it is the construction of conscious and unconscious forces 
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operating within and without the subject; truth positions 
the subject within discursive and material orders which 
speak through the subject, they subject the subject. 
Reality is not consistent and coherent, neither for diverse 
or even unified communities, nor for individuals. As I 
have argued elsewhere (1991:14), reality is not independent 
of ideology as some concrete, objective 'Truth' which all 
'normal' adul ts would be able to agree on. I am not 
denying that there 1S a Real; like Derrida, I do not 
endorse that, 
rather facile strain in current post-structuralist 
thinking ... that passes directly from the 'arbitrary' 
nature of the sign (the lack of any natural or 
determinate link between signifier and signified) to 
the notion that texts cannot possibly 'refer' to any 
world outside their own rhetorical domain. On the 
contrary, Derrida argues: language is marked through 
and through by referential (or mimetic) assumptions, 
and there is no way of simply breaking their hold by 
a kind of deconstructionist fiat. What he does seek 
to show ... is that classical ideas of this referential 
function have greatly simplified its nature, ignoring 
whatever gets in the way of a direct return to 
mimesis, origins and truth. There is, in short, an 
ideology of representation .... (Norris, 1987:53-4) 
"To distance oneself from the habitual structure of 
reference, to challenge or complicate our common 
assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there 
is nothing beyond language" (Derrida, quoted in Norris, 
1987: 144) . For Lacan, the Real (the third part of the 
Symbolic, Imaginary, Real triad) is "that which 1S 
radically extrinsic to the procession of signifiers ... the 
infinitely receding goal towards which the signifying chain 
tends" (MacCannell, 1983:917). Moreover, for Lacan, "it is 
necessary for the unification of one signifier with one 
signified to remain stable, to become necessary for the 
mind if there is to be any ordering of the real and of 
thought" (Lemaire, 1977:17). Relating this to the 
autobiographer's task, one does not expect autobiographies 
to deny the validity of narrative or the possibility of 
communication -- we take it on faith that in most cases the 
words do point to real individuals' real experiences. But 
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what we identify as ' real' is that which conforms to 
normative cultural definitions, as Ellen Kuzwayo, Emma 
Mashinini and many other autobiographers find when deprived 
of a social network confirming their own perceptions of 
reality. "The audience and their representations are the 
terms of the 'realism' of any film or work of art -- not 
some pre-existent reality which it merely conveys" 
(MacCabe, 1985:74). 
Barthes argues further that cultural codes define the 
natural, which is not natural at all but ideological, 
repetitive, stereotypical (1974:97-8): "The natural is 
never an attribute of physical Nature; it is the alibi 
paraded by a social majority: the natural is a legality" 
(1977: 130) . Autobiographical writing inscribes cultural 
prescriptions for recognition of the 'natural' and shows, 
too, that the body, as Foucault theorized, 
far from being some fundamentally stable, acultural 
constant to which we must contrast all culturally 
relative and institutional forms, is constantly "in 
the grip," as Foucault puts it, of cultural 
practices.... Cultural practices, far from exerting 
their power against spontaneous needs, "basic" 
pleasures or instincts, or fundamental structures of 
body experience, are already and always inscribed, as 
Foucault has emphasized, "on our bodies and their 
materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and 
pleasures" .... [S]ocial practice [changes] people's 
experience of their bodies and their possibilities .... 
[However], the physical body can also be an instrument 
and medium of power. (Bordo, 1988:90-1) 
Bordo adds that "women's bodies in general have 
historically been more vulnerable to extremes ... of 
cultural manipulation of the body" (Bordo, 1988:91). She 
is referring to culturally specific ways in which women are 
taught to experience their bodies (e.g. the experience of 
hunger for the anorexic; or the experience of breastfeeding 
for say a traditional Zulu woman as compared to a 
contemporary professional American woman), as well as to 
actual physical impositions on the body in the form of 
etiquette codes for women's bodies such as the common 
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Western taboo on bodily hair for women, or restrictions on 
movement (women frequently record the opposition of their 
men partners to their involvement in politics or trade 
unions (see Lydia Kompe , 1985:105-9)), or in the extreme 
form of torture (Kompe speaks of female circumcision 
rituals, 1985:99). Importantly, Bordo goes on to point out 
that although power relations involve the domination of 
particular groups (white South Africans or men in general) , 
this does not necessarily mean that "the dominators are in 
control of the situation, or that the dominated do not 
sometimes advance and ex tend the situation themselves" 
(1988:91) . Numerous autobiographical accounts testify to 
this, some implicitly, some explicitly. When Emma 
Mashinini speaks of her trade union she notes that while 
membership is equally distributed amongst men and women, 
the executive has a majority of men: "But who's responsible 
for that? It's the women themselves. I don't know why. 
It's the women who will always elect a man" (1985:131). 
While subj ects are interpellated in terms which are 
culture and history spec i fic, subjects experience a degree 
of freedom to contest or contribute to their own subject 
positions , to shape facets of their lives . The degree of 
freedom will, of course, differ between groups and within 
groups. In South Africa , in particular, where race 
determines one's life so utterly, in concert with gender, 
class and language group, individual lives might quite 
reasonably be described as scripted according to type. 
Autobiographical writing demonstrates the differential 
nature of the functioning of patriarchy across class lines, 
and the rural/ urban divide. The texts which are devoted 
only to women respondents, like Working Women, Vukani 
Makhosikazi, and Women of Phokeng, attempt to address the 
gender discrimination which black women are subjected to, 
in addition to racism. Sharon Welch makes an observation 
which is relevant to much contemporary South African 
politics, and this is evidenced in much autobiographical 
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writing, by both women and men: 
I became aware that emphasis on universal human rights 
and the dignity of all persons obscured some people's 
sensitivity to the abrogation of . those rights and that 
dignity on the basis of sex. I was faced with the 
paradox of seeing men who were fully committed to such 
universals as freedom and equality and yet were 
thoroughly sexist. (1985:213) 
Many autobiographies record a fi erce attempt by the 
autobiographer to refuse the roles which race, gender and 
class classifications offer: this is true of black freedom 
fighters like Caesarina Makhoere and Frank Chikane, of 
women like Ellen Kuzwayo, Sindiwe Magona, Helen Joseph, 
Lyndall Gordon, and white men like Breyten Breytenbach and 
Rian Malan, to name but a few. But many texts are 
testimonies to the powerful ness of this sort of 
straightjacketing classification, for they construct the 
autobiographical subject as symbol, as representative. 
Many of the worker autobiographies discussed later in this 
chapter construct prototypical subj ects . But perhaps 
Dugmore Boetie's so-called autobiography which records the 
horrors of black existence is the most trenchant example, 
for while his story rings true according to type -- and it 
was clearly what the author believed his publisher wanted -
- it is (we are told) a fabrication . Here the individual 
has been eclipsed by a generalised truth about urban black 
experience. 
But we need to consider the truths of autobiography very 
carefully: the double mediation of autobiographical writing 
means that reading the autobiography as historical document 
requires constant vigilance that the complexities of this 
practice are not collapsed into a mimetic reading which 
wilfully overlooks the text ' s process of production -- the 
role of the imagination in the production of knowledge (de 
Bolla, 1986:52), and the structures of mediation which are 
its discursive raw materials. As Elbaz so nicely puts it: 
History, science, or for that matter any meaningful 
statement, in no way duplicate reality; they construct 
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it. For language is functional to the ideological 
position of the speaking subject, and 'reality' is the 
creation of this same subject. One does not report, 
duplicate or verify the truth: one makes it. (1988:8-
9) 
We know that objectivity is an unattainable ideal; the 
denunciation of the historian's 'objectivity' is now 
commonplace, and because autobiography admits some erosion 
of even this mythical kind of historical objectivity by the 
narrating subject, it is doubly suspect (or doubly honest, 
depending on one's viewpoint). In disciplines as diverse 
as physics, anthropology, literary theory and criticism, 
and history, the fundamental imbrication of the observer in 
the examination of the object of scrutiny is acknowledged, 
as is the radically rhetorical nature of the historical 
text (White, 1980). Rather than collude with a sense that 
history is a series of "progressive approximations to the 
reality of things in themselves" (Smart, 1985:54), Foucault 
stresses the partiality of present knowledge so that even 
when one tries to read autobiography with its importance 
for history in mind, one avoids carefully the temptations 
to make pronouncements on history. Because totalizing 
narratives obscure lived complexities, I have avoided 
collapsing the diversity of textual responses into one 
~ __ n rrative of apartheid; 3 ln any case, the texts 
themselves refuse this sort of neatness, weaving within 
them a host of conservative and oppositional discourses in 
relation to racism, sexism , tribalism, religious practices 
and so on. Important as racism has been in this period, 
South Africans have not experienced only racism. They 
write about class divisions, about gendered lives, about 
familial relationships, about aspirations and 
disappointments. My readings are based on the Foucauldian 
argument that, 
Nothing is fundamental.... That is why nothing 
irritates me as much as these inquiries -- which are 
by definition metaphysical -- on the foundations of 
power in a society, etc.... There are only reciprocal 
relations, and the perpetual gaps between intentions 
in relation to one another. (Foucault, 1984:247) 
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Having said this, however, autobiographical writing of the 
period 1948-1994 nevertheless speaks very powerfully (even 
through avoidance of commentary in some texts) of the 
effectiveness of apartheid in creating a chasm between 
black and white South Africans; as Lyndall Gordon observes 
in her autobiography, the physical separation of the races 
due to legislation like the Group Areas Act (whose effects 
are still enormously powerful, even though it was repealed 
in 1990) caused each group to turn upon itself, "cut off 
from other groups, each locked in its narrow cares" 
(1992:84). Seemingly, Louwtjie Barnard's, Zola Budd's and 
Ruth Gordon's only cross-racial contact is with black South 
African servants; Moloi, Qabula and Makhoba meet whites as 
employers or policemen . Even those who want to ignore 
racial divisions and its caste system find themselves 
caught within networks of distrust, practical difficulties, 
ignorance (Kuzwayo, Magona, Breytenbach, de Villiers and 
many others record experiences of this). But the texts 
also show, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, how power is 
relational, it is not a property (much as the politicians 
would like to believe that it is), and it is immanent in 
sexual, familial, economic, knowledge and other 
relationships. Analysis of South African autobiography in 
the last 46 years yields, in effect, "analysis of a 
mUltiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein far-
reaching, but never completely stable, effects of 
domination are produced" (Foucault, 1980:102); this, ln 
spite of the fact that in South Africa in this period the 
force relationships are more obviously centralized and 
defined in terms of warfare , of State violence, than in the 
Western societies to which Foucault refers. An 
autobiographical text like Rian Malan's My Traitor's Heart 
exemplifies the complexities of historical knowledge, 
counterpointing as it does Anglo-American logic with what 
is for him the unknowable of Africa . . 
Autobiographical writing reminds us that Foucault's point 
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that, "history does not operate as a force, but remains 
dispersed, split, random" (Bartowski, 1988:47) is valid, 
even for a country like South Africa whose history seems so 
crudely obvious. Autobiographical writing, as a form of 
what Foucault refers to as "effective history", affirms 
"knowledge as perspective", not seeking to erase, as 
traditional historians usually do, "the elements in their 
work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and 
place, their preferences in a controversy the 
unavoidable obstacles of their passion" (1984:90) 
Autobiography, as a species of history, rarely pretends 
to find "its support outside of time" or "to base its 
judgments 
1984:87) ; 
on an apocalyptic objectivity" (Foucault, 
instead, all information, verifiable or 
otherwise, is contextualized within the genre's 
conventional insistence on the relativity of the text to 
the idiosyncratic of the writing subj ect. A survey of 
autobiographical production exposes the mutiplicities and 
varieties of responses to historical change which refuse 
the simplistic summation of the master narrative of 
tradi tional history. 4;.It is in this sense that South 
African autobiographical writing in the last two decades 
presages the political shift in power away from white 
hegemony and towards a consolidating black centre; 
stealthily, black autobiographies (and their reaaers) nave 
~ 
asserted their importance; and gradually whites' VOlces 
" have corne to explore uncertainty, a significant political 
dislocation. But the forms these tendencies take, the ways 
in which individual texts may reinforce or subvert these 
broad trends, are uneven, diverse, varying. Foucault again 
reminds us that, 
[t] he world we know is not this ultimately simple 
configuration where events are reduced to accentuate 
their essential traits, their final meaning, or their 
initial and final value. On the contrary, it is a 
profusion of entangled events.... We want historians 
to confirm our belief that the present rests upon 
profound intentions and immutable necessities. But 
the true historical sense confirms our existence among 
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countless lost events , without a landmark or point of 
reference. (1984: 89) 
When we turn to autobiography as history, we confront the 
fragmentations of reality , the blindnesses and gaps which 
are not only structurally encoded in all narrative but in 
all perceptions of the real. We read each text with the 
knowledge that autobiographers probably construct 
narratives which conform to traditional, teleological 
models of history, and t his awareness enables us to 
contextualize certainty, to probe the silences, to prize 
open the cracks. 4 
A poststructuralist reading of autobiography, therefore, 
analyses the historical implications of the silences and 
gaps in the text: for instance, when white autobiographers 
fail to address their political circumstances as whites in 
an apartheid state (and many still do), exploration of the -significances of this must be undertaken - '- perhaps it -testifies to the effectiveness of the State in creating 
almost incredible ignorance on the part of the white 
electorate regarding political reality; perhaps it is 
wishful thinking -- a need to transcend the horrors of 
racism, transformed in text into an avoidance of the 
inescapability of racism in south Africa. In some cases, 
the emphasis on the publ i c l ife, the career, can be seen to 
be a refuge from private feeling ;5 public commitment may be 
used to help solve or avoid personal problems (Ruth 
Gordon's autobiography seems to exemplify this) -- and it 
is not inconceivable that failure to address one's position 
as a whi~ South African in an apartheid state could be 
part of one's personal problems. 
Autobiography, although a kind of historical record, is, 
as we have seen, not simply history on a small scale; there 
are qualitative differences . As Finney observes, 
[l]ike a work of his t ory [autobiography] tries to be 
factually true; yet it differs from history in not 
offering generalized truths based on documentary 
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evidence. 6 Autobiographical truth is concerned with 
both fact and the meaning the autobiographer attaches 
to the facts. (21) 
This brings us to another kind of truth, other than what is 
understood as factual truth. Autobiographical texts, if 
they are to succeed in persuading readers that they have 
earned a place in the genre, have to ring true. Verifiable --fact is not, I contend, in the long run as important as the 
sense that this is a sincere attempt to bear witness to 
personal circumstance. It is this tone of authenticity 
from the speaking subject that is lacking, as I shall show 
later in this chapter, in some researcher-scripted texts. 
This truth-of experience is more profoundly relevant to the ---identity and sense of self than are truths which can be 
verified. Unfortunately, the self cannot even be sure that 
what it recognises as true is so, even in its own terms; as 
St Augustine wrote: "wi thin me are those lamentable dark 
areas wherein my own capacities lie hidden from me. Hence 
when my mind questions itself ... it is not easy for it to 
decide what should be believed" (cited by Jay, 1984:31). 
And Arthur Koestler observed: "In the realm of psychology 
no concrete, objective truth exists, only an almost 
infinite number of levels of truth" (cited by Finney, 238). 
Poststructuralist theory has, pace Nietszche, claimed that, 
"Truth is simply the honorific title assumed by an argument 
which has got the upper hand -- and kept it ln this war 
of competing persuasions" (Norris, 1982:61) and Foucault's 
elaboration of this position has resulted in widespread 
acceptance of the inter-connectedness of 
truth/knowledge/power. My own argument is that it is not 
possible to recognise Truth,? but it is possible to 
recognise what the discourses of truth are -- and how they 
function -- at a given moment and it is thus possible to 
identify what will pass for truth within a given discursive 
construct. Thus analysis interrogates the paradigms of 
truth employed in particular texts, seeking to explore 
conscious and unconscious strategies by which such truths 
are secured, for this is how one can begin to understand 
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the articulation between the social and the sUbjective. 
The idiosyncratic should not be subsumed by cultural 
analysis, but then neither should its culturally 
constituted aspects be overlooked in favour of an emphasis 
on the uniquely individual. 
One aspect of the relationship between autobiographical 
writing and history concerns the broader historical 
significance which can be attached to changes ln 
autobiography. (~blicat ion trends ln autobiographica'l 
writing can contribute to our conceptualisations of 
historical change: Who has access to print? Who does not 
publish? what sorts of lives are attracting the support of 
publishers in response to perceived interest among readers? 
How does autobiographical writing encode historical 
circumstance? And how does such writing respond to change 
(what Jay refers to as "a functional relationship between 
changing epistemologies and changing narrative strategies" 
(111-2))? What kinds of experiences qualify as personal 
historical record? How do structural constraints shape 
lives? Where is the 'real' in the text? How are the 
fragments of these autobiographical texts (more than one 
hundred and twenty) to be read? 
South African autobiographical writing spans a wide range 
of interpretations of life , from those which recount the 
entire life, as Alan Paton does, to those which record very 
short periods, as do authors of prison memoirs, in 
accordance with 'diversifying needs which life-writing comes 
to fulfil. Of the texts discussed in ~his chapter, 
Luthuli's represents the former i worker autobiographies 
", 
record only aspects of the life' (and very briefly). 8 ) A 
field dominated in the 1940s and 50s by white men's 
autobiographies recording life stories that tended to be 
career or achievement oriented, and markedly 
individualistic (those by Evenden, Rose-Innes, Malherbe, 
and Duffield are good examples), has gradually been 
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populated also by texts by women and people of colour which 
are often collections of life-narratives, brief 
adumbrations not of a whole life or even an entire career, 
but of what has happened to the enunciating subject, rather 
than what she or he has achieved. Again, the worker 
autobiographies which I examine later in this chapter are 
a good example of the latter. Furthermore, over the last 
four and half decades, South African autobiographical 
writing, comes increasingly to include texts which document 
the experience of being a South African of a particular 
racial category (Benson, Kitson, Malan, de Villiers, 
Mphahlele, Mathabane amongst others); these come to 
predominate over those which recount an individual's life, 
with racial classification being treated as some sort of 
rather irrelevant inessential. 
Moreover, in this period social change has afforded 
opportunities for different sectors of the population to 
write autobiographies, and there have been marked shifts in 
the kinds of South Africans who are recording their lives 
in autobiographies, often in response to perceptions of 
publishers regarding market demands. Autobiography 
chronicles the emergence of the black middle class (The 
Diary of Maria Tholo and Richard Rive's Writing Black are 
examples) as well as the growing sense of the importance of 
the lives of impoverished rural and urban workers; it thus 
declares the worth of individual testimony, perhaps in 
contestation with authoritarian academic studies which 
erased the individuals by using their evidence to construct 
other, statistically based narratives, addressed to the 
academic community. As has been noted, autobiographical , 
writing in the last twenty or so years manifests the 
struggle for democratization. Furthermore, across the 
board, there has been a shift to overtly politicized 
autobiographies: Luthuli, Makhoere, Joseph, First, Benson, 
Wilson, Woods, Kitson, Bernstein and many others define the 
self principally in terms of political allegiance. Perhaps 
r 
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this is to be expected considering the increasingly brutal 
repression of blacks and anti-government individuals in the 
60s and 70s. These changes are in response to political 
repress10n and also in response to shifts in the interests 
of readers who have sought in the last two decades to read 
about the experiences of a more diverse range of South 
Africans. Autobiographical writing traces, in addition , 
the growing conscientization of South African women and 
their refusal of the role of the good, silent woman. And 
while early autobiographers (from all racial groupings) 
writing in English 1n the apartheid period addressed 
themselves more or less consistently to a white readership, 
this becomes less usual in the last two or so decades, thus 
indicating growing democratization (in collective 
consciousness, if not in political reality), and also the 
spread of literacy amongst black South Africans. 
As Fanon and many others have observed, initially the 
pretext for colonization 1S that the coloniser brings 
enlightenment, education, technology, religion, law, human 
rights; colonization is, "A fight against barbarism, 
poverty, backwardness" (Fanon, 1967b: 161) . But 
colonization is increasingly seen to manifest itself as 
brutal exploitation, as the withholding of 
economic rights, technological skills and so 
education, 
on. Many 
black autobiographies -- and even some white-authored ones 
-- are an attempt to come to terms with, or an expose of, 
this shocking realisation. Luthuli writes of his 
experiences in the 20s and 30s at Adams College: 
We pray very hard about our children, most of all 
because of the South Africa in which they are growing 
up. In the days when Professor Matthews and I were 
young teachers at Adams the world seemed to be opening 
out for Africans. It seemed mainly a matter of 
proving our ability and worth as citizens, and that 
did not seem impossible. We were, of course, aware of 
the existence of colour prejudice, but we did not 
dream that it would endure and intensify as it has. 
There seemed point, in my youth, in striving after the 
values of the Western World. It seemed to be a 
striving after wholeness and fulfilment. Since then 
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we have watched the steady degeneration of South 
African affairs, and we have seen this degeneration 
quickened in the last ten years. (42) 
From autobiographies like Plaatje's one can infer that in 
the early decades of this century "striving after the 
values of the Western World" was seen as a reasonable 
response to colonialism, but not from Abrahams (1954) and 
Mphahlele (1959) onwards. In the later texts the brutality 
of white racism is explored as a virulent and contaminating 
illness. 
Autobiographical writing of the last two decades in 
particular also displays more diverse responses to the 
problems of life-writing. Sub-categories of the genre 
emerge in response to changing social circumstances. 
Records of prison experiences, for instance, often document 
only the ' period of incarceration (Ruth First's 117 Days is 
one such text) i no longer insisting on the author/subject 
as the same person, quasi-autobiographies -- sometimes co-
authored as in Luthuli's and Makeba's cases (amongst 
others), sometimes motivated and compiled by independent 
researchers -- burgeoned, especially in the 80s. A Talent 
for Tomorrow (Suzanne Gordon), Working Women (Lawson and 
Perold), We Came to Town (Kerfoot), and The Sun Shall Also 
Rise for the Workers (Makhoba), as well as the other worker 
autobiographies analyzed in this chapter, are examples of 
such researcher-motivated texts. 
These diversified approaches to the problems of life-
writing serve as historical records in the sense that 
discourses function constitutively in the social formation 
and new discursive practices in texts thus manifest shifts 
in the social formation and in the social relations which 
are enmeshed in material and discursive circumstance. 
Autobiography, moreover, serves as historical record since 
it marks what a segment of a culture deems important for 
inclusion at a particular cultural and historical moment, 
how material should be treated, and who should be sharing 
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experiences with readers. 9 As Hayden White has noted, 
narrative selects for inclusion; indeed, it is the "need or 
impulse to rank events with respect to their significance 
for the culture or group that is writing its own history 
that makes a narrative representation of real events 
possible" (1980: 14). And this is a point central to my 
argument in this chapter: life-writing tells us about 
(culture and language-mediated) experience and enacts 
social and discursive changes by encoding features of the 
social formation's value systems as they impinge upon the 
writing subject. In an important sense what is written 
bout reveals the problematic nature of the texts' concerns 
for the broader social formation. Foucault argues that a 
large body of literature on a specific topic is indicative 
of the problematic nature of that issue, problems which are 
teased over in writings (1984:344-5) The following seem 
to me to be paramount among the unresolved problems 
emerging in South African autobiographical writing: How to 
be an individual when group identity 1S overwhelmingly 
prescriptive (note the root of script in prescriptive); how 
to survive when survival is a luxury? How to respect 
oneself -- and command respect from your readers -- when as 
a black South African the entire social machinery denies 
your worth, or, as a white South African, your position as 
part of the dehumanising racist edifice causes you to 
mistrust everything you do , for nothing is innocent? Or, 
to put this another way : how to construct an identity which 
escapes the racism of the social formation? How to tell 
one's life so that the experience becomes a meaningful 
contribution to the understanding of the brutally simple 
narrative that is the received South African history?lo 
Importantly, South African autobiographical writing in 
English in the last 46 years generally (but of course 
unevenly) becomes markedly less Eurocentric 1n form, 
subject-matter, and audience. For many, the rejection of 
Europeanized autobiographical forms was simply a response 
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to the realization that the kinds of lives to be documented 
would not be accommodated by the rational narrative forms 
which characterize mainstream autobiographical writing in 
the major English-speaking countries. Autobiographies 
written in English by black South Africans initially tended 
to conform to the Western norm of telling the life-story of 
the particular individual (and it was usually a . rather 
special kind of individual -- Mphahlele, Abrahams, Jabavu, 
Matshikiza), while more recent autobiographies by black 
South Africans often came to be attempts to rewrite 
history, to set the record straight. And while much of the 
autobiographical writing in the early decades of 
Nationalist rule displays ordered and coherent narrative 
attempts to explore and explain (like Luthuli's and Rose-
Innes's), in the later decades autobiographical writing 
increasingly (but with important exceptions) evidences 
attempts to grapple with what Spengemann calls the 
"anarchic effects of individual existence and the 
totali tarian effects of social organisation" (1980: 113) . 
This is true not only of black-authored autobiographies, 
like Mattera's, Modisane's and others, but also of white-
authored autobiographies like Malan's and de Villiers'. 
This again demonstrates in large scale what Luthuli found 
personally: in large numbers, South Africans (black and 
even white) turned away from the metropole, away from white 
standards, rejecting the brutalities which accompanied the 
cultural package. 
If autobiography may be described as an assertion of the 
importance and meaningfulness of the individual's life --
and I think that this is an apt description, those texts 
dealing more broadly with the historical horrors of 
apartheid or with aggregated 'individuals' notwithstanding 
(Thula Baba and Bozzoli's Women of Phokeng) -- then the 
changing demographics of South African autobiographical 
production to a more (but incompletely) democratic textual 
production shows how for many dispossessed and disempowered 
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South Africans, women and men , claiming the right to tell 
their own stories is a negation of apartheid's negation of 
life. 
New distributions of power are being textually enacted as 
perceptions of reality change. Metaphorically, white South 
Africans were presented by the apartheid state with a 
mirrored world in which t heir own reflections glittered 
back at them, with black South Africans receding into the 
unfocused and undifferentiated background. (This was 
literally, spatially , accomplished by means of the 
establishment of ' homelands' and 'locations' for blacks --
which white South Africans could not freely enter -- and 
backyard khayas where black workers in white suburbs, 
because of prohibitions regarding prolonged stays by family 
members or friends, were seen only ' in terms of their 
positions as servants to whites). The autobiographies by 
white South Africans, especially those written in the 
earlier decades of the period under discussion, as a rule 
reinscribed this mirrored myth, as they wrote about their 
careers and lives with scarcely a mention of the barely 
seen horrors of institutionalized racism. 11 But as social 
realities presented themselves as unavoidable black 
South Africans and the world carne increasingly to disallow 
the fantastic explanations of apartheid -- autobiographers 
began to address (again, unevenly, for white-authored 
autobiographies are still appearing whose authors seem not 
to have lived in the most virulently racist country) their 
racially assigned 'positions. Beginning in the mid-sixties 
with texts authored by politically active whites like Ruth 
First and Albie Sachs, the acknowledgement of racially 
assigned privilege becomes central in autobiographies by 
non-politically active people like an Afrikaner recording 
his travels in Africa (Ted Botha), a teacher (de Villiers) , 
and journalists like Natie Ferreira, Rian Malan and Tony 
Heard. 
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While many South African autobiographies bear only some 
of the marks of testimony, one striking feature of these 
texts which they share with other testimony is the fact 
that they are clearly frequently to be read as responses to 
the crises of truth that South Africa has been experiencing 
-- with growing urgency -- in the last 46 years. As Felman 
observes, 
testimony is provided , and is called for, when the 
facts upon which justice must pronounce its verdict 
are not clear, when historical accuracy is in doubt 
and when both the truth and its supporting elements of 
evidence are called into question. The legal model of 
the trial dramatizes, in this way, a contained, and 
culturally channelled, institutionalized, crisis of 
truth. (1992:6) 
Autobiographical texts might be attempts to deal with a 
personal "crisis of truth", when the author wishes to prove 
that she or he is a particular kind of person (and not 
otherwise). An example of such a text is Godfrey Moloi's 
My Life: Volume One which I discuss in the following 
chapter. Yet although I say this is a response to a 
personal need for self-definition, it is also, and perhaps 
more obviously, a way of dealing with institutionalized 
racism, for this text can be read as a rebuttal of 
apartheid's dream of confining all black South Africans to 
rural 'homelands' and keeping them uneducated, 
conservative, simple. My Life sets out to establish that 
Moloi is not "just a farm boy" (1987:5) . Refusing 
apartheid's positioning of blacks as ineducable, tribal, 
Moloi positions his autobiographical subj ect as smart, 
streetwise, sophisticated , individualistic. Racist 
doctrine, presented as truths, is neatly encapsulated in 
what was a commonly mouthed dictum: you can take the black 
out of the bush, but you can't take the bush out of the 
black; this 1S repudiated in Moloi's text which shows that . 
he and 'the bush' are quite incompatible! Thus 
autobiographical writing can (and more frequently does) aim 
at challenging socially accepted notions of truth by 
presenting contestatory versions of reality. A very large 
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proportion of South African autobiographical texts belong 
in this category, from the worker autobiographies discussed 
later in this chapter, which explore the deprivations of 
the lives of ill-educated workers thus contradicting 
assertions that black South Africans are satisfied with 
their lot, to texts like Breytenbach's True Confessions and 
all other prison writing, which expose the conditions in 
South African prisons, to Malan's My Traitor's Heart, which 
painfully picks over the unreality of South African 
, reality' . 
Citing Camus, Felman asserts that contemporary writing --
and she is including fictional writing -- "is testimonial 
to the extent that it exists in a state of referential 
debt, of 'constant obligation' to the 'woes of history,' 
and to its dead" (1992:115). The acknowledgement by South 
Africans and the international c ommunity of the need for 
unofficial South African testimony, of documentation of 
ordinary people's lives, has resulted in a growing sense of 
autobiography's importance, relative to fictional forms. 
Luthuli's Let my People Go and the worker autobiographies 
which I examine in this chapter may be read as attempts to 
grasp the significance of history -- and to rewrite that 
history -- for all South Africans, including ordinary, ill-
educated, impoverished blacks. Again citing Camus, Felman 
observes that, 
"History rushes onward while thought reflects. But 
this inevitable backwardness becomes more pronounced 
the faster History speeds up. The world has changed 
more in the past fifty years than it did in the 
previous two hundred years." The" li terature of 
testimony" is thus not an art of leisure but an art of 
urgency: it exists in time not just as a memorial but 
as an artistic promissory note, as an attempt to bring 
the "backwardness" of consciousness to the level of 
precipitant events ... . The literature of testimony, 
therefore, is not simply a statement (any statement 
can but lag behind the events), but a performative 
engagement between consciousness and history, a 
struggling act of readjustment between the integrative 
scope of words and the unintegrated impact of events. 
The ceaseless engagement between consciousness and 
history obliges artists, in Camus' conception, to 
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transform words into events and to make an act of 
every publication .... (1992:114) 
Each of these texts indeed functions as a "promissory note" 
in that it serves not merely to record past experience but 
t o affirm the relentless progress of South African history 
toward justice and democracy , to contribute to that 
inevitable movement. And subsequent events have borne out 
the promise: just a few months ago South Africa held her 
first democratic election. In this the 
authors / researchers, no less than the artists to whom Camus 
refers, "transform words into events and . . . make an act of 
every publication". The growing importance of South 
African autobiography in the period 1948-1994 is indicative 
of the desire of South Africans and people abroad to re-
view South African reality , to revise the official story of 
the white Afrikaner Nationalist government in accordance 
with the testimony of the oppressed peoples. And indeed, 
most of the world found the State guilty of perfidy and 
isolated it accordingly . 
Life-writing then func t ions not only as historical 
document; it is also an historically significant act. 
Autobiographical writing acts upon social and discursive 
practices in that texts may influence other texts, readers, 
and thus the social formation. Autobioqraphical testimony I 
contributes importantly to general knowledges about South I 
Africa. Although the influences of texts are impossible to 
measure with any precision , analysts need to take account 
of "the necessary and ineluctable dialectic between text as 
structure and text as act " (Easthope, 1988:70). The fact 
that many of these autobiographical texts were banned in 
South Africa (those by Ruth First, Albie Sachs, Winnie 
Mandela, Indres Naidoo and Caesarina Makoere spring 
immediately to mind) indicates the State's fear of the 
power of these texts to persuade. Thandi Moses and 
Boitumelo Mofokeng cite Ellen Kuzwayo's autobiography as 
having been greatly inspiring to black women writers, one 
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of whom was Emma Mashinini who then went on to write her 
own autobiography (Daymond and Lenta, 1990:74-5). It is 
for this reason that autobiographers have a significant 
responsibility when they undertake to publish a text. 
Autobiography, as I read it, can be described as a 
confrontation between psychoanalysis, ethnology and 
semiotics, and the analysis of autobiography may (as 
Foucault argues about psychoanalysis and ethnology) open up 
"the double articulation of the history of individuals upon 
the unconscious of culture , and the historicity of those 
cultures upon the unconscious of individuals" (1970:379). 
We know that "neither culture nor the unconscious can be 
approached apart from a theory of signification, since it 
is by means of historically circumscribed signifying 
operations that both are organized" (Silverman, 1983:129). 
In this study, the focus is on this relationship between 
the signifying systems employed in autobiographical writing 
and their import for our understanding of the intersection 
of cultural transformation and individual change, both 
conscious and unconscious. 
***** 
The first text to be examined in this chapter, by Nobel 
Peace Prize winner, Albert Luthuli (with amanuenses), dates 
back to 1962 and is a fine example of the tendency to write 
history (from a specific individual's perspective) when 
writing autobiography. Fanon remarks on the importance of 
this task for black intellectuals: 
Colonialism -- empties the native's brain of all form 
and content and also distorts, disfigures and destroys 
the people's past in order to convince the natives 
that colonialism came to lighten their darkness. Thus 
the native intellectual must give the past of the 
whole continent of Africa its value for the colonist 
has degraded the whole continent. (1973:169-70) 
All autobiographers (and researchers who use 
autobiographical accounts to construct quasi-
autobiographical narratives) are probably motivated by a 
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need to give their own personal versions of what their (or 
other people's) lives were like. As we have noted, "Unless 
at least two versions of the same set of events can be 
imagined, there is no reason for the historian to take upon 
himself the authority of giving the true account of what 
really happened" (White, 1980:23). For some, this 1S a 
personal quest: Zola Budd and Louwtjie Barnard, for 
instance, both portray themselves as victims of selfish men 
in order to counter possible allegations that they were 
responsible for their own misfortunes; and I have already 
referred to Godfrey Moloi. For others, like Luthuli, the 
motive is less personal: he sets out to prove that State 
punitiveness against his organization and himself was 
unwarranted, but more importantly Luthuli, like many black 
autobiographers (Lekota, Mashabela, Magona, Kgosana, 
Mokgatle amongst others), uses autobiography as a forum to 
rewrite and revise South African history. 
The focus 1S on the events that have occurred, broadly 
historical events as well as those that have been 
personally experienced by the autobiographer, and sometimes 
this means that the authorial persona is obscured or non-
individualised. The subject of Let My People Go is 
remarkably self-effacing. This is in part because the 
protagonist's narrative traces his growing political 
activism, rather than a more general, and perhaps more 
private and personal, maturation process. The focus on the 
political is due perhaps to a commitment on the part of the 
writing subject to political struggle, as well as to the 
fact that those committed to political struggle may 
actually have to live out their lives by subordinating 
personal concerns to the political struggle. As Spacks 
remarks, "Of course commitment to a cause necessarily 
implies subordination of self" (1980: 116) . For South 
African activists especially, knowing that political 
activism may result in very long term incarceration or even 
death (with or without the rubber-stamp of the Courts) 
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obviously meant an enormous degree of personal sacrifice. 
Luthuli, for instance, says of his wife's unfailing support 
and unselfishness: 
I cannot express how grateful I am, especially as I 
quite literally neglect my family and feel extremely 
guilty about it. Ungrudgingly she has taken on, since 
I entered public life, the whole burden of the home 
and of working our smallholding. (41) 12 
Such commitment to a cause , and corresponding effacement of 
the self, informs the very title of Luthuli's 
autobiography: Let My People Go. The emphasis is on the 
group ("My People") of which the autobiographer is a 
member; moreover, the impersonal Biblical injunction 
addressed to an aggressor is fitting in the light of the 
narrator's unswerving Christian piety, which is, in effect, 
a philosophy of selflessness. 
Political activism is clearly not only the substance of 
the narrative, but also its aim (about which more shall be 
said). But what is interesting in Luthuli's case is that 
the narrating self and protagonist seem paradoxically 
caught up in activism without there being active pursuit of 
such a life. Luthuli' s Let My People Go is not only a 
remarkably impersonal autobiography, it lS remarkable too 
for its use of passive constructions at significant moments 
in Luthuli's life and political career. Luthuli accepts 
his election as chief of Groutville (it was not an 
hereditary title) only after two years' pressure from the 
tribal elders (50). He becomes an active member of the 
A. N. C. when "precipitated into Congress casually, almost by 
accident" (89). At an annual Congress meeting which 
disintegrated into chaos, Luthuli 
leapt on the platform and called for silence. To my 
surprise, I got it.... I found myself in the 
chair. . . . Champion became Natal President, and I 
found myself serving on his executive. It was a day 
of surprises. 
To accept this position seemed to me the natural 
outcome of an attitude which I had imbibed at Adams: 
it was another way of trying to serve people. (My 
emphases, 90). 
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When Dr Dube dies, Luthuli becomes a member of the Native 
Representative Council seemingly without desire or effort 
to campaign on his part (92). Later, after initially 
refusing the Youth League's requests that he stand for the 
Natal Presidency of the A.N.C., Luthuli's acceptance is 
conditional upon his opponent's agreement to this (100). 
At the following National Conference of the A.N.C., Luthuli 
is asked by the President-General to take the chair (101). 
During the Defiance Campaign he was, he says, "having to be 
very lively" (108). And in the account of his election to 
the Presidency of the A.N.C. in 1952, again Luthuli's 
passivity dominates; the subject of the autobiography is 
indeed often construed as the object to whom things happen. 
It is worth quoting another illustrative passage at some 
length: 
The Natal delegates ... told me that they intended to 
nominate me to stand against Dr. Moroka. I agreed 
without much excitement, making one stipulation: "I do 
not intend to become involved in fights over 
position. " 
"You just leave it to us," they replied. 
I did leave it to them .... 
In the voting, Dr. Moroka had some support from 
Free State delegates, but the upshot was that I now 
found myself at the head of the resistance movement, 
President-General of the A.N.C. I suppose that the 
deposition [from his position as chief] which Doctors 
Eiselen and Verwoerd conferred on me had something to 
do with the matter. If the people wanted me there, I 
was there. But I was grateful that I did not have 
behind me any struggle for power, nor any contention 
with other resisters. (117) 
Not only can this passivity be accounted for because of 
the subject's subordination to a cause, one can also 
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account for much of the lack of self-assertion in black-
authored autobiographies by looking to profound 
disempowerment of Africans by the apartheid regime; Luthuli 
describes it thus: "[Natives] stand by and watch ourselves 
being used as the white man's football.... Our lot is to 
feel the impact of the boot" (79); we are "objects rather 
than subjects" (80). But this is not all there lS to it. 
For Luthuli's passivity is conveyed in a tone of humility, 
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born of inner strength and certitude; as his 
"the humility of a man who 
amanuensis 
cannot be says, it is 
humiliated" (12). It is not the aggrieved passi vi ty of the 
helpless victim . This is seen in the fact that Luthuli's 
passivity occurs most notably when he faces political 
e x altation. When it comes to the struggle against the 
State (and it must be remembered that this began before the 
Nationalist Party became the Government in 1948), Luthuli's 
commitment is steadfast. Personal hardship such as 
repeated bannings, imprisonment and consequent severe ill-
health are met with stalwart indifference. But there is no 
evidence of passive indifference to injustice, regardless 
of the consequences to himself. 
What Spacks finds amongst certain women autobiographers, 
applies, too, to Luthuli: "Instead of using the cause 
ultimately to enlarge the sense of self, these women seem 
to diminish self 1n their reports of their causes" 
(1980: 116) . 13 Spacks refers to a symptomatic lack of 
affect, a denial of all emotional response to the 
autobiographer's own public importance and accomplishment; 
this, too, is evident in Let My People GO. 14 It is worth 
looking at this lack of recorded response on the part of 
the autobiographical subject in some detail: Luthuli does 
not tell us how he feels about being made chief, about 
becoming an office-bearer in the A.N.C., or even of his 
response to his election as President-General of the A.N.C. 
This 1S what he says of the adulation he receives in 
Durban: 
I found myself travelling towards the railway station 
over the heads of the crowd. In the enthusiasm of the 
moment, the traffic regulations and the prohibitions 
against outdoor meetings were forgotten. I managed to 
persuade people to put me down so that I could leave 
for Ladysmith. (188) 
When he is chosen to visit India to attend the 
International Missionary Conference, he records no 
response. His banning orders elicit no comment (e.g. 191) i 
bouts of serious illness provoke only the expression of 
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grati tude for correspondence and visits (141). This is 
indeed an autobiographical subject who is subordinated to 
a cause. 
Subordination of self is evidenced also in the overall 
structure of the text which tends to narrate the history of 
the resistance movement, involving the narrator only 
marginally. For instance, his teaching career is submerged 
in the narrative of the progress of Bantu Education (a 
notorious system designed to educate disenfranchised South 
Africans for a lifetime of servitude); his political career 
is only a small part of the more central narrative of the 
history of increasingly brutal racism and the resistance 
movement. Luthuli's autobiography is remarkably reticent 
about important personal relationships: 
Over the inner reality of our marriage and the depth 
of the attachment between my wife and me, I draw a 
veil. But I may say here that I count myself 
fortunate among men to have married so good a wife, 
and so devout a Christian. (41) 
Of his children we learn virtually nothing. This is his 
cryptic description of his children: " We were married in 
1927. Between 1929 and 1945 Nokukhanya bore me seven 
children, of whom the first and last two were boys" (42). 
Luthuli's insistence that he is no more and no less than a 
representative of those who fight in the struggle for 
liberation informs not only the structure of the 
autobiography (the subordination of the personal to the 
historical) , but lS indeed his reason for agreeing to the 
project: 
The burden of my evidence [at the Treason Trial] was 
the burden of this book. It was a description of what 
the Congress movement has stood for, of the reasons 
for our actions, the method we have embraced, the 
goals which we mean to achieve, and the South Africa 
we envisage. (198) 
Luthuli's aim lS not simply to inform; his autobiography 
is itself part of his activism. He aims to enlighten 
ignorant "white would-be sympathisers" (47) and to persuade 
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the international corrununity that the "official" South 
African version of political reality is a vicious lie, best 
combatted by applying sanctions against South Africa which 
might shock white South Africa out of its smug inability to 
listen to reason or moral argument. For instance, of his 
participat ion in 
Council, Luthuli 
the toothless Native Representative 
acknowledges that the Council had for 
years, and in vain, importuned the governing white 
authorities to reverse the process of increasing 
oppression: 
I was disillusioned myself and could only reply, 
'There are people beyond South Africa who sometimes 
hear what we say. All we can do is try to shout to 
the world. All I can do is help us shout louder .... ' 
White South Africa was impenetrably dead, and their 
newspapers did nothing to educate them. (92-3) 
This autobiography is part of that attempt to address the 
world; Luthuli, as autobiographical subj ect, is not the 
principle object of narrative interest; South African 
politics and history are central. The autobiographical 
subject functions as the authenticating narrating subject. 
That the self is not of primary concern to Luthuli can be 
seen also ln the fact that the decision to write the 
autobiography is taken after much persuasion. The Preface 
begins: 
This book is the outcome, after long hesitation on my 
part, of the urging of a number of my friends. It is 
true that in the last thirty years I have been 
increasingly identified with the movement of 
resistance against oppression by white supremacy in 
South Africa, until now I find myself at its head. 
Nevertheless, I regard my life as one among many, and 
my role in the resistance as one among many. If I 
have anything to say, it is not because of any 
particular distinction, but because I am identified 
with those who love South Africa .... 
Among the many friends who have encouraged me to 
write this book -- and had they not implanted the idea 
it would not have been written -- it fell to Charles 
and Sheila Hooper to deliver the final blow to my 
reluctance. (My emphases; 1982:15) 
And a kind of quietism informs the act of composition, too. 
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Luthuli's amanuenses, the Hoopers, each made records of 
Luthuli's dictation, out of which "they compiled a first 
draft of the book.... To this draft I added my 
afterthoughts, occasional corrections, and this preface" 
(1982:15) . But even more remarkable is the author's 
insistence that his importance lies merely in an extraneous 
status granted him by others; it is "not because of any 
particular distinction, but because I am identified with 
those who love South Africa". He goes even further, 
concluding the Preface thus: 
If I have done injustice to any [men and women who 
fight valiantly in the cause of freedom and justice], 
I ask pardon, and I point out that this book is in 
part dedicated to them. But the last impression that 
I wish to create is that their role is minor, while 
mine is major. Indeed, the reverse is true. As I 
look back I accuse myself of having contributed too 
little. 
May God's will, holy and perfect, be done in 
South Africa, the dearly loved land whose children we 
all are. (16) 
I doubt that there are many autobiographies by famous 
people, let alone Nobel Prize winners, which are this self-
effacing. 
Commi tment to formal autobiography, a story of the 
self written with the intent of dissemination, implies 
a claim of significance -- a fact that troubled early 
[women] practitioners, who felt obliged to defend 
themselves against the charge of vanity by asserting 
the exemplary shape of their experience or the 
didactic intent of their prose. Women, for obvious 
social reasons, have traditionally had more difficulty 
than men about making public claims of their own 
importance. (Spacks , 1980:112) 
Whether Luthuli "felt obliged" to defend himself "against 
the charge of vanity" is, on the evidence of the text, 
doubtful; however, the narrating subject certainly takes 
great pains to ensure that his readers know that he is not 
laying claim to extraordinary importance, and he does this 
in part by "asserting the exemplary shape" of his 
experience, as well as "the didactic intent" of his prose. 
"Goodness ~s selflessness, these [women's] 
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autobiographies suggest; and vice versa -- a notion by its 
nature unlikely to make for effective autobiography, since 
autobiographies are about selves" (Spacks, 1980:114). 
Perhaps Luthuli' s autobiography is instructive since it 
exemplifies, I believe, just the opposite. It is 
effective15 precisely because it is not only about a self; 
it aims to effect change, and it aims to do this not for 
personal reasons but because this is the morally defensible 
way of responding to the process of dehumanization to which 
the vast majority of South Africans were subjected. It is 
effective, surely, because there can be few readers who are 
not convinced of this, and we are convinced of this in part 
because we are persuaded that the protagonist is selfless -
in keeping with his professed Christian faith -- and 
steadfast. 
Hayden White has persuasively demonstrated that in 
historical narrative, "The events that are recorded in the 
narrative appear 'real' precisely insofar as they belong to 
an order of moral existence, just as they derive their 
meaning from their placement in this order" (1980:26). Let 
My People Go secures its own foregrounded moral order, or, 
more precisely, its counter order, in three principle ways: 
most notably, it counterpoints its own narrative of the 
material effects of racist legislation and increasingly 
naked displays of State power with the fictive (both in the 
senses of made-up and false) versions used in white 
justification; secondly (and less markedly) it employs most 
skilfully an understated irony which firmly places the 
narrator in a position of moral superiority; and, thirdly 
(the text foregrounds this least) , the narrator's 
generosi ty16 and earnest desire to serve his fellows, 
manifested in a great many minor incidents as well as in 
his life-long commitment to the liberation struggle, ensure 
that the reader's sympathies are with him (and thus against 
those he opposes) . 
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Taking the first, let us examine precisely how this 
juxtaposition of Luthuli' s account with the accounts of 
white supremacists functions. The narrator's account of 
events and consequences is contrasted with justifications 
for racist oppression which are shown to be based neither 
on reason nor confrontation with material reality. This is 
a consistent feature of Luthuli's narrative; it is the most 
explicit of the three strategies to secure a contrary moral 
order to that of the State. Luthuli shows repeatedly how 
the false validations of racists emanate from a discursive 
domain which is highly selective in the aspects of reality 
to which it chooses to attend: he frequently indicts the 
white press for its consistent failure to inform its 
readers about the realities of black existence or even of 
black objections to egregious State brutality. It is a 
discourse which cannot survive without profound deceit. Of 
the advice to black South Africans to accept whatever 
benefits the State might provide, Luthuli is adamant that 
these can be conceived of as benefits only by those who 
wish to be deceived: "I am open to progressive compromise, 
but I reject Dr. Aggrey's advice to accept anything given. 
I must be sure it is bread I am offered, and in apartheid 
I see not bread but a stone" (38). The argument that 
Africans cannot "catch up" with white civilisation in a few 
decades but need "a two-thousand-year apprenticeship" (43) 
is, Luthuli declares, "pure nonsense" which 
does not arise from a survey of history, it arises 
from the urge to justify a course already chosen. The 
. conclusion ("No rights for two thousand years") is 
there before the argument begins. An uncritical 
assumption ("Whites are civilised") is there too. No 
account is taken of the fact that there have been both 
bad and exemplary Christians throughout the whole of 
the two thousand years in question, and that various 
societies have produced civilised beings for much 
longer than that. The argument assumes that, whereas 
white[s] can take up where the last generation left 
off, Africans cannot .... Must we really invent the 
spinning-wheel before we can wear or make clothes? 
Must we really invent the internal combustion engine 
before we can drive cars? (43) 
Luthuli patiently explains the most important "Apartheid-
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Baaskap [sic] Acts" (48), what he calls -~ pointing to the 
inherent contradiction in South African "justice" 
"criminal laws" (110), and their impact on black lives. 
Of stock limitation, Luthu1i shows how deeply flawed 
official white ' reasoning' is. Black farmers are, he 
points out, unlikely to be persuaded of the desirability of 
stock limitation, 
when we are familiar with the spectacle of white 
farmers with thousands of head of cattle on spacious 
ranches. Cattle-culling is an unreal solution to the 
problem in South Africa. The problem is: 13 per cent 
of the land for 70 per cent of the people. The white 
version of the problem is: how can we continue to 
confine them to 13 per cent of the land, as we are 
determined to do? Cattle-culling is not the result of 
facing the real problem, it is the outcome of this 
white determination to make no concession whatever. 
(55-6) 
Luthuli encounters a similar response to the problems of 
racism being , solved' with yet more racist legislation: 
land theft by whites which results in the migrant labour 
system is dealt with by white authorities by enforcing 
Influx Control laws which prohibit the free movement of 
black South Africans to urban areas "to protect the urban 
natives" (109)! 
Challenging patiently throughout the narrative aspects of 
the lies which together constitute the raison d' etre of 
raClsm, Luthuli's narrator contrasts white delusion with 
reality. While whites see steady social disintegration of 
black communities "as just another sign of African 
incapacity" (56) , the narrator explains that the 
destruction of black families is the result of white 
avarice. Promiscuity and neglect amongst blacks are thus 
directly attributable not to inherent black savagery but to 
the immoral actions of white overlords. Whi tes, 
comfortably horrified, seek to avoid recognition of their 
common nationhood with black South Africans; they define 
themselves as a superior group apart. They fail to 
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recognise that they are really neighbours, "not white 
masters" (103). 
That the official white version is part of a whole false 
discourse of racism is implicitly contrasted with the 
narrator's own true discourse in which words are used to 
refer to experienced reality, not to a sham: Luthuli refers 
to "white parlance", one feature of which is the fact that 
in this discourse "all people who do not wholeheartedly 
accept indefinite white supremacy are 'agitators'" (83). 
The gross distortions which are encoded in "white parlance" 
prevent communication from taking place. During the 
Defiance Campaign "there was a fruitless interchange of 
letters between the Congresses and the authorities ... 
[though our] letters were sometimes completely ignored" 
(104). However futile the attempt to communicate with the 
white rulers, 
[o]ne thing which this correspondence did underline 
was that there is not really even a common language in 
which to discuss our agonising problems. The 
Nationalist rulers cannot speak to Africans except in 
the restricted vocabulary of white Baasskap. They 
cannot discuss. They know, and they then proceed to 
arrange and give orders. For our part, we cannot 
employ the phrases of supplication and subservience, 
we cannot take up the unreal posture of "good native 
boys" towards good, all-knowing and all-beneficient 
[sic] white rulers. Our whole protest and resistance 
is based on our claim to human dignity. (105) 
The official motto of white South Africa is EUROPEANS ONLY 
(105), a motto upheld by the white press which blatantly 
works to keep white readers ignorant and misinformed. 
Examples abound. I cite only one. At the time of the bus 
boycott an enormously successful total boycott 
Luthuli notes tha t , "[ t] here was the usual talk in the 
Press of intimidation as though a few picketers could 
intimidate a township of a hundred thousand people at bus 
queues where the police were active to break the boycott." 
He adds in a footnote: "There were, in fact, no queues. 
The police assembled at bus stops to protect non-existent 
'loyal' natives. Loyal to what? Poverty?" (155) . The 
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creation of 'Bantustans' is described in farcical terms: 
tightly controlled Government appointees manage the system 
paradoxically known as "Bantu Self-Government" (179) in " 
Homelands" . 
misrepresent, 
When language is used deliberately to 
and when these efforts at fraudulent 
fabrication are so patently at odds with the experiences of 
millions of people subjected to the evils of its hypocrisy, 
satire and irony are often the only modes with which the 
narrator can address the distortions. 
Repeatedly, Luthuli shows the irony of white oppression 
lying not in secure knowledge of superiority (as is claimed 
by supremacists) but in (unwarranted) fear. Of black 
violence, for instance, Luthuli notes that 
[m]any whites, having persuaded themselves against the 
evidence that they share South Africa with a barbaric 
and hostile black horde, cannot leave us alone, they 
feel they must goad and prod us. It is as though they 
are perversely most afraid of us when we are friendly 
and disciplined and patient. The large, amiable dog 
in the yard is on a chain. You have been told that he 
is a snarling, dangerous cur. His amiability must 
therefore be a deception. You keep out of reach and 
jab repeatedly at him to rouse him to anger. If you 
succeed, that proves he is a wild and savage creature. 
Now and then you do succeed the best-tempered 
animal gets sick of ill-willed pestering. Sometimes 
you do enrage him. Sometimes the chain made for him 
snaps. Then there is a riot. 
Whites see only the riot. Their reaction? -- Make 
a stronger chain.... What follows when the chain 
breaks is not riot and the restoration of order. It 
is riot and counter-riot.... There are occasions when 
the counter-riot takes place before the "riot". (My 
emphasis.) (114) 
Luthuli adds ln a footnote: "Since I wrote this, 
Sharpeville has provided macabre illustration of its truth" 
(114). Luthuli thus secures his status as the bearer of 
truth, as being in a position of unassailable moral 
superiority, thus endowing the narrative with prestige of 
historical document. For history-writing must seem to be 
'true', above the petty politics of the events it recounts. 
While Luthuli's narrative serves to enlighten, the whites 
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it describes desire only to be kept ignorant and in power: 
in response to an A. N.C. call for a Judicial Inquiry into 
the role of agents provocateurs in riots, the Minister of 
Justice replied that this "would achieve nothing except to 
provide a platform for agitators" and Luthuli comments, 
"This last observation now accompanies all refusals to make 
facts public" (115). This fantastic deception about 
agitators -- a fabrication which the Government was to rely 
on more and more right until 1990 is an incredible 
refusal to acknowledge the evidence of their lives and eyes 
and minds: 
I sometimes wonder if life is not one long series of 
surprises for the Nationalists. Most of them perhaps 
really do think that Africans are so thick-skinned and 
limited in understanding that they would not notice 
things like malnutrition, low wages, leaks in the 
roof, police brutality, or flagrant discrimination, 
unless an agitator came to point it all out. It takes 
them gravely aback when we arrive at our conclusions 
and resolve to do something about them . Deep down, I 
wonder if they believe us left to ourselves 
capable of more than "Ja, Baas!" After the event, 
they seem sometimes to have the air of people who 
really had not thought it could happen. They still 
seem to believe, even now, that as soon as their 
unreal plans are established and applied, the whole 
African people is going to subside into centuries of 
subservience. (143) 
But perhaps, the narrator muses, this delusion of agitators 
and intimidation is because the whites "have become so 
accustomed to the political coercion of Africans that they 
expect us to imitate their methods" (156). The trouble 
with whites is that 
they credit us with their own ambitions. They mislead 
themselves by believing that we too have master-race 
aspirations. And since they see things in those 
terms, they terrify themselves into an attitude which 
knows only two alternatives -- dominate or perish. 
For us, we do not desire to dominate but to share as 
between brethren, basing our hierarchy on ability, not 
colour. That is our offer. And we shall not consent 
to perish. Let them never cherish that foolhardy 
illusion, for all their guns and Saracens . (187) 
Again stressing his refusal to sit back and passively allow 
the State and other white politicians to play their games 
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with millions of Africans lives, in accordance with their 
flimsy deceptions, Luthuli argues: 
I see no clever strategy in leaving them to attribute 
fictitious attitudes to us when in fact we have real 
attitudes of our own. Further, it has always been my 
aim to ensure that if the whites are ignorant of the 
realities, the fault does not lie with us. (162) 
And ignorant they are: "the white fifth [of the population] 
has almost no idea how the other four-fifths live ... it is 
more and more a Government-enforced ignorance" (189). 
The second way in which the narrative secures its own 
moral order is through pervasive use of understated irony 
at instances when the absurdity of South African politics 
is gently, and with great restraint, satirised. Many of 
the passages quoted above are evidence of this method (I 
shall not labour the point with direct reference to them), 
but there are many more. In a so-called Christian State, 
for instance, the State and its supporters are themselves 
those who ensure that Christianity does not spread amongst 
black South Africans: "White paternalist Christianity -- as 
though the whites have invented the Christian faith 
estranges my people from Christ" (119). 
The 
But the worst impediment to the spread of Christianity 
and the maintenance of early standards nowadays is not 
even the fact that many white Christians are unwilling 
to practise what they profess. It is the recent 
glorification of the past, and the cry by the present 
Government (with legislation to match) that Africans 
should "develop along their own lines" . . .. The effort 
currently being made to pour us back into the mould of 
nineteenth-century African tribalism is detrimental to 
our advancement and to Christianity. (20)17 
narrator tells us, too, that the Natives' 
Representative Council (an attempt to appease black 
political aspirations since black disenfranchisement had 
become state policy) was apparently born out of the belief 
"that if we could be induced to talk enough to no purpose, 
our political hopes and economic troubles would fall away" 
(85). When Dr. Eiselen claims that Luthuli's membership of 
the A.N.C. is incompatible with his position as chief, the 
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narrator corrunents: "I still saw no conflict between the 
Defiance Campaign and my place as chief, but that is 
perhaps because I failed to see my position in Groutville 
as a favour bestowed by the Native Affairs Department" 
(111) 18 
The narrator's ironic humour underscores his moral 
superiority. The narrator records the termi ation of his 
first banning order thus: "In the winter of 1954, when the 
new battery of ruthless laws was freshly in place on the 
Statute Book, my ban expired. It was not irrunediately 
reimposed. I suppose I was being given a chance to go 
straight. I irrunediately misbehaved" (135). When served 
with his second ban the hero's pretence to be the simpleton 
that his captors think all Africans are serves to 
underscore their stupidity (136), a stupidity which emerges 
over and over again. Luthuli observes, for instance, that, 
"A small number of Afrikaners who have begun to think are 
beginning to ask whether Dr. Verwoerd and Mr. de Wet Nel 
really do speak with the authentic voice of the African" 
(my emphasis; 190). He relates an incident demonstrating 
the almost incredible incompetence of Government 
representatives, again showing the enormous discrepancy 
between official claims that black South Africans were 
receiving Government assistance and the ridiculous nature 
of so-called assistance. The particular incident occurred 
when Luthuli, as chief, determined to co-operate with the 
Government agricultural advisor's suggestion that the 
entire corrununity change to producing a cotton crop by 
offering a piece of his land to serve as initial model. 
I ploughed. He [the demonstrator] planted. My wife 
tended the crop. The Government demonstrator visited 
the experiment casually. At the time of reaping he 
was nowhere to be found. We reaped it in ignorance of 
the correct methods to employ. He reported the 
operation to his superiors. That was that.... [The 
system of agricultural field advisors] fails, on the 
whole, and its failure is pointed to by whites as yet 
another piece of evidence that Africans are 
unteachable. (54-5) 
181 
But certainly the greatest irony of all (one to which 
white supremacists are blissfully oblivious, and one that 
is emphasised throughout the text) is the paradoxical 
strength which the liberation movement gains from 
increasing State repression. Some of the credit for the 
co-operation between liberation movements the narrator 
accedes to General Smuts "for it was one of his more 
iniqui tous Acts which made us and the Indians of Natal 
realise that we have a good deal in common" (91). "It 
seems hard to recognise at the moment that the Nationalists 
more than anybody have given force and insistence to 
African demands" (97). When Luthuli is arrested along with 
many others on charges of High Treason, again the 
resistance movement is strengthened: "What distance, other 
occupations, lack of funds, the police interference had 
made difficult -- frequent meetings -- the Government now 
insisted on" (148); and the Treason Trial itself, 
provided a new rallying point for the resistance. I 
must give credit where credit is due. I doubt whether 
we could have devised so effective a method of 
ensuring cohesion in resistance and of enlarging its 
embrace as did the Government when it set the trial in 
motion. . . . The colour-bar dropped away like the 
fictitious and beastly thing it is, within the borders 
of the unexpected world which the Trial had created. 
(152-3) 
Given the horrors of oppression which whites inflicted 
upon millions of South Africans, the narrator's insistent 
acknowledgement of the positive effects of repression, 
combined with his very mildly satiric tone, strikes one as 
an exceedingly generous response, one which serves to 
highlight the narrator's superiority. And this brings us 
to the third method in which Luthuli's narrator reinforces 
his own moral superiority: viz. , the text's 
characterisation of narrator/protagonist as humble yet 
profoundly principled, as acutely critical of hypocrisy and 
cant yet irrepressibly generous and earnest in his desire 
to serve his people for the greater good. It is perhaps 
this which compels respect in the reader for the moral code 
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which the text upholds, and thus ensures that we acquiesce 
to its version of reality as the correct one. His refusal 
to co-operate with white lies inevitably leads to a 
positive interpretation of State oppression. The principle 
by which he tries to live, that of giving "a charitable 
interpretation to every man's actions" (36) until proven 
wrong, informs the narrative. He tells us that is 
knowledge of Afrikaner history "gave me some insight into 
the dilemma of whites, particularly Afrikaners, which has 
possibly served in later years as a real protection against 
hatred and bitterness" (37). This is illustrated when he 
comments on the plans of Dr. Loram (Chief Inspector of 
Native Education In Natal) to impose a "practical" 
education on black South Africans: 
His driving intention seems to have been, in all good 
faith, to equip African children for the lives white 
South Africa decreed they would have to live. Since 
they had been cast for the role of hewers of wood and 
drawers of water , their education must equip them to 
hew wood and draw water. (My emphasis, 33) 
He goes on to say that he doubts whether this was a 
conscious strategy; Luthuli attributes Dr. Loram's support 
for a programme set to make Africans "contented in [their] 
mental shackles" to a lack of critical acumen. Luthuli 
concludes, with amazing benevolence that Loram "had, no 
doubt, the best of intentions" (33). The narrator even 
acknowledges, quite ungrudgingly, 
Government have effected some 
that the Nationalist 
positive 
amendment regarding the payment of fines 
changes: the 
to the Tribal 
Treasury (rather than the chief) is one such instance (52). 
Of his imprisonment under the State of Emergency which 
followed Sharpeville, Luthuli writes: 
Vigilant steps were taken to seal me off from other 
prisoners.... Even African warders were under 
instructions not to speak to me. Especially as my 
illness kept me confined to bed for most of the day, 
I led a solitary life . Nevertheless, I do not 
remember my cell as a place of boredom. It became, in 
fact, a place of sanctuary, a place where I could make 
up for the neglect of religious meditation occasioned 
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by the hurly-burly of public life. There was time, 
there was quietness, there was comparative solitude. 
I used it. Frail man that I am, I pray humbly that I 
may never forget the opportunity God gave me to 
rededicate myself, to consider the problems of our 
resistance to bondage, and above all to be quiet in 
His Presence. My whitewashed cell became my chapel, 
my place of retreat. (201) 
This kind of quiet magnanimity is very rare, in the people 
one meets or in those who are depicted in autobiographical 
texts. The consistent humility, too, which is never 
strident or self-seeking, ensures that we are more than 
sympathetic to the speaker. Earlier he tells us, "My 
ambitions are, I think, modest -- they scarcely go beyond 
the desire to serve God and my neighbour, both at full 
stretch" (36). The autobiography testifies to this, its 
very self-effacement serving paradoxically as self-
revelation. This gentle humility inspires as the most 
outstanding characteristic of the subject of Let My People 
=..;;;....;;...-=-<--...;;;....;;;;...;;:;..,""'--=...;:;;.. 
Go. It is, in large measure, this modest ~npretentiousness 
which secures the reader's trust in the autobiographer's 
account of history, thus enabling him to realize his aim to 
make the text serve as an intervention in that history. 
****** 
Autobiography is a protean genre, taking a variety of 
shapes in order to serve authors and targeted readers in 
specific ways, but always as an attempt to record 
experience. I have mentioned before my belief that the 
genre in South Africa has increased in importance 
relative to fictional works -- in the last twenty or thirty 
years, in response to political and social engineering 
which sought to deny individuals the right to determine 
their lives. In the struggle to survive, oppressed South 
Africans have written about themselves not in order to 
explore new ways of writing, so much as to declare the 
rawness of their experience, the inescapable reality of 
their lives. The Afrikaner Nationalist government sought 
to write black South Africans out of South African history, 
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to silence black voices entirely, to remove their bodies 
physically from the land that they designated South Africa 
by compacting millions of people onto impossibly small 
'homelands' which could, presumably, write their own 
, independent' histories. Much of South African 
autobiographical writing insists on the right of these 
dispossessed peoples to rewrite, to right wrongs, to 
personally wrest the Master's fictional narratives away, to 
expose the official version as the babble of madmen. 
The rewriting of history is an important feature of much 
(but not all) South African autobiographical writing, with 
growing urgency in the latter part of the period under 
discussion. Elizabeth Nelani says of black South African 
youths: 
They might already be spoiled because of the lack of 
education. But what little they have they'll use to 
fight -- fight back for the whole of history -- for 
the days after the war when the British couldn't pay 
the Afrikaners who fought in the war, and so they paid 
with Africa -- the children are not scared of death. 
(Quoted by Barrett et al, 1985:232) 
The revision of history significantly encodes realities and 
also feeds back into perceptions of readers, South African 
and international, thus materially (but immeasurably) 
affecting interpretations, narratives, of South African 
reality. Autobiographical texts appropriate the right to 
interpret; interpretation is "the violent or surreptitious 
appropriation of a system of rules ... in order to impose a 
direction, to bend it to a new will" (Foucault, 1984:86). 
Even those texts which ostensibly deal with the minutiae of 
experience of particular black South Africans (and thus do 
not seem to challenge apartheid history), ln effect do 
contest History's collusion in the silencing of the South 
African masses by documenting the lived history of specific 
oppressed individuals, however humble; by exploring the 
"uniqueness of experience in the face of its theorization" 
(Felman and Laub, 1992:xx). 
185 
One of the glaring ironies of the whole apartheid 
project, noted by Luthuli, has been the strengthening of 
the resolve to resist In proportion to the increase In 
State repression; this is evident in a survey of 
autobiographical writing, which, in the last 15 or so 
years, documents increasing white resistance as well as 
black. White resistance often takes the form of 
researcher-scripted autobiographies like those of Frances 
Baard and Winnie Mandela, and of Elsa Joubert's poppie. 19 
These texts provide a platform for the victims of 
apartheid. Fanon's observation (quoted at the end of 
Chapter 3) that decolonization transforms the victims of 
colonial oppression into key players in history is 
particularly apposite; and South African autobiographical 
writing in the latter part of the period under discussion 
demonstrates the importance of those whose inessentiality 
was strategized in political, geographical and human terms. 
While early black autobiographies tend to be written by 
educated individuals whose texts had to compete with far 
more numerous white-authored texts, the writing of the last 
fifteen years marginalizes whites, especially those who 
either supported apartheid or were politically neutral, and 
asserts the centrality of even the most humble of the poor 
and illiterate. The impulse to affirm the importance of 
the life experiences of the underdog has resulted in the 
emergence, around the 1980s, of a sUb-species of 
autobiography 20 which I believe is uniquely South African, 
comprising the brief life stories of victims of apartheid 
who are semi-literate or illiterate blue collar workers and 
subsistence farmers. Many of these texts are hardly 
recognizable as autobiographies -- some are more readily 
classifiable as biography than autobiography, and some seem 
closer to fiction; I have nevertheless studied them as a 
species of autobiography because each relies on the reader 
having some sense of the narrative being based on the 
personal testimony of living individuals. These texts are 
all researcher-motivated, that is, it is as a result of the 
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suggestions of a researcher (I use this term loosely to 
embrace a range of individuals in different disciplines) 
that the autobiographical subject tells about her or his 
life experiences, often recorded in a series of interviews. 
Moreover, these worker autobiographies are usually written 
and compiled not by the autobiographical subjects, but by 
researchers cum editors. (The only exception, an 
apparently unaided composition, would seem to be Qabula's 
A Working Life, Cruel Beyond Belief) . 
These texts raise a host of questions: What needs with 
regard to readers' knowledge of the life experiences of 
South Africans do these texts fulfil? The appearance of 
this kind of writing in the 1980s and its virtual 
disappearance at the end of this decade invites reflection 
on its role in the South African social formation. How do 
these texts establish themselves as 'true'? Since these 
texts are usually markedly different ln form from 
conventional autobiographies, I am concerned to explore the 
textual strategies by which they establish themselves as 
authentic life stories, and seek to probe what is at stake 
in their doing so. But perhaps what interests me most is 
the politics of this form of life-writing: who tells about 
life experiences, the autobiographical subject (through the 
researcher), or the researcher (through the 
autobiographical subject)? Who is it that has the power to 
name the real in these quasi-autobiographical texts? Does 
the obvious power of the researcher detract from the 
project of empowerment of the voiceless and illiterate? To 
what extent do these texts serve to fragment the grand 
narratives of history, or, at the other end of the spectrum 
in their frequent aggregation and radical abbreviation 
of the lives of individuals do they rather conserve 
master interpretations by reinforcing stereotypes? In this 
analysis I have found that although these texts differ, and 
each has to be considered on its own merits, in general 
they challenge the obscurity in which the lives of poor, 
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uneducated people are lived, and thus claim importance for 
the individuals who speak and whose voices are 
representative of millions of others whose lives are lived 
in similar obscurity. 
The aspects of reality which seem to emerge as problems 
in these texts stem, it would appear, from the chasm 
between black illiterate workers and white South Africans, 
as well as from the perceived absence of recognition by 
black workers of the importance of members of their own 
ranks. Perhaps it is also the contradiction between 
institutionalized deprivation and the growing strength of 
liberation movements which insist on the power of the 
people which necessitates attempts to reconsider aspects of 
life. Some of these texts, moreover, address the needs of 
adul t black literacy students, for whom Eurocentric or 
childish textbooks are unsuited. "This development of a 
given into a question, this transformation of a group of 
obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the 
diverse solutions will attempt to produce a response, this 
is what constitutes the point of problematization and the 
specific work of thought" (Foucault, 1984:389). 
The texts that I have studied are not uniform; they 
represent a variety of responses to questions regarding 
lived experiences of the oppressed. Worker autobiographies 
range from those texts which deal each with an individual 
life story to those which blur the boundaries of 
individuals' experiences. The Story of Mboma by Mboma 
Dladla, as told to Kathy Bond (1979), The Sun Shall Rise 
for the Workers by Mandlenkosi Makhoba (helped by an 
anonymous friend; 1984:1), My Life Struggle by Petrus Tom 
(1985), A Working Life, Cruel Beyond Belief by Alfred Temba 
Qabula (1989) each deal with single autobiographical 
subjects. 21 Some worker autobiographies take the form of 
anthologies of autobiographical "sketches" of many 
subjects, as ln Working Women: A Portrait of South Africa's 
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Black Women Workers by Lesley Lawson (1985), We Came to 
Town, edited by Caroline Kerfoot (1985), A Talent for 
Tomorrow: Life Stories of South African Servants by Suzanne 
Gordon (1985), Vukani Makhosikazi: South African Women 
Speak edited by Ingrid Obery (1985), Sibambene: The Voices 
of Women at Mboza by Hanlie Griesel (1987), and Facing the 
Storm: Portraits of Black Lives in Rural South Africa by 
Tim Keegan (1988) 22 Also included in this group are texts 
which are autobiographical only in the very loosest sense: 
they are based on the testimonies of individuals but the 
researcher / editor creates out of a number of life-stories 
one aggregated narrative . Thula Baba (no author named; 
1987) and The Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life 
Strategy, and Migrancy in South Africa 1900-1983 by Belinda 
Bozzoli (1991), although very different in tone, form and 
intention, both create of the life stories of a number of 
women a single narrative. 
The emergence of these worker autobiographies in a period 
of profound social turmoil in South Africa is important. 
It will be remembered that 1976 saw political tumult on an 
unprecedented scale; no longer relying on leaders (who were 
mostly in exile or imprisoned), ordinary people risked 
their lives to defy their white overlords. Riots did not 
end there, but what did - - it seems to me -- begin there 
was a paradoxical reaction by the State of crushing 
displays of increased State power (there were successive 
States of Emergency in which curfews were instituted and 
thousands of South Africans imprisoned without trial), and 
a contrary admission In the 1980s that apartheid had 
failed, and that white supremacy could not be maintained. 
Wi th this public confession by the then Prime Minister, 
P.W. Botha, came a relaxation of so-called petty apartheid, 
and the legalisation of black trade unions. This latter 
event is especially pertinent to the study of South African 
autobiographical writing since fledgling black trade unions 
(FOSATU and NUMSA) were instrumental in publishing life-
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stories of workers. Allied organisations which aimed to 
empower blacks, like the Domestic Workers and Employers 
Project (DWEP), USWE and Sached, were also involved in the 
production of some of these texts. With the exception of 
only three of twelve texts viz. Qabula' s (NUMSA) , 
Obery's (Catholic Institute for International Relations) 
and Keegan's (David Philip) all of these worker 
autobiographies were published or co-published by Ravan 
Press, a Johannesburg publishing company which obviously 
set out to democratize its targeted audience base, and to 
contribute to the conscientization of its readership. The 
texts without exception aim to validate the lives of the 
autobiographical subj ects. It seems to me that this 
objective points to an increasingly urgent desire, on the 
part of many white academics, to register -- in their own 
way -- their determination to subvert State power. 
Let us consider the types of subjects whose lives are 
narrated: there are subsistence farmers (Sibarnbene, Facing 
the Storm, Vukani Makhosikazi) and a child in an 
impoverished rural "reserve" {The Story of Mboma) , migrant 
workers (We Came to Town, Vukani, Women of Phokeng), 
domestic workers (two texts concern themselves exclusively 
with domestic workers, viz. Thula Baba and A Talent for 
Tomorrow, two with women domestic workers as well as with 
black women employed in other sectors of the economy, V1Z. 
Working Women and Vukani), factory workers, nurses, 
teachers (Working Women, Vukani), a forklift driver (Cruel 
Beyond Belief), a foundry worker (The Sun Shall Rise) and 
a trade unionist (My Life Struggle). The focus is on the 
ill-educated, the exploited. The publication of the life 
stories of such humble people asserts their right to 
readers' attention, along with the famous and infamous who, 
prior to the appearance of these texts, had cornered the 
market of autobiographical writing. The subjects are not 
achievers in the usual senses, yet these texts claim for 
them a remarkableness, and affirm their achievements to be 
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worthy of public attention in their difference. In so 
doing these worker autobiographies attest to the importance 
of all the millions of like South Africans of whom these 
autobiographical subjects are representative. 
Importantly, these texts are often addressed to workers 
(The Sun Shall Rise and My life Struggle are published --
the publishers, Ravan Press, declare -- in order "to make 
available stories by workers, for workers, to give the 
workers' point of view", n.p.); they are addressed to those 
who are themselves semi-literate and perhaps in literacy 
classes, thus subverting for these targeted readers, too, 
the policy of subjugation and debasement by presenting them 
with models of people who are important enough to read and 
write about, people like the readers themselves. We Came 
to Town, for example, opens with a note to the literacy 
teacher: "The aim of this book is to provide adult beginner 
readers of English with simple, authentic material which 
deals with everyday adult concerns and experience" (n.p.). 
The Story of Mboma has the following comment on its back 
cover: 
The Msinga Series is drawn from the autobiographies of 
children at the Emdukatshani School, and illustrated 
by the children themselves. The books are 
'supplementary readers' with a difference: literacy is 
seen as part of the struggle against one's 
environment, for a better life. 
These texts resist apartheid ln many ways: they aim to 
spread literacy (and thus enable black South Africans to 
rise above their usual status of unskilled labourers), they 
endorse the lives of even the most humble and poor, and 
they often target a previously neglected readership. 
A black working class readership is reminded of both 
their oppression and their dignity in many of these texts. 
The paradox that an oppressed class must be taught to 
recognize its own interests is usually explained in 
Marxism through such notions as ideological hegemony, 
but for Jameson it is equally due to the fact that 
denial or repression is, even for the oppressed, a 
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means of survival. (Dowling, 1984:118) 
Black South Africans might internalize negative attitudes 
to other blacks, perhaps forgetting the whites' role in the 
disintegration of black communi ties, and thus of moral 
standards. One of the women interviewed by Bozzoli 
remarked: "Jesus, do you think blacks can stay in one place 
wi thout quarrels?" (1991: 150) . Collusion in their own 
oppression is especially true of many black women, 
undeniably the most victimized group in South Africa. 
Lydia Kompe describes her difficulties as a woman amongst 
men in her trade union: "It was a real problem at the 
beginning but I learned to live with it. I felt inferior 
all the time, maybe because we African women are taught to 
think that we're inferior to men" (1985: 104) . Louise 
Yekwa, a teacher, 1S apparently unaware of her silent 
acquiesence to her husband's exploitation of her: 
When I get home from school I do some ironing, sweep 
and dust the house. And then I start cooking. 
At home I don't have anyone to help me. I have to 
do everything because my kids are still young. When 
I'm not at home my husband helps. When I'm at home --
nothing. . . . Bu t he'll never cook when I'm around. 
The thing is, he's studying and he wants time to read. 
I'm studying for matric because I want to get 
promoted .... I study after supper .... Sometimes I 
sleep early. I go to sleep at eight o'clock and wake 
up at about twelve and study until morning. It' s 
easier to work when everybody's sleeping. (1985:121) 
Working Women, the text in which the above extract appears 
is explicitly feminist in intent, and thus it 
contextualizes experiences such as Louise Yekwa's within an 
overall survey and contestation of black South 
African women's oppression. While the autobiographical 
subj ects might not position themselves as feminist, the 
text frames each autobiographical extract so that the 
oppressed class is taught to recognize its own oppression 
in each of the life stories. 
But what is perhaps more radical in texts which address 
a black working class readership is that those whites who 
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read these texts are positioned 1n what I'm sure 1S a 
novel experience for most -- as Other. Instead of being 
the normative implied reader they are more or less obliged 
to adopt the position of the impoverished and ill-educated 
black worker. Texts like Vukani Makhosikazi, Thula Baba, 
We Came to Town, Working Women, The Sun Shall Rise for the 
Workers, My Life Struggle, are, I believe, very successful 
in positioning the white reader such as myself, "in the 
shoes of blacks", thereby effectively fulfilling what 
J.C.Kotze explains is of vital importance for the 
reconciliation of South Africa's segregated race groups: 
People can only interact meaningfully with one another 
if they understand one another, if they share meaning. 
And people will be able to share meaning if they share 
experience. Though whites cannot share the 
experiences of blacks in a real way, they can gain 
insight into the everyday experiences of blacks. 
(1993:v) 
He goes on to say: 
A profound knowledge of one another's conditions of 
living (blacks are far more knowledgeable about 
conditions amongst whites than vice versa) and of 
differing perceptions, may start to bridge the social 
gap between black and white in South Africa. 
(1993:xii) 
Because of their positions as members of the hegemonic 
culture, whites are indeed generally ignorant about the 
lives of black South Africans i and the books they read 
almost invariably serve to reinforce their sense of their 
own infallible grasp of reality since they address whites 
in and on their own terms. Worker autobiographies which 
refuse to co-operate with this norm thus represent a very 
important break with hegemonic practice. 
Of course, not all worker autobiographies imply a black 
worker readership: A Talent for Tomorrow, Facing the Storm 
and Women of Phokeng are aimed at educated English 
speakers. The latter two texts are part of an academic 
project, and thus address other academics. But even these 
texts function to assert the significance of those who have 
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been "caught under the wheels of history" (Lionnet, 
1989:24). And these texts, more obviously than those aimed 
at a worker readership, contribute significantly to the 
reshaping of attitudes in their identification of new 
subjects worthy of study, to the extension of boundaries of 
what is worth knowing, producing new truths for academics 
and the broader social formation. This is a project of 
empowerment. As Foucault argued, knowledge and power are 
always indivisible, thus the reinterpretation of these 
autobiographical subjects as subjects worthy of study 
not simply as nameless parts of grand abstractions in 
sweeping statistical studies of the effects of apartheid on 
black South Africans -- imbues them with an importance, and 
hence a power, which they hitherto did not have or were not 
accorded. 
These worker autobiographies seem to me to meet several 
needs for South African readers, writers and publishers: 
they address the needs of white people of influence 
(academics and publishers) to turn the spotlight of 
learning onto those who have been profoundly marginalised; 
thus these texts represent attempts to undermine the 
apartheid state's own monolithic narrative distortions of 
history. These texts furthermore address the need of 
apartheid's victims to explain themselves and to assert the 
validity of those like themselves: "I tell this story," 
Makhoba tells his readers, "to remind you of your life. I 
tell you this story so you will remember your struggle and 
the story of the struggle we fight. AMANDLA!" (1) In this 
these texts meet a growing desire to democratize South 
Africa so that the voices of all may be heard. 
As Shoshana Felman argues with regard to the role of 
interviewers of survivors of the Holocaust, these 
investigators enable victims "to believe that it is 
possible, indeed, against all odds and against their past 
experience, to tell the story and be heard, to in fact 
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address the significance of their biography" (1992: 41). In 
a similar way, Suzanne Gordon found that, 
The interviewee reviewed his or her life: looked back 
upon the striving, the decisions taken; puzzled over 
the complexities, dwelt on regrets or the occasional 
triumphs; sometimes chuckled over escapades. Memories 
could be resistant, drawn reluctantly and painfully 
into consciousness; occasionally a woman would be 
overwhelmed with sorrow. Bitterness was surprisingly 
infrequent and, there seemed to be an almost heroic 
acceptance of the forces behind the march of events. 
Then, as the protagonist listened to his or her voice 
being played back, or the story being read aloud, it 
seemed that there dawned a recognition of the almost 
epic quality of the struggle, of the hardships 
confronted if not always overcome. (1985:xvi) 
This would seem to be an instance of what Felman argues was 
a fundamental feature of testimony for those who had 
experience of the Holocaust: 
The narrator herself does not know any longer who she 
was, except through her testimony. This knowledge or 
self-knowledge is neither a given before the testimony 
nor a residual substantial knowledge consequential to 
it. In itself, this knowledge does not exist, it can 
only happen through the testimony .... (1992:51) 
In spite of the fact that the shaping influence of the 
compiler must not be discounted -- and I shall discuss this 
in more detail shortly -- it seems to me that an attempt to 
formulate some sort of explanation of experience must often 
have meant a process of insight-gathering on the part of 
the interviewee. And while I would not argue that all of 
these texts can be described "as a sort of signature" 
because of the intervention of the 
interviewer/editor/writer, I do feel, with Felman, that an 
opportunity to testify might have meant for many of the 
autobiographical subj ects an opportunity to "repossess 
[themselves], to take, in other words, the chance to sign, 
the chance to count" (1992:51). Johanna Masilela expresses 
her gratitude to the compilers of Vukani Makhosikazi: "I'm 
happy that I've got someone who will introduce me. Let me 
make history please" (1985:44). 
The democratization of access to print is also manifest 
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in the fact that a significant proportion of these texts 
(Sibambene, Thula Baba, Working Women, and Women of 
Phokeng) are concerned to contribute to the empowerment of 
women, the most disadvantaged of the disadvantaged. 
Lockett (1990:18-9) refers to the importance fqr women of 
this sort of social documentation. These texts manifest 
the truths of subjective experience, for they insist on a 
recognition that reality is gendered. Many worker 
autobiographies testify to experiences of scripted lives: 
lives determined by the structural constraints of race, 
gender and class, even though these are never simple 
categories. One has to try to resist simplistic 
definitions and hierarchization for these constructs are 
never divisible from complex lived relationships; they are 
never identifiable on their own terms. 23 
Autobiographical writing helps us to understand the 
paradoxes of the structural compulsions of race, gender and 
class, as well as the inconsistencies and disparities 
between indi vidual experiences. We need to hear the 
testimony of particular subjects. Dori Laub's point about 
the importance of testimony to our grasp of the Holocaust 
seems apposite to our understanding of South African 
history: 
While historical evidence of the event which 
consti tutes the trauma24 may be abundant and documents 
in vast supply, the trauma -- as a known event and not 
simply as an overwhelming shock -- has not been truly 
witnessed yet, not been taken cognizance of. The 
emergence of the narrative which is being listened to 
-- and heard -- is, therefore, the process and the 
place wherein the cognizance, the 'knowing' of the 
event is given birth to. The listener, therefore, is 
party to the creation of knowledge de novo. The 
testimony to the trauma thus includes its hearer, who 
is, so to speak, the blank screen on which the event 
comes to be inscribed for the first time. (Felman and 
Laub, 1992:57) 
Those who encouraged black South Africans to tell about 
their life experiences were all In some measure 
instrumental in giving birth to "the cognizance, the 
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'knowing'" of apartheid. The researchers either encouraged 
black workers to write themselves (Petrus Torn, for 
instance, prefaces his text with a note of thanks to Judy 
Maller "who interviewed me about my life and past 
experiences in trade unionism. Before I met Judy I didn't 
thi n k I could write a book, but she encouraged me and 
introduced me to Ravan Press" (n.p.)), or interviewed 
subjects and wrote up their responses (as did Obery et aI, 
Griesel, Bozzoli, Gordon, Bond, the editors of We Carne to 
Town and Thula Baba, Keegan, and Lawson) . 
That these researchers are "facilitators" (Davies, 
1989:88) is indisputable. But this is not necessarily all 
they are. For one thing, the texts are written in English, 
apparently not the mother-tongue of any of the 
interviewees. Translation is problematic, for languages 
are not simply equivalent; moreover, in most instances, the 
editor/researcher employs a third party to translate the 
interviewee's responses to her before she begins her own 
editing process. Griesel is one example. 
In writing the English version, I attempted to mirror 
the style and reasoning of an oral tradition and a 
different language. My guide here was the manner in 
which the discussions were translated to me and also 
(I would like to believe) my sensitivity to the 
tonalities of the women's deliberations about their 
lives. Stylistically the English version is therefore 
unconventional in terms of what is usually regarded as 
'standard' English. The only evidence to support the 
achievement of a close approximation of the women's 
style and tone in the English text is that the 
translation back into Zulu was effortless for the 
interpreter and also seemed right to the people at 
Mboza, and that the Zulu version is almost exactly the 
same length as the English one.... (my emphases; 
1991:52) 
Was Griesel able to judge the efficiency of the 











translated into non-standard English? Is length a valid 
cri terion ?25 Griesel herself voices a reservation: "The 
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tension between the writer being literate (in English) and 
the women becoming literate (in Zulu) added a further 
dimension to the construction of meaning ln text" 
(1991:52) . 
Apart from the complexities of the language problem, 
there is also the fact that the texts are composed 
according to the researcher/editors' own interpretative 
schema and agendas. Lawson and Perold, of Working Women, 
for instance, clearly have a feminist project in mind -- a 
project which it seems is not necessarily endorsed by all 
of the interviewees (a gendered conservatism is evident, 
for instance, in the narrative of Louise Yekwa). 26 The 
compiler's framework will determine the questions which are 
asked (and hence the answers that are given); one can, for 
instance, infer a range of repeated questions in the 
answers of Gordon's interviewees. One can only speculate 
as to whether a predetermined agenda interfered with the 
researchers' ability to listen, and to hear. They might, 
as Laub observes, "have felt driven to confirm [their] 
knowledge ... by proceeding to hear everything [the 
interviewees] had to say in the light of what [they] knew 
already" (61). Whatever the truth of the matter with 
regard to each individual text, the compilers/editors 
clearly exercise a great deal of power in that they 
determine the context in which the subject's narrative will 
appear. 
Perhaps Davies' objections to the interruptions of the 
researcher's narrative voice in A Talent for Tomorrow, in 
contrast with her approval of the apparent restraint of the 
editor of Working Women (1989:89-91), is principally a 
stylistic obj ection -- she complains of tediousness and 
disjointedness in the former (91) rather than a 
criticism of greater intervention, per se. I would argue 
that the intervention is always there. If I may quote 
Griesel yet again: 
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My insistence in the preface that I am not the author 
[but] . . . "the arranger" seems to have been an 
unnecessary preoccupation at the time, and an 
impossibili ty. The task of reconstructing spoken 
discourse in a written text is clearly more complex 
than merely recording or arranging (as a scribe would) 
the spoken words of individuals. (1991:52-3) 
Nevertheless, there is a qualitative difference between the 
autobiographical text which is largely or even partially 
biographical (using the researcher as narrator, as in 
Facing the Storm, A Talent for Tomorrow, Women of Phokeng, 
and Thula Baba) and the text which inscribes the 
autobiographical subject as narrator. In the former, the 
researcher announces his/her interpretive narrative 
influence -- in some instances so as to undertake the role 
of mediator, of cultural translator, for a white 
readership. Keegan, for example, justifies his role as 
writer, not merely as scribe, thus: 
Some might think that the subjects should be left to 
speak for themselves, in their own words, with 
editorial intervention only. In fact that is almost 
always impossible. Reminiscences simply do not come 
out as connected narratives. Questions have to be 
constantly asked; information has to be extracted. 
Seldom can the informant's own words be quoted 
verbatim without being explained or 'translated'. 
Creative reconstruction by an interlocutor is 
necessary before the broken conversational process can 
be made intelligible as a narrative. What is more, 
the significance and meaning of much of what an 
informant tells us cannot really be understood unless 
placed in the context which only the practising 
historian can provide. (1988:161) 
In texts where the autobiographical subjects' voices are 
seemingly reproduced without interference, the narrative 
impresses the reader as "essentially a narrative of 
silence, the story of the [interviewer's] listening" 
(Felman, 1992:218). The effacement of the researcher thus 
becomes a means of authenticating the narrative as one of 
testimony, of autobiography. Felman reminds us that, "In 
the legal, philosophical and epistemological tradition of 
the Western world, witnessing is based on, and is formally 
defined by, first-hand seeing" (1992:207). 
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Authenticating the narrative with the authority of the 
witness is an important part of most of these worker 
autobiographies. I would like to look more closely at 
Sibambene to assess the success of this attempt. I have 
already mentioned Griesel' s insistence that she is the 
"arranger, not the writer. My task was to arrange the 
translated and transcribed words of the women into a 
written text" (n.p.). The text, however, tends to erase 
the reader's sense of the individual women by the 
arrangement of the text into chapters dealing with three 
age groups, each of which is composed as the amalgamated 
voices of the women in the particular age group. The 
"arranger" refers to the women's opinions mostly in the 
third person, interspersed with very brief quotes from 
unnamed women. This diminution of the perceived presence 
of the autobiographical subjects results in a corresponding 
increase in one's sense of the arranger's hand. Sibambene, 
I believe, fails to retain in the narrative the "essence 
and mood of [the women of Mboza' s] discussions about 
individual experiences" (n.p.) . Rather, 





generalized assertions about their age group's views. 
Griesel summarizes these in one of the prefatory notes: 
The older women think life is not the same as it used 
to be, but accept the way things are because, they 
say, 'We don't know another life.' 
The younger women reject the reality of hard work and 
difficult circumstances and say, 'Life will only be 
better if there is change.' 
The young girls compare their lives with those of 
their peers who attend school and say, 'Our futures 
are dark without education.' (n.p.) 
The reduction of lives to adumbrations relating to the 
thematic concerns of the compiler (as can be seen in 
varying degrees in Sibambene, Working Women, We Came to 
Town, Thula Baba), the abbreviation of identity to 
stereotype or case study, could be construed as a betrayal 
of the autobiographical subjects' complexity of experience 
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and humanity; yet this prototypical treatment of the life 
story might also be perceived as a way of emphasizing the 
fact that a witness speaks for others, as well as to others 
(Felman, 1992:3). The implicit claims of the 
representative status of the autobiographical subjects may 
also serve to lend factual validity to the life story; 
Felman (1992:111) asserts that it is from this sense of a 
community who could offer like testimonies that some of the 
authority of the witness, that is, the truth claim of the 
narrative, proceeds. Spengemann argues that, 
Historical autobiography was invented to demonstrate 
the consonance of an individual life with an absolute, 
eternal law already in force and known through some 
immediate source outside the life that illustrates it. 
Fashioned to these purposes, the form could neither 
make the conclusions . of an individual life seem 
universally applicable without misrepresenting the 
individual life, nor represent that life accurately 
without compromising the universality of its 
conclusions. (1980: 60) 
Often autobiographical writing resorts to a quasi-
allegorical rendition of experience in which historical 
events are treated primarily as emblems of an absolute 
truth (political reality) beyond themselves rather than as 
links in a spiritually/personally consequential chain of 
events (in Spengemann's formulation, 1980:69). This can be 
seen to some extent in texts like Working Women, We Came to 
Town, and even more in Thula Baba. It is seen too in the 
'kaffir boy' stereotypical autobiography (Mathabane's and 
Boetie's are probably the best examples). These texts 
demonstrate what Spengemann calls a "typological view of 
human behaviour" (1980: 50), figuring forth a world in which 
things happen to people, rather than one in which people do 
things, or dealing in qualities rather than in agents. 
This textually enacts the passivity enforced on black South 
Africans by the state, and portrays their experiences of 
lack of agency. Also, the stereotyping of the victim may 
be politically effective: mUltiply the experiences of these 
poor people by 23 million and the horrors of apartheid hit 
home. 
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Many worker autobiographies present the personal 
histories of the autobiographical subjects almost as case 
histories, exploring lives for a specific investigative 
purpose. 27 In all of the worker autobiographies analyzed, 
the individual testimonies are presented as case histories 
in the sense that either researchers, editors or even 
publishers (as in The Sun Shall Rise for the Workers) are 
concerned to establish the testimonies of the 
autobiographical subjects as bearing witness to kinds of 
experience that categories of similar people may have 
shared. Perhaps the point is clearer if rephrased: the 
interest is not only in the individual, but in the 
contextualization of the subject's responses , within an 
explanatory paradigm which resembles a kind of sociological 
case study. This is taken to extremes, it seems to me, by 
Mathabane, Boetie and the writers of Thula Baba. In these 
texts the impression is created that truthfulness rests 
less upon accuracies of depicted events than upon the 
feelings the narratives call forth and express; not so much 
the idiosyncratic truths of self but rather the generalised 
truths of political reality, situating the subject in terms 
of a Marxian notion of truth as the view of the totality of 
social relations. There is, of course, the danger of such 
a text doing exactly the opposite of what it intends 
viz. to bring the subject to life and instead to 
caricature and reduce, thereby to make the autobiographical 
subject seem simplistic -- as though treatment and subject 
coincide. Texts which abbreviate experience to broad 
strokes might appear to betray the texture of life, the 
complexity of being, creating caricatures that reinforce a 
certain "v ictimology " of which Bozzoli speaks. It is my 
contention that most worker autobiographies escape this: 
anthologies like Facing the Storm, Working Women, A Talent 
for Tomorrow, and Vukani Makhosikazi manage to allow for 
the transcendence of individual autobiographical subjects 
over the context of being one autobiographical voice 
amongst many other similar voices. 
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I have chosen to focus the foregoing discussion on texts 
which, to my mind, fail to achieve their desired aim of 
foregrounding the very human dimensions of the plight of 
the autobiographical subjects because this allows me, by 
implication, to highlight the features of texts which are 
successful. Thus I hope to explore some of the fine 
details in which the politics of textual production may be 
located. Sibambene is one text which, in addition to its 
failure to convey a sense of individual speakers, 
undermines its own project by using children's drawings to 
illustrate each page in a visually interesting but childish 
way. 
the 
These drawings, and the layout in general, reinforce 
childlike quality of the verbal text which has 
flattened, it would appear , all figurative, idiomatic and 
proverbial expression from the women's comments. If such 
a loss has indeed occurred, it is probable that this was an 
inadvertent loss in the translation process. Nevertheless, 
it seems to me that the effect of the children's drawings 
in conjunction with the very simple verbal text is a 
reduction of the narrative to childishness, which 
undermines the women's attempts to command recognition and 
respect from adult readers. It is my impression that the 
text, unwittingly, co-operates in that patronising view of 
the poor as being simple and childlike. (Griesel' s own 
reservation regarding the layout is different from my .own: 
she sees the "variety" of the text as a "contradiction to 
the often featureless experiences of living at Mboza and 
the fleeting nature of individual existence in an oral 
context" (1991:53)). 
That the text reduces the women to c i phers is indeed most 
unfortunate, for Sibambene is unique in its address of very 
severely impoverished women rural dwellers. 28 It is, 
furthermore, clearly not the intention of its compiler to 
reimpose, ln yet another forum, the silence which the women 
by force of circumstance suffer; Griesel states at the 
outset: 
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Sibambene is a book produced with a group of women who 
have had no formal schooling. They live in a rural 
communi ty known as Mboza where they have recently 
started literacy classes .... The decision to write 
this book was taken in July 1986, jointly with the 
women participants in t he research. 
The book is intentionally spoken in the words of the 
women. As rural women without formal schooling they 
have minimal access to resources which are common to 
the privileged and the powerful. These include 
literacy itself; and related resources such as school 
and books, through which the privileged maintain 
control over literacy . 
The fact that it is those who are literate who 
exercise control over texts serves to perpetuate the 
mystique of literacy . .. . 
The book is intended to contribute to the development 
project at Mboza where the focus is on people and on 
building structures for democratic participation in 
decisions which affect their lives. 
To participate means to have a voice, and the voices 
of the women and young girls need to be heard. (n.p.) 
The intention to empower, through giving the women the 
opportuni ty to speak about their own lives, and through 
encouraging the women to acquire literacy skills which will 
give them a measure of control over the world of printed 
words, is sadly not fulfilled to its maximum potential in 
this text as Griesel herself admits: 
In my constant attempt not to impose an external 
perspective on the formation of the book, the end 
product may have merely served to make public the very 
reali ties which the women wanted to have changed. 
Phrased differently, although the material contained 
in the book may have succeeded in capturing the 
essence of the lives of women at Mboza, it did not 
(and could not) provide the resources with which to 
transcend this reality.... The stark reality is that 
women at Mboza have remained effectively illiterate: 
despite their having learned the basic skills of 
reading and writing, they still live in a 
predominantly oral context; text is not part of the 
fabric of their daily lives and this in itself 
excludes them from a re-interpretation of the text 
which reveals their lives. (1991:53) 
Another worker autobiography which I find problematic, 
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principally because of the intrusive presence of non-
autobiographical writers/compilers, is Thula Baba. This 
narrative is, the editor/s inform us, "a moving account of 
the everyday life of a group of domestic workers told by a 
literacy teacher. It is based on the firsthand experiences 
, 
of some of her learners" (5). Neither the editor/s nor the 
literacy teacher are named, but their influence is 
fundamental, for this text , while presenting itself as the 
autobiographical narrative of "Ntombi" , would seem to be 
rather a kind of aggregated life-story, attributed to a 
central character and her family and friends. It is the 
full significance of the words "based on the firsthand 
experiences of some of her learners" that is uncertain for 
they could encompass a range of meaning from the faithfully 
auto / biographic to autobiographical fiction (David 
Copperfield is a good example). Initially, what disturbs 
is the assertion that the autobiographical narrator 
("Ntombi") is the writer (7-8), when the reader has already 
been informed by the editor that the text is composed by a 
literacy teacher. Furthermore, the "literacy teacher's" 
voice is heard briefly within the narrative itself when, 
after the first page which introduces Ntombi as narrator in 
first-person narration (with an accompanying photograph), 
the following page gives more information about Ntombi, but 
in third-person narration. This section is headed "People 
in the book" and begins thus: 
Ntombi. She writes the book. 
She is a domestic worker. 
She is 33 years old . 
She has four children . 
Sipho, Thoko and Jabu. [sic] 
are in the homelands. 
Lindiwe, her baby, stays with her 
in the city. (8) 
The uncertainty of t h e factual/fictional status of the 
text is further reinforced by the use of first names only 
for all characters, and by the arrangement of the narrative 
into a quasi-diary form in which incomplete dates are given 
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(day and month, with no year). Like the incomplete proper 
names, the sense of factual verifiability is undermined by 
a consistent vagueness. The reader will perhaps recall the 
quote from Barthes which I used as an epigraph at the 
beginning of the chapter: "nothing lS more 'real', we 
think, than a date." The references to particular names of 
places and people , and the dating of events, lend to 
autobiographical writing the verifiability of history and 
journalism, and provide, too, an important interpretative 
context, in terms of which meaning is constructed in the 
reading process. The meaningless dates which head each 
entry in Thula Baba deny a sense of the factuality of the 
narrative. 
Yet another conventional feature of autobiographical 
writing which, along with names and dates, is apparently 
used in Thula Baba to confirm the verifiability of the 
narrative, but which fails to do so because of unorthodox 
usage, is the use of photographs. Since photography is an 
important means by which much autobiographical discourse 
secures its status as 'true', I would like to devote some 
time to a discussion of how photographs are usually read in 
more conformist autobiographical discourse, and demonstrate 
why it is that the photographs in Thula Baba counteract the 
normative effects. 
Photographs function in conventional Western narrative 
autobiography as they do in journalistic discourse, to 
'prove' the accuracy of the verbal text. Photographs seem 
to demonstrate that someone or something had real 
existence. For Barthes, the "photographic referent" is, 
not the optionally real thing to which an image or a 
sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has 
been placed before the lens, without which there would 
be no photograph .. . in Photography I can never deny 
that the thing has been there. There is a 
superimposi tion here: of reality and of the past. 
(1981b:76) 
"The Photograph does not cal l up th e past .... The effect 
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it produces upon me is not to restore what has been 
abolished (by time, by distance) but to attest that what I 
see has indeed existed" (1981b:82). Photographs attest to 
the ontology of beings. "Photography. . . began, 
historically, as an art of the Person: of identity, of 
civil status, of what we might call, in all senses of the 
term, the body's formality" (Barthes, 1981b:79). This is 
arguably why it is so often a feature of the 
autobiographical text, indicating a 
beyond the verbal text. Barthes 
bodily materiality 
argues that "the 
Photograph is never anything but an antiphon of 'Look,' 
'See,' 'Here it is'; it points a finger at certain vis-a-
vis, and cannot escape this pure deictic language" 
(Barthes, 1981b:5). It is this effect which the editors of 
documentary and auto / biographical texts, including Thula 
Baba, have presumably attempted to achieve. 
But where the use of photographs in Thula Baba deviates 
from their use in other factual narratives like journalism, 
history, and auto/biography is that some of the photographs 
in Thula Baba are clearly staged. Two which are mos t 
strikingly so are the one which bears the caption, "Tembi 
got a telegram today" (21) which depicts the characters 
Tembi and Ntombi looking at a telegram. Another is of the 
character Matshepo in the dark of the station waving at a 
departing train (73). The contrivedness of these 
illustrations, for me at least, instead of securing the 
truthfulness of the narrative, serves rather to undermine 
the relationship of all of the photographs to the verbal 
text (one wonders if perhaps all are staged?) and, indeed, 
to create an impression of fictionali ty of the entire 
narrative, a sense (as I mentioned) reinforced by the 
unconventional narratorial position and use of dates and 
names. The photograph "can lie as to the meaning of the 
thing, being by nature tendentious, never as to its 
existence" (Barthes, 1981b:87); presumably, the editors of 
Thula Baba wanted to create the impression that even if the 
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people depicted in the photographs are not who they are 
said to be, they are real, and might hav~ lived lives such 
as are recounted in the narrative. 29 
Photographs are particularly effective in establishing 
the factuality of autobiography, history, journalism and 
related 'true' discourses because, as Kaja Silverman 
observes, the photograph is an icon (1983:19); it is 
message without code, since, "In order to move from the 
reality to its photograph it is in no way necessary to 
divide up this reality into units and to constitute these 
uni ts as signs, substantially different from the obj ect 
they communicate" (Barthes, 1977b:17). The photograph is 
thus usually simple validation . 
But photographs are not merely transparent manifestations 
of a past, . for, "Not only is the Photograph never, in 
essence, a memory... it actually blocks memory, quickly 
becomes a counter-memory" (Barthes, 1981b:91). The 
photograph, in other words, can supplant the visual memory, 
and become itself what is 'remembered' of past experience. 
But this feature of photography can itself be useful to 
autobiography. It is in this sense that the photograph 
which is borrowed from journalism by an autobiographical 
text serves to import into the autobiographical text 
fragments of the journalistic narrative, and journalistic 
'memory'; it situates the autobiographical text and imbues 
it with an interpretative frame, supplied by what is 
remembered of news media presentations. This can be seen 
in an autobiography like The Diary of Maria Tholo which 
uses only photographs of a general documentary nature and 
none which are specific to the autobiographical subject. 
The photographs here function to situate the narrative as 
part of contemporary history, rather than to allow the text 
to stand as an individual's story which is coincidentally 
a record of the times in which the person lived. Some of 
this effect is created, too, in Call Me Woman which has 
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about 40% of its photographs functioning to record the 
images of other women and events of broadly historical 
interest. 
But even in those texts ln which the photographs are 
intended to serve as records of the person of the 
autobiographer, such as in My Life Struggle and A Working 
Life, the record is not without its own complexities. As 
Barthes writes in his own autobiography (which uses 
photographs liberally): 
"But I never looked like that!" -- How do you know? 
What is the "you" you might or might not look like? 
Where do you find it -- by which morphological or 
expressive calibration? Where is your authentic body? 
You are the only one who can never see yourself except 
as an image; you never see your eyes unless they are 
dulled by the gaze they rest upon the mirror or the 
lens (I am interested in seeing my eyes only when they 
look at you): even and especially for your own body, 
you are condemned to the repertoire of its images. 
(1977a:36) 
While few autobiographers confront in the text the 
complexities of the fixed photographic image being intended 
to represent a changing being -- and certainly none of the 
texts included here in the category of worker autobiography 
does this -- the reader might well have her sense of the 
contrast between the instability of living subjects and 
unchanging print reinforced, particularly in those texts 
of photographs of the which contain a number 
autobiographical subject over a period of time. And this 
brings us to the related problem of the verbal text 
attempting to fix the autobiographical subject, of the 
'translation' of lived realities into verbal artifact. 
Worker autobiographies, in general,30 are simple and brief, 
designating realities which are unquestioned and implying 
that reality is unproblematically transcribed into print. 
This serves a purpose, as has been suggested, in that their 
message of the intense hardships of the poor is delivered 
with a simplicity which can be very powerful, and which is 
necessary in order for these texts to accomplish a 
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democratization of readership. "Testimonies are not 
monologues; they cannot take place in solitude" (Laub, 
1992:70-1). These texts are addressing important needs of 
their listeners, be they those struggling to acquire 
li teracy, or academics needing to understand about the 
lives of the silenced masses, and these needs would 
doubtless not be met by postmodernist interrogations of the 
conventional nature of reality, and of the problematics of 
the 'translation' of experience into text. 
However, the quasi-autobiographical texts like Thula Baba 
and to a lesser extent Women of Phokeng and perhaps even A 
Talent for Tomorrow might cause some unease in the reader 
who is seeking the autobiographical subject's VOlce and 
person (Davies, 1989:91); when the editors appropriate 
these voices to create a narrative which names the real on 
the editor's own terms (and often in the editors' own 
terms Iwords) , the reader might feel that the 
autobiographical contract is severely compromised. 
To bear witness is to take responsibility for truth: 
to speak, implicitly, from within the legal pledge and 
the juridical imperative of the witness's oath. To 
testify -- before a court of law or before the court 
of history and of the future; to testify, likewise, 
before an audience of readers or spectators -- is more 
than simply to report a fact or an event or to relate 
what has been lived, recorded and remembered. Memory 
is conjured here essentially in order to address 
another, to impress upon a listener, to appeal to a 
community. To testify is always, metaphorically, to 
take the witness stand, or to take the position of the 
witness insofar as the narrative account of the 
witness is at once engaged in an appeal and bound by 
an oath. To testify is thus not merely to narrate but 
to commit to oneself, and to commit the narrative, to 
others: to take responsibili ty -- in speech -- for 
history or for the truth of an occurrence, for 
something which, by definition, goes beyond the 
personal, in having general (nonpersonal) validity and 
consequences. (Felman, 1992:204) 
Perhaps it is this contractual obligation which occupies a 
privileged status in the discourse of Western liberal 
humanism that is placed jeopardy in quasi-
autobiographical texts which undermine or blur the 
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testimonial quality of the autobiographical text. A strong 
sense of editorial interference might weaken one's sense of 
vital communication between autobiographical subjects and 
reader. The passage quoted above continues: 
But if the essence of the testimony is impersonal (to 
enable a decision by a judge or jury -- metaphorical 
or literal -- about the true nature of the facts of an 
occurrence ... ), why is it that the witness's speech is 
so uniquely, literally irreplaceable? .. What does it 
mean that the testimony cannot be simply reported, or 
narrated by another in its r ole as testimony? 
(1992:204-5) 
It is the voice-over of editors and researchers that may 
erode the power of the testimony, and of the witness's 
, presence' as living, unique person. In these cases 
(aggregating autobiographical narratives like Thula Baba, 
Sibambene, Women of Phokeng), "The reader has trouble 
finding the self the autobiography purports to depict" 
(Spacks, 1980:117). This is due, in part, too, to the fact 
that most of the texts which are part of the worker 
autobiography tradition, and also texts like Luthuli' s, 
focus principally on the working life, rather than the 
experiencing being. But, of course, reading and 
interpretation are functions of culture and social 
circumstance, and my own reading is not given here as a 
statement of immutable, unquestionable fact, but rather as 
a reading which might be representative of the impressions 
of many who have been interpellated in the discourses of 
white privilege, of liberal humanism. Whether a similar 
impression 1S created 1n the minds of readers whose 
cultural paradigms are different from my own is of course 
open to debate, and is an important question. 
The worker autobiographies studied here, in spite of 
fundamental differences, contribute to the creation of new 
knowledges which serve to reinforce the struggle for 






of history, by 
the statistical 
abstractions which can numb one's sense of what human 
beings who are part of these statistics feel. The 
dehumanizing effect of statistics is especially dangerous 
in cases like that of South Africa where one is talking 
about mass deprivation, where the vast majority of people 
are brutally oppressed in their millions. The danger is 
that suffering might be robbed of any tragic impact simply 
because its occurrence is so widespread, so anonymous, so 
depersonalized. In the case of these texts they are actual 
interventions 1n the conflict between this tendency, a 
tendency which is greatly exacerbated by the State's 
efforts to remove black South Africans from that part of 
the country which they designated the 'Republic' to the 
'independent homelands'i and the desire to hear the 
testimony of the silenced masses. It seems to me that this 
sUb-species of autobiography is a very important textual 
development because it both insists on historical 
knowledge, from the grass roots up, while simultaneously 
undermining any possibility of an all-encompassing grand 
narrative which elides or erases the individual histories 
of those who live history. Felman observe~ that Camus, for 
instance, 
puts side by side the blindness and the contradictions 
of historicism and the blindness and the 
contradictions of antihistoricism.... "To deny 
history is to deny, in fact, the real," but "neither 
more nor less, " insists Camus, than the denial of the 
real which historicism dramatizes in its ideological 
fetishization of history itself: "one takes a distance 
from the real by wanting to consider history as a 
totality sufficient unto itself" [Camus, "Lettre au 
directeur des Temps modernes]. (Felman, 1992:174) 
The fact that this sub-species of life-testimony seems to 
have all but disappeared in the 1990s appears to be partly 
a response to heightened poli ticization of black South 
Africans as the 1980s progressed, thus decreasing the need 
for texts whose aim 1S conscientization, and partly a 
response to the vastly different political dispensation in 
South Africa ever since the 1990 release of Nelson Mandela 
and other political leaders. But the major reason for 
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their virtual disappearance might be the far more prosaic 
one, the fact that Ravan Press found that there was little 
or no market for such texts. A representative from Ravan 
Press (who asked not to be named) told me in a conversation 
that, "the black working-class readership is a myth". If 
reports of 45% (or more) illiteracy are correct, then one 
can see why these texts might be indicative more of 







of widespread poverty 
painted by worker 
autobiographies renders unsurprising the fact that few can 
afford to purchase books . 
In spite of the fact that researchers seem to have 
channelled their efforts in other directions in the last 
few years, this analysis of the role of the researcher in 
these texts brings one to a recognition that the question 
of researcher involvement raises broader considerations of 
the responsibilities of the intellectual in social 
transformation. It seems to me that the intellectual 
should, as Foucault has argued, open new ways of knowing, 
ways which are sensitive to perceived injustices and power 
imbalances in the larger social formation. 
In 
The writer's function is not without its arduous 
duties. By definition, he cannot serve today those 
who make history; he must serve those who are subject 
to it. (Terrence Des Pres, cited by Felman and Laub, 
1992:xi) 
these terms, the researcher/editors of worker 
autobiographies have succeeded , whatever the shortcomings 
of specific texts. 
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Chapter 5: writing 
I myself am my own symbol, I am the story which 
happens to me. 
Roland Barthes 
When true accounts of the past are given, it is not 
the things themselves, which have passed away, that 
are drawn forth from memory, but words conceived from 
their images. 
St. Augustine 
[Cjonsidering the complexity of the signifying 
process, no belief in an all-powerful theory is 
tenable; there remains the necessity to pay attention 
to the ability to deal with the desire for language, 
and by this I mean paying attention to art and 
literature, and, in even more poignant fashion, to the 
art and literature of our time, which remain alone, in 
our world of technological rationality, to impel us 
not toward the absolute but toward a quest for a 
little more truth, an impossible truth, concerning the 
meaning of speech , concerning our condition as 
speaking beings. 
Julia Kristeva 
As Barthes indicates above, constructing a self, a 
continuous core of adjectival qualities with a 'character,' 
a 'nature,' is a process of symbolization, of story-making. 
When that narrativized personal history is subjected to the 
additional pressures of text, and of public reception, then 
the autobiographer's attempts to translate the realm of 
experience into verbal construct result in a duplication of 
mediation. With discursive mirrors reflecting into 
discursive mirrors, finding the 'real' or the 'truth' upon 
which the text's claims to autobiographical status depend 
becomes like an attempt to find the material object in the 
mirrored reflection: we are left in the end with the 
reflection, and our interpretations of its significance. 
Ultimately, as analysts of personal histories we have only 
the autobiographical text, the verbal (and sometimes part 
pictorial) construct. Its highly codified relationship 
wi th material circumstance might never be far from our 
conscious application of reading strategies, but it 1S the 
text, the words on the page, that we have to read. 
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Confronting the textuality of the autobiographical is not, 
I would argue, a denial of the connectedness of text and 
material context, but rather an acknowledgement that at 
best we seek in autobiographical writing not the Truth, 
but, in the words of Kristeva, "a little more truth." 
Discursive and non-discursive, text and context, are never 
separable; but the precise nature of the relationship is 
only to be dimly apprehended through the polished opacities 
of our own ideological and historical mirrored tunnels. 
Acknowledging at all times the partiality of my own 
vision, this analysis attempts to engage with the 
materiality of textuality. Refusing the autobiographical 
texts' usual pretence at transparency their blithe 
implici t claim that the wo"rds and the pages are merely 
innocent bystanders or vehicles for an independent, 
discrete truth -- I have interrogated the actual verbal 
constructions. Analysis has involved examination of the 
discursive hierarchies by means of which the 'truths' of 
the text have been constructed (as in my analysis of 
Campbell); I have attempted to tease out the generic 
compulsions and tensions at work in texts in order to 
ponder their implications (Kuzwayo and Breytenbach); I have 
probed the text's rhetorical strategies (Luthuli) and the 
poli tics of textuali ty (the worker autobiographies). In 
this chapter, I examine the political implications of 
Moloi's hierarchization of discourses, and the generic 
problematics facing Lynda 1 1 Gordon, the biographer as 
autobiographer. 
As has been noted, the concern with lived experience, 
bios, leads to a desire apparent in most South African 
autobiographical writing in the last 45 years, to make text 
transparent so that encoded realities will be apprehended 
by the reader without impediments of verbal constructs. 1 
The need to privilege the referent rather than the vehicle 
of reference is, of course, understandable, given the stark 
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improbabilities of experience for South Africans, and has 
resulted in radical shifts in textual practice. There has 
also been a marked prioritization of auto/biography over 
fiction2 and also, in almost all South African 
autobiographical writing in English in the last 46 years at 
least, in writing in which the denotative is dominant over 
the connotative. This emphasis on the denotative, manifest 
in conventional autobiographies authored by whites like 
Evenden and Ruth Gordon and blacks like Luthuli and Rive, 
and which is particularly obvious in worker 
autobiographies, is, I believe, borne out of a need to bear 
witness, to report, as Benson says (1991:124). This 
privileging of the referential is also seen in criticism of 
much South African fiction in the last two or so decades: 
many critics are unwilling to defend texts which seemingly 
de-historicize the South African context. The novelist 
J.M.Coetzee has come under attack for this. 
This need to testify about material circumstance in South 
Africa is, of course, a serious purpose. And in its 
efforts to achieve transparency or unimpeded 
referentiality, much South African autobiographical writing 
in English of the last four and a half decades impresses 
the reader with its gravity by means of its solemn flatness 
of tone. Our classification of autobiography as factually 
true perhaps leads to an earnestness in reading which co-
operates with a lack of humour and a paucity of imaginative 
inventiveness which seem to be characteristic of the genre 
in South Africa in this period. Moreover, the weighting of 
chronology and event, rather than the less ordered 
sequences of emotional or psychological experience, 
contributes, it seems to me, to an apparent lack of 
profundity or personal probity in these texts. (Gordon's 
Shared Lives is, as we shall see, a notable exception). 
Lockett (1990:19) remarks upon what Western readers might 
feel 1S a lack of aesthetic grace in autobiographical 
writing by black women (and presumably this applies to 
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writing by black men too). I would argue that in many 
cases a bleakness of style might in part be attributable to 
overriding polemical objectives. When trying to persuade 
readers that the horrors of oppression are real, the 
message takes precedence over other considerations. 
Much South African autobiographical writing is 
fundamentally polemical in nature. Texts are intended to 
persuade: in such cases, experimentation with verbal 
constructs (graphe) might merely deflect attention away 
from the weighty issues under review. Thus one is not 
surprised to find little or no verbal or formal 
experimentation in such texts. Many of these texts might 
appear superficial and formally simplistic ln their 
attempts to be purely denotative, informative, and to 
persuade by means of this information. Often those texts 
which aim at transparency deny the pleasures of text, the 
playful engagement between text and reader, because they 
try to fix or delimit meaning, to deny plenitude and 
contradiction . The authoritarianism of much South African 
autobiographical writing may sometimes be off-putting 
because the reading subject is positioned so 
wi thin very narrow interpretational boundaries 
becomes uncomfortable. In other words, the 





this accounts ln part for the unpopularity, until very 
recently, of autobiography in uni versi ty departments of 
literature. 
There is no doubt that most of the hundred or so 
autobiographical texts which I have studied will sink 
wi thout a trace, gathering dust on specialist library 
shelves. The lack of appeal in such narratives does not, 
of course, diminish their importance for the student of 
South African culture. Perhaps it is the failure of many 
straight-forward autobiographies to fulfil the reader's 
expectation of what Barthes identifies as hermeneutic 
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coding (the "agency whereby a mystery is first suggested 
and later resolved" and the various "mechanisms for 
delaying our access to the desired information" (Silverman, 
1983: 257) which frustrates many readers' narrative 
pleasure. Another factor which may contribute to what the 
'Western reader', taught to value the aesthetic standards 
of predominantly white male authors, perceives as lack of 
textual grace may be the marginalization of blacks and 
women from public forms of discourse. 3 Irigiray argues 
that, 
The rej ection, the exclusion of a female imaginary 
undoubtedly places woman in a position where she can 
experience herself only fragmentarily as waste or as 
excess in the little structured margins of a dominant 
ideology, this mirror entrusted by the (masculine) 
"subject" with the task of reflecting and redoubling 
himself. The role of "femininity" is prescribed 
moreover by this masculine specula(riza)tion and 
corresponds only slightly to woman's desire, which is 
recuperated only secretly, in hiding, and in a 
disturbing and unpardonable manner. (1981:105) 
Irigiray's assessment applies perhaps to women in general, 
to South Africans who have been marginalized on the basis 
of race, and particularly, to women of colour who have been 
doubly excluded. Madeleine Gagnon explores gendered 
exclusion: 
Yet I snatch this language that is foreign to me and 
turn it about in my fashion. I thread together truths 
that will be reproduced. But on the slate I wrote 
with a sovereign chalk. It told which part of me was 
to prevail. I am a foreigner to myself in my own 
language and I translate myself by quoting all the 
others. (1981: 180) 
Al though Irigiray' s and Gagnon's views deserve careful 
consideration, we should not forget that clumsy or bald 
autobiographies -- according to these 'Western' standards -
- are by no means the sole preserve of black South Africans 
or women. 4 And if we consider mediated autobiographies, 
specifically, I wonder to what extent a 'deadness' ln some 
of these texts might be attributable to a sense, on the 
interviewee's part, of "[t]he absence of an empathetic 
listener, or more radically, the absence of an addressable 
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other, an other who can hear the anguish of one's memories 
and thus affirm and recognize their realness," a sense of 
absence which "annihilates the story" (Laub, 1992:68). 
Thus I am arguing that even the preclse configurations of 
texts which seem insipid can be important indicators of 
cultural realities. Furthermore, one needs to bear in mind 
the contrary: that a textuality which appeals to the 
reader's desires can provide a powerful context which 
reduces the reader's sense of the text's purported truth-
value because it appeals more forcefully to the reader's 
pleasure in the telling. Moloi's autobiography is perhaps 
a good example: it beguiles because of its stylistic 
novelties and narrative enticements. It is not so much 
that we accept that the narrative is wholly true, but 
rather that we ask fewer questions as we read; we do not 
wish to disturb the pleasures of the text by interrupting 
its flow. Narrated events, just as words in a sentence, 
depend for their value, and hence significance, upon their 
position in a textual context. Pleasure, or lack thereof, 
in a text, it seems to me, needs to be taken seriously. 
Lockett argues that the fact that autobiographical 
writing by black women "is seldom aesthetically pleasing to 
the Western reader" (1990:19) is largely because the 
language used is not a mother-tongue. The issue of 
language is important, for when most black autobiographers 
choose to write in English5 -- as do dissident Afrikaners 
like Breytenbach, Ferreira and Small -- the politics of 
language come to the fore. English allows writers to reach 
the widest possible audience, both South African and 
overseas; it is the language of hegemony, being the 
favoured language with most South African publishers. The 
worker autobiographies which were discussed in the previous 
chapter were all written in English not the mother 
tongue of any of the sUbjects. Could it be that for these 
and other black South African writers (and perhaps too for 
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Breytenbach, Ferreira and Small), "the significance of the 
occurrence can only be articulated in a language foreign to 
the language(s) of the occurrence" (Felman, 1992:212)? 
Perhaps the distance of another sign system is -- for some 
__ necessary for the attainment of the requisite narrative 
perspective, that 






on) all the 
constituents of narrative, while for others the use of 
English is simply an imposition made by compilers, 
researchers, or editors. 
Lebohang Sikwe addresses the issue of the dominance of 
English in the writing by black South Africans: 
The problem for us when it comes to writing in our own 
languages is that nowadays we don't talk one language 
at a time. The problem of mixing. And when you start 
writing a poem you have to have the logical current of 
that language.... For myself, I'm a Tswana-speaking 
person, but I can't talk pure Tswana. For me, writing 
in English is simpler than writing in Tswana .... 
(Daymond and Lenta, 1990:76) 
The decision to use English in their writing comes not only 
from a great many second-language users of English, but 
also from editors and researchers. Casting the life 
stories of poor unskilled workers and subsistence farmers, 
as the worker autobiographies generally do, in terms and 
textual models familiar to whites (and using English) 
enables authors to communicate the significance of 
apartheid for its victims to whites and non-South Africans 
who have no experience of townships or rural squalor. And 
those texts which are devised to be part of literacy 
~ programmes also induct learners into Western models of the 
auto/biographical, the narrativized adumbration of 
experience. 
Taking due cognisance of the role of researchers or co-
authors or amanuenses, means asking, as Foucault has done, 
"What difference does it make who is speaking?" (1984:120). 
When academics mediate and subj ect the autobiographical 
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subjects' responses to further translations (the 
translations of cultural paradigms as well as to linguistic 
translation), then in these cases, translation is (as 
Derrida argues) more properly conceived of as 
transformation (1985:95). Translation is governed by the 
ideal of a transfer of sense between languages that 
respects "the priority of the signified (of meaning itself) 
over the mere written signs that serve to communicate its 
presence" (Norris, 1987:38). This is probably true, too, 
of collaborative or mediated autobiographies which imply 
that the researcher/scribe is merely an impartial conduit 
for a meaning which is prior to its formulation, and which 
can be found intact in the final text. But when the text's 
language is not the mother-tongue of the autobiographical 
subject one should consider the position of the language 
chosen in the hierarchized and disjunctive social formation 
that is known as 'South Africa', not just in terms of what 
it signifies in the social formation (access to publishers, 
audience, legal systems and de facto power bases etc.) but 
also in terms of the untranslatability of paradigms, of 
perspectives, of proverbial and idiomatic knowledges. 
Vance's question is pertinent: "Isn't the colonization of 
the New World basically a form of translation?" (in 
Derrida, 1985:137). 
But analysis should avoid the temptation to romanticize 
mother-tongue as orlglnary and innocent before the 
corruptions of more powerful languages of translation: no 
language is innocent of the inscription of power-relations 
in its structures, not even the mother-tongue. 
Furthermore, neither the original language nor the language 
into which it is translated is a unified entity or pure 
(Derrida, 1985:100): English no more comprises only 
'English' words than Zulu comprises purely 'Zulu' words. 
I have tried in this study to address something which South 
African autobiographies rarely acknowledge: 
the inescapable, pervasive way in which ideological 
coercion is surreptitiously built into language, into 
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the very discourse one is inadvertently employing and 
the very writing of which one believes oneself to be 
the author. (Felman, 1992:139) 
Moreover the position of dominance is not axiomatically 
on the side of the language of translation, in this case 
English. For, "When no known language is available to you, 
you must determine to steal a language -- as men used to 
steal a loaf of bread. (All those legion -- who are 
outside Power are obliged to steal language)" (Barthes, 
1977a:167). The 'thief' might manipulate the stolen 
language (even while she herself has to succumb to its 
value-laden structures); she 
constructions and conceptions. 
might subvert hegemonic 
One might consider that 
the Greek art of metis is an art of transformation and 
transmutation, an aesthetics of the ruse that allows 
the weak to survive by escaping through duplicitous 
means the very power intent on destroying them. 
(Lionnet, 1989:18) 
It is this that Lyndall Gordon achieves: as a woman who is, 
by definition, "outside Power" she has to use the 
'languages' of biography and autobiography in order to 
undermine their authoritarianism. For, in terms of these 
conventional forms, it is the lives of those who achieve in 
the public realm, who can compete with men, which are 
worthy of documentation. This prescription, in effect, 
silences women who do not fit the bill. Gordon's Shared 
Lives employs "an aesthetics of the ruse" to evade the 
male-biased discourses that are intent on effacing women. 
In some cases, Malan (1990) springs to mind, 
acknowledgement of a lack of innocence in the narrative 
process leads to a degree of cultural relativism. However, 
it seems to me that a more profound relativism comes from 
the colonised peoples like Moloi, who practises linguistic 
metissage, and Kuzwayo, who creates a new discursive 
practice out of the fusion of disparate cultural paradigms. 
If, as LiOnnet shows, "The Anglo-American consciousness 
seems unable to accommodate miscegenation positively 
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through language" (1989:14) 6 then it may be relevant that 
white South African autobiographers rarely attempt 
autobiographical hybridization. Nevertheless, the culture 
of the oppressor has to break out of its ossifying power 
structures and mutate and researcher-motivated 
autobiographical mosaics are evidence of this kind of 
adaptation. Lionnet argues that 
reciprocal relations prevent the ossification of 
culture and encourage systematic change and exchange. 
By responding to such mutations, language reinforces 
a phenomenon of creative instability in which no 
, pure' or unitary origin can ever be posited .... 
variety and heterogeneity lead to richer and more 
fulfilling lives for all those who share a given 
environment; mul tiplici ty flourishes when the shackles 
of homogeneity and rigidity are broken. (1989:17-8) 
The politics of textuali ty, then, extend beyond the 
obvious polemical aim of much writing. As Cixous points 
out: "writing is precisely the very possibility of change, 
the space that can serve as a springboard for subversive 
thought, the precursory movement of a transformation of 
social and cultural structures" (1980b:249). For instance, 
the seizing of rules and forms e.g. Western 
autobiographical forms -- to subvert and reshape these and 
the power base on which they rest: this is an important 
part of the life-writing industry in South Africa in the 
last 46 years. Such texts may undermine textual 
conventions by appropriating these forms for novel causes, 
thus subverting the power of those who controlled the 
forms. We shall see something of this in Godfrey Moloi's 
My Life: Volume One. 
One way in which texts may (intentionally or not) 
persuade or manipulate readers is by hierarchizing 
discourses. MacCabe defines discourse as a domain of 
language usage which takes account of the position of the 
speaking subject within the utterance. "With discourse we 
become interested in the dialectical relation between 
speaker and language ln which language always already 
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offers a position to 
the act of speaking 
(MacCabe, 1985:63). 
the speaker and yet, at the same time, 
may itself displace those positions" 
A field of discursivity is "the site 
of the possibility of proof and disproof" for the split 
Lacanian subject (MacCabe, 1985:82). Foucault argues that 
it is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined 
together; but discourse does not comprise a number of 
discontinuous segments, some dominant and others excluded. 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to 
power or raised up against it, any more than silences 
are. We must make allowance for the complex and 
unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance 
and a starting point for an opposing strategy .... 
There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, 
and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter 
to it. Discourses are tactical elements or blocks 
operating in the field of force relations; there can 
exist different and even contradictory discourses 
within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, 
circulate without changing their form from one 
strategy to another, opposing strategy. (Foucault, 
1980:100-2) 
Speech or discourse always implies a dialogue, as we have 
learnt from Bakhtin; texts respond to repressed 
oppositional voices. This is true even of hegemonic 
discourses. As Dowling observes, a hegemonic discourse 
"suppresses or marginalizes all antagonistic class voices, 
and yet the hegemonic discourse remains locked into a 
dialogue with the discourse it has suppressed" (1984:131). 
Something of the converse occurs in Gordon's Shared Lives, 
a text which explicitly refuses to conform to conventional 
Western models of either biography or autobiography, but 
which has to engage with the codes o f both: it has to 
remain "locked into a dialogue with the discourse[s] it has 
suppressed" . 
It is from this complex interweaving of discourses (over 
which the author has little control) that meaning 
originates. And it is in this sense that the materiality 
of the language, the discursive arrangement of the text, 
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provides important material for the analysis of the 
culture(s) out of which it emerges. 
Alongside each utterance, one might say that off-stage 
voices can be heard: they are the codes: in their 
interweaving, these voices (whose origin is "lost" in 
the vast perspective of the already-written) de-
originate the utterance: the convergence of the voices 
(of the codes) becomes writing .... (Barthes, 1974:21) 
The writer, then, speaks not in his or her own voice, but 
in the voices which her or his interpellated positions make 
available; the multiple voices of the already written 
culture. Discourse thus issues from an unconscious as well 
~onscious speaking subject (Silverman, 1983:50). It 
must be recalled, however, that the writer adopts a 
speaking position from within a specific discursive 






herein lies a measure of conscious or unconscious control 
Thus Kuzwayo is able by the enunciating subj ect. 
knowingly or unknowingly to forge a new discursive 
practice out of the mutually exclusive discourses of black 
non-narrative autobiographical praise poetry and Western 
individualizing narrative. Lynda 1 1 Gordon also, by 
reinterpreting or translating the act of autobiographical 
narration through the discourse of feminism, is able to 
draw on those off-stage voices, those cultural codes, which 
her experiences of many cultures (South African white 
Jewish culture, American and British academia) make 
available to her. 
Texts are not only resonant with their multiple 
constitutive discourses, they resonate with one another, 
acquiring significance and lending significance by 
association. As Foucault says, 
The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond 
the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, 
beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous 
form, it is caught up in a system of references to 
other b ooks, . other texts, other sentences: it is a 
node wi t in a network. . .. The book is not simply the 
object that one holds in one's hands; ... its unity lS 
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variable and relative. As soon as one questions that 
unity, it loses its self-evidence; it indicates 
itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a 
complex field of discourse. (1972:23) 
By (implicitly or explicitly) announcing itself to be part 
of one or other generic tradition and thus by 
classifying itself as like certain kinds of texts and 
unlike others 
signification. 
a text sets limits on the play of 
Generic distinctions may seem unfashionable (Elbaz 
springs to mind as a detractor of this position?), however 
even Derrida insists that deconstruction should 
keep its eye on the specific differences of logic and 
sense that mark off one text from another, and which 
also demand some answering awareness of generic 
distinctions on the reader's part. Texts are 
'stratified' in the sense that they bear along with 
them a whole network of articulated themes and 
assumptions whose meaning everywhere links up with 
other texts, other genres or topics of discourse. 
This is what Derrida calls the 'disseminating' force 
always at work within language, written or spoken .... 
Writing, in short, is intertextual through and 
through. But this should not be taken as a licence 
for that other wholesale 'intertextuality' that 
rejoices in simply riding roughshod over all such 
generic distinctions. (Norris, 1987:25-6) 
And Foucault distinguishes between texts with an "author 
function" such as poetry and fiction, and those in which 
the author function is lacking, so that in the latter -- of 
which autobiography is an example -- the personal pronouns, 
adverbs of time and place, and verb conjugations "refer to 
the real speaker and to the spatio-temporal coordinates of 
his discourse (although certain modifications can occur, as 
ln the operation of relating discourses in the first 
person) " (1984: 112) . The references to social 
circumstances in autobiographies function not only as 
narrative techniques, as novelistic scene painting in the 
tradition of realism; they also provide an interpretive 
framework. Contextual fullness in narrative explicitly 
invokes "the idea of a social system to serve as a fixed 
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reference point by 
be endowed with 
which the flow of ephemeral events can 
specifically moral meaning" (White, 
al though South African autobiographical 1980:25). Thus 
writing is a heterogeneous 
autobiographies may be more like 
like each other, the fact that a 
field, and specific 
other forms than they are 
text asks to be read as 
autobiography is important for it calls into being a 
specific set of reading strategies with which the reader 
mayor may not comply but whose invocation necessitates due 
consideration. 
Autobiography as a genre defines its limits, as all 
concepts do, relationally: like history, it is about 'real' 
events; unlike history, it is personal, not impersonal and 
does not involve the effacement of the narrating voices ; 
like journalism, it documents 'factual' occurrences; unlike 
journalism, it usually covers a protracted period, and does 
not seek to present itself as a purely 'objective' 
discourse; like fiction, it constructs stories around 
themes and significances and in forms that will entice the 
reader; unlike fiction, it insists on the verifiability of 
much of its material; like fiction and popular movies, 
television narratives and so on, autobiography often 
constructs heroes and villains, relying on culturally 
acceptable cliches of narrative situation and interpretive 
models; unlike these media, it insists that these heroes 
and villains actually lived. Autobiography usually 
expressly invokes a contractual agreement with the reader: 
the reader reads the references as true, and the text 
undertakes to refer to people, places and events which have 
had material existence. Felman cites de Man: 
Political and autobiographical texts ... have in common 
that they share a referential reading-moment 
explicitly built in within the spectrum of their 
significations, no matter how deluded this moment may 
be in its mode as well as in its thematic content .... 
(Felman, 1992:143) 
Lest it appear that I am arguing that autobiography is 
ontologically distinct from other genres, I should explain 
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that my position is that autobiography establishes its 
particularity through use of specific rhetorical 
strategies. So while the text cannot be conceived of as 
mere transcription of self and life -- the writer's stated 
or implied intentions to write a 'truthful' document are 
not a reliable indicator of generic distinction ("Decentred 
as subj ects, lost in Derridean difference and caught in 
ideological cross-fire, we cannot always rely on the 
stabili ty of such intentions" (Wicomb, 1990: 42) ) the 
text nevertheless should, I believe, be read so that the 
discursive strategies which it employs in order to 
establish itself as autobiography are given due 
recognition. 9 Derrida observes that it is "the ear of the 
other", the acknowledgement of the receiving subject, that 
ensures that an autobiographical signature has been 
inscribed, that marks the text as autobiography, which is 
why he uses the inaudible differance of otobiography, 
instead of autobiography (1985:50-1). 
Because textuality makes its own demands, the text cannot 
simply be understood as transparent vehicle for truths 
about subject and life. Text assumes a life of its own, 
with generic conventions shaping the story, motivating the 
inclusion and omission of details; and each retelling 
assumes its own shape, as Breytenbach shows, and constructs 
a different self, a different life, a different story; 
"each new attempt at autobiography will tell a different 
story since the story has changed in the course of its 
telling and as a result of it" (Finney, 1985:13). Every 
act of composition is an act of commentary: "the 
juxtaposition of facts becomes in itself an act of 
interpretation" (Finney, 1985:23). In the composition 
process radical selection of remembered experience must 
occur (memory itself having effected a fundamental 
abbreviation). A publishable text must be of a manageable 
length, and this requires ruthless selection. Moreover, 
there are considerations of what segments of experience one 
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would not want to share with an anonymous reading public. 
A.E. Coppard's admission that, "There have been episodes in 
my life, important and privately fascinating occasions, 
which not even the prospect of an eternity of hellfire 
would induce me to reveal" is, Finney argues, "true of all 
autobiographical writers" (1985: 46) . Certainly, we have 
seen that Breytjnbach and Kuzwayo admit to omission, while 
Campbell and others like Alan Paton, Ruth Gordon, Noni 
Jabavu do not really attempt to conceal their withholding 
of information. Finney argues that, "an autobiography is 
likely to throw more light on the normally aging 
autobiographer than on the earlier self about whom the book 
is ostensibly written" (1985:259). And long before this 
Freud demonstrated that, 
the past represented in analysis is both a discursive 
and a symbolic one. The material recollected is less 
a 'pure' past than a narrative created in the present 
as the subject imaginatively reworks conscious and 
unconscious material. (Jay, 1984:25-6) 
While the psychoanalytic situation and the textual 
circumstances of writing autobiography are not equivalent, 
the role of the unconscious should not be discounted, and 
many autobiographies clearly serve their writers as 
similarly therapeutic acts of analysis. 1o 
The autobiography, furthermore, does not simply document 
life because, as we have had occasion to note already, 
textuality is ontologically distinct from life. The text 
can only point or gesture towards the real author: 
The bios of an autobiography, we may say, is what the 
"I" makes of it; yet as recent critics have observed, 
so far as the finished work is concerned, neither the 
autos nor the bios is there in the beginning, a 
completed entity, a defined, known self or a history 
to be had for the taking. Here is where the act of 
writing the third element of autobiography 
assumes its true importance: it is through that act 
that the self and the life, complexly intertwined and 
entangled, take on a certain form, assume a particular 
shape and image, and endlessly reflect that image back 
and forth between themselves as between two mirrors. 
But at this point, as .. . [Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan 
tell us], the text takes on a life of its own, and the 
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self that was not really in existence in the beginning 
is in the end merely a matter of text and has nothing 
to do with an authorizing author. (Olney, 1980:22)11 
Textual characters are not equivalent to material beings, 
the former (as verbal constructs) not being subject to the 
vicissitudes of life. But these characters are subject to 
the narrative and its constituent discourses. The 
character must serve the narrative -- we find this even in 
a text like Breytenbach's True Confessions where the 
storyline requires that accounts of prison friendships be 
omitted or radically reduced so as to prevent the 
subversion of the story of his solitary confinement; more 
tellingly, in this text, no matter how much he might wish 
to destabilize any notions of continuity of being and of 
the innocence of text, finally the narrator has (in a 
concluding note to the reader) to return to an avowal of 
truthfulness which employs precisely these very conceptions 
so as to enlist the reader's acceptance that this is indeed 
a true account of the material conditions of a material 
being, the writer. Barthes states, and we see this 
evidenced ln the example from Breytenbach, that "the 
character's freedom is dominated by the discourse's 
instinct for preservation" (1974:135). Later he adds: 
the character and the discourse are each other 's 
accomplices: . . . Such is discourse: if it creates 
characters, it is not to make them play among 
themselves before us but to play with them, to obtain 
from them a complicity which assures the uninterrupted 
exchange of the codes: the characters are types of 
discourse and, conversely, the discourse is a 
character like the others. (178-9) 
Even to claim that autobiography is an account in the 
present of past experience is problematic: for as Derrida 
has demonstrated, the present is a composite of manifold 
memories and anticipations, 
never existing in the isolated instant of awareness. 
Time is an endless deferring of presence. . .. In other 
words, there is no privileged ground of reflection 
from which thought could ever organize or control the 
flux of temporal experience. (Norris, 1982:47) 
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While textuality would seem to be the source and evidence 
for the fact / fiction divide, this division of texts into 
fact / fiction is metaphorical and rhetorical, not logical. 
Lacan remarked that "truth always manifests itself in a 
structure of fiction" (cited by Davis, 1983: 861), and Elbaz 
argues that 
everything having to do with language is fiction, the 
construction of a speaking subject: one always speaks 
from a linguistic-metaphoric reality. Every discourse 
is an interpretation. The hope of grasping events in 
their bareness and immediately as they happen is an 
illusion which takes strength from the dichotomy 
'truth/falsehood' -- a metaphysical residue which is 
one of the bastions of the prevalent ideology. 
(1988:14) 
The mediation of "a linguistic-metaphoric reality" is thus 
duplicated by the mediation of textual convention and 
generic requirements when the speaking subject becomes a 
writing subject. Barthes' position is that 
[i]t is the misfortune (but also perhaps the 
voluptuous pleasure) of language not to be able to 
authenticate itself.... [L]anguage is, by nature, 
fictional; the attempt to render language unfictional 
requires an enormous apparatus of measurements: we 
convoke logic, or, lacking that, the sworn oath .... 
(1981b:85-7) 
In addition we might use photographs, for, "Every 
photograph is a certificate of presence" (87). The point 
is, I believe, to examine that "enormous apparatus of 
measurements," not to pretend that because there is no 
logical or theoretically valid reason for their existence 
that we should therefore ignore them and "do away with the 
concept of genre" (Elbaz, 1988:14) . Barthes argues in "The 
Death of the Author" that 
writing is the destruction of every voice, of every 
point of origin. Writing is that neutral, composite, 
oblique space where our subject slips away, the 
negative where all identity is lost, starting with the 
very identity of the body writing. (1989:114) 
But his view carefully excludes writing which has "a Vlew 
to acting directly on reality" (114). So al though the 
autobiographer, the person , eludes textualization and the 
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narrative is 'peopled' by 'characters' not unlike those in 
fiction, there is one important difference and that is that 
of legal accountability. Autobiographers can be held up 
for defamation or libel because of their texts' truth 
claims. 
It is futile to attempt to be much more specific in 
defining the genre. To some extent, autobiography is a 
tautological genre: if a text presents itself as 
autobiography the strategies by which it secures this 
status are matter for analysis. The claim to be 
autobiographical represents a contract, "and it cannot be 
honored except by another" (Derrida, 1985:9). In spite of 
the fact that I defend the continued recognition of the 
importance of generic categories for the reasons I have 
already given, I must concede that 
if the border between autobiography and fiction is 
erected on a privileged notion of referentiality, then 
the study of autobiographical works will always be 
partly founded upon an illusion .... De Man rejects 
the idea that the subject in an autobiographical work 
represents a privileged form of referentiality. He 
wants, instead, to view the subj ect as a textual 
production. What we always confront in any 
autobiographical work, he argues, is not a series of 
historical events but a series of efforts to write 
something. The action proper to autobiography, is not 
historical but rhetorical. (Jay, 1984:18) 
Generic conventions function to delimit the sayable. 
Moreover, generic convention, when it becomes formulaic a-s 
in much South African autobiographical writing, seems to 
provide a structure whose truth value is endorsed through 
repetition, each retelling acquir\ng validity from those 
that have gone before. The repetitiveness of much South 
African autobiographical writing (especially the 'township' 
autobiography), serves perhaps to create the illusion of 
stability, a clearly delimited real. This repetitiveness 
of many of the tales of black South Africans' lives under 
apartheid might arise, in part, from a need in some readers 
to hear variations of the theme because of the 
incomprehensibility both for white and black South 
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Africans, the latter trying to understand their oppression 
of the horrors of apartheid. Autobiography contributes 
to the collective memory of what apartheid meant; "Our ' 
memory... repeats to us what we haven't understood. 
Repeti tion is addressed to incomprehension" (Valery, quoted 
by Felman, 1992:276) Moreover, each autobiographical text 
enacts a difference in the repetition. 
But autobiography, as is true of all genres, is a 
transitory cultural product; it is governed by shifting 
conventions which are culture and history-specific. In 
fact, as we have seen, even to use the same term, 
'autobiography' , for such widely divergent textual 
productions as Western-style narratives and traditional 
black South African autobiographical praise poems is 
probably somewhat misleading and certainly imprecise. 
Nevertheless, since generic classification serves as a 
determinant of t he status of a text in the material world 
of publishers and readers, its unstable configurations 
warrant attention. As Christie McDonald suggests in a 
question to Derrida, "the principle of a traditional genre 
is fundamentally that of an order which, even though it 
does not remain fixed, makes possible the production of 
meanlng and glves • rlse to hermeneutic discourse as 
meaningful discourse" (Derrida, 1985:47). In my study of 
generic developments over time my method is archaeological; 
I am concerned to establish "the regularity of the 
discursive practice concerned, 'the set of conditions in 
which the enunciative function operates and which 
guarantees and defines its existence'" 
Foucault, 1985:49). 
(Smart citing 
South African autobiographical writing since 1948 has 
seen some significant innovations in its formal features. 
Raymond Williams observes that: 
As a society changes, its literature changes, though 
often in unexpected ways, for it is part of social 
growth and not simply its reflection. At times, a 
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rising social group will create new institutions 
which, as it were, release its own writers. At other 
times, writers from new social groups will simply make 
their way into existing institutions, and work largely 
within their terms ... . (1961:528) 
I would argue that autobiography has released writers from 
the oppressed classes that other prose genres would not 
have been able to accommodate . 12 "In addition to being the 
simplest and commonest of writing propositions, 
autobiography is also the least 'literary' kind of writing, 
practised by people who would neither imagine nor admit 
that they were 'writers'" (Olney, 1980a:4). This ability 
to include even the barely literate is the source of its 
crucial importance in South Af.rican literary production in 
the last four and half decades. Moloi's My Life: Volume 
One, for instance, is often ungrammatical, as even his 
apology to the reader indicates: 
I apologise in advance for my poor writing style, I 
couldn't make it, even at school. But, nevertheless, 
here I am trying to the best of my ability to put down 
on this paper for my generations to come, and for 
those who care, the truth about this me called 
Godfrey. ( 4 ) 
Autobiography's inclusiveness is an important part of what 
makes it of greater cultural and political significance 
than fiction. As Nise Malange remarks: "each person has a 
story to tell ... you do not need to be well educated or 
specially gifted to be able to tell the story or to write" 
(cited by Lockett, 1990:19).13 The mediated 
autobiographical anthologies like Facing the Storm and 
Working Women and the aggregated auto/biography like Thula 
Baba and Women of Pho.keng exemplify this non-elitist 
inclusi veness of the genre . They illustrate, too, the 
elasticity of the genre which enables it to accommodate and 
contribute to social change. 
Other more radical changes in South African 
autobiographical writing are the changes from traditional 
black non-narrative praise poems to narrative prose 
autobiography. While so much of White's essay on "The 
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Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality" will 
be useful to my analysis of the shift in black South 
African autobiographical writing from praise poem to 
narrative, Nussbaum's astute criticism of White for seeming 
to be bound to an idea of narrative as transhistorical, a 
metacode which he terms, "a human universal on the basis of 
which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared 
reality can be transmitted" (White, 1980:6) is important. 
The fact that traditional black South African 
autobiographical texts are non-narrative suggests that we 
need to be rather more cautious when making assumptions 
regarding "human universal[s]." As Nussbaum observes, 
[W]hile it is crucial to acknowledge the way history 
is always someone's story, it is equally important to 
historicize narrative, to recognize its embedment in 
its particular moment and sociocultural situation, and 
to note the ways in which its various readers over 
time assign its various meanings. (1989:17) 
The seemingly abrupt shift in the autobiographical texts 
by black South Africans from traditional black li thoko 
(Sotho) and imbongi (Zulu) (praise poems) to narrative 
forms (one must, of course, guard against essentializing 
these autobiographical forms), is significant beyond its 
indication of a shift to a Western aesthetic standard, 
ascribed to the impact of a dominant culture on dominated 
cuI tures . I have argued elsewhere that this change is 
indicative of a shift in epistemology towards a Western 
linguistic practice which accords greater truth value to 
prose than to poetry. The truths of prose are themselves 
generally conceived of in this community as unembellished, 
rooted in daily experience, this notion depending "on the 
assumption that language can function mimetically in 
relation to reality, that transparency of meaning is an 
attainable ideal" (Coullie, 1991:16). Furthermore, the 
move to Western autobiographical forms betokens a shift 
from autobiography as act (the praise poem is a 
performative text which may alter in certain minor respects 
from one performance to the next) to autobiography as 
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relatively stable product14 (which mayor may not accrue for 
the author some monetary profit); and also from 
autobiography as both sacred and profane (an individual's 
praises being used after death as incantation to the 
ancestors), to autobiography as secular textual product. 
The move from performative poetry to printed prose 
narrative means fundamental epistemological shifts and 
Jay's point about British autobiography is pertinent: 
"tradi tional autobiographical forms began to dissolve as 
the conventional ideas that underlay their conceptions of 
sUbjectivity and its 
dissolving" (1984:112). 
literary representation were 
The communally defined self (which 
involves, it would seem , a more dispersed sense of what 
self is) is replaced by a self who is known and narrated by 
an authorizing author/narrator. Traditional black South 
African poetic forms define identity in terms of ancestry 
and relationship (Gunner, 1984: 50, 59); the self is not 
autonomous, nor does the autobiographical subject function 
as author in quite the same way as in narrative 
autobiography. The self is defined by the community; in 
Zulu and Sotho non-narrative praise poems the defining 
criteria for biography and autobiography are less clear 
than they are for most Westerners: 
An ordinary individual's praises are. . . both 
autobiographic and biographic. He composes praises 
for himself but is helpless to prevent others from 
doing the same for him and commenting upon features 
that catch their attention and excite their 
admiration, amusement or distaste. (Gunner, 1984:63) 
In narrative autobiography the self is commodified as an 
entity over which the author has exclusive auth'ority (and 
whose narrativization thereof may earn her disapprobation 
or profit). In this Western tradition originality of 
composition, not community effort, is the norm. 
The author's authority is embedded in the centrality of 
the narrator in the narrative and in the unifying nature of 
narrative plot (which tends to disallow untidy elements 







line) . The 
in narrative 
individualization of the 
autobiography (a _kind 
central 
of holy 
trini ty of author, narrator, protagonist) , can be 
contrasted with an explicit embedding and relational 
defining of the autobiographical subject in traditional 
praise poems. The act of composition is treated In 
markedly different ways in the two traditions: Westerners 
allow for one author only of autobiography, and although 
co-wri ters may be accepted, it is extremely rare for a 
communally composed text to be received as 
autobiographical. 15 
The point that I wish to make is that mutating textual 
practices are rofoundly significant. -- "- - --:- Textual structures 
are not something imposed from outside the genesis of the 
tetl, but are "a projection of that person's way of 
handling realities" (Minh-ha, cited by Maqagi, 1990:23). 
J It has been argued at least since Nietzsche that the 
Western conception of the unified self is a constructed 
tradition, "a historically constituted set of ideas and 
assumptions whose referents are complexly dispersed within 
the very language we must use to think the self into being" 
(Jay, 1984:28). Linguistic and textual transformations are 
concomitant with paradigm shifts. Foucault remarks that, 
"[t]he corning into being of the notion of 'author' 
constitutes the privileged moment of individualization in 
the history of ideas, knowledge, literature, philosophy, 
and the sciences" (1984:101) . Narrative autobiography has 
as its pivot the individualized author as source of 
knowledge and meaning. But this individualizing philosophy 
embraces too the autobiographical subject in narrative 
autobiography. Narrative is an authoritarian mode, whereas 
the performative, more collectively composed traditional 
black autobiography is less obviously so. In the non-
narrative praise poem of black South African tradition, the 
author (or more properly, the autobiographical subject) is 
not sole authority over the text, nor sole composer, and 
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thus cannot assume a position of unimpeachable dominance 
wi thin the text. 16 
Hayden White remarks that 
[u] nless at least two versions of the same set of 
events can be imagined, there is no reason for the 
historian to take upon himself the authority of giving 
the true account of what really happened. (1980:23-4) 
The authority of narrative history and auto/biography lies 
not only in its positioning of the narrator as authority 
for the story, it lies perhaps more powerfully ln a 
characteristic of narrative itself. That is, the narrative 
structure imbues narrated ev~nts with an order of meaning. 
Spacks notes that, "To understand one's life as a story 




This "sense" is achieved by means of the 
characteristic attempts 
coherency, and meaning 
"to put an image of 
in place of the 
fantasies of emptiness, need , and frustrated desire that 
inhabit our nightmares about the destructive power of time" 
(Whi te, 1980: 15) . 17 I would a .=..r = """"-........... = 
succumb to th~ attract~ons and da g~s of rationality, what 






The authority for the narrative's schema of 
conveyed by relying on the techniques of what 
referring to fictional works 18 calls the 
Almost all South African autobiographical writing in 
English since 1948 can be classified as readerly -- rather 
than writerly texts. In the latter meaning is 
constantly transformed, in flux; it is p lural and 
contradictory. The readerly text, however, 
steers clear of contradiction, which would challenge 
the imperative of inevitability. 
The readerly text purports to be a transcript of 
a reality which pre-exists and exceeds it, and it 
tightly controls the play of signification by 
subordinating everything to this transcendental 





its signifiers, which are understood as 
toward a privileged and originating 
(Silverman, 1983:243) 
The readerly, of which the classic realist text is a prime 
example, hierarchizes its discourses "and this hierarchy is 
defined in terms of an empirical notion of truth" (MacCabe, 
1985:34) . 
Most South African autobiography in the last four and a 




the subject 1n a relation of dominant 
(McCabe, 1985: 39) This is manifested in 
Luthuli, and can be found too in Butler, 
Hermans, Juta and Joseph. The reader's relationship to the 
represented world is generally designed to be one of 
assent: the text evokes a world which soothes the reader's 
expectations of passive consumption of significances 
(however disturbing these may be) which exceed the verbal 
representation thereof. Barthes argues that "the author 
[of the readerly text] is a god (his place of origin is the 
signified); as for the critic, he is the priest whose task 
is to decipher the Writing of the god" (1974: 174) . The 
primacy of the author as the godhead of the holy trinity 
(author/narrator/protagonist) 







concomi tant secondary supporting role of the reader as 
collaborator. 
Autobiographers have to create an illusion of 
conclusiveness out of their inconclusive and uncompleted 
lives, but since, as Barthes intimated, each autobiographer 
1S her or his own symbolic and ideological blind spot 
(1977a:152-3), they can rarely achieve consistent mastery 
of the discursive raw material with which they must work; 
gaps must inevitably be smoothed over by the reader. The 
reader is, . in autobiographies as different as Winnie 
Mandela's and Alan Paton's, invited to co-operate with the 
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text's narrative strategy which is 
[t]o end, to fill, to join, to unify -- one might say 
that this is the basic requirement of the readerly, as 
though it were prey to some obsessive fear: that of 
omitting a connection. Fear of forgetting engenders 
the appearance of a logic of actions; terms and the 
links between them are posited (invented) in such a 
way that they unite, duplicate each other, create an 
illusion of continuity. (Barthes, 1974:105) 
My own position of reader refuses this role, seeking not 
some sort of divine truth regarding the text, but rather 
attempting to unravel some of the discursive threads which 
constitute the text so as to interrogate the gaps, . the 
inconsistencies. 
At the other extreme of this continuum, the writerly 
text, like Breytenbach's and , to a lesser extent, Gordon's, 
contemplates its own discursive raw materials. It may be 
fruitful to consider the traditional autobiographical 
praise poem, izimbongi and lithoko, as a species of the 
writerly, sharing some of its characteristics. It denies 
the rigidity of a syntagmatic order, and seeks no "final 
great ensemble, [no] ultimate structure" (Barthes, 
1974: 12) . The wri terly text replaces the concepts of 
"'product' and 'structure' with those of 'process' and 
, segmentation'" (Silverman, 1983 :247). The performances of 
a person's pralse poem will be sensitive to audience 
responses, hence "process" rather than "product". The 
praise poem may, in performance, be constructed 
differently; it is a pre-eminently social and communal act. 
Its form is loose in that it does not seek some unifying 
narrative point. 
Autobiography usually authenticates itself by inscribing 
in the narrative the probable, what the culture has 
"already written" (a favourite Barthesian phrase) as making 
up the tissue of everyday life. In "readerly" fashion it 
"attempts to conceal all traces of itself as a factory 
within which a particular social reality is produced 
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through standard representations and dominant signifying 
practices" (Silverman, 1983:244), aiming for transparency 
by concealing the apparatuses of enunciation (215). The 
binary oppositions which are part of 
system (male/female, black/white, 
sophisticate, 
narrative by 
the culture's meaning 
country dweller/city 
are woven in to the oppressor /victim etc.) 
means of what Barthes refers to as the 
symbolic code. McCabe notes that for Barthes, 
[o]n the one hand representation refuses to accept the 
unlimited nature of the real, a nature which entails 
that no description can be brought to an end, while, 
on the other, it refuses to acknowledge the operations 
of fantasy in the description by supposedly grounding 
the writing in external conditions. (1985:135) 
Paradoxically, narrative achieves the illusion of fullness, 
completion, through establishing its frame of reference 
metonymically, using detail to suggest a larger, complete, 
reali ty. All of these techniques are especially 
significant, indeed crucial, for autobiography since its 
value rests almost entirely on its claim to represent the 
real. Just how specific texts employ these techniques so 
as to achieve maximum credibili t y and transparency is 
matter for much further study. 
White argues that "narrative in general ... has to do with 




legitimacy, or, more 
Where there is ambiguity or ambivalence regarding the 
status of the legal system, which is the form in which 
the subject encounters most immediately the social 
system in which he is enj oined to achieve a full 
humanity, the ground on which any closure of a story 
one might wish to tell about a past, whether it be a 
public or private past, is lacking. And this suggests 
that narrativity, certainly in factual storytelling 
and probably in fictional storytelling as well, is 
intimately related to, if not a function of, the 
impulse to moralize reality, that is, to identify it 
wi th the social system that is the source of any 
morality we can imagine. (17-8) 
White argues that narrative closure consists of the passage 
from one moral order to another for there is no other way 
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of 'concluding' an account of real events; "for we cannot 
say, surely, that any sequence of real events actually 
comes to an end, that reality itself disappears, that the 
events of the order of the real have ceased to happen" 
(26). A story, by contrast, concludes when the events it 
has treated are "endowed with specifically moral meaning" 
(25). Barthes makes a similar point in his autobiography: 
"History is a moral notion; it allows us to relativize the 
natural and to believe in a meaning of time" (1977a:126). 
~he narrative ~utobiography thus establishes_~tself as an 
authoritarian undertaking also because it becomes its own 
moral authority for interpretation. We see this 
part l cularly in Campbell's, Luthuli's and Moloi's 
autobiographies. Perhaps it is no accident that these are 
male-authored texts. 
But as White goes on to show, this certainty of moral 
code, of interpretative model , is born out of desire, not 
experience. The historical narrative 
displays to us a formal coherency that we ourselves 
lack. . . . In this world, reality wears the mask of a 
meaning, the completeness and fullness of which we can 
only imagine, never experience . Insofar as historical 
stories can be completed, can be given narrative 
closure, can be shown to have had a plot all along, 
they give to reality the odor of the ideal. This is 
why the plot of a historical narrative is always an 
embarrassment and has to be presented as 'found' in 
the events rather than put there by narrative 
techniques. (White, 1980:24) 
And again we return to 
much autobiographical 
contrivances of plot 
the issue of stylistic flatness in 
wri ting: making explicit the 
and verbal dexterity would be 
tantamount to an admission of fictionality (in the sense of 
creative shaping, but also with an implication of 
constructedness) . Given the seriousness of their task as 
witnesses to the social catastrophes of the last 46 years, 
or even for those who see their texts in less momentous 
terms as records of their lives and careers, few 
autobiographers are willing to take the risk of confronting 
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the narrativized idealization of experience. 
I have sought to suggest that this value attached to 
narrativity in the representation of real events 
arises out of a desire to have real events display the 
coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an 
image of life that is and can only be imaginary. The 
notion that sequences of real events possess the 
formal attributes of the stories we tell about 
imaginary events could only have its origin in wishes, 
daydreams, reveries. Does the world really present 
itself to perception in the form of well-made stories, 
with central SUbjects, proper beginnings, middles, and 
ends, and a coherence that permits us to see 'the end' 
in every beginning? (White, 1980:27) 
And, judging by the rarity of autobiographical texts which 
confront the issues of narrative expediency, it would seem 
that few readers of autobiography seek such exposure of the 
textual production process, of the ideological functions of 
narrative. Silverman says that 
Barthes emphasizes that the classic text depends upon 
a linear reading or viewing; any deviation from that 
norm threatens its existence. This is because the 
classic text is finally nothing more than a large-
scale predication, i.e. a statement which defines and 
situates a subject.... [Its discourse] requires 
readers and viewers who will accede to the terms of 
its (linear) unfolding. It enlists those readers and 
viewers by fostering in them a desire for closure, and 
a belief in the revelatory nature of endings. 
Narrative represents a particularly powerful 
syntagmatic lure, affirming the coherence of the text 
and binding the reader or viewer to it in a 
relationship of pleasurable dependence.... At the 
moment of closure toward which every readerly 
experlence moves, the reader or viewer enjoys an 
illusory sense of liberation illusory because 
through that closure his or her subjectivity has been 
reconfirmed. Subjectivity must be constantly re-
activated in this way; hence the readerly text is a 
disposable product, designed to be consumed during one 
encounter. More must always wait on the shelf .... 
(1983:245) 
Certainly, most narrative autobiographies are "designed to 
be consumed during one encounter", attempting to convey 
certainty of meaning through transparent text. This again 
contrasts with autobiographical praise poems of traditional 
black cultures which are intended to be repeated many times 
-- not necessarily identically -- during the course of a 
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person's life; the performance is itself an experience, not 
a commodified product which can be purchased and then 
disposed of. The repetitiveness of formulaic 
autobiographies relates too to their function as disposable 
products: the reader's one encounter with the text is 
predictable, depicting a reality that is reassuring (even 
when it horrifies), holding no surprises in the positioning 
of the reading subject . 
Writing of the hermeneutic code in the readerly text, 
Barthes argues that it serves to "structure the enigma 
according to the expectation and desire for its solution" 
(1974:75). Expectation 
becomes the basic condition for truth: truth, these 
[hermeneutic] narratives tell us, is what is at the 
end of expectation. This design brings narrative very 
close to the rite of initiation (a long path marked 
with pitfalls, obscurities, stops, suddenly comes out 
into the light); it implies a return to order, for 
expectation is a disorder: disorder is supplementary, 
it is what is forever added on without solving 
anything, without finishing anything; order is 
complementary, it completes, fills up, saturates, and 
dismisses everything that risks adding on: truth is 
what completes, what closes. (Barthes, 1974:76) 
Not all autobiographical writing covered in this study is 
obviously hermeneutic in emphasis (Moloi's "farm boy" theme 
being an unusually clear example of a narrative which is 
structured around the hermeneutic impulse) , but 
nevertheless most relies on the reader's desire to 
apprehend a new moral order In narrative closure. 
Breytenbach, for example, has left the prison and racist 
South Africa to emerge a wiser, more self-aware man in the 
free world of Europe. Donald Woods in Asking for Trouble 
(1980) also concludes his narrative with his arrival in 
Europe (England, to be precise) and his vindication in a 
new moral order which condemns racism. And Mathabane 
(1986), too, ends with his departure from South Africa to 
America, where a new moral order (which his own courage has 
begun to engender in him already) will enable him "to 
become a man, to realise his dreams" (350). Most South 
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African autobiographical writing positions the reader 
securely in a relation of acquiesence to its moral vision. 
White exposes the nature of the appeal of narrativity ln 
historical discourse: it "makes the real into an object of 
desire" by imposing upon events that are represented as 
real "the formal coherency" of stories (1980:23-4). 
Implicit in his argument, however, is a proposition that 
the ideological functions of narrativity make it unsuitable 
for representations of the real. 
If we view narration and narrativity as the 
instruments by which the conflicting claims of the 
imaginary and the real are mediated, arbitrated, or 
resolved in a discourse, we begin to comprehend both 
the appeal of narrative and the grounds for refusing 
it. (White, 1980:8-9) 
While I am sympathetic to White's position, one must be 
wary of assuming that non-narrative representations of 
reality are necessarily less problematic. One other 
alternative (the one that Barthes chooses), to write the 
self as a disordered collection of fragments, is also 
illusory: 
I have the illusion to suppose that by breaking up my 
discourse I cease to discourse in terms of the 
imaginary about myself, attenuating the risk of 
transcendence; but since the fragment (haiku, maxim, 
pensee, journal entry) is finally a rhetorical genre 
and since rhetoric is that layer of language which 
best presents itself to interpretation, by supposing 
I disperse myself I merely return, quite docilely, to 
the bed of the imaginary. (1977a:95) 
Barthes' description of his own autobiographical 
compositional strategy -- the heaping of summary on top of 
summary seems applicable to non-narrative 
autobiographies, such as some of the autobiographical 
anthologies of the worker autobiography sub-genre which 
achieve little more than the broad adumbrations of the 
epitome, the stereotype. Thus narrative is not an arch 
villain and the alternative is not necessarily truer or 
more satisfactory. Narrative is developmental yet 
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coherent; summaries are only incidentally cumulative. 
** *** 
I said earlier that significant innovations have occurred 
in this latter part of the twentieth century in South 
African autobiographical writing in English. In addition 
to the formal innovations of the move amongst black South 
African autobiographers from traditional poetic praise 
poems to Western narrative forms, there are very important 
changes regarding the demographics of writers and readers 
of autobiography: as has been mentioned, the field has 
become increasingly democra t ic with more and more Eeople of L 
~nd women publishing their life stories. 0 
Nevertheless, women still produce fewer autobiographical 
texts than men. The proportions are roughly just short of 
double the number of black men autobiographers to black 
women; black men have published about 6/10 of the 
autobiographies that white men have; and white women's 
autobiographical texts make up less than half those of 
white men. If one considers that in South Africa blacks 
outnumber whites to about 6 to 1, and that women generally 
slightly outnumber men, these figures are even more 
disturbingly skewed. The imbalance is particularly obvious 
in the case of black women , especially if we recall that 
the largest proportion of quasi-autobiographies, of 
researcher-scripted autobiographical texts, are to be found 
in the black woman category. Between 1960 and 1985 two 
black South African women published their autobiographies 
in English (i.e. Jabavu and Kuzwayo); none exist prior to 
this. In this period, however, two other autobiographical 
texts of black women were published in English, but these 
were both penned by white women . Even post 1985, a large 
proportion (more than half , i t would seem) of black women's 
autobiographical texts are researcher-motivated and 
scripted. These include Winnie Mandela's Part of my Soul, 
Frances Baard's My Spiri t is Not Yet Banned, and the 
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anthologies like Working Women, Vukani Makhosikazi, and 
Women of Phokeng. In these cases it is white women who act 
as facilitators for black women to recount stories of some 
of their experiences. 
Who is it that silences women? It is male-dominated 
social structures which interpellate women as Other, which 
make women believe that they have sole responsibility for 
domestic chores (and thus less time for any other 
pursuits), which make women feel that they have nothing of 
importance to say or, if they do wish to be heard, regard 
their contributions with disdain. As is evident in Shared 
Lives, Lyndall Gordon's youthful (and obviously gendered) 
feelings of inadequacy are eroded principally not by Gordon 
herself, but by her husband who encourages her to write, 
who -- in effect -- authorizes her achievements. 
And who is it that silences black women, specifically? 
It is both the white establishment (inferior black 
education, and also the publishing industry which tends to 
neglect indigenous black languages and women's writing) and 
also patriarchal black cultural formations, which inform 
not only traditional social structures but, as has been 
well documented, liberation movements and trade unions too. 
Racism and patriarchy silence black women by interpellating 
these women into subordinate subj ect positions by which 
they themselves think and act. Nise Malange writes of a 
"socialized lack of self-confidence"; young women from 
traditional homes are "considered unmodest or rude" if. they 
attract attention for anything other than the products of 
their labour (cited by Lockett, 1990:18). And Boitumelo 
Mofokeng comments on the enormous courage required for a 
black woman to speak in her own person, using the first 
person (Daymond and Lenta, 1990:78-80). In the light of 
this, many South African women autobiographers can indeed 
be seen as crusaders, as women warriors, demanding 
recognition and an audience where none existed before. 
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Black South Africans produce proportionally fewer 
autobiographical texts than whites, nevertheless, for 
obvious reasons, their texts tend to be regarded as more 
important. (One needs only to look at South African 
university English department syllabi to see that if 
autobiographies are prescribed, they will almost always be 
black-authored texts). Hayden White's point about the 
contest over meaning which is implicit in any narrative 
account of history is apposite: increasingly marginalized 
persons are appropriating the right to speak, to be 
\ 
attended to. Will-ers-. pllbl~:r:s and readers are 
responding to demands of history to recognize black South 
Africans and to marginalize whites~ 
There are shifts, too, in the readership of 
autobiographical texts. Increasingly, as I have said, 
black South Africans are targeted as readers. Barthes' 
argument that "in the text, only the reader speaks" 
(1974:151) refers to the role of readers in the meaning-
making process, the text being inert matter until it is 
read. But readers make meanings in another sense too: as 
texts are written for implied readers, so the image of the 
targeted audience will shape the text. And In this 
diversifying of implied audiences there has been an 
accompanying hybridisation of autobiographical forms. The 
relationship between text and reader is dialectical, for as 
the implied reader shapes the text so the text shapes the 
implied reader, encouraging certain attitudes and beliefs 
in that reader. So the meaning-making process of actual or 
real readers is generally quite tightly circumscribed by 
the narrative's hierarchization of discourses, its claims 
to have in its possession the truth, and its positioning of 
the reader in relation to these textual strategies. 
Readers of autobiography are usually placed in a position 
of pseudo-dominance: sharing all meanings with the 
narrator, being the privileged auditors who are invited to 
listen to confidences and truths. 
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While the reader may refuse the subject positions offered 
by the text, the reader is not autonomous: 
The subject who reads is constituted by a series of 
conventions, the grids of regularity and 
intersubj ecti vi ty. The empirical "I" is dispersed 
among these conventions which take over from him in 
the act of reading. (Culler, 1975:258) 
Or, as Barthes would have it, the reader is already 
written. The experiential side of this theoretical 
argument is expressed by Dabi Nkululeko who insists that 
white women cannot fully comprehend the experience of the 
native woman under colonialism. I agree. However, I 
differ from her when she argues that comprehension can 
begin if "Euro-settler women... overcome most of the 
trappings of their own experience, such as their own class 
interests and status," and dissociate themselves from their 
experiences "as part of the colonist-settler nation" (cited 
by Lockett, 1990:14). If we are our own ideological blind 
spots, as Barthes and Foucault have demonstrated, no more 
than an attempt can be made to understand, let alone 
dissociate oneself from, the discourses that inform our 
consciousness. Disengagement per se is not possible. Nor 
should we essentialize ourselves or others ln terms of 
race, gender, class and other categorizations. 
***** 
Felicity Nussbaum's remarks about 18th Century English 
autobiography apply to South African autobiographical 
writing in the last four decades: 
Autobiographical writing allows the previously 
illi terate and disenfranchised to adopt a language 
sufficiently acceptable to be published, and, at the 
same time, it enables them to envisage new 
possibilities in the interstices between discourses or 
to weave them together in new hybrid forms.... Such 
texts may work simultaneously for and against the 
ideologies of identity which prevail. They may 
sometimes seem to resolve certain manifest 
contradictions in order to affirm the humanist self, 
but just as often the texts may be read as subverting 
hegemonic formulations of identity, thus arrogating 
the power to change dominant knowledges regarding the 
human subject. (1989:37) 
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Both Godfrey Moloi' s My Life: volume One and Lynda 1 1 
Gordon's Shared Lives seem to illustrate the phenomenon 
described above (in spite of the fact that Gordon is not 
illi terate: she is certainly marginalized) for, as new 
hybrid discursive compounds these texts can be seen (albeit 
in very different ways) to "work simultaneously for and 
against the ideologies of identity which prevail". My 
interest in this chapter (in keeping with the theme of 
graphe) is precisely in how Moloi and Gordon "envisage new 
possibilities in the interstices between discourses or ... 
weave them together in new hybrid forms". While Gordon's 
innovativeness lies in her subversive manipulation of the 
discourses of biography and autobiography so as to expose 
new ways of being and of knowing, Moloi' s lies in his 
pastiche of seemingly incompatible discourses, and in the 
hierarchization of these discourses, so that established 
interpretations are invalidated, and novel ones offered. 
I shall begin with Moloi. 
Most autobiographical texts by black South Africans, 
predictably, challenge the apartheid State. Moloi' s !1Y. 
Life: Volume One, published in 1987, although authored by 
a victim of apartheid does not explicitly defy the regime. 
Moloi's autobiography, tracing his experiences of 
destitution and crime from the 1930s to the 1960s, attests 
to the fact that, "for Africans our country has been made 
into a vast series of displaced persons' camps" (Luthuli, 
1982:177); but it also exemplifies the irrepressible spirit 
of someone who flouts displacement by creating out of the 
emergent chaos a place in which the squalor of poverty is 
imbued with the glamour of celluloid. The autobiographical 
hero is just that: a hero. While simultaneously exploring 
a life of deprivation and oppression, the narrative, by 
hierarchizing seemingly contradictory and incompatible 
discourses, refuses the position of victim for the 
autobiographical subject, thus subverting material and 
discursive realities of South Africa both in the period of 
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the narrated events (the 1930s, 40s and 50s) and in the 
1980s (the time of the narration). My Life19 is a 
particularly interesting attempt to create out of racially 
motivated deprivation, a hero's life, not in the more 
expected mould of hero of the liberation struggle, but in 
the unorthodox positioning of the self in the discourses of 
popular American culture of the 40s and 50s. 20 
White South African governments have engineered the 
breakdown of traditional black social structures through 
racist legislation dating back to the early decades of this 
century. As masses of impoverished blacks flocked to the 




and the norms and 





Understanding as we do that the subject is positioned in 
discursive networks which involve material and non-material 
relations, we can expect that the destruction of the social 
and discursive fabric means that new ways of being emerge. 
Apartheid has, quite literally, changed the subject. 22 But 
the changes show that power is not simply an oppressive 
force. Power, as Foucault argued, "transforms" (1980:92); 
"relations of power... have a directly productive role" 
(1980:94). This is true of those crystallised force 
relations embodied in the state apparatus, and of the less 
stable, non-institutionalised "moving substrate of force 
relations" (Foucault, 1980:93). Power is productive as 
well as repressive: "it produces things, it induces 
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It ... [is] 
a productive network which runs through the whole social 
body" (Foucault, 1972:61). 
Inviting Fou.cauldian analysis which avoids "a conception 
of power in terms of the terminal form it may assume" 
(Smart, 1985:136), Moloi's text explores some of the 
251 
diversity of structures in which power -- even in a racist 
police state like South Africa -- is exercised, and its 
positive, pleasure-inducing effects. 
The productive effects of forms of power are evinced in 
the fact that My Life 1S a Western-style narrative 
autobiography which shows no evidence of influence from 
traditional poetic, non-narrative zulu and Sotho 
au to / biographical texts. 23 My Life narrativizes the 
autobiographical subj ect' s desire in terms of hegemonic 
culture. It hierarchizes its discourses so that 
traditional discourses, such as worship of the ancestors 
(amadlozi) , deep and selfless respect for parents, 
functioning extended family networks, and other culturally 
inscribed norms, are marginalised. For instance, although 
Moloi's autobiographical subject at times invokes the 
ancestors' help, he more frequently prays to a Christian 
God (Moloi's father was an Anglican priest), and even more 
often seems sceptical of both of these belief systems, 
revealing a spirit of agnosticism that is in keeping with 
the characterization of himself as the sophisticated city 
slicker. The following exemplifies this well: 
One pitch-black night we went to steal from The 
African Moon, an American ship and for that reason a 
favourite target. When I was half way up the anchor 
rope to the deck, some devil wind came from nowhere 
and slowly swayed the ship to my side, sagging the 
rope with my weight dangling from it slowly into the 
dark drink. Waist deep, I was praying in the name of 
all gods and devils and holding for dear life to the 
rope. I don't know, between God and Satan, who swung 
the wind back in my favour as I slid back to the quay 
where my friend 'Pikinini' was waiting. (24) 
Moreover, while the protagonist is still part of an 
extended familial network, the links are clearly weak, and 
the narrator does not define himself in terms of these 
relationships. He lives at various times with his aunt, 
brother and cousin, but alcohol abuse and poverty place 
enormous strain on these relationships. (It 1S hard to 
imagine how anyone could be hospitable in a two-roomed 
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shack with no proper sanitation or even running water) . 
The narrator's isolated expressions of admiration for 
tribal traditions notwithstanding, Moloi recounts his 
experiences of traditional Zulu culture as if its practices 
are curiosities. For instance, his discussion of the 
prohibitions against women and men sitting on the same side 
of the hut, or drinking from the same vessel, concludes 
thus: 
So the big clay pot, ukhamba, would be stirred, sifted 
and tasted by the youngest. He would give to the 
elder next to the door. The elder would drink and 
pass the khamba to his neighbour, and so on across the 
hut until it reached the youngest. Then the youngest 
would again bring it to the elder next to the door. 
The same procedure was followed by the women on the 
other side, as they never drank from the same khamba 
as the men. Before long, somebody would start a song, 
and the rest would join in the harmony. You know 
those beautiful tunes the Zulus sing. (46-7) 
Again referring to "Zulu culture" (50) as an outsider 
would, the narrator describes the rules of courtship which 
serve to prevent male aggression and promiscuity. "How 
wonderful the world would be if we all behaved like that, 
especially in the townships" 
fantasy that he does not 
Moreover, Moloi's urban 
(50) he says, indulging in a 
really want to be part of. 
manners and American-style 
fashions, which are generally a source of intense pride, 
disqualify him from participation in traditional society. 
A woman with whom he attempts to flirt responds by 
dismissing him because his clothes make him look "like a 
woman" and his hands are "as soft as a child's" (56). He 
does not suffer much regret, however, for not having "their 
clothes and their beliefs" (57) because the anonymity of 
urban slums has its uses for Moloi: "town," he observes, 
"is the only place where one can hide one's disgraceful 
past" (51). 
Abandoning traditional Zulu and Sotho constructions of 
the self as an indivisible part of a community24 -- the 
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living community of extended family and tribal 
affiliations, as well as the community of those who have 
gone before, the ancestors25 -- Moloi' s egoistic hero is 
presented as "a self-made man" (3) (as S. 'Teacher' Masebe, 
the author of the Introduction says). He is an ambitious 
individual, battling against enormous difficulties such as 
poverty-induced crime and the lack of legitimate employment 
opportunities above the unskilled and semi-skilled levels. 
The autobiographical subject is presented as a picaresque 
hero whose rejection of traditional "country ways" serves 
as the principle narrative structuring device. That is to 
say, the country vs. city theme informs the hero's 
maturation process and also the plot, which traces his 
experiences from his familial country roots in rural Natal 
to his acquisition, at the conclusion of the narrative, of 
a permit to rent a house in Johannesburg. 
The narrative begins with an implied question regarding 
the hero's identity. The first chapter is entitled: "'I 
Thought You Were Just a Farm Boy'". The speaker, Acme 
Hlatshwayo, is, as the past tense of his utterance implies, 
mistaken. The rest of the text proves the extent of the 
error, and concludes with a heavily ironic reconsideration 
of this proposition. My Life, then, in terms of its 
central problematic of self-definition, rejects traditional 
rural culture, and the narrator not infrequently refers to 
these country folk pej orati vely as "country bums" (92), 
" moegoes " and "sqazas" (136), which may be roughly 
translated as hicks and barbarians. Interestingly, Fanon's 
observation that the antagonisms between country people and 
urban dwellers "is the antagonism which exists between the 
native who is excluded from the advantages of colonialism 
and his counterpart who manages to turn colonial 





(1973:89) is most apt. It is 
colonial exploitation to his 
the implied disdain for 
traditionalists who, the narrator feels, are never able to 
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rise above their status as unsophisticated, uneducated 
pawns. It is widely agreed that conventional narrative 
solutions may b~ prescriptive as well as descriptive, and 
this is certainly-!he case in My Life for it is_ apparen~ 
that the narrator expects the reader to concur with him in -- ---
his dismissal of what he perceives to be peasant culture. ~ 
But how is rejection of tradition to be construed as 
positive and productive? My Life endorses a lifestyle 
which is a hybrid of various South African discourses as 
well as the dominant discourse of popular American culture, 
born out of the narrator's desire to be identified as a 
superior, urban sophisticate. For instance, illustrating 
Foucault's point that the hegemonic culture is not only 
repressive, but traverses lives and induces pleasures, the 
autobiographical subject models himself on an idle idol, 
"Mr Soweto": 
He chose his dress and his cars well. He was no 
councillor, no shopkeeper, no manager. He was just 
nobody but Elijah Msibi.... Many people have 
forgotten about Msibi ... but this might remind them to 
go back and scrutinize his past deeds and see just how 
worthwhile he was. He used to drive around in his 
beautiful red Impala convertible, immaculately dressed 
in his favourite Stetson shoes and hat (sometimes a 
straw hat took its place), with a pole of a cigar in 
his mouth. (116-7) 
Apparently, all Mr Msibi did to earn this respect was to 
dress stylishly, be generous with his liquor, have smart 
cars and avoid getting his hands dirty in any lawful 
employment. Emulating Mr Msibi, the narrator carefully 
describes his own modish clothing, which generally conforms 
to contemporary American fashions. 
The effect of the narrative's desire is seductive: 
Moloi's tale of the first 30 years of his life enthrals 
because it is entertaining, evoking as it does in 
indigenized form the glamour and thrills of early 
Hollywood adventure movies. This new world, emerging out 
of the destruction of traditional communities, is, however, 
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a crazed world in which fantasy and adventure collide with 
racist oppression; a world in which husbands and wives may 
not live together, a world of cardboard and tin shacks, of 
an illegal-liquor industry born out of poverty and racially 
differentiated liquor laws, of the "Pass" whose efficacy 
was ensured by the regular police raids which Moloi 
describes as, "the most terrible thing ever created by man 
against man" (66) . It is a world in which racial 
classification is a prime determinant of criminality: 
I have lived my life in the worst of times, when 
almost anything you did was a crime. You would get 
arrested just for being found drinking your own home 
brew -- and if it was white liquor you were really in 
trouble. Being found smelling of liquor, being 
without an I.D. document, being drunk no matter where, 
sometimes for having cutlery in your house ('dangerous 
weapons'), never mind not having a job -- you were 
always being found guilty. . .. So all in all life was 
but a vicious circle. Today I really wonder how 
people, including me, existed under such inhuman 
conditions. (117-8) 
This is a world in which even the most innocent activity 
is characterised by extreme violence. The narrator 
confides his greatest fear in the final pages, without any 
apparent awareness of what for most people would seem to be 
a strange terror in response to an apparently trivial act: 
All this time I had a continuous worry on my mind. I 
had been haunted by it since marriage. I always 
prayed my God to take me through that age and help me 
not to be forced by circumstances to travel in trains 
with my wife. This was because I had witnessed some 
barbaric acts by tsotsis [gangsters] travelling on 
these trains. They wouldn't hesitate to molest a girl 
while in the company of her boy-friend. They would 
mercilessly beat her up or even stab her if she tried 
to resist, while telling the boyfriend to shut up and 
mind his own if he treasured his life. They would 
take the poor girl away forcibly while the poor boy-
friend watched helplessly. 
This I prayed should never come my way.... I 
prayed if ever it did I would know that my God never 
intended me to see my thirties, as that would have to 
be the day that I died. (219-20) 
Repeatedly expressing his desire to avoid gangsterism and 
violence, the hero nevertheless consistently engages in 
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acts of brutality because in this world heroes are those 
who surVlve. The narrative is punctuated with the 
narrator's constant reminders that acquaintances have died 
since the narrated events had occurred; for instance, of 
"McKay Davashe, Kippie Moeketsi, Mzala Lepere, Willie 
Malang, Grey Mbawe, and ... General Duze" all except one are 
dead (78) and of his band of eleven "most ... are no more in 
this world" (175). The "brave new world" which emerges out 
of the devastations of apartheid is one in which the bully 
rules, be he the white racist or the black thug. The 
autobiographical hero robs and loots; he stabs a pickpocket 
several times in his quest to rid the world of such 
criminals, without confronting the irony of his own 
pickpocketing career (209). He savagely attacks unarmed 
men (even a sleeping man), shoots the wrong man (and 
expresses no regret), and he beats up women. And yet he 
manages to pardon all of this because it is part of a racy 
movie-like adventure. 
It is important to note that Moloi's hero is, and could 
only be, a man. Jelinek aptly observes that the 
construction of their lives 
as heroic seems to be a male literary tradition. The 
proclivity of men toward embellishing their 
autobiographies results in the projection of a self-
image of confidence, no matter what difficulties they 
may have encountered. (1980:15) 
While there are texts by both women and men which do not 
conform to Jelinek's observations about gendered writing 
(Makhoere's and Breytenbach's, for instance) Moloi's text 
does. My Life obviously positions the subject in terms of 
this gendered aggrandizement. The narrative demonstrates 
what a psychologist has recently found in empirical studies 
in Natal townships, a link between violence and a "more 
general crisis in masculinity" (Campbell, 1992: 617 -8) . 
Catherine Campbell has found that "the ability of men to 
control women ... and the use of violence to ensure this 
control, is one area where the power of working-class men 
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has not been threatened by a racial capitalist society" 
(625-6). Moloi's autobiography demonstrates the collapse, 
in urban ghettos, of traditional patriarchy into a much 
more virulent sexism (Luthuli argues that this is yet 
another negative effect of white domination (171)), 
authorised by reference to American male 'action' movies. 
The protagonist's attempts (referred to earlier) to woo a 
non-Christian Zulu woman are met with scornful rejection: 
"You mean that this ridiculous guy can make a man, to me? 
Look at his clothes! He looks like a woman .... You get 
away from here. I told you, I'm not your class!" (56). 
Township women, on the other hand, and even rural women 
where social norms have been eroded by contact with 
Europeans ways, are easy prey for Moloi and other men. 
When he finds a girlfriend kissing a man he perceives as 
his enemy he beats the man up, and then glves his 
girlfriend "the beating of her life" (58). The hero of MY 
Life achieves his status as hero in specifically 
stereotypical masculine pursuits: womanizing, hard drinking 
and acts of physical bravado, including extreme violence. 
The hero's status is secured through mUltiple discourses: 
traditional Zulu/Sotho patriarchy, Western style sexism, 
and, most importantly, through the discourses of macho 
American fantasy. 
Just as it attempts to negotiate incompatible cultures 
and value systems, My Life is a wonderful example of 
linguistic metissage (pace Lionnet, 1989). Mixed In 
amongst the Zulu, Sotho, Afrikaans and tsotsi-taal 
(township slang) terms -- which, incidentally, are often 
unexplained, thus implying a black South African reader 
Mol o i's autobiography liberally employs American slang of 
the period. Women, for example, are referred to as "dames" 
(99), "dolls" (28) and "molls" (73) i men are "guys" (56) or 
-- if they're enemies "bums" (57) i police are "cops" 
(31), liquor is "booze" (48) which is purchased from a 
"joint" (122); a pianist is "good at the ivories" (99). 
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One of many fights is described thus: "I... bashed [my 
opponent] twice with my dome, bending his grazers in .... 
Then I flattened his protruding proboscis with my ham 
digging right. He hit the deck with his bum ... " (93). 
Americanisms exist not only at the level of express lon, 
for My Life has the structure of a comic movie: complete 
mini-narratives, often humorous, frequently described as 
"scenes" or "shows", are linked together by a narrator who 
very often positions himself as movie director. The 
autobiographical subject in these instances is more than 
hero; as director he appropriates a greater form of 
compensatory power by placing himself in a position of 
control. This is how the narrator describes the violence 
which erupted at the Communal Hall where his band was 
performing: 
It was exactly fifteen minutes to midnight ... when I 
saw some manoeuvres at the door.... My God, the 
Plantation Spoilers [a gang] had arrived. 
They burst through that door and left it wide open. 
There were loud screams and yells as people ran 
towards the stage. I could see the flashes of their 
long blades reflecting from the hall lights.... The 
women were screaming, the sweat was smelling, people 
were running around like rats.... This was some 
scene, surely the Spoilers had arrived.... This was 
action at its best .... 
There were screams, yells and blood allover .... 
The Spoilers were allover the hall.... A shot 
exploded and echoed across the hall. I saw Sika do 
some kind of tango; he had stopped a slug with his 
bum .... Dululu was now alone in the centre of the 
hall, swinging his gun from one hand to the other .... 
I realized nobody wanted to hurt me as people were 
passing me on all angles. This meant I had a good 
chance to be both director and spectator of the whole 
show. (179-183} 26 
The narrator takes a similar view of his experiences in 
prison (for unlawful possession of a firearm): 
I feel unable to put down in words on this paper what 
this scene looked like. But vividly I still remember. 
To start with, there were over a thousand men involved 
in this [dam-building project]. There were warders, 
specials, oxen, tractors, wheelbarrows, mules, 
shovels, picks, spades, blou and wit baadjies (long 
and short term prisoners) . So just imagine rolling 
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sound, clapping slate and calling action on all this! 
What a scene. (147) 
And the autobiography's conclusion tantalisingly evokes the 
movie or T.V. serial convention of hinting at the themes of 
"the next exciting episode": 
A new episode was about to begin. But will those 
knives, guns and goals be things of the past or will 
the whole past follow me into my brand new home? 
This was the inscription on the wall for Godfrey 
the f arm boy. ( 221 ) 
"[I]dentity is a strategy" (Teresa .de Lauretis, cited by 
Lionnet, 1989:8), and Moloi's strategy of according 
Hollywood movies the position of dominant discourse, 
enables the narrator to derive pleasure from an existence 
fraught with hardship and danger: he is constituted as the 
hero or director who transcends all obstacles. His 
unprincipled acts of gangsterism are interpreted from 
wi thin a discursive practice which applauds the hero's 
behaviour, just as long as he remains the hero. He is 
often portrayed as a kind of movie star who strikes poses, 
a township Humphrey Bogart. (The description comes from S. 
Teacher Masebe's Introduction, 1). So successful is the 
movie-illusion, that the reader has frequently to remind 
herself that the narrator is not simply recounting 
fantastic adventures but is presenting us with a document 
which purports to record "the truth about this me called 
Godfrey" (4) . 27 The point is that these sword-hero movies 
and Westerns (and, less centrally, popular American music 
of the time) do not simply serve to enliven the narrative; 
they inform the narrative, inducing pleasure, forming 
knowledge, producing discourse (precisely as Foucault 
argued) 
township. 
the crazy hybridized discourse of the black 
Movie illusion is not simply the ideal to which the 
narrative aspires; it is the transcendent reality against 
which experience is measured. The perils of bootlegging 
provide opportunities for movie - like adventures: 
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[The cops] knew our little black Prefect cars v~ry 
well by sight and they used to chase us around llke 
rats in that maze of a township whenever they spotted 
us. This called for fast thinking and real mad movie 
driving. (203-4) 
One police chase concludes successfully for the hero when 
he "disappeared into the wild west" (205) . The 
protagonist's departure from his aunt's horne (to escape 
from the cruel beatings of his drunken cousin) is described 
as his "escape from Alcatraz" (8). Blood is compared to 
tomato sauce (instead of the other way round) (30). Gang 
violence, even when the hero is a victim, is accepted if it 
reminds him of the movies. Once, when his band 1S 
performing, a gang breaks in "to rob those few pennies from 
the takings": 
All of a sudden hell broke loose. . .. I tried to reach 
the door but somebody punched me on the nose and I 
bled the same instant.... I found the wall and 
flattened myself as much as I could against it while 
those running in circles in the middle of the hut got 
the worst of it from the thugs and those trying to 
defend themselves.... Pharaoh didn't stand high in 
my estimation, but on the other hand I had enjoyed 
what happened. It reminded me of some of the Westerns 
I'd seen. ( 53 - 4 ) 
Crucially, movie discourse is not simply idiosyncratic: 
Moloi's friends give themselves movie hero names like 
Scaramouche (75), "Zachariah 'Satch' Lepele" (112), and 
"Zorro" (151); township bands take names like the "Jazz 
Maniacs, the Harlem Swingsters" (110), the "Ink Spots ... , 
the Manhattan Stars, the Manhattan Bros, and the Broadway 
Bros" (111). Providing a structure in which subjects can 
function, weaving through the gaps of crumbling traditional 
cu1 tures, Hollywood comes to Soweto many decades before 
Whoopi Goldberg. 28 
The broader social implications of American movie fantasy 
lie in the fact that 
[e]very text is an articulation of the relations 
between texts, a product of intertextuality, a weaving 
together of what has already been produced elsewhere 
in discontinuous form; every subject, every author, 
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every self is the articulation of an intersubjectivity 
structured within and around the discourses available 
to it at any moment in time. (Sprinker, 1980:325) 
Like all texts, My Life is the result of "systematic change 
and exchange" (Lionnet, 1989:16), the product of the 
intersection of a number of discourses which are" locked in 
an intricate web of practices, bearing in mind that every 
practice is by definition both discursive and material" 
(Henriques et al, 1984:106). Demonstrating "the relational 
character of [the] mutual effects" of the social and the 
subject (Henriques et aI, 1984:21), Moloi's autobiography 
shows that the radical social changes wrought by racist 
oppression have resulted in profound and often unexpected 
changes in the ways that subjects are positioned. My Life 
illustrates what Jameson argues is a feature of fundamental 
social change in a class-based social formation: 
the real notion of a proletarian revolution involves 
not some minor adjustment of social relations but a 
conflagration of forms, of modes of being, of 
individuality and experience as such so total as to be 
literally unimaginable to the bourgeois mind. 2 9 The 
bourgeois fears mob violence, rape, the clubbing to 
death of his children, the rampage through the 
museum. .. and yet these are only dim figures of a 
revolution in which bourgeois consciousness itself 
will become extinct. (Dowling, 1984:117) 
My Life appropriates the freedom to interpret the self and 
experience in terms that are quite foreign to the culture 
of the white Afrikaner overlords; it creates, out of 
"frames of reference [which] are cultural worlds apart" 
(Lionnet, 1989: 21-2) , a self which defies the vast 
machinery of the white supremacist state to crush all sense 
of self-worth in black South Africans. Even though Moloi 
does not explicitly position himself as an opponent of the 
apartheid state, 30 he survives and defies the State's 
positioning of him as victim. As an instance of the 
"conquest over meaning and the contest over the power to 
name the real" (Nussbaum, 1989:xxi), My Life demonstrates 
that although white Afrikaner culture has been the obvious 
oppressor in South Africa, the discourses of American 
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movies have proven in Moloi's case at least -- to be 
stronger, the truly hegemonic discourse. 
***** 
We might agree that Moloi's autobiography demonstrates a 
refusal to resist the State that could seem tantamount to 
collaboration, nevertheless I hope to have demonstrated 
that Moloi's text illustrates a significant, and 
politically subversive, shift in textual production and 
power. My Life is an event and 
[a]n event .. . is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or 
a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of 
forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of 
a vocabulary turned against those who had once used 
it ... the entry of a masked 'other.' (Foucault, 
1984:88) 
In his deployment of discourses which specifically excluded 
oppressed peoples like the colonised black masses, Moloi 
appropriates the position of popular hero wi thin those 
discourses. 
Another trans formative autobiography but 
trans formative in terms of generic configurations and 
gender positioning is Lyndall Gordon's Shared Lives. 
While Moloi shores up masculinist discourses by weaving 
together a diverse range of discourses and carefully 
hierarchizing these, Gordon prizes open the authoritarian 
structures of Western biography and autobiography in order 
to interrogate (specific) women's experience. Nussbaum 
reminds us that modifications and transformations in 
writing such as we find in My Life and Shared Lives 
"disrupt old narrative codes or locate new ones as the 
texts strain to make currently available narrative 
models ... stretch to 'represent' new kinds of consciousness 
and experience " (1989: xiii) . 
Gordon's title is telling : her text explores the fluidity 
of boundaries of self and other, the seepage of one life 
into another, the possibilities of autobiography permeating 
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the biography. Shared Lives probes these realities, thus 
practising the politics of her feminism which strives for 
collaboration, co-operation , between women. Stretching 
biography to incorporate autobiography, stretching 
authorship beyond · the confines of the authorizing name, 
Gordon constantly reshapes existing narrative models so 
that the myths of individual autonomy are made to make way 
for "new kinds of consciousness and awareness". Gordon 
sets out to write the biography of three friends of her 
youth in Cape Town who have since died. But she finds that 
to be true to the intent of biography and to the memories 
she has of Flora (Romy, as she comes later to be called), 
Ellie and Rose, she has to write autobiographically, 
positioning them in her life and positioning herself in the 
narrative of their lives, thereby refusing the illusions of 
narratorial objectivity . Since her own knowledge is 
limited, and -- by her own admission -- biased, she turns 
to a host of other friends, and absorbs their musings into 
her tale. In my analysis of Gordon's book, my interest is 
(as, according to Dowling , is Jameson's) "in the cultural 
artifact as the symbolic resolution of a real 
contradiction, an attempt to resolve on an imaginary level 
the intolerability of a lived dilemma" (Dowling, 1984: 119) . 
The "real dilemma" concerns the gender positioning in a 
variety of specific social circumstances, ranging from Cape 
Town's Jewish community to the academic circles of New York 
and Oxford, of the living subject as well as of the 
textually constructed autobiographical subj ect. Gender 
imperatives are largely responsible for the intolerable 
tensions, but it is in gender, too, that their resolution 
is found. For it is in her creative exploration of the 
promise and potentiality of women's (diverse) experience, 
that Gordon is able to symbolically resolve at textual 
level the oppressive imperatives that she confronts as a 
woman. 
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Interestingly, both Moloi and Gordon achieve a measure of 
resolution for their v ery different circumstances by 
e xploring gender-specific possibilities for the 
constitution of the textual self. In both instances, these 
gendered discourses stru cture the texts, providing 
narrativ e intertexts which, while not erasing 
contradictions (contradictions can never be eradicated), 
construct subj ect positions which make dissonances more 
tolerable. Perhaps I should say that I did not set out to 
choose for this chapter on textuali ty two texts which 
foreground issues of gender ; rather, what happened was that 
in choosing two texts which treat the problems of life-
writing in innovative and , I believe, important ways, I 
stumbled upon the fact that in both instances the textual 
solutions (and problems) were indivisible from the problems 
(and solutions) of gender . Moloi 's hero resolves the 
dilemmas of racist oppression which has been shown by 
many (e.g. Catherine Campbell) to be an emasculating force 
-- by recasting experience in terms of popular American 
masculinist myths. Moloi 's autobiographical hero could 
only be masculine. Gordon's Shared Lives establishes 
itself as a woman's text: it makes gender more than a 
concern at the level of content by locating gender vas the 
key in-forming concern of the text. It 1S this 
intersection of gender and genre in Shared Lives which I 
shall now expl ore . 
Since this brings us to the debate regarding gender and 
genre, I shal l i ndicate, at the outset, my own position on 
this question. I do not support the generalized claims 
that gender i nf l ec ts writing of men and women in ways that 
are predictab l beyond national, linguistic, class, race 
and historica l i i fferences . While I am not sure that this 
is precisely ·I·;~d t those adherents to notions of gendered 
characterist i c~ I n autobiographical writing are arguing, it 
would seem t hd ~ t he generalizations of many critics like 
Mary Mason dbout the implications of gender for 
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autobiography are not sufficiently qualified. Jelinek, for 
instance, contends that there is "a literary tradition in 
which women write autobiography that is different from that 
by men" (1980, xi-xii). She argues that women's 
autobiographies, unlike men's, 
rarely mirror the establishment history of their 
times. They emphasize to a much lesser extent the 
public aspects of their lives, the affairs of the 
world, or even their careers, and concentrate instead 
on their personal lives -- domestic details, family 
difficulties .... (1980:7-8) 
I have not found this to be generally valid in the texts 
that I have studied; in some instances, the differences 
between women's autobiographical texts (like Ruth Gordon's 
and Ruth First's) and between men's (for example, 
Breytenbach's and Lekota's), 
more obvious than the 
seem to me to be greater and 
differences between the 
autobiographical texts of representatives of the different 
genders. Al though there are differences between some 
women's writing and some men's which conform to the general 
trends delineated by Jelinek, there are also many texts 
which do not conform. Consider, for instance, my 
discussion in the prevl0us chapter of Luthuli's 
autobiography: much of the analysis is structured around 
Spacks's argument concerning the characteristics of women's 
• 
autobiographical writing. Self-effacement, subordination 
of self to a cause, and denial of emotional response to the 
autobiographer's own public importance: all of these 
features which Spacks finds to be distinctive features of 
women's autobiography, are manifest in Luthuli' s Let my 
People Go. Thus although women and men might compose 
contrasting autobiographies, different in respects which 
may reinforce our expectations of their gendered 
experiences, such gender differences are not predictable 
and, in South African writing of the last 46 years, are not 
even the norm. Anticipated gendered norms are not defining 
characteristics, linked without exception to the biological 
sex of the autobiographer. What is predictable is that in 
life women and men (in all race, class, and ethnic 
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categories) will be differentially interpellated, and will 
be expected to speak from different subj ect positions. 
Some women and men may refuse their positioning, or their 
gender positions may be subordinated to other, conflicting 
discourses. One could therefore perhaps argue that an 
apologetic, humble subject in a black man's autobiography 
is due to the discourse of racism, which undermines the 
discourse of patriarchy. (I think that this is only partly 
the case for Luthuli: I think that his position as a 
Christian has far greater impact) So while there are 
women's autobiographies which conform to gendered 
expectations (Kuzwayo's and Mary Benson's are examples), a 
woman like Ruth Gordon writes an autobiography which 
posi tions the autobiographical subj ect as authoritarian 
centre and the narrative is largely a record of her public 
life. Cornell, Campbell and Alan Paton write in terms of 
a masculine tradition of selfhood, whereas Breytenbach's 
autobiographies explore the inner life, and chart the 
inconclusiveness of self and experience (as women's 
autobiographical writing often does). So although the 
gender differences are particularly insistent in Moloi's 
and Lyndall Gordon's texts, this is not to argue that such 
gender differences are normative. 
Gender discourses, like other discursive systems by which 
individuals are interpellated, are neither monologic nor 
consistent. And these gender discourses are always in 
concert with a host of other discursive systems, their 
relations being fluid, constantly in flux, corning to the 
fore. and receding in the course of time. This applies both 
to lived experience as well as to text. Speech or 
discourse always implies a dialogue, as we have learnt from 







has been referred to 
a hegemonic discourse 
suppresses or marginalizes all antagonistic class voices 
(and of course, one can broaden the application of this 
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beyond class), it nevertheless remains locked into a 
dialogue with the discourse it has suppressed (1984:131). 
Thus gender discourses are multifaceted, not only being in 
conversation, so to speak, with other discourses but also 
with other perhaps contrary gender discourses. 
Shared Lives responds to the repressed oppositional voices 
within patriarchal discourse. At times the dialogue breaks 
the narrative surface and narratorial opposition is made 
explicit. A particularly moving example of this comes when 
Gordon recounts her experiences as a young wife and 
expectant mother in New York: authoritarian male doctors 
dictate brutal conditions for childbirth, with "the woman's 
hands ... tied down, a general anaesthetic administered, and 
the baby delivered with forceps" (1992: 147) . Pregnancy 
disqualifies a woman from study or indeed from others' 
consideration of her as a thinking individual: Gordon's 
husband's professor disapproves of her plans to study, and 
advises, '" You should stay at home with your baby. . .. And 
your husband, too, working long days and nights, giving his 
all as a man of science, will depend on you for unselfish 
support'" (148). But the narrative shows repeatedly that 
men are not the only purveyors of these patriarchal myths. 
Gordon finds that most women she encounters collude with 
the patriarchal myth of Mother Nature and pain-free, 
natural childbirth, and when she is unable to act the part 
she can only adjudge herself to be a failure, rather than 
questioning -- as the narrator later does -- the validity 
of the popular, hegemonic, version. It 1S the animal-like 
scream that tears unwittingly from her during labour that 
"seemed to break open the facades of social existence" to 
reveal the "truth" (150), a truth that 1S so unbearably 
cruel, so vastly at odds with all she had been led to 
expect from womanhood , that confronting it causes her to 
sink into deep depression. 
The narrator/protagonist is able to escape the 
depression, not with the aid of male-dominated medicine's 
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brutal shock treatments, but with the help of her woman 
friends, principally Romy (also known as Fruma and Flora) , 
the central subject of Gordon's biography. Gordon had been 
raised in a very closed Jewish community in Cape Town. Her 
friends from her school-days, Romy, Ellie, Rose, Phillippa, 
and Linn, are crucial to her developing sense of self. But 
of greatest importance is Romy. Years later, when Gordon's 
severe post-natal depression only worsens in response to 
conventional medicine, so that a spell in an asylum for the 
insane is prescribed, it is Romy who responds to her plight 
by flying from South Africa to New York to rescue her 
friend by restoring to her a self that she could believe 
in. 
Then, late one night at the end of January, Romy came: 
a saviour in high tan boots, with streaming red hair 
framed in a white bonnet, alighting at Kennedy 
Airport, tired from her flight but bent on 
transformation. She had feared, she said, 'the 
worst', and her shock came out in a burst of tears. 
So she gave me back that person. She brought letters 
from Ellie and Phillippa which addressed that 
forgotten beingi . . . and best of all, she challenged 
the fiction of illness, in words I could not have 
dared to say. (153) 
Gordon transcends the limits of gender straightjacketsi 
her struggle against the master narratives of male hegemony 
leads her to a threshold of truth, a truth that she can 
weave into her own rewriting of the already wri t ten. 
Gordon's battle leads her to exceed the frontiers of genre 
in her exploration of what it meant to be a young woman 
thirty or so years ago. The creative extension of the 
parameters of biography and autobiography are very much 
part of her project to probe the significances of lived, 
and rigidly gendered, experience. 
Gordon explicitly sets out to write biography: "This book 
is [Flora' s/Romy' s] biography, as exact as if she had 
public importance on the stage of history" (1). She writes 
too of Ellie and Rose, part of the same group of friends. 
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What motivates her to write is the fact that all three have 
died as young women . Gordon insists that her story is 
"life, not fiction. It will be an authentic record of a 
group of women who met in 1954 at the age of twelve at a 
girls' school" (3). But she finds that conventional 
biography is i nsufficiently plastic to respond to the 
indefinable, t h e interstices of being: 
Absorbed by the lives of the obscure, George Eliot was 
alert to 'that roar which lies on the other side of 
silence' . To hear that roar of the inward lives of 
each of these women requires a freedom to push 
biography beyond its standard form. It could be easy 
to piece together the usual narrative of dates, 
events, and facts, leading to affecting scenes of 
tragic finality. But the stories of these women 
[Flora, Ellie and Rose] cannot be told with the linear 
simplicity of the dessert-course romances of Myra and 
Linn. For the lives of Flora, Rosie, and Ellie were 
more buried, more disturbed by talent, and rooted in 
aspects of womanhood , that remain, as yet, undefined. 
They need more time, more delicate sifting of fact, 
more searching of what remains unknown in women's 
lives. . . . (38) 
The narrator cannot write conventional biography because 
the truths about the subjects that she wishes to explore 
simply cannot be accommodated in conventional forms. The 
genre, the typical biography, simply cannot interrogate, 
the fluid adjustments of character (often mistaken for 
female capriciousness) i the almost bodily need for the 
language o f response (often mistaken for female 
vanity) i and, strangest of all, the close-guarded, 
comic fixity of the stale roles that girls of the 50s 
chose to pl ay -- games of compliance that carried, 
already, some element of amused, spectatorial 
detachmen t . . . . ( 38) 
The text, t hen, redefines the kinds of feminine 
experience tha t t he narrator and her friends shared in the 
close-knit Ca pe Town Jewish community. Insisting that 
patriarchal gements are "mistaken" , the narrator 
undertakes t o '« p lore fluid forms of experience in fluid 
narrative form~. Confronting the insistent questions which 
cannot be a n ",,'e r ed (and which perhaps cannot even be 
clearly artic~:a t ed), the narrator weaves into her story 
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the silences and dark places which have to be acknowledged 
if an attempt is to be made to strain towards the truth, a 
little more truth. Of Rose she has to conclude: 
To ask which was the real Rose was, of course, the 
wrong question. For her triumph was a form of 
contrivance that would leave the essential behind: 
that Rose I had known, long ago, without makeup, who 
had dared to think at Good Hope and written essays of 
ambitious brilliance. When we met, once in '67 in [a] 
dark, empty coffee-bar on a late afternoon in 
Johannesburg and once in '69 in her serene, baby-
filled home, she was - - serious . That is all: her 
triumph is to defeat the presumptions of the 
biographer. (210) 
Of Flora, or Romy, as she came later to be called, her 
task as biographer is eaSler; she is more able to delineate 
a character in keeping with the conventions of biography. 
But even with Flora, the mysteries of existence become part 
of what the biographer must concede is what makes the 
'character' a person. Repeatedly, we are told that Romy 
"found herself" (230) in Paris; but even while the narrator 
appears to share this opinion she accepts that such 
certainty is a fiction: 
She found herself, he said. But what, I wondered, did 
she find? Was it what she had always moved towards : 
being, not doing, not that absurd busy-ness that 
protects the rest of us from confronting our void? 
Was it Lewis Carroll who said that the achievement of 
living is the formation of character? If so, Romy and 
other unknowns had their achievements that are not 
measurable in public terms. (230) 
Since biography is a public genre, a publishable record 
of lives, Gordon has to redefine the genre so that the 
"public terms" of biography are split apart to expose in 
part at least the shadows and illuminations of private and 
often wordless experience. 
How do we divine the language of the sigh or the 
scream or that state of pure happiness that we called, 
delightedly, 'hysteria'? There will be, I thought, no 
path to follow. There will be no easy truth. It will 
be an imaginary meeting of divided halves: the 
biographer and the subject, the living and the dead. 
There is no essential truth and no end to truth. 
Biographic objectivity is an illusion: that voluminous 
271 
'Definitive Life' favoured by publishers is but a 
shell. For the only approach to a living truth is, on 
the basis of fact, to imagine the life -- which is to 
take it to the border of fiction. (251) 
Ultimately, Romy, Rose and Ellie cannot be explained; they 
have to remain, in the words of Barthes, subjects wandering 
in search of their final predicates. In her confrontation 
with the limits of the genres of biography and 
autobiography, Gordon finds that neither the subjects of 
the story nor the narrating subj ect can be known. Like 
Barthes, Gordon seems to acknowledge im-possibilities of 
knowing and being: 
Do I not know that, in the field of the subject, there 
is no referent? .. I myself am my own symbol, I am 
the story which happens to me: freewheeling in 
language, I have nothing to compare myself to; and in 
this movement, the pronoun of the imaginary, "I," is 
im-pertinent; the symbolic becomes literally 
immediate .... (Barthes, 1977a:56) 
As the discussion in the preceding chapter has indicated, 
photographs in autobiography and biography usually provide 
clear visual 'proof' for the text, functioning as 
adj ecti val paradigms; however, the illustrative photographs 
in Shared Lives deviate from this norm, serving instead to 
add to the enigmas of the narrative, reinforcing the sense 
that identity cannot be contained -- either verbally or in 
pictorial images. The photographs in Shared Lives do not 
function as solutions; rather their blurred outlines and 
averted gazes increase our realization that clarity of 
defini tion, that knowing the Other, is illusory. The 
exception to this rule, the photograph of the author on the 
back fly-leaf (presumably chosen by the publishers), proves 
the point. All the other photographs which illustrate each 
chapter, and also the cover photograph, are either blurred, 
or the subjects' eyes look away, withholding their meaning. 
One source of indeterminateness is the dissimilarity of the 
lmages where one person features ln more than one 
photograph. For instance, the indistinct lmages of 
Lyndall, Flora and Rosie in the school photograph cannot be 
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likened to the images of these women which appear 
elsewhere. And where there is more than one person 1n a 
photograph, as in the one of the group of schoolgirls 
(Chapter 3 ) or in the image of Romy and Lyndall Gordon on 
the beach (Chapter 8) , it 1S difficult to discern the 
identities of the people. One cannot immediately ascertain 
which is which. 
In part the obscurity is because the captions are 
separated from the photographs (they precede the text 
proper), but also because the narrative text (with only one 
exception, viz. Chapter 2) does not comment on the images 
depicted in the photographs. And perhaps most 
disconcerting is the fact that very often the visual image 
contradicts the characterisation constructed in the verbal 
text. This is most striking in the case of Flora/Romy, the 
most important character in the biography, who is portrayed 
as spontaneous, confident and warm and yet she appears, in 
the photograph of her at her graduation (Gordon, 1992:108), 
as submissive, compliant, self-effacing, and in the 
photograph of her at the beach (136), as uncertain, 
quizzical, seemingly wondering why the photographer wants 
the photograph of her at all. There is no evidence of bold 
vivacity in any of the photographs of Romy. Furthermore, 
the photographs seem to disrupt narrative certainties 
because they do not represent only those who are central to 
the narrative: both Phillippa and Rosie Kunene are rather 
marginal figures in the story; their importance lies in 
their contributions to the composition of the story, yet 
their photographs have no less status than do those of Romy 
or Ellie or Lyndall. And one wonders why the only 
photograph of Rose which has some clarity (given the 
distortions of the dramatic shadows and lights caused by 
the footlights) depicts her in costume, on stage, in a play 
which apparently has little significance in terms of the 
story of Rose's life. 
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The photographs, then, are not clues to a kind of 
certainty, pieces in a puzzle, either verbal or visual. 
Even on repeated reading of this text the photographs evade 
comprehension, reinforcing indeed, illustrating too --
the text's insistence that we can only reach toward truth; 
there is no arriving. Just as Romy and Ellie in the cover 
photograph demonstrate, truths are secrets that can be 
shared only between the special few: Romy's face is almost 
entirely obscured by her hand and Ellie's mouth is hidden. 
It is the earnestness of the gaze (a gaze we can only 
imagine since we cannot see Romy's eyes) which conveys a 
profound sharing from which we are deliberately excluded. 
Shared Lives is a testimony to the failure of fact to 
locate truth; it is a testimony to the power of 
imagination, not only in the creative process but in life. 
It is the "imagined challenge" (153) that she finds in 
Virgil which initiates the healing process, helping Gordon 
to begin to break out of her deep post-natal depression 
mentioned earlier (as ten sessions of shock treatment 
failed to do), "each sixty lines of translation for the 
following class were the first, hesitating steps of a 
return to the living" (153). It is a healing to which Romy 
contributes significantly by interpellating, "hailing" as 
Althusser has it, the Lyndall who had, 1n her youth, 
believed more completely in her own potential. And it is 
with gratitude that Gordon recalls the forcefulness of 
Romy's imaginative recreation of her friends, her inventive 
shaping of their being and lives. 
Could any act of reciprocity give back to Romy what 
she did for me? She invented her friends, made us up, 
endowed us with qualities that were congenial to her. 
This was the source of her attraction. She gave to 
each what each most needed. . .. All of us she urged to 
play our parts in character. (1992:250-1) 
The biographer acknowledges her debt to her subject, the 
Romy of the past, the Romy who, even though she had died 
suddenly in 1976, cannot die: Gordon finds that she 1S more 
fully a creation of her subject than her subject is of her: 
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In September 1988 ... I talked to 'Romy' rather than 
'Flora', a person o f my own age, who could look back 
from the same point at the life she had helped to 
shape: 
But for you, Romy , I would not have been a candidate 
for the mated existence; I would have been, for a long 
time, a subject of family conclaves (which they would 
have enjoyed) about my appearance and manner.... I 
should have been , according to family prediction, a 
Miss Prim of a nursery teacher, waiting around, after 
friends had married, for some second-rate husband who 
would have me. (1992: 2 63 - 4) 
Finding that what she is not defines what she is, and also 
that absence defines presence, Gordon rediscovers in the 
writing process her friends, especially Romy, who have long 
since died. "This was no ordinary biographical research; 
it was the renewing of bonds which was, to Romy, the 
essential act of life" (276). 
The book concludes with another 'meeting' between the 
author and the spirit or memory of Romy, this time in Paris 
in 1990, 14 years after she had died. 
As I met this Romy, who had been distant in her last 
years, I let Winston [Romy's husband] press on, again, 
towards Notre-Dame. I stood on the bridge, and the 
music swelled and carried her forward buoyant in the 
mild sun, her reckless past the scream, the 
virginal frenzy, the broken wedding -- contained by 
the graces of Paris. The speaker dimmed, swelled 
again, and -- suddenly -- she came close, hiccupping 
with laughter, laughing wildly as she did at school, 
shaking b a c k her red curls. It was for this that I 
came to Par is, without knowing it ... to meet her on 
this bridge in the city of her dreams. (1992:284-5) 
Death does no t mean finality, at least not in the accepted 
sense, for Romy's absence does not always mean a diminution 
of her influence. When Gordon interviews friends and 
others who h a ve shared their lives with Romy, she finds 
that Romy re t u~n s : 
How stra~y e ly after 12 years, the memories stir. 
[Winston ] b r ings Romy back when he tells a story and 
sinks b a ~ l aughing. She used to laugh in that way, 
with a k :~d o f helpless and tolerant mirth at her own 
follies . 'de' d tell each other stories, making the 
past, gl':: ng it shape and point. Romy is the 
collabo r a ~ o r in her biography. I simply relay her 
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oral performance. (261) 
The biographer's 
shared with the 
role 1S shifted from i ts pivot; it is 
subject's own continued influence. 
Author / authority are reconfigured. 
Not only is the biographical subject placed in a position 
of power uncharacteristic of the genre, the subj ect is 
approached from unlikely directions. The biographer's 
subj ect is found in unlikely places: Gordon finds her 
(years after Romy's death) in the literature that she 
teaches at Oxford: 
In the course of many tutorials, it happened, again, 
that Romy emerged from certain texts.... Yes, I was 
getting to know Romy better than in the course of her 
life. She came closer as old lines swerved from their 
context. (250) 
And again, the narrator freely admits that factual research 
cannot provide all the raw materials necessary. Finding a 
batch of old letters from Romy, Gordon records her musings 
on whether to undertake the biographical proj ect . The 
letters were "part of Romy's unpublished life -- could I 
find and imagine the rest?" (247, my emphasis). 
The subject is delineated not only through assertion or 
suggestion, but through the narrator's insistent awareness 
of Romy's absence through premature death. But absence 
defines presence in another sense for some of the young 
women of Gordon's generation. The narrator refers to the 
message Camille Claudel wrote to Rodin, her lover: 
'11 y a toujours quelque chose d'absent qui me 
tourmente.' · Could this, I wondered, speak for Romy 
and women like her, who cannot accommodate to the 
given lot: 'There is always something missing which 
torments me.' (284) 
Refusing the position of knower, of authority over all of 
the narrative and over the narrative subjects, the narrator 
does not answer directly the question of how formative 
absence was for these young women, but the text's evocation 
of gendered prescriptions which truncate possibility for 
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young women -- particularly for her friends and herself as 
members of "an increasingly fantastic colonial tribe" (1) 
of white, middle-class Jews in Cape Town of the late 50s --
implies an affirmative answer. 
Women's writing, Jelinek argues, is "anecdotal and 
disruptive" as opposed to men's which is "linear", public 
(1980:19). Shared Lives exemplifies this (when much South 
African's women's autobiographical writing in the last 46 
years does not; Ruth Gordon's Alive, Alive-O!, for 
instance, is largely linear and details the public rather 
than the private events of her life). Shared Lives weaves 
its non-linear way around the false constraints of 
chronology. The basic structure which begins with the 
reflections in the present of the writing process of the 
narrator, and then goes back to the 1880s, recounting the 
histories of the families of the women, and moves forward, 
chapter by chapter, period by period, to the time of 
writing in 1990, is continually disrupted by comments or 
memories which cannot be contained by the time frame. 
Frequently, the narrative of the past anticipates what is 
to come in the succeeding decades. This happens 
throughout: for instance, ln just over a page, the 
narrative veers from the 1950s back to 1795, forward to the 
riots of 1976 and then on to the 1980s, before resuming the 
narrative of the 50s (39-41). 
Shared Lives weaves together the always unravelling 
threads of time and thus - achieves a measure of closure in 
that for the narrator the ends of her three friends' lives 
come to be seen as an early warning, "marking the imminence 
of the moment when our generation will move into the past" 
(1992:7). The moment of telling, then, marks the end of a 
search, and the beginning of the process whereby a 
generation passes out of relevance. But the narrative's 
conclusion also demonstrates what has been implicit all 
along, and that is that the process of composition was not 
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simply a record of the past but an act in the experiencing 
present. It becomes the reason for resuming relationships 
long since dormant. Wri ting structures the narrator's 
life, providing a mild kind of rebellion against a husband 
whose influence had been so beneficial, so fundamentally 
formative (and to whom a quiet kind of homage is paid in 
the narrative). The rebellion lies in the fact that 
Siamon, the author's husband, had encouraged her to be a 
thinker and to write (specifically biography), long before 
she had contemplated such possibilities, but had 
discouraged her from writing a biography about a friend 
(Romy) of whom he had disapproved. So the act of 
composi tion becomes a kind of benchmark in her relationship 
with her husband (and with herself). 
demonstrates that 
Shared Lives 
autobiography is not a reflection of the life but 
something added to it, not a picture but an action, 
which can neither stand still long enough to see the 
life whole nor pursue its own movement to a point of 
certain rest. (Spengemann, 1980:109) 
Jay notes that Valery argues that his mind retains from 
the past "only what 'can be assimilated so intimately that 
it is no longer the past but an element of potential 
action, a resource for the future'" (1984:165). Gordon's 
auto / biography concludes with a sense that due homage has 
finally been paid to these dead friends, but perhaps more 
forcefully with the knowledge that the lessons she has 
learned from re-searching the past will inform her 
teaching, her reaching out to future generations of women. 
Unlike most autobiography critics, and perhaps many 
autobiographers too, Gordon in Shared Lives does not claim 
that the present of the writer is the most powerful force 
in a narrative of the past; rather, while acknowledging the 
influence of the present on the shape of the recalled past, 
the narrator shows that the divisions of time into past, 
present and future are neat and necessary, but ultimately 
oversimplified, a distortion. Memories, apparitions and 
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dreams undermine the seeming solidity of the present, 
redefining the real. In the month after Romy's death 
Gordon has a recurrent dream, a dream which "brought back 
the intense reality of the past in contrast with the 
unreality of the present" (1992:242). Gordon exposes, by 
implication, the falseness of the neat chronologies of 
past, present and future: she presents the past as a 
product of the present and the present as a product of the 
past. The text enacts the Derridean point that the present 
is a composite of manifold memories and anticipations, 
never existing in the isolated instant of awareness. 
Time is an endless deferring of presence.... In other 
words, there is no privileged ground of reflection 
from which thought could ever organize or control the 
flux of temporal experience. (Norris, 1982:47) 
The narrator concludes the first chapter thus: 
I have thought of this book all through middle age, 
from 1976 to 1988, through my mid-thirties to mid-
forties, but only at forty-six did I see in 
perspective that Flora's death at the end of youth, in 
1976, foretold a first lapse of energy twelve years 
later, marking the immanence of the moment when our 
generation will move into the past. The time has 
corne, then, to record the end of a way of life and, 
more elusive, the truncated lives of women who were 
shaped by a warped society yet who were, all the same, 
portents of the future. (Gordon, 1992:7) 
Shared Lives counterpoints its narrative of past and 
present with a concern for the implications that the forces 
informing experience might have for the future. Unlike 
most autobiographies, which either ignore the future, or 
merely hint at its possible dimensions, Shared Lives embeds 
its story ln an awareness that continuities cannot be 
artificially broken, that nothing ever ends. Even though 
lives may cease, and people may be buried, they continue to 
be in the minds and lives of others. 
Not pretending that the past 
defined package of memories, 
is available as a neatly 
just waiting for the 
auto/biographer to return to, Gordon uses the diaries 
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(which she kept from the age of ten until her wedding day) 31 
as well as the letters which were written and received by 
herself and her friends. 32 The past is a text, as a well as 
a context; the auto/biographer is one who seeks, not one 
who delivers. Although Shared Lives diarises the 
narrator's quest for truths, her shared efforts to 
reconstruct ~ives, the text is not a diary, at least not in 
the usual sense. But its employment of diary and letters 
lends an authenticity to the narrative for these documents 
enable past selves to speak again; the narrative is not 
wholly under the control of a narrator who reconstructs the 
past selves in the light of later concerns. 
Nevertheless the narrative is diary-like in some 
respects: increasingly, the narrator records her 
experiences of reconstituting a past in narrative. While 
most auto/biographers attempt to render the writing process 
transparent, Gordon tells the story of the story, 
recounting frequently the performance of collaboration. 
Recording the conversations and interviews (the dates and 
places being carefully noted) which she held with people 
who were significant in the lives of her friends, Gordon 
makes explicit her release of the authorial hold on the 
text. This de c entering of auto/biographer, however, 
informs the text much more pervasively than the mere 
inclusion of l et t ers and conversations indicates. The 
final chapter ope ns: 
What began in dreams and acts of memory has become, in 
its final stage, collaborative. What was written 
after break i ng the silence in South Africa at the 
beginning o f 1990 has been an attempt to fuse the 
words of o t hers with my own biased hoard. We 
exchanged 0 r stories of Romy, Rose, and Ellie, a 
continuat i o . . , a recovery it seemed to me, of the vital 
part of t h e : r iendship: we had circled a passing phase 
of life, ~ d recognized in what we called 'stories' 
the muddl e ' f our indeterminate existence .... 
Diff e~ en t speakers have challenged a version of 
the past '~at tugged Romy towards my own life. 
'Partners ' ·,·;a s shaped by Leonora; 'Futures' by Winston 
and Rosie ~· ~.mene; 'Moves' by David Gevint and Bonnie 




the advancing dead, their words nearer, 
the resounding echo of the past. (277) 
In its polyphonic 
acknowledgement of the 
narrativ e style 
indivisibilities 
and circling 
of time, Shared 
Lives traverses the intricate web of experience which blurs 
the boundaries of self and other . Biography slips at times 
into autobiography, both of these discourses being 
transformed in Gordon's use of them so that they refuse the 
comforts of the readerly, the known. 
Resisting the illusory separation of teller and tale that 
defines so much biographical writing, Gordon weaves a 
narrative of self into the narratives of others, just as 
she insists that the friendship which united the characters 
about whom she writes was mutually defining. The narrator 
notes that in January 1977 she wrote: 
Flora and Rosie were obscure growths of postcolonial 
South Africa. As such, I was part of them, they of 
me, and I want to claim that part. I am the divided 
relic of these friends, and feel the footsteps of 
their lives in mine. (248) 
In January 1990, in the course of researching this book, 
the author meets with one of Romy's former boyfriends. 
There was no need to make conversation or think up 
questions or put him at ease. We talked together as 
two who had been possessed by the same person who had 
disappeared and left us with her i mpact on our lives, 
conscious that whatever we were or had become, she had 
-- to some large extent -- made us. Over our meeting 
she presided, having brought us there, to that corner 
table, with the pink napkins and the marmalade . (275) 
Kolodny, writing about other autobiographical texts by 
women, makes an observation which is especially pertinent 
to Gordon's autobiography: 
What is being revealed here... lS the lack of 
appropriate cultural definitions for women in our 
contemporary society. The implications of addressing 
that lack are at once literary and political: for, in 
altering the images and narrative structures through 
which we compose the stories of our lives, we may hope 
to alter the very experience of those lives as 
well. ... 
In terms of literary history, it is a situation 
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not unlike that of the eighteenth century, the first 
great age of autobiographical outpourings, when, as 
James Cox put it, 'the modern self was being liberated 
as well as defined.' As more and more women today 
seek precisely those goals -- that is, liberation and 
self-definition -- we may expect even more startling 
autobiographical narratives to come. (1980:258-9) 
The text's insistence on the collaborative nature of self, 
life and text marks a new departure in auto/biographical 
writing for this insistence is formal as well as thematic. 
I have referred earlier to the emphasis on the denotative 
in most South African autobiographical writing, on implicit 
claims to the transparency of the text and of the 
effacement in the narrative of the process of production: 
Gordon's text is innovative for it does none of these. 
Shared Lives does not hierarchize its discourses in terms 
of an identifiable and definable notion of truth; rather, 
it offers the reader points of entry, layers of 
interpretative options, dispersing the narrative line 
across mUltiple possibilities. Gordon explicitly refuses 
the illusion of unity and continuity, the expediency of 
fact; she gives us a wri terly text which proclaims the 
importance of the imagination. Allowing the narrative to 
slide at times into almost dramatic forms, the text 
explores the polyvocality of the real 
aligned with the author's feminism. 
a textual practice 
Shared Lives is the (partial) symbolic resolution of the 
experiences of the gendered straight-jackets which Gordon 
and her friends were expected to accept in the tightly 
circumscribed community of white Jews in Cape Town, and 
which ~ccompanied them in different forms even when they 
moved out of this closed social group. Writing of American 
social norms, Jane Tompkins argues: 
Because women in our culture are not simply encouraged 
but required to be the bearers of emotion, which- men 
are culturally conditioned to repress, an epistemology 
which excludes emotions from the process of attaining 
knowledge radically undercuts women's epistemic 
authority. (1989:123) 
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Shared Lives asserts the validity of "women's epistemic 
authority". Rejecting women who ape men, "manikins" 
grasping at male power, Gordon celebrates women's sharing, 
a sharing which draws her to the women's college, St. 
Hilda's, at Oxford University. Gordon aims in her teaching 
(and in this text) to promote a community of women, 
"thinking together, which seems to me a preferable mode of 
education, especially for women, to that of showmen" (224). 
It is this sharing which she sees as Romy's especial 
talent, "a triumph of women's tradition and portent of 
women to be" (263). 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
Nor knowest thou what argument 
Thy life to thy neighbour's creed hath lent. 
Emerson 
The immense suffering black people experience in South 
Africa. .. created in me a reverence for ordinary 
people. 
Bessie Head 
This business is everybody's business. 
Camus 
The texts selected for detailed discussion ln the 
preceding chapters will have shown something of the 
diversity of autobiographical practice in South Africa 
during the apartheid years. I have hoped to show in my 
analyses of particular texts that what might perhaps seem 
unified under genre is in fact fragmented, and fraught with 
difference. The texts are shaped as responses to an array 
of problems. Some of the problems addressed are: how to 
tell about a self which is demeaned by experience while 
simultaneously attempting to redress the inequities (the 
worker autobiographies, Kuzwayo' sand Moloi' s) i how to 
appeal to adult learners in literacy classes in such a way 
that learning is promoted along with a validation of the 
learner's sense of self-worth (We Came to Town and Thula 
Baba, for example). Campbell's responds to the problem of 
depicting one's individuality, while Luthuli's stresses his 
unexceptionalitYi Lyndall Gordon appears to attempt both in 
her depiction of the narrating and narrated subjects as 
very particularized, yet subjected to pressures generalized 
to women. Gordon also probes the poss~bilities and limits 
of the genre, as do Breytenbach and Kuzwayo, with very 
different results. Kuzwayo's autobiography explores 
creative innovation in the space between the cultural 
frames of white hegemony and traditional black culture i 
Call Me Woman's autobiographical subject emerges out of 
seemingly irreconcilable discourses. 
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Similarly, motives for writing differ. Spengemann 
(1980:xvi, 167) identifies three motives in autobiography 
in the Augustinian tradition: philosophical autobiographers 
aim to search for the self; poetic autobiographers seek to 
express the self; and historical autobiographers seek to 
explain the self. But, he says, for those who have not 
maintained Augustine's belief in unconditioned selfhood, 
autobiography becomes self-invention (xvi) . These 
divisions are not particularly useful as categories into 
which to attempt to slot South African autobiographical 
texts produced in the last four and a half decades 
principally because much South African autobiography does 
not follow the Augustinian tradition which focuses on the 
self. As has been noted , a large proportion of South 
African autobiographical writing is primarily concerned 
with the life rather than with the self. Instead of 
---------~--~--~~----~~~ exploring an experiencing self, _many text~ seek to expo~ 
th; experiences the subjects have to undergo. Moreover, 
even if one were to apply Spengemann's designations to the 
texts' treatment of those problems of self-construction 
which no autobiographical text can avoid, the process would 
have a rather large measure of arbitrariness in it because 
invariably texts would fit into more than one category. 
Nevertheless, we can see elements of each of the above 
motives (not necessarily based on a sense of an absolute 
self) in the texts which have been selected for detailed 
consideration I n this study. Lynda 1 1 Gordon's 
autobiographical text might be described as tending towards 
the philosophica l; Breytenbach's tends towards the poetic; 
Moloi's and t he worker autobiographies towards the 
historical. And both Lyndall Gordon and Breytenbach write 
autobiography as poetic self-invention, Spengemann's fourth 
category. Bu t ~here Spengemann ' s designations are useful 
for the purpo ses o f this study is that they bring to one's 
attention the :ac t that he has omitted another motive for 
autobiography ', ..;h i ch is extremely important in contemporary 
South Afric a n a u tobiographical production: this is the 
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desire to persuade. Where Spengemann' s motivations seem to 
be largely confined to what the author sets out to achieve, 
an intention to persuade includes the reader in its ambit. 
This is significant in that autobiography in South Africa 
during the apartheid period is far less an individualistic 
art form or means of expression than a tool for profound 
social change. Autobiographies which aim to promote social 
change by persuading readers that this is necessary might 
be referred to as polemical autobiography. Luthuli' s 
autobiography and many worker autobiographies such as 
Working Women (Lawson) and Thula Baba might be classified 
thus, along with others not singled out for close reading, 
such as Winnie Mandela's Part of My Soul which is a public 
relations exercise for the ANC but also, more pointedly, 
for Winnie Mandela herself. 
In similar vein, Erikson identifies three forms of time 
in autobiography, "the writer's present, the writer's past, 
and the historical context in which the writer has lived" 
(cited by Finney, 1985:227). Erikson (and Finney, in his 
endorsement of Erikson's observation) fail to take into 
account the role of the future in autobiographical writing; 
the purposeful nature of much South African life-writing 
makes this form of time very important Slnce a large 
proportion of texts may be described as polemical in 
intent. Almost all texts by black South Africans 
understandably -- look to the future, and aim to act as 
interventions in that future. Luthuli speaks of "the new 
South Africa" (1982: 136); his text addresses the three 
forms of time to which Erikson refers in order to 
contribute to the creation of a just and free South Africa 
at some time in the future. (Let My People Go is a command 
for future action). Kuzwayo concludes her autobiography 
with a reference to the commitment of the women of her 
community "to stand side by side with our menfolk and our 
children in this long struggle to liberate ourselves and to 
bring about peace and justice for all in a country we love 
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so deeply" (1985:263). Qabula's last words in the 
narrative refer to the desire that ordinary workers be 
remembered by future generations (1989: 109) . Likewise, 
Makhoba's concluding sentence reads: "And we know that when 
we make our unity, the sun shall rise for the workers" 
(1984: 38). But it is not only in their conclusions that 
these autobiographers look to the future; for those cited -
- and for a great many others -- it is for the future (this 
post-apartheid state that has now been achieved) that they 
write. They write so that past struggles for freedom will 
be remembered and will contribute to the shaping of a 
future free of racism. 
The selected texts show that the genre 1S pulled in many 
directions, towards writing styles more usually considered 
to be characteristic of other genres -- and usually in more 
than one direction in one text. sometimes the 
autobiographical/ testimonial impulse is modified by a 
leaning towards the novelistic (Light on a Dark Horse, 
Campbell) or the short story (Thula Baba); sometimes 
towards historical documentary (Let My People Go, Luthuli); 
sometimes towards philosophical exposition (Shared Lives, 
Lyndall Gordon and True Confessions, Breytenbach) ; 
sometimes towards political tract (The Sun Shall Rise for 
the Workers, Makhoba). Motivational and formal diversity 
affect length which ranges from a few lines per 
autobiographical subject (as in Sibarnbene) to hundreds of 
pages (as in True Confessions); they affect language, which 
ranges from the simplest of English (as in We Came to Town) 
to poetic and creative uses of prose (True Confessions); 
they affect layout and design so that texts range from 
uninterruptedly verbal text (Campbell's has only small 
illustrative drawings at the beginnings of each chapter) to 
the highly decorated (Sibambene and The Story of Mboma). 
The leanings of the text towards other ancillary genres 
also modifies its reliance on photographic material: there 
are those texts which do not use photographs as support 
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except for one of the author on the cover I presumably 
requested by publishers (Breytenbach/s and Campbell/s) I and 
those which use photographs as illustrative material in 
journalistic style (Makhoba and Tom l for instance) I while 
at the other extreme some use photographs not specifically 
linked to the narrative or the autobiographical subjects 
(We Came to Town). Narratorial stance shifts l tOOl with 
the text/s tendency towards one or other generic satellite: 
the authorial narrator (as employed by Campbell and 
Luthuli) is replaced in some texts by complex narratorial 
shifts
l 
as in Women of Phokeng (Bozzoli) I True Confessions 
(Breytenbach) and Call Me Woman (Kuzwayo). 
The texts that I have discussed in detail in the 
foregoing chapters indicate l in the words of Foucault l the 
heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself: 
texts l genres l races l classes l genders I and even 
individuals. A significant advantage of an analysis of 
South African autobiography which attends to its diversity 
is that l 
it enables us to think of difference as a resource 
rather than a threat.... Neither does one regard 
difference as an obstacle to effective resistance. 
Difference can be a resource insofar as it enables us 
to mUltiply the sources of resistance to the myriad of 
relations of domination that circulate through the 
social field.... Moreover I if we redefine our 
differences l discover new ways of understanding 
ourselves and each other I then our differences are 
less likely to be used against us.... Of course l this 
means discovering what we have in common as well. 
(Sawicki l 1988:187) 
One point that needs to be made here is that the texts 
illustrate that differences co-exist within single subjects 
so that often resistance and collaboration are conjoined in 
one subj ect I each being foregrounded when it is deemed 
necessary or expedient. Thus while for some Lynda 1 1 
Gordon/s Shared Lives might be disappointingly vague in its 
criticisms of apartheid l it nevertheless registers a very 
important and complex kind of resistance to oppressive 
systems of identity-formation and knowledge-making. 
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Another issue which requires mention is that while some 
might despair of South Africans ever bridging the gaps 
which separate them (Bessie Head said, "We are all really 
startled alive by the liberation of Africa, but we have 
been living in exclusive compartments for so long that we 
are all afraid of each other" (1990a:30)); I think we need 
to understand that mutual respect does not mean 
homogenization. 
The diversity of South African autobiographical 
production enables us to explore some of the shadows behind 
the historical events that loom large in South African 
history. Bessie Head remarked upon her need for "a sense 
of hist-orical continuity, a sense of roots, but I remember 
how tentative and sketchy were my first efforts, not 
finding roots as such but rather putting on layer after 
layer of patchy clothing" (1990a: 86) . Life-stories can 
provide much important information about peoples and their 
past. Through such texts we can learn about what sectors 
of the population have access to publishers, about what 
sorts of lives are being recorded, about what sorts of 
selves they portray, about formal and stylistic trends, and 
so on. But this information does not appear in a solid 
body, tracing clear lines of development. Rather, the 
information to be gleaned from this body of texts, when 
pieced together, often forms contradictory patterns which 
frequently refuse linear narrativization. Thus the life-
stories of South Africans under apartheid can be likened to 
this "patchy clothing". 
Autobiographies, written in the present, about the past, 
can shape the future precisely because they can help 
redefine our sense of ourselves and our fellow South 
Africans of whatever colour or political persuasion. Head 
says that like most black people born in South Africa, she 
"lived with a very broken sense of history" (1990a:97). 
This 1S just as true, too, of white South Africans. 
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Autobiographies can help to remedy this, as well as the 
opposite tendency of history to present itself as seamless 
narrative. Mainstream history tends to concentrate upon 
the important people who make important events happen: 
There isn't anything in this village that an historian 
might care to write about. . .. Historians do not write 
about people and how strange and beautiful they are --
just living. There is so much necessity living they 
do and in this village there is so much mud living. 
Women's hands build and smooth mud huts and porches. 
The fierce November, December thunderstorms sweep away 
all the beautiful patterns. After some time these 
same patient hands, hard and rough, will build up 
these mud necessities again. (Head, 1990a:30) 
While the career-oriented memoirs of the famous might have 
their brief moment of fame, it is to these "patient hands" 
that the autobiographies draw attention and upon which 
South Africa's future prosperity and peace depend. 
Autobiographical writing, as a discrepant body of 
writing, seems to me to be a kind of antidote to myth as 
"depoliticized speech, which ... 'does away with all 
dialectics, . .. [and which] organizes a world which is 
without contradictions because it is without depth, a world 
wide open and wallowing in the evident ... '" (Klinkowitz 
citing Barthes, 1988:73). The life stories, as 
heterogeneous as they are in so many respects, expose the 
dialectic in ind ividual lives between the momentary and the 
pervasive. The patterns of transformation in specific 
texts could not have occurred 
if through a series of sequences, [they] did not 
eventual ly enter into an overall strategy. And 
inversely , no strategy could achieve comprehensive 
effects if it did not gain support from precise and 
tenuous re lations serving, not as its point of 
applicat i on or final outcome, but as its prop and 
anchor p oint . There is no discontinuity between them, 
as if one ~ere dealing with two different levels (one 
microscop: and the other macroscopic); but neither is 
there ho~ogeneity (as if the one were only the 
enlarged . ro j ection or the miniaturization of the 
other); c<1ther, one must conceive of the double 
condition ::1g of a strategy by the specificity of 
possible ~ a ctics, and of tactics by the strategic 
envelope ~ ~at makes them work. (Foucault, 1980:99-100) 
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It is this "double conditioning" which life-writing 
documents in diverse ways, and which I particularly wished 
to foreground in my discussion of Kuzwayo's Call Me Woman 
and Moloi's My Life. 
The discourses of power and subordination are 
multifaceted, as my analyses have attempted to show. While 
one can see something of the bourgeoisie versus the masses 
at play in South African life-writing (Campbell as opposed 
to Qabula, for instance), there are too many other sites of 
meaning (and thus of interpretative contestation) to use 
this opposition with anything other than extreme caution. 
While it is partly true to say , as Barthes does, that the 
oppressor's language "is plenary, intransitive, gestural" 
and relies on "tautological statements which ... exercise a 
certain tyranny of likelihood" (cited by Klinkowitz, 
1988:63-4), this is itself too obvious and simple. There 
is more to the language of the oppressor than this; 
moreover, we know that 'the masses' too employ slogans and 
tautological statements in their struggle for liberation. 
The very term 'the Struggle' essentializes what is 
fragmented and disunited, as Resha, Kitson, Indres Naidoo 
and Kasrils testify. Many of the protest autobiographies 
utilize "a certain tyranny of l ikelihood". Qabula's very 
title (Cruel Beyond Belief) and also Mathabane's (Kaffir 
Boy), for instance, invoke the reader's generalized sense 
of the horrors of apartheid. In Qabula's case the 
narrative does not, it seems to me, consistently 
demonstrate these horrors. In short, the title seems 
inappropriate, if effective as political rhetoric. But 
perhaps the most trenchant example of 'the oppressed' 
relying on self-justifying slogan comes from recent events. 
The PAC chant "One sett l er, one bullet" was used to 
'explain' the murder of the American Fulbright student Amy 
Biehl. Biehl was not a South African settler, and had no 
intention of ever being one . 
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A further problem concerns the identity of 'the 
oppressor'. In the context of South African apartheid, it 
is usually easier to identify the oppressed than it is to 
identify the oppressor for a white skin has not necessarily 
meant compliance with Afrikaner Nationalism, nor a black 
one resistance. Victims can themselves contribute to 
oppression (their own and others), while those who are 
positioned as oppressors may seek, in a variety of ways, to 
undermine the system which defines them thus. 
In order to explore the micro and macro politics of 
apartheid, the texts selected for close analysis were 
chosen in part for their political differences. This study 
has sought to pay heed to those whose voices have been 
silenced the migrant labourers, subsistence farmers, 
domestic workers, those who live in abject poverty (such as 
We Came to Town, Vukani Makhosikazi, Thula Baba, Sibambene, 
A Talent for Tomorrow, Facing the Storm, The Sun Shall Rise 
for the Workers) -- as well as to those whose voices have 
been amplified by their social positioning as white males, 
like Roy Campbell and Breyten Breytenbach. For it seems to 
me that if one is to come to understand how dominant and 
subversive discourses intersect, are in dialogue with one 
another, then one has to look across the spectrum. The 
readings are influenced by the Foucauldian argument that 
power is a transaction, rather than a contract; "it is not 
the ' privilege,' acquired or preserved, of the dominant 
class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions --
an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the 
position of those who are dominated" (1984:174) I have 
sought in some readings to analyze the power relations 
informing the texts, even those which are apparently 
irrelevant to apartheid, such as American cultural hegemony 
in Moloi. 
Chronologically, the emphasis in this study has been on 
more recent autobiographical production. I have selected 
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one each from the 50s and 60s; the rest are from the late 
70s through to 1992 . Campbel l 's Light on a Dark Horse 
(1951) -- the earliest publicat i on discussed in this study 
-- represents, in rather exaggerated terms, what I have 
found to be the predominant trend in autobiographical 
writing in the early decades of this period, viz. the 
signalling of special individuals whose lives are of 
interest because they are not like those of ordinary folk. 
I have therefore not chosen others from this period which 
might have little further to offer in the way of fresh 
insights into narrativized self-construction and generic 
practices at the time. Roy Campbell had achieved worldwide 
acclaim as a poet; James Rose-Innes (1949) was a prominent 
politician; . C.A Evenden (1952) founded the international 
M.O.T.H. movement; Sarah Gertrude Millin (1941 and 1955) 
was a novelist of international repute. Although Luthuli's 
autobiography (1962) is also the life-story of a famous 
man, it differs from this tradition in the important 
respect that the autobiographical subj ect, rather than 
attracting attention to himself, seeks to deflect it. 
Autobiographies by famous people continued to be produced 
throughout the apartheid period, but in the last two 
decades they have come to be increasingly marginalized, 
especially if the autobiographical subj ect' s fame lies 
outside the struggle for political equity. Thus 
autobiographies by Guy Butler (1977, 1983, 1991), Zola Budd 
(1989), and Sir de Villiers Graaf (1993) are not, as far as 
I can gather, popular amongst 
likely to be prescribed 
reviewers or academics 
at 
or 
autobiographies by South Africans 
universities, while 
(white or black) who 
tackle their political circumstances head on, as do Rian 
Malan and Ellen Kuzwayo, are more attractive to those in 
the business of making knowledge, and thus are likely to 
have far greater impact. 
A greater emphasis on the latter part of the apartheid 
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period is warranted in terms of my desire to explore the 
ways in which autobiographical practices are tied to the 
material world since there has been greater diversity in 
approach to the task of telling about one's life in the 
last two decades or so. This is a time of accelerating 
social crisis, and "autobiographical writing ... serves as 
a location where residual and emergent notions" of race, 
ethnicity, 
challenge 
1989 :xiv) . 
class, and gender "clash to replicate and 
reigning notions of identity" (Nussbaum, 
In the case of those who were the victims of 
apartheid this is because social disintegration had gained 
momentum to such an extent that individuals and communities 
were losing their traditions, their value systems, their 
sense of identity. Many black South Africans could not 
compose traditional indigenous-language autobiographical 
texts because they were no longer familiar with the 
tradition of oral poetry, and indeed, perhaps felt less 
than confident in using their mother tongue for any sort of 
formal composition. Lebohang Sikwe (who was quoted 
earlier), for example, suggests that many black South 
Africans do not speak their own languages any more, they 
have lost "the logical current of that language" (Daymond 
and Lenta, 1990:76), and usually speak a mixture of 
languages. She says that because of this she prefers to 
compose in English. But having only broken indigenous 
traditions to call upon, many black South Africans could 
not then simply adopt the kind of Western autobiographical 
practice which interpellates an autonomous individual at 
the centre of a narrative. This is in part because the 
remnants of African culture run contrary to such a 
conceptual framework (as I have explained in Chapter 3) and 
in part because apartheid prevented them from conceiving of 
themselves thus. In almost every respect, life was out of 
their control. Kuzwayo's and Moloi's autobiographies serve 
as wonderful examples of how a text can resolve 
symbolically the actual lived problems confronting black 
South Africans under apartheid. 
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There are some important shifts in white writing too in 
the latter part of the apartheid period. Increasing 
political activism by black South Africans activism 
which impinged on whites' lives in ways that were, it seems 
to me, unprecedented - - forced whites to take stock of an 
untenable political dispensation. Whites could no longer 
ignore the fact that they were , whether wittingly or not, 
beneficiaries of this system and its systematic attempts to 
keep them ignorant of its evils. Thus we find the 
researcher-scripted autobiographical texts proliferating 
from the late seventies through the eighties: whites like 
Joubert, Bond, and Hermer were recognizing that black 
people had faces, lives, concerns, and they sought, through 
textual production, to make the rest of the white 
population recognize this too. These researchers, and 
those who followed (Keegan, Lawson and Bozzoli, for 
instance) made possible the autobiographical texts of 
representatives of the nameless masses. 'rhese (often 
illiterate) individuals who have no public profile are 
unexpectedly given a platform. Some worker autobiographies 
go even further in their recognition of oppressed black 
South Africans by not only recording the life-stories of 
black South Africans but also by addressing black readers, 
a previously neglected group in all fields of textual 
production in South Africa, so as to show their readers 
that their poverty and oppression were not indicative of 
their lack of worth (as the subject of Poppie suggested), 
but were the result of carefully orchestrated, and 
widespread, oppression. 
We find, a lso , ln this latter period, an increasing 
number of whi te- authored texts which register considerable 
discomfort wit:-: the experience of being in positions of 
privilege as ·",·r. :' t es. Along with texts by white activists, 
like the libera t ion theologist Cedric Mayson (1984) and// 
Hugh Lewin ~9 8 0) who was imprisoned for subversive 
activities, :-:e re are those by Afrikaners like Natie 
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Ferreira (1980) and Breytenbach (1980 and 1984), and by 
English-speaking whites like Christopher Hope (1988), an 
expatriate, and Elizabeth de Villiers (1990), which explore 
the confusion and shame of whites who have not supported 
implicated in its 
Campbell's, which 
apartheid, but who are nevertheless 









a secure and 
1S no longer 
possible for these later writers referred to here, and many 
others. 
There is yet another reason for the greater attention to 
the last two decades of autobiographical writing, and that 
is that autobiographical texts were produced in much 
greater numbers in the eighties than they were in previous 
decades, thus indicating the grow1ng importance of 
autobiographical testimony for writers and readers alike. 
In my bibliography, for instance, 9 autobiographical texts 
are recorded for the 60s, 16 for the 70s, while 71 are 
listed in the 80s (one might add 7 more which were 
reprinted in that decade). I believe that in the 90s this 
trend will continue, for I have already read 26 
autobiographical texts published in the last four years, 
and I know of another six which I have yet to read. Now 
although one has to bear in mind that the recent texts are 
more accessible, and more likely to come to my notice, I do 
believe that these figures nevertheless indicate the 
growing importance of the genre in South Africa, a shift 
which this study has itself -- by implication -- traced. 
Not surprisingly, a recurrent theme in autobiographical 
writing in works by black South Africans and others during 
apartheid is protest against systematized inequality. 
Peter Abrahams' Tell Freedom (1954) 1S the first protest 
autobiography in the 1948-1994 period. It was followed by 
Huddlestone's Naught for your Comfort (1956), Mphahlele's 
Down Second Avenue (1959), Modisane's Blame Me on History 
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(1963) and many others into the nineties with Lekota's 
Prison Letters to a Daughter appearing in 1991. While 
Luthuli's Let My People Go (1962) undoubtedly strives to 
register protest, it differs from those which precede it in 
that the narrating subject blurs his own individuality so 
as to depersonalize the oppression, to foreground its 
inclusiveness. This feature of the narrative can be seen 
as an indirect precursor to a number of texts -- the worker 
autobiographies of the 1980s being rather extreme examples 
-- which implicitly lay claim to the importance of the 
autobiographical subjects precisely because they are not 
unique individuals. 
Another precursor, ln a different sense, to the worker 
autobiographies is a text not discussed in detail in this 
study, and that is Elsa Joubert ' s Poppie. This text, first 
published in Afrikaans in 1978, was, it seems to me, the 
first of the researcher-scripted autobiographical texts, 
being based on the testimony of an illiterate and very poor 
black woman who is given a pseudonym by the (white) author. 
This text marks a new direction in white protest writing. 
Although the traditions of protest established by Trevor 
Huddlestone (1956) and in different vein, Ruth First (117 
Days, 1965) and Albie Sachs (Jail Diary, 1966) were to be 
continued, Poppie is the first autobiographical text which 
takes white protest in another direction. It registers 
protest by implication, by pUblicising the plight of the 
oppressed. Bessie Head observed that 
a meeting of strange cultures in Southern Africa did 
not inspire wonder and communication between black and 
whi te. It produced a desolate history of moans, 
lamentations and wars. For a long while the concerns 
of black people and their day to day survival were of 
little account. (1990a:85) 
With Elsa Joubert's Poppie, a representative of the non-
politically active white population attempted to address 
the ignorance of the white minority by which apartheid's 
evils were perpetuated. It documents in painful detail the 
phenomenal struggles for survival which an impoverished 
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black woman has to undergo from day to day throughout her 
life. poppie, a widely acclaimed work by an esteemed 
Afrikaans novelist, portrayed the pathos and tragedy of 
Poppie's life, and, by implication, of the lives of 
millions of apartheid's victims. 
Life-writing during the apartheid era shows how writers 
have employed the print media to subvert the attempts of 
government to delete the voices and stories of black South 
Africans from the media. Using the language of the former 
colonial power, and autobiographical narrative forms in 
print, autobiographers seized the technologies by which the 
rulers sought to keep themselves in power. Foucault argued 
that, "The successes of history belong to those who are 
capable of seizing [the rulers' ] rules ... so as to overcome 
rulers through their own rules" (1977:85-6). There is no 
doubt that autobiographies by and large served an important 
role ln the struggle for liberation. The Nationalist 
Government recognized their potential by banning many of 
them. (Barthes reminds us that "all domination begins by 
prohibiting language", 1974:68.) Protest narratives were 
able to make an impact because they were available in print 
(legally or illegally in South Africa), ln the language 
accessible to the largest number of South Africans and 
overseas readers, rather than as performance texts in the 
indigenous languages which would reach significantly 





oppreSSlon was indeed an important 
But Foucault's deconstructive methodology acts as a 
warning "against the commitment to any confessional mode as 
necessarily liberating.. .. It is imperative that we ... 
question the structure of the communicative relation that 
is operating" (Martin, 1988: l5-l6). When considering South 
African autobiographical writing one needs to consider 
carefully as I have done with some of the worker 
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autobiographies the role of publishers, researchers, 
readers (the book buying public) for the autobiographer's 
seeming grasping of the opportunity at self-definition is, 
of course, constrained by all of these. Furthermore, while 
the use of English might in many respects be considered 
effective politically, it must also be borne in mind that 
in many other respects it may contribute to the silencing 
of the speaker, the disempowering of someone who is already 
the subject of oppression. 
Important as protest is -- and as unpredictable as its 
forms might be, ranging from Makhoba's pro-union story to 
Breytenbach's postmodernist exploration -- the texts which 
do not explicitly resist the State or its policies should 
not be overlooked. In this regard, Moloi's and Campbell's 
autobiographies provide an interesting comparison: both 
express some dissatisfaction with racism, but both 
implicitly endorse it by expressing racist (and, I contend, 
not coincidentally, stridently sexist) sentiments. I have 
not included any texts for detailed discussion which either 
ignore the political dispensation (as far as I can tell, 
such texts are all white-authored, for obvious reasons) or 
which defend it. This is because such texts are few in 
number, and tend to follow a very conservative Western 
generic pattern: the authorial narrator/protagonist is 
positioned as centre and authority of a narrative which 
admits little or no uncertainty and which has a classic 
realist plot line (usually tracing a career, as do the 
autobiographies of Forbes, Hermans and Malherbe, or a 
particular period, as does Attwell's). While the 
coincidence of formal conservatism and political 
conservatism is of interest, and would be worth pursuing in 
further analyses, the conjunction is not necessarily 
consistent (Luthuli's is formally conservative too) and I 
did not find it sufficiently compelling to warrant 
inclusion of such a text here. 
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I have mentioned that there are texts which defend 
apartheid; this is perhaps misleading. In this study, of 
the more than 120 autobiographical texts which I have read, 
there are only a handful which attempt -- explicitly or 
implicitly -- to justify white supremacy. These are Sarah 
Gertrude Millin's (1941 and 1955), Mike Hoare's (1986) and 
Kaizer D. Mantanzima's (1976). Mantanzima's autobiography 
is tellingly published (and presumably motivated and 
sponsored) by the Nationalist Government's Foreign Affairs 
Association. Mantanzima was responsible for the success of 
the Nationalists' plan to make Transkei take its 
"independence" from South Africa. Why, you might be 
wondering, are there so few autobiographical texts which 
defend apartheid? Where were all its supporters? How did 
it last so long if they were not exploring every avenue to 
vindicate their political beliefs? While I cannot presume 
to know the answer to these questions, I can make some 
suggestions: perhaps there are a greater number of 
defensive autobiographical texts published in Afrikaans (it 
was an Afrikaner Nationalist Government, after all); 
perhaps, even from its inception, there was some kind of 
sense amongst the English-speaking supporters of white 
supremacy that while institutionalized raClsm could be 
practised, individual defences of it were unlikely to wash; 
perhaps the most ardent advocates of apartheid were too 
busy promulgating laws and ensuring that these were adhered 
to, to write their own life-stories. Perhaps the published 
defences of apartheid in English took other forms: 
biographies of white supremacists, 
political and/or historical analyses. 
require further consideration. 
for instance, or 
These issues, too, 
But of greater importance for future study in the field 
of South African cultural production is the forging of a 
theoretical model which is more sensi ti ve to indigenous 
influence than I have been able to be here. Theory is a 
story -- a complex, non-monologue -- by which we explain 
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our selves and our world. Academics need to know more 
about the stories, the theories, by which the indigenous 
peoples of South Africa e xp l ain themselves, the stories out 
of which they give meaning to their lives. The old 
disciplinary divisions which have kept such material within 
the preserves of anthropology and Zulu, Xhosa, Sotho and 
other language departments need now to be transcended. 
The end of race prejudice begins with a sudden 
incomprehension. 
The occupant's spasmed and rigid 
liberated, opens at last to the culture 
have really become brothers. The two 
affront each other, enrich each other. 
culture, now 
of people who 
cui tures can 
In conclusion, universality resides in this 
decision to recognise and accept the reciprocal 
relativism of different cultures, once the colonial 
status is irreversibly excluded. (Fanon, 1967b:44) 
I have heard eminent academics say that South Africa has 
not yet produced any black theorists of note. I believe 
that these people are looking for the wrong "theory": they 
are looking for black South Africans who speak the language 
of Eurocentric theory that they, as First World academics, 
have been trained to hear. Instead we now need to look for 
the theories that inform the cultures outside of academic 
institutions. This is where the indigenous theories of 
Africa lie; and it is responsiveness to new kinds of 
theory, new kinds of myth , that I hope to develop in 
subsequent study . 
Nevertheless , t he employment in this study of a modified 
postructuralis t t heoretical model has its merits. For one 
thing, as I have said, these analyses refuse mimetic 
readings. They r ender visible the illusory transparencies 
of text and undermine the attempts by sectors of the 
literary cri t i c a l establishment which persist in reading 
black people ' s ~r i ting as being of worth only insofar as it 
can be read s r eferential (Wicomb, 1990: 42), as "non-
literary arena s r ather than with their internal structures 
as acts of l a r. g~ age" (Henry Louis Gates, cited by Wicomb, 
1990:42). I hope to have demonstrated that even what seem 
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to be the simplest of autobiographical texts are just as 
fully implicated in the politics of textuality as are those 
that appear to be highly sophisticated. I have tried to 
show why it is false to engage in a mock criticism in which 
"the structure of the black text has been repressed and 
treated as if it were transparent" (Henry Louis Gates, 
cited by Wicomb, 1990:42). And while the Eurocentricism of 
postructuralism is disturbing, this Western theoretical 
model has relevance because the discourses and technologies 
of the West are imbricated in the making of apartheid South 
Africa and are therefore germane to its analysis. 
While this study has sought to avoid generalizations 
which are presented as being beyond dispute, some 
conclusions can be drawn, one 
period an important shift in 
autobiographical texts has 
autobiographical accounts of 
of which is that in this 
terms of the ranking of 
occurred. Initially, 
non-achievers, of the 
representatives of the oppressed masses, were thought to be 
of little or no value: one can infer this from the fact 
that in the first few years of the apartheid period no such 
texts were published. The life-stories that seem to have 
been held in highest esteem (indeed, which have actually 
been printed) are those by individuals -- usually white --
who have public visibility: the politicians, sportsmen and 
so on. But as apartheid entrenched itself further with 
more and more draconian laws being passed, and as it 
impacted more forcefully on people's lives, those who could 
(who had the means to) escape South Africa, like Abrahams 
(1953 and 1954) and Mphahlele (1959), recorded the painful 
circumstances leading up to 
exile, while Luthuli (1962) 
their decisions to go into 
and Jabavu (1960 and 1963) 
documented the tragic implications of apartheid on black 
South Africans' lives. In the second half of the apartheid 
period the ranking which rather indiscriminately favoured 
the life-stories of the famous lS inverted. The 
autobiographical texts of the oppressed are validated in 
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print in significant numbers, along with the life-stories 
(covering brief or longer periods) of individuals who 
document experiences of, and responses to, apartheid. At 
the same time the autobiographies of whites who have no 
particular political objections to apartheid are 
marginalised to the extent that people iike Ruth Gordon 
(1984), David Alexander (1992), and Brian Godbold (1989) 
apparently could not find publishers. 
autobiographies is privately published. 
Nussbaum points out that, 
Each of their 
In a given social format i on, then, at a particular 
historical moment, the power of certain discourses to 
determine knowledge may be uneven, and an ensuing 
struggle occurs in human subjects, in texts, and in 
the management of those texts. (1989:36) 
In this regard one can see the beginnings of a canon of 
South African autobiography emerging. Interestingly, those 
by Mphahlele (1959), Modisane (1963), Kuzwayo (1985) and 
Magona (1990) have, it would seem, made it into the very 
select canon, often finding their way onto undergraduate 
and graduate prescribed book lists. "Language, like 
mankind, expands forever , and one becomes a hero simply by 
having the last word" (Klinkowitz, 1988:59). Given the 
fact that all of these are black-authored texts, it would 
seem that black South Africans will (appropriately) have 
the last word on apartheid. 
But what is needed now, to make that "last word" more 
representative, is for South Africans across the spectrum 
to write their own stories. Petrus Tom prefaces his 
autobiography with the following: 
I hope that this book will be a valuable contribution 
to the workers' struggle, and that other workers will 
be encouraged by it to come forward and write their 
own books which will tell their own stories. 
Intellectuals and academics have, for far too long, 
been writing books about us. But now the time has 
come for us, the working class, to take a stand and 
write our own stories about our experiences in life 
(1985:n.p.) . 
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Those so-called Coloured South Africans: where are their 
stories? Where are the stories of Indian South Africans? 
Where, in both of these groups (and others), are the 
stories of women? Greater accessibility, in print form and 
translated, of traditional autobiographical performance 
texts is also needed. While there are problems inherent in 
this, this will nevertheless be an important way in which 
South Africans from diverse backgrounds (including 
urbanized and Westernized blacks) could learn about the 
past, and acquire resources for the future. 
A study suc? as this cannot achieve significant political 
effect: but it can undermine simplistic interpretations. 
And it is upon simplistic interpretations that the worst 
brutalities, the worst violations of human rights and human 
life, have rested. Reading about how different people have 
chosen to characterize their lives, their daily struggles, 
may not cause a revolution in the usual sense, but it may, 
ln the words of Kate Millet, help to effect "a deep 
emotional type of transformation that must also take place 
inside us. It's a better way to live" (in Kolodny, 
1980: 249) . Textual analysis might seem to be a luxury 
which only the privileged can indulge in, but it is not 
without merits. Jameson, for instance, defends literary 
criticism, which "in bourgeois terms is very obviously a 
marginal activity ... , but from a Marxist perspective it 
would appear to be even more so, the very type of 
apolitical or 'unrevolutionary' speculation ... " (Dowling, 
1984:99) with the answer that this argument derives from a 
failure to perceive the cultural sphere as an arena of 
class struggle and revolutionary conflict. His view of 
narrative completes his response: 
since History comes to us encoded in narrative form, 
the literary critic confronting a text is, far from 
being a marginal figure, the very type of the mind 
confronting Reality, and interpretation is the form of 
its understanding. The task of Marxist thought is 
thus not to forswear interpretation, but to rescue it 
from the denial and repression of History. (Dowling, 
1984:99-100) 
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Perhaps what I hope most to have demonstrated through 
particularized readings of specific texts is what Lionnet 
so succinctly expresses: "the symbolic is real, and In 
symbols lies our only hope for a better world. To 
reinterpret the world is to change it" (Lionnet, 1989:26). 
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NOTES 
Notes for Chapter 1 
1. Perhaps a caveat is necessary here: 1948 is commonly 
(and erroneously) emphasised as giving rise to racism in 
South Africa under the auspices of the Afrikaner 
Nationalist Party; as Clements Kadalie and Naboth Mokgatle 
and others indicate, racism was entrenched in South African 
lifestyles and legislation (e.g. 1913 Land Act) long before 
the Nationalists won the 1948 election. 
2. Not all South African autobiographers are concerned with 
the political horrors of their lives: many write life 
stories which give little indication · of a specifically 
South African social context. Some that come to mind are 
Ulf Boberg's The Boberg Story (1957), Ruth Gordon's Alive~ 
Alive-O! (1984), Gordon Forbes' A Handful of Summers 
(1978), and Harry H. Hermans' The Law my Master (1970). 
3. It must, of course, be noted, that the genesis of the 
interdisciplinary movement in intellectual endeavours is to 
be found in the influence of linguistics on a wide variety 
of human sciences and the arts. In literary studies, for 
example, the early decades of this century saw the 
Formalists, the New Critics, and Leavis emphatically defend 
the notion of the specialness, the distinctiveness, of 
literary studies. In the latter half of the century, 
however, the influence of Saussurean linguistics on 
literary studies was to cause a re-assessment of the field 
in the light of its place as one semiotic system amongst 
others. Literature was thus seen to be one instance of a 
general system by which meanings are generated; the 
methodology of literary studies differed very little from 
those adopted by others in the humanities. The result of 
the broad application of the Saussurean linguistic paradigm 
across this range of disciplines was, as we know, 
structuralism . A fuller discussion ensues in Chapter 2. 
(See Scholes, Structuralism in Literature and Culler, 
Structuralist Poetics and also the chapters on 
structuralism in the introductory texts to literary theory 
by Selden and J ef ferson and Robey) . 
4. Terry Eagle ton has some interesting things to say about 
the rise of Lit e rature as a discipline in the introduction 
and first chapter of his Literary Theory: An Introduction. 
He notes, for instance, that since the turn of the 
eighteenth cen t ury , li terature' has been used to refer 
exclusively t o c r eative or imaginative work (1983:17-18). 
5. Derrida ind icates a suspension of concepts by placing 
words "under era s ure", signified by crossing them through 
in the text and t hus warning the reader not to take them at 
face value. "-:'he marks of erasure acknowledge both the 
inad~~acy 0 E the terms employed their highly 
provlslonal s tat us -- and the fact that thought simply 
cannot manage ~l thout them in the work of deconstruction. 
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By this graphic means, much akin to the anomalous spelling 
of differance, concepts are perpetually shaken and 
dislodged" (Norris, 1982: 69) . 
6. It is important to bear in mind, however, that while 
the genre, by definition, concerns itself with issues which 
are presently enjoying topicality across a range of 
theoretical approaches and disciplines, I do not wish 
claim, as Olney rather extravagantly does, that, 
"autobiography renders in a peculiarly direct and faithful 
way the experience of a people, which is the same 
experience and the same vision lying behind and informing 
all the literature of that people ... " (1980: 13). The genre 
in all its multiplicity of forms and functions, subject to 
constant transformation, cannot justly be exalted over (or 
indeed, dismissed as inferior to) other textual practices 
as though such status is a quality inherent in the genre 
per se, a quality which transcends historical and cultural 
specificity. 
7. James Olney remarks that it is a contemporary 
fascination with the autos that is primarily at root of the 
current popularity of autobiography as the focus for 
critical and theoretical studies (1980:19, 23). While not 
contesting this, I would argue that the centrality accorded 
to material practice, largely as a result of Marxist 
theories, and the importance which recent theories confer 
upon textuali ty, are also important contributors to the 
popularity of the genre. 
Olney notes, too, that autobiography, "has become the 
focalizing literature for various 'studies' that otherwise 
have little by way of a defining, organizing center to 
them ... such 'studies' as American Studies, Black Studies, 
Women's Studies, and African Studies. According to the 
argument of these critics autobiography offers a 
privileged access to an experience ... that no other way of 
writing can offer" (13). 
8. Felicity Nussbaum says that the first stirrings of 
conceptualisations of the autobiographical as a distinct 
generic class (and, by implication, theorisations about 
that generic category) occurred in England "toward the end 
of the eighteenth century" and notes that "The first use 
of the word 'autobiography' in an English title may well be 
in W.P.Scargill's The Autobiography of a Dissenting 
Minister (1834)" (1989:1-2). 
9. The first edition of a\b:Auto\Biography Studies appeared 
early in 1985. Four issues per annum have been produced 
ever Slnce. 
10. In 1989 six papers were presented which dealt with 
South African fiction, and two which looked at South 
African literature and society. No papers dealing with 
South African autobiography were presented. In 1990, five 
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papers dealing with South African fi~tion were presen~ed; 
two on South African poetry and nlne on South Afrlcan 
autobiography, making this the most heavily represented 
field at the conference. This weighting has not been 
repeated (perhaps because such an enthusiastic panel 
organiser has not again come forward), but the genre is 
still very topical, judging by the numbers of journal 
articles on autobiographical writing. 
11. Thus Helen Joseph's autobiographical writings are 
included even though she was born in England. Her texts 
are about her experiences in South Africa, and she feels 
she belongs here. She says in her autobiography, 
My brother in England asked me to consider 
returning... For me, to leave South Africa and 
return to England was unthinkable. South Africa 
is my land by adoption, even if not by birth. 
For me to leave would be the ultimate betrayal. 
I was not being a martyr about this. I wanted to 
stay ' in South Africa, to be side by side with my 
friends in the struggle, whether banished, banned 
or in goal. Perhaps it might cost me dear. I 
did not know, but the greater price would have 
been to leave. (1986:146) 
I have included, t oo, autobiographies by exiled South 
Africans like Hugh Lewin and also by authors who are not 
South Africans, by birth or naturalisation, but who have 
written about their experiences in South Africa. Examples 
are Trevor Huddlestone's Naught for Your Comfort and 
Quentin Jacobsen's Solitary in Johannesburg. 
12: The fact that the apartheid era has ended has been( 
significant for this study in another way: a great many 
previously banned texts have now been unbanned, no longer 
being perceived as a threat to the State, and whereas in 
the past many texts had to be read in the physical presence 
of a librarian (if they were accessible at all), these are 
now freely available. 
13. Some attempt to present verifiable information about a 
person's experiences was an almost invariable criterion; 
Dugmore Boetie's self-proclaimed autobiography is 
exceptional in that it has, according to its editor Barney 
Simon, proven to be a work of fantasy. Also deviating from 
this norm is Thula Baba, the aggregated life-story 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
14. The study has been confined to texts written in 
English. Certainly, a more comprehensive analysis of 
autobiographical writing across languages would no doubt 
reveal some interesting trends. I believe, however, that 
the restriction to English (enforced by my own linguistic 
limitations and my disciplinary affiliation) is not too 
seriously debilitating for English is the medium in which 
by far the largest number of autobiographical texts are 
published, even by those whose mother tongue is not 
308 
English. This may be explained, in part, ,by writers' ,and 
publishers' awareness of the greater potentlal readershlp -
_ within South Africa and abroad-- for English texts rather 
than those written in Zulu, Sotho, Afrikaans or other 
indigenous languages. It may be due, too, to the 
perception of many that English is the language of 
liberation and progress. In this regard, one might recall 
the number of African countries which have, post-
independence, adopted English as their official language. 
Namibia and Zimbabwe are two recent examples. 
15. The selection favours works by black South Africans 
principally because these texts seem to carry greater 
weight -amongst readers, in South Africa and overseas, and 
because they have, in certain instances, seemed to me to be 
more innovative. Black women: Kuzwayo and numerous others 
in the worker anthologies; black men: Moloi, Luthuli, and 
many others in worker autobiographies. White women: 
Gordon; white men: Breytenbach and Campbell. 
16. The corollary has been the exclusion of texts which 
frequently find themselves on English undergraduate 
syllabi, such as Mphahlele's Down Second Avenue, Abraham's 
Tell Freedom, and Modisane's Blame Me on History. 
********************************************************* 
Notes for Chapter 2 
1. I usually use the term poststructuralism, although 
there has been a tendency in the last few years for 
theorists to prefer the term postmodernism. In spite of the 
fact that poststructuralism is not a unified theory, some 
of its detractors have effected a shift in emphasis (rather 
than a rejection of fundamental poststructuralist 
precepts). The new appellation for the later theoretical 
position would seem usually to be 'postmodern'. Lars 
Engle, for example, used this term at the 1990 AUETSA 
conference to denote what he referred to as "oppositional" 
approaches, clearly denoting a range of responses relying 
heavily on poststructuralist theories, ~nd Felicity 
Nussbaum defines her theoretical position as a "postmodern 
mode of inquiry that takes account of gender issues" 
(1989:xvi). I, however, find the term 'postmodernism' to 
be more misleading than 'poststructuralism' since it 
already has long established a usefulness as a reference to 
a different and rather specific set of characteristics of 
'literary' (and 'artistic') texts; and even when used in 
relation to theoretical texts it embraces a variety of 
approaches which are not always distinguishable from 
poststructuralist practice. Rice and Waugh, for instance, 
argue that, 
There are some obvious links between postmodernist and 
poststructuralist theories: for instance, emphasis on 
the signifier, the questioning and relativizing of 
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truth, the fragmentation of the subject. But there 
are also important differences. Postmodernism extends 
the reign of the signifier into culture in general and 
poses a more radical "loss" of the signified; it casts 
doubt on the function and ability of language to 
organize and control meanings in the socio-cultural 
domain; it recasts the role of the social mass as held 
within the reason of ideology; and it emphasizes 
consumption, seeing it as a play which constantly 
eludes the rational explanation of theory ... 
[Postmodernist theory] marks the emergence of a 
radical critique of the theoretical moment witnessed 
over the past twenty or so years; a critique which 
poses critical theory as the dream of a now redundant 
form of understanding the world. (1989:260) 
Many self-defined 'postmodernist' theorists are more 
materialist in emphasis than Rice and Waugh's definition 
implies, while many poststructuralists engage in what they 
refer to as postmodernist practice. 
2. Rice and Waugh, on occasion, use the plural to indicate 
the heterogeneity of the field: "various post-
structuralisms" (4); Young, in his introduction to Untying 
the Text, notes that poststructuralism is an "autocritique" 
of structuralism and that the word poststructuralism itself 
"shifts the emphasis from any single meaning or theory 
towards an unbound movement through time and space, 
suggesting that there... can never be any definitive 
'theory of poststructuralism'" (1981: 6) . Chris Weedon 
acknowledges the plurality of meanings of poststructuralism 
(1987:19) but identifies some cornmon principles (20). 
Nussbaum, too, makes this point (1991:24 -30). 
3. Young, in his introduction to Untying the Text refers 
to a 1971 interview with Barthes in which Barthes suggests 
that the shift from structuralism to poststructuralism 
occurred between 1966 and S/Z (1970). 
4. This insight characterizes the poststructuralist 
thinking of Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, White and many 
feminists like Weedon and Nussbaum but not the thinking of 
Lacan or Althusser. This poststructuralist insistence on 
provisionality is criticized by Selden (1985:102) and 
others. 
5. See, for instance, Barthes (1977:3-4; 74; 79; 85; 92-
95; 105; 119). 
6. Althusser contends that the relative 
influence of ISAs alter in response 
historical circumstances prevailing at 
(Henriques et aI, 1984:96). 
distributions of 
to the overall 
a specific time 
7 . Ideology" represents the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence" 
(Althusser, 1971:162) and it requires the blindness of all 
310 
to its distortions; it requires the subjection of all to 
its exploitive system. I find Althusser's account to be 
useful as an explanatory model of the interpellation of the 
subject but, like Foucault, I reject Althusser's use of 
ideology as though it is in opposition to the truth of 
Marxist "science". So when I use the term ideology, I use 
it to mean the idea systems by which we make sense of the 
world, not to mean that these are false and that I have 
access to the ' truth' . Generally, I prefer the term 
discourse (it also has the advantage of being more 
obviously implicated in material practice) and my analyses 
of specific texts tend to focus on discourses rather than 
ideologies. 
8. Lemaire (1977:113-114) notes that Lacan's intellectual 
approach may be defined as ironic (i. e. ·having an 
interrogative import) Lacan's writings do not lend 
themselves to closure; nor does he claim to have propounded 
theories. 
9. It will be recalled that Weedon (1987: 27) made a 
similar, yet importantly different, observation about 
Althusser's theory of the subject and the social when she 
said that consciousness is not the cause of social 
relations but rather their effect. 
10. Derrida, like Barthes and Lacan, theorizes the role of 
language in the constitution of subjectivity as being, 
a place of exile, a medium where absence, death, and 
repeti tion rule without exception. A language can 
only constitute itself as such by virtue of an 
original catastrophe, a violent separation from 
nature .... As [is written in Derrida's] "Living On": 
"A tongue can never be appropriated; it is only ever 
as the other's tongue that it is mine, and 
reciprocally." (Levesque, 1985:143-144) 
The speaking/writing subject is split from the 
subject; the 'real author' is a split subject 
discourse and by unconSClOUS desire, and 
process is simply a record of absence, of 





11. Anne Jefferson and David Robey are guilty of this in 
their Modern Literary Theory: A Comparative Introduction, 
as are Rory Ryan and Susan van Zyl in their like text, An 
Introduction to Contemporary Literary Theory. This 
erroneous simp li fication of poststructuralism ignores key 
poststructura l : s t insights generated by Lacan, Barthes, 
Foucault and Kr:s teva but does serve to draw attention to 
the prominen c - of the contribution of Derridean 
deconstructi on :: 0 the poststructuralist enterprise. For 
instance, Young . in his Introduction to Untying the Text 
observes that . "I t is Derrida who is often associated most 
closely with Pi s t structuralism, precisely because it is he 
who has inve s ~ ~gated and exposed the contradictions and 
paradoxes upo n · ... ·hich structuralism is formed" (1981: 15) . 
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12. But to attempt to stabilize differance as signifier 
and signified is to ignore the Derridean injunction against 
such logocentrism for differance "has neither existence nor 
essence. It belongs to no category of being, present or 
absent" (1973 :134). Differance, in its refusal to accept 
stability of signifieds and in its disturbance at the level 
of the signifier (its anomalous spelling), thus designates 
as well as enacts the theme of the instability of 
signification (Norris, 1987:15 and 1982:32; -also Jefferson, 
Jefferson and Robey, 1986:119). 
13. Interestingly, the point is made in "Roundtable on 
Translation" in The Ear of the Other (1985:93-161) that 
translation, in its attempts to divorce signified and 
signifier so that a pure signified is simply attached to a 
new system of signifiers, can never achieve its ultimate 
goal. It must always entail transformation. Nor can one 
translate one integrated and complete language into 
another, forevery linguistic system comprises "several 
languages or tongues" (100). 
14. Norris, in Deconstruction, remarks that the utopian 
longing for textual free play tends to "anarchic effect" in 
later Derridean texts (1982:49). 
15. Derrida has also delivered (more direct) attacks on 
Foucault's early work: apropos Foucault's attempt in 
Madness and Civilization to write a history of madness 
before being captured by knowledge, Derrida shows that the 
project is self-deluded if it tries to achieve a standpoint 
outside or above the discourse of reason (Norris, 1987:214-
215) 
16. The Foucault vs Derrida quarrel which Norris takes up 
on the side of Derrida seems to me to fail to take account 
of the fact that what is at stake is a difference in 
strategy. Moreover, Norris's defence of Derrida (1987:216-
217) on the grounds that Derrida's concerns with political 
realities are evidenced in his insistence on the "worldly" 
consequences of the writings of Nietzsche and Freud seems 
to me to be very slim justification in the face of much 
more evidence which indicates a complete absence of 
political engagement in even a broad sense. 
Norris's criticism of Foucault"s "extreme epistemological 
scepticism" which, Norris claims, "leads him to equate 
knowledge with power, and hence to regard all forms of 
'enlightene~' progress (in psychiatry, sexual attitudes or 
penal reform) as signs of increasing sophistication in the 
applied technology of social control" is a misreading of 
Foucault in the sense that it implies a hopelessness and 
lack of resistance which Foucault is at pains to deny is 
true of contemporary power relations (any more than power 
relations in the past). Furthermore, what Norris (217) 
says of Derrida (by way of contrast with Foucault), applies 
equally to Foucault; Foucault also insists that one has to 
work within contemporary intellectual traditions but 
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against some of its ruling ideas, and that thus one can 
effectively criticize existing institutions. 
17 . This is a serious difference between Foucault and 
Al thusser and other Marxists and neo-Marxists; for them~---­
Marxist doctrine (in some form) provides the 'truth' which 
- must be referred to whenever understanding of ideology is 
sought. 
18. By the by, The Hamlyn Pocket Thesaurus of English 
Words (1979:31) gives "effeminacy, femininity" as synonyms 
for weakness, and "effeminate, womanly" as synonyms for 
weak! 
19. Other important French feminists are Helene Cixous, 
who has been producing feminist texts rather prolifically 
since the mid sixties (Jones, 1985b:89); Monique Wittig, 
whose stridently feminist Les guerilleres was published in 
1969; and Luce Irigaray who published her important essay 
Speculum de l'autre femme in 1974. 
20. Some who are guilty of this oversight are Jefferson 
and Robey, Selden (1985), Easthope (1988 :xiv) and even 
avowed feminists like Chris Weedon (1987) and Cecily 
Lockett (1990); in all of these the emphasis is on the 
influence of poststructuralism on feminism, omitting a 
concomitant analysis of the influence of feminism on 
poststructuralism. Selden, for example, includes Kristeva 
in his discussion of poststructuralism, but excludes the 
feminist dimension of her work, dealing with it only in his 
(deeply flawed) chapter on feminism, even though of her 
"semanalysis" Kristeva declares: "It was perhaps also 
necessary to be a woman to attempt to take up that 
exorbitant wage of carrying the rational project to the 
outer borders of the signifying venture of men ... " 
(1980:x). 
21. While I think that Weedon fails to acknowledge the 
influence of feminism in much of the work of 
poststructuralism's founding fathers (and to pay due 
attention to Kristeva's key input), her remark about the 
"men's club" of the early poststructuralist theorists is 
nevertheless worth repeating: 
It is no coincidence that these theorists are all men; 
this is a consequence of the gender relations which 
have structured women's absence from the active 
production of most theory within a whole range of 
discourses over the last 300 years. It is also a mark 
of the particular conditions under which prestigious 
and powerful bodies of knowledge were and are 
produced. (1987:13) 
22. For a summary of Showalter'S critique of Terry 
Eagleton's and Jonathan Culler's "feminist" approaches, see 
Joseph Allen Boone (1989:161). 
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23. See Kristeva 
course, many women 
issued a powerful 
feminisms which do 
sufficient rigour of 
1980b:137-141, especially 140. Of 
of colour in America and Africa have 
critique on European and American 
not consider race and class with 
honesty . 
24. I am not able to wholeheartedly endorse this position, 
tending dangerously as it does towards essentialism. 
Moreover, the celebration of women's sexuality seems to be 
a little flippant in the light of the profound deprivation 
to which millions of South African (and other) women are 
subjected. 
25. Levi-Strauss' s implicit sexism is manifest in his 
failure to react to this contradictory status of women. 




Derrida and many other poststructuralist 
a similar distrust for grand political 
27. Jameson, too, endorses a view of marxism as "truth" 
while working within a poststructuralist or postmodernist 
paradigm (Dowling, 1984:13). 
On problems with marxism, see Dowling, 1984:48-49. 
28. See also Henriques et al, 1984:95-98. 
29. See, for instance, Lemaire, 1977:181. 
30. Consider the 'sexism implicit in the following from 
"The signification of the phallus" in : 
... male homosexuality ... is constituted on the side of 
desire, while female homosexuality, on the other hand, 
as observation shows, is orientated on a 
disappointment that reinforces the side of the demand 
for love. (1977:290) 
Surely not many lesbians would agree. 
31. See Cathy Urwin (Henriques et al, 1984:282, 318). 
Also dubious, though not strictly germane to my theoretical 
discussion, is whether psychoanalysis, and marxism, 
actually do what they set out to do. Has marxism achieved 
what it promises, anywhere? Can the psychoanalyst be 
utterly passive (Lemaire, 1977:198, 217-219, 221) so that 
"the movement of analysis unfo l ds 'according to the paths 
of a specific gravitation, which is truth' [Lacan, French 
Ed. of icrits]: the truth of the patient's desire" 
(Lemaire, 1977:222)? And even if this is achieved, how is 
it known to be achieved? How does the analyst recognize 
this truth? Or the patient, since it is the truth of the 
unconscious? Moreover, how do the psychoanalyst and 
psychoanalytic theorist recognize the "true essence" of the 
subject (Lemaire, 1977: 6-7, 67, 69)? Is this not an 
attempt to cling to the notion of the unified subject, 
while simultaneously positing a decentred, split 
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subjectivity? 
32. Dowling, for instance, argues that "neither the human 
psyche as Freud studies it nor the theory he developed to 
explain its dynamics is permanent or timeless"; "it is the 
essence of ideological thinking, of which Freudian 
psychoanalysis is simply one prominent example, to shut out 
or deny its ultimate grounding in History and Necessity" 
(1984:31) . 
33. I am most uncomfortable, for example, with Barthes' 
claim that, 
the intellectual's (or the writer's) historical 
function, today, is to maintain and to emphasize the 
decomposi tion of bourgeois consciousness ... this means 
that we deliberately pretend to remain wi thin this 
consciousness and that we will proceed to dismantle 
it, to weaken it, to break it down on the spot, as we 
would a lump of sugar by steeping it in water. 
(1977:63) 
34. Selden concludes his chapter on poststructuralism with 
the following: "[Poststructuralism'sl desire to resist 
assertions is itself doomed to failure because only by 
saying nothing could they prevent us from thinking that 
they mean something. This summary of their views itself 
implies their failure" (1985: 102) . While I would argue 
that not all poststructuralists can be tarred with the same 
brush, examples of the kind of theoretical project to which 
he refers are amply provided by Derrida, Lacan and by 
Barthes (1977:172). 
35. On the abstruseness of Derrida, Dowling remarks: "What 
Derrida was saying, I later realized, was that you can come 
right out and say what you mean only if you've got a false 
theory of meaning, but even so, he never said that 
directly, and... (These are the frustrations one felt)" 
(1984:10-11). And Norris refers to the "the centrifugal 
energies of destruction" (1982:124; also 126-129). 
Lemaire notes that certain expressions typical of Lacan 
refer to different concepts · in different contexts, this 
without explanation on Lacan's part (1977:157); and Robert 
Con Davis says that it often seems as though we're not 
meant to understand Lacan's work (1983:855-6). 
36. Deconstruction theorized the discursive context as the 
relationship of difference between written texts, and 
while insisting that non-discursive forces are 
important, does not spell out the social power 
relations within which texts are located. (Weedon, 
1987:25) 
Of the charge of political timidity, Barthes says of 
himself (rather damningly, in my opinion), "And it is 
because he fails to separate political reality from its 
general, repea ted discourse that politics is barred to 
him." For Barthes, "politics too belongs to the category 
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of languages, and turns to Prattle" (1977:52-53). 
37. See, for example, Norma Kitson's (1987) critiques of 
the power games played by members of the Anti-apartheid 
movement in London or Elizabeth de Villiers' (1990) 
oppressive consciousness of her white skin or Godfrey 
Moloi's (1987, 1991) racism . 
38. Foucault's notion of the "specific intellectual" is 
helpful here; see "Truth and Power" (1984:51 -75). 
********************************************************* 
Notes for Chapter 3 
1. "The unconscious comes into existence simultaneously 
with the subject's first assimilation of cultural 
prohibition" (Silverman, 1983:55). This poststructuralist 
insistence on the de-centred nature of sUbjectivity is the 
reason for this chapter's title; " identi ty" implies 
sameness and would thus be inappropriate. 
2. Although claiming to be true (based on true accounts of 
experience) Thula Baba is the exception to this rule 
because it does not give verifiable information. 
3 . See Gunner, Opland , and Kunene. I have already 
referred to this phenomenon briefly in the section on 
Foucault in Chapter 2, as an instance of the productivity 
of power. More detailed discussion follows in Chapter 5. 
4. Although the title of Rive's Writing Black insists upon 
a recognition of the writer's racial classification, the 
text tends to efface this. 
5. See Foucault's essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 
(1984) . He takes the argument regarding the body as 
socially signi ficant a step further: 
We believe ... that the body obeys the exclusive laws 
of physiology and that it escapes the influence of 
history, but this too is false. The body is molded by 
a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by 
the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is 
poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or 
moral laws; it constructs resistances.... Nothing in 
man -- not even his body -- is sufficiently stable to 
serve a s t he basis for self-recognition or for 
understan '~ ng other men. (1984:87-8) 
6. Whether th ~ero 's exploits, recorded in the narrative, 
were actually p rformed by the writer, Roy Campbell, or not 
is irrelevant ~ } t his analysis of the text . At stake here 
is the tex t ' . d 1 construction of the narrator and 
protagonist. ?oststructuralist theory insists upon the 
non-transparency of the text. Of course, what is relevant 
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though, is the fact that the text claims that it is a 
faithful record of lived experience. 
7. Consider his pronouncement that the French Revolution 
was a "volcano of blood and pus" which caused France to 
decline into "a third-rate masonic republic, divided 
against itself" (Campbell, 1971:158). Not afraid to pass 
to pass summary judgement about disparate global events, he 
goes on, "All political activity which has been attempted 
outside of tradition during the last one hundred and fifty 
years has worked out in the inverse sense from its original 
intention" (158). 
8. For example, from his maternal grandmother, a Gascon, 
he inherits his "love of bulls, and of Provencal, French, 
and Spanish poetry" (23; also 84-5). From his paternal 
grandfather he inherited the "malady" of versifying (25). 
An exceptional ability with animals "runs in the family" 
(35). In later chapters we read that he inherited from his 
father "his unselfconsciousness in dealing with [his] 
fellowmen" and his "mastery of horses which has been [his] 
passport through every frontier" (62). 
9. The narrator's introduction indicates the motive and 
time of writing: he is a demobilised soldier, the time is 
1951 (20). 
10. Annie Leclerc's thoughts on mastery are apposite: 
"Master, master: there is the master word of all our 
submissions to the greatness of man" (1980: 81) . She 
observes that men must conquer to obtain mastery: 
I know that what a man likes about himself and what 
he's made the object of his respect are the virtues of 
the conqueror and the proprietor. He needs the 
strength to conquer and the bulk to possess with 
impunity. 
The virtue of virtues, the virtus, is force. 
(1980:82) 
11. Campbell was "still a only minor of nineteen" (251) 
when he married. 
12. Chaucer's Franklin's advice on how to keep love alive 
in a marriage has clearly fallen on deaf ears here! 
1,3 . She is referred to by name by Wyndham Lewis ("Mary 
Campbell", 244), Stuart Gray ("Miss Mary", 247), by a 
servant ("Miss Mary", 251), by the gypsies (254), and by a 
woman whom the narrator dubs "Mrs Sennacheribs" (255). 
14. In the narrative dealing with their courtship, this 
phrase ("my wife") occurs three times (248, 249, 251); 
after marriage it is used more frequently (252, 253, 254, 
255, 256, 258, 264). 
15. I must mention the fact that Campbell's chivalric 
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attitude to his wife in no way precludes his womanising 
pursuits . Although almost thrown away in narrative asides, 
Campbell tells us of a kind of urban hunt in which he and 
Liam 0' Flaherty "carried out the four best-looking ladies" 
from a Mayfair club ("without any opposition from their 
menfolk"), forgetting that their wives were waiting in the 
taxi (317). And later , it is only when he and Mary convert 
to Catholicism and are remarried in the Catholic Church 
that he "went monogamous" (325). He does not record these 
earlier affairs. 
16. That the autobiography is peppered with racist 
sentiment is undeniable, but one should also bear in mind 
that the author claims to have made himself very unpopular 
by defying the "Colour Bar" (83,261). 
17. Alan Paton, Zola Budd, E.G. Malherbe, Ezekiel 
Mphahlele, Guy Butler, Noni Jabavu, amongst others, write 
what I would classify as classic realist autobiographies. 
18. This term is, according to Dorothy Driver, Lauretta 
Ncgobo's (Driver, 1991a:93). Neither feminism nor 
nationalism take precedence in the woman's self-definition. 
19. Rirnrnon-Kenan explains this term: 
The story is presented in the text through the 
mediation of some ' prism', , perspective', , angle of 
vision', verbalized by the narrator though not 
necessarily his.... Obviously, a person (and, by 
analogy, a narrative agent) is capable of both 
speaking and seeing, and even of doing both things at 
the same time.... But a person (and ... narrative 
agent) is also capable of undertaking to tell what 
another person sees or has seen. Thus, speaking and 
seeing, narration and focalization, may, but need not, 
be attributed to the same agent. (1983:71-2) 
20 . . There are many examples; I cite the following two, 14 
and 23-4, in which the focalizer and focalized become the 
black woman, uprooted, uneducated, poverty-stricken. When 
Kuzwayo is the focalizer, she consistently foregrounds her 
sympathy and empathy for all sorts of black women, even 
those who are markedly different from her, in all sorts of 
ways. For instance, her discussion of women who 
participate in a licentious dance called the timiti (31) is 
sympathetic (yet disapproving) . 
21. Focalization "has a subj ect and an obj ect. The 
subject (the 'focalizer') is the agent whose perception 
orients the presentation, whereas the obj ect (the 
, focalized') is what the focalizer perceives" (Rirnrnon-
Kenan, 1983: 74) . 
22. I would argue against the suggestion made by Gordimer 
(1985: xi), Head (1985: xiv) and Daymond (1987: 13 -4) that 
Kuzwayo is representative of South African black women. 
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This comment has often been made about the autobiographical 
subjects of American (e.g. by Rosenblatt, 1980:179-80) and 
South African black-authored autobiographies; viz. that the 
autobiographer stresses not her unique individuality but 
rather her representativeness or typicality. 
23. See also Kuzwayo's response to two white women: 
I examined the way I had received my visitors and was 
forced to recognise the harm my detention had done to 
me. I saw the dents it had left on me, the unseen, 
emotional scars I had suffered, as well as the need to 
help myself out of that rut. (1985:232) 
Daymond, for example, cites a number of features which 
are held in some quarters to be definitive of 
autobiography: a confessional impulse; a sense that the 
confessing self can be representative; the "ability to 
isolate the shaping events and conditions" of one's life, 
"to give them form and to search in them for a meaningful 
pattern of cause and effect" (1987: 15); the individual must 
"speak up for herself against the community" thus 
indicating "a sense of self, a sense of her right to 
autonomous decision-making" (20); suffering as the usual 
motive for autobiography (15, 21) ; and, lastly, 
"specificity of detail ... what could only be told by the 
narrator herself" (21). 
25. See 154 (this is claimed twice), 159, 163, 166, 331. 
26. See, for example, 
narrator's use of dates 
narrative in fact. 
61, 183, 
and place 
242ff, 314, and 
names to "anchor" 
the 
the 
27. Obviously, I am disagreeing with Johan Jacobs' claim 
(1986) that the text is more fictional than 
autobiographical. 
28. See Part I, Chapter 6 which discusses how and why he 
came to indulge in "terrorist" activities (especially 38) . 
29. The narrator outlines his opposition to the ANC and 
SACP on the grounds that their refusal to acknowledge the 
deep divisions caused by apartheid between black and white 
reduces the effectiveness of their strategies of subversion 
(73-4; 76). 
30. My edition (Faber and Faber, 1984) has a drawing by 
the author on the front cover, and a small photograph of 
him on the back. I have since seen another copy of the 
text which has an enlarged copy of the photograph of the 
author on the front cover, replacing the drawing. This is 
a great pity. It underscores only one reading of the 
author's identity, the most conventional one. 
31. This is a.common feature of narrative autobiographies; 
at the narratlve's conclusion the narrator and protagonist 
319 
are not only closer together temporally (the time gap 
between story time and time of narration usually closes 
progressively during the course of the narration), but 
values approach coincidence. Thus the conclusion of the 
narrative autobiography often represents an attempt to 
suture the split between le sujet de l'enonce and le sujet 
de l'enonciation but this coincidence can never be perfect 
because it is exactly in the divorce between the two that 
the autobiography's existence is possible at all. 
32. This is the title of a play by Athol Fugard, thus 
again illustrating the complexity of the interweaving of 
present (in Paris) and past (in South Africa) . 
33. Barthes' autobiographical narrator states: 
Self-commentary? What a bore! I had no other 
solution than to rewrite myself -- at a distance, a 
great distance -- here and now: to add to the books, 
to the themes, to the memories, to the texts, another 
utterance, without my ever knowing whether it is about 
my past or my present that I am speaking. (1977:142) 
34. I am indebted to a late colleague, Ashley Ward, for 
his comments on his reading of this drawing. 
35. See 13, 
("jailbird") , 
140, 146 (prisoner as 
194 ("birds"). 
"birdie") , 154, 179 
36. He describes with bitterness how his keepers liked "to 
fuck around with my mind" (36). It is noteworthy, however, 
how rarely the narrator expresses or implies any hostility 
to Mr Investigator, reinforcing the sense that "we here see 
the mirror and its own mirror image" (86). 
37. Silverman states that "the mirror stage is one of 
those crises of alienation around which the Lacanian 
subj ect is organized, since to know oneself through an 
external image is to be defined through self-alienation" 
(1983:158). 
38. See Silverman (1983:43-53), Belsey, Weedon and others. 
39. Cf. frontispiece quotation, "Song of the Origin of the 
Four Natures": 
Others do not know my nature. 
As I know not the nature of others, 
The nature of things as that of men, 
Just like the universal nature. 
This universal nature is like my partial one. 
If I were to know my nature well, 
I should be knowing universal nature. 
40. Lemaire: 
One of the specific characteristics of language 1S 
that it evokes a thing, a reality, by means of a 
substitute which this thing is not, evoking, in other 
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words its presence against a ground of absence .... 
This act of substituting a "sign for a reality is also 
an operation of mediation whereby the subject places 
himself at a distance from the lived experience and is 
thus able to locate himself as a subject distinct from 
his surroundings. (1977:51) 
********************************************************* 
Notes for Chapter 4 
1. The editors of Vukani Makhosikazi state that between 
1960 and 1980, "more than two million people were moved as 
a result of government policy" (1985:181). 
2. This tendency for the record of the life to obscure the 
writing self is found also in some white-authored texts 
like Boberg's, Ruth Gordon's, Malherbe's and many others in 
which the motive is patently not political; it would seem 
in these instances that the authors want rather to retain 
a large degree of privacy in their making public their life 
stories. 
3. Derrida describes his opposition to grand explanations: 
"In any case I am very mistrustful whenever people identify 
historical breaks or when they say, 'This begins there'" 
(1985:84) . 
4. The temptation" to conform to traditional teleogical 
models is hard to avoid in South Africa in the period under 
consideration since the Master narrative (in its double 
sense) of apartheid and its eventual demise seem to be 
paramount. 
5. This is a point made by Spacks (1980:121) ln relation 
to women's autobiographical writing. 
6. While it is true of most autobiographical writing that 
it does not off er "generalized truths based on documentary 
evidence", there are South African autobiographical texts 
which do something very similar. As we shall see, many 
worker autobiographies present aggregated autobiographical 
subjects (bas ed on interviews, usually), and many 
autobiographie s of black individuals present themselves as 
prototypical. The "generalized truths" of these texts are 
usually based o n interviews. (Nevertheless, since much 
'people's his t o ry' is too, the distinction must be used 
with care) . 
7. Of course my own interpellation as a white South African 
academic cons t~ · cts for me my own notions of what is true. 
8. My decisi or. to exclude from analysis white-authored 
autobiographi e s in this chapter is a deliberate and, I 
contend, a de f e nsible one. Autobiographies by whites like 
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Guy Butler, Alan Paton, Gordon Summer and zola Budd, to 
name a few examples, are unlikely to be reprinted, while 
Luthuli's went into twelve editions with one publisher, and 
was published by at least two other publishers. In a 
recent visit to the united States (July, 1993) the South 
African autobiographies which I found on the shelves of a 
few university bookstores were , almost without exception, 
those by black South Africans (the exception was usually 
Rian Malan's). Moreover , in courses on South African 
literature taught at South African universities, the 
autobiographies which are included are almost always those 
by black South Africans. 
9 . English autobiographies, and probably autobiographical 
production in general, are still not proportionally 
representative in terms of race groups or gender. 
10. At the risk of being repetitive, I would like to 
reiterate that developments are always uneven; there are 
autobiographies being produced even now which do not 
address these problems, but which are very conventional 
records of an individual's life and career. 
11. Although one should bear in mind the fact that 
Afrikaans-speaking peoples are likely to publish 
autobiographies in their own language, it is noteworthy 
that there are virtually no English autobiographies 
published in the last 46 years which act as apologies for 
apartheid, while there are Afrikaners who write their 
autobiographies in English, as do Ferreira and Breytenbach, 
in order specifically to distance themselves from Afrikaner 
culture and politics. 
12. This disunification of the family due to a family 
member's political activism is simply an intensification of 
the dissolution of the family as caused by apartheid, as 
Luthuli finds when he and his wife spend the first eight 
years of their marriage living apart (40-1). 
13. There are many South African autobiographers (women 
amongst them) who record their commitment to political 
struggles with the effect of increasing their own personal 
importance: Thomas Boydell, Boris Wilson, Caesar ina 
Makhoere, Janet Levine, Indres Naidoo all seem to me to 
have some elements of this in their autobiographies. 
14. Luthuli proves to be the exception to the rule that 
Spacks identifies: Spacks finds that the value of such 
commitment to a cause is different for women. Such a clear 
gender difference is not a consistent feature of South 
African autobiographical writing. Intense selfless 
commitment is evident in a man like Luthuli's 
autobiography; it is evident to some extent in 
autobiographies by women like Kuzwayo, First, Joseph, 
Benson and Mashinini. 
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15. I argue for the effectiveness of the text in spite of 
the fact that we cannot measure the text's influence in 
terms of actual responses by the international community. 
16. See 33, 36, 37. 
17. What Luthuli does not add here but acknowledges later 
(46) is that the "nineteenth-century tribalism" defined by 
white supremacists was their own version, a sham designed 
to disempower and impoverish blacks, rather than engender 
tribal 'identities and pride. This is evidenced in the fact 
that chiefs were Government appointees, whose primary 
responsibilities were to the white leaders, not to their 
own people. 
18. Luthuli takes great pains to ensure that readers 
understand that his appointment to the position of chief is 
the result of democratic process in the Groutville 
community. 
19. It seems to me that Poppie -- first published in 
Afrikaans in 1978 -- was the forerunner of these white-
authored quasi-autobiographical texts about black subj ects. 
Even though it is not, strictly speaking, autobiographical, 
the author, Elsa Joubert, prefaces the text with this note 
to the reader: 
This novel is based on the actual life story of a 
black woman living in South Africa today. Only her 
name ... is invented. The facts were related to me not 
only by Poppie herself, but by members of her 
immediate family and her extended family or clan, and 
they cover one family's experlence over the past forty 
years. (1985:n.p.) 
After Poppie came The Story of Mboma (1979) and The Diary 
of Maria Tholo (1980). Many others followed, especially in 
the form of anthologies of short autobiographical sketches 
in the mid-eighties, the worker autobiographies. 
20. Carole Boyce Davies also argues for this group of 
texts to be considered as a specific literary genre, 
because of peculiarities in "form and intent" (1989:88). 
21. Davies does not seem to include texts which deal with 
single autobiographical subj ects (1989: 88); she defines 
this category in terms of the class status of the 
autobiographical subject, and the intent of the 
edi tor /publisher to foreground the plight of the most 
oppressed black South Africans. I believe texts -- these 
are briefer than conventional autobiographies -- which are 
not "collections of personal stories" (Davies, 1989: 88) 
belong in this sUb-species. 
22. Working in South Africa edited by Ken Dovey, Lorraine 
Laughton and Jo-Anne Durandt (1985), belongs on the margins 
of this group since it includes personal accounts by South 
Africans who cannot be counted amongst the oppressed. I 
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have not included this text in my discussion of worker 
autobiographies. 
23. Bozzoli argues persuasively that "even such seemingly 
obvious concepts as 'race' are ambiguous, forged through a 
series of processes and shot through with both class and 
gender attributes" (1991:239). Nevertheless, in spite of 
the fact that these are not immutable concepts, and are 
"products of political decisions and not products of 
nature" (Kotze, 1993:xi), they affect in fundamental ways 
material existence. Kotze adds: 
To be labelled 'black', 'white' , 'coloured' or 
'Indian' in South Africa constitutes a very real kind 
of experience for the people concerned. But this is 
not to say that each of these population categories 
constitutes a common, homogeneous culture. They 
merely provide contexts -- externally specified and 
internally constructed. (Kotze, 1993:xi) 
24. Arguably, the experiences of black South Africans are 
traumatic, but not a trauma (which implies a discreteness, 
a finality, which is not applicable to a prolonged and 
systematic disempowerment and disablement of millions of 
people) . 
25. I spoke to a woman who had translated a Zulu novel 
into English; the English version was more than double the 
length of the original as this was, she said, the only way 
she could capture the essence of the Zulu. While I am not 
qualified to either endorse or deny such claims, I do think 
that length is probably a rather minor issue in the 
translation of prose. 
26. The blurb of Workinq Women claims: 
Working Women tells of the struggles of South Africa's 
black women workers. Through interviews and 
photographs women describe their lives at work and at 
horne. Strong voices speak out against women's 
oppression. The book shows women challenging the 
government, the bosses, and their own husbands. (n.p.) 
While this is true, it would also be true to say that the 
book shows many instances of women not challenging the 
government, the bosses, and their own husbands; examples of 
women submitting to gendered oppression are numerous. 
27. Robert Con Davis remarks that, 
[t]he structural kinship of literary narrative and 
clinical case history is as least as old as Freud. In 
fact, one of the distinctive inventions of the 
nineteenth century was the development of the case 
history as a mode of enquiry in many fields .... 
(1983:846) 
28. Although Women of Phokeng is meant to be a companion 
piece to Facing the Storm, and thus allow rural women to 
tell their life stories , it does not really do this since 
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many of the women spent large portions of their lives as 
migrant workers in the cities (4). 
29. The editors of We Came to Town (1985) do not use the 
photographs to "prove" the existence of the speaking 
subjects. In the "Note to the teacher" (n.p.) the editor 
states, "The photographs are not intended as direct 
illustrations but have been chosen to stimulate interest 
and group discussion by contrast and comparison." Here 
too, the sense is created that these photographs document 
typical black experience in its many facets, in both rural 
and urban environments. 
30. I have referred, previously, to Facing the Storm, Women 
of Phokeng and A Talent For Tomorrow as exceptions. 
********************************************************* 
Notes for Chapter 5 
1. Olney, writing of American or Western autobiographical 
practice, identifies a shift of attention from bios to 
autos which was "largely responsible for opening things up 
and turning them in a philosophical, psychological, and 
literary direction" (1980:19). In South Africa, the focus 
has remained largely biographical; nevertheless, when the" 
emphasis is on the self, as it is in Breytenbach and --
less obviously -- Kuzwayo, the philosophical tendency noted 
by Olney is apparent. 
2. I have argued elsewhere that the claim by the publishers 
of Jay Naidoo' s Coolie Location that the tradition of 
autobiography is "even more central than the novel in South 
African literary culture" is probably valid for literary 
production in the last decade at least (1991:20). 
3. Some readers might be tempted to deny that 
autobiographica l writing by the oppressed could be 
unappealing si nc e such an attitude would be politically 
incorrect. I wou ld argue, however, that judgements such as 
these are important indicators of the hierarchized 
constitutive d iscourses of both reader and text. 
4. I can think of quite a few texts by white men which I 
have had to struggle through, motivated only by my sense of 
purpose regarding this study. (Malherbe's, Evenden's, 
Boydell's and , unexpectedly, even Paton's, were for me 
quite unentic i~g ) . Although, of course, disparagement of 
these texts i s a cceptable in terms of current political 
fashions. 
5. I have r e sea r ched only English-medium texts (and thus 
do not know wha: autobiographical texts are being produced 
in any of the ,) t her languages currently spoken in South 
Africa) . Howe '; e r, while the fact that there are now 11 
official langua ges in South Africa makes a comprehensive 
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survey of the field of autobiographical production 
extremely difficult, I would hazard a guess that English 
texts make up by far the largest proportion. 
6. Lionnet lS referring here to the terms for 
miscegenation in English which always imply a negativity. 
I am broadening the application of this observation to a 
seeming inability (in general terms) of Anglo-American 
discursive fields to incorporate creatively the cultural 
practices of other groups. This is probably largely due to 
the power-base of the coloniser, and the fact that one of 
the ways to maintain this was to keep the coloniser' s 
culture 'pure' so that all of the bending had to be done by 
the colonized. 
7. Interestingly, Frye excludes biography and history from 
the category of fiction because he argues that these are 
non creative; however, he admits autobiography (or 
confession) as one of the four terms of fiction because he 
says "most autobiographers are inspired by a creative, and 
therefore fictional, impulse to select only those events 
and experiences in the writer's life that go to build up an 
integrated pattern" (cited by Scholes, 1974:125). 
8. There is, however, some evidence of the depersonalizing 
of the narrative voice in a few autobiographies: an attempt 
to achieve a sense of the historian's objective view of an 
epoch is manifest in the autobiographies of Lekota, 
Mokgatle and Luthuli. 
9. Since this chapter was written, I have corne across 
Eakin's book on referentiality in autobiography (Touching 
the World: Reference in Autobiography. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992) but although its subject is 
relevant to my work, I was not able to read it before 
completing the thesis . 
10. Freud refers to the need for those seeking relief from 
traumatic neuroses to re-experience a distressing past, but 
in such a way as to increase the distance between it and 
the present. What this really means is that ." the sensory 
and affective intensity of the memories in question is 
drastically reduced by submitting them to a linguistic 
organization" (Silverman, 1983:75); "the original memory 
traces ... lose sensory and affective intensity, but they 
gain meaning" (102). This would seem to apply to Rian 
Malan, Breytenbach, First (and other writers of prison 
memoirs), Lyndall Gordon, Mashinini, Kuzwayo, Mathabane, 
and Modisane. 
11. I find this formulation extreme, and untrue: the 
relation between the "authorizing author" and the text is 
highly complex. 
12. Autobiographies by black South Africans like 
Mphahlele, Abrahams, Jabavu and Luthuli made their mark, I 
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believe in the 60s. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out 
that in the 70s a far greater impact was made by black 
poets in journals like Staffrider. 
13. "Lily Moya" of Not Ei ther an Experimental Doll: The 
Separate Worlds of Three South African Women fails to tell 
her story. Shula Marks (the editor) has some interesting 
comments on this , as does Felicity Nussbaum (1990:26). 
14. The printed text can undergo revision: texts may be 
revised, abridged, censored and so on, and thus are not 
necessarily unchanging. Moloi's autobiographical writings 
illustrate the point. 
15. I think that Thula Baba, if indeed it is accepted as 
autobiographical, is perhaps the sole exception, having a 
"composite" autobiographical SUbject, the narrative being 
composed by numerous respondents in conjunction with their 
literacy teacher(s) . 
16 . Of course, one should bear in mind that In the 
traditional praise poem the community serves as the 
interpretative "brake" or limit condition . It is usually 
a profoundly allusive text; and the reality it connotes 
will be shared (and defined) by the community amongst whom 
it is performed. So the impression that the traditional 
form is less authoritarian is only partly valid: there is 
not a centralized authority, but meaning is nevertheless 
constrained by the community. The seemingly looser 
structure of the traditional autobiography does not mean 
that there is no structure, but rather that the 
interpretative structure is less individualistic, more 
community-based. 
17. In terms of a Lacanian conceptualization, narration is 
also seen as an effect of the unconscious , revealed in the 
gaps or lapses that appear in a narrative's manifest text. 
It must be borne in mind, however, that the unconscious of 
the text is not necessarily the unconscious of the author. 
Analysis of the narrative's unconscious can be a 
significant contribution to one's understanding of the 
collective unconscious. 
18. Although Barthes' analysis is restricted to fictional 
works, some of the categories and techniques that he 
identifies can be fruitfully applied to non-fictional 
narratives. 
19. Moloi has published a revised version of My Life: 
Volume One which lS combined with Volume Two In 1991 
(Jonathan Ball). Since the modifications are quite 
substantial -- and , in my opinion, distort and devalue the 
text -- I refer at all times to the Ravan Press edition of 
My Life: Volume One. As Nussbaum has remarked, "We tend to 
think of a printed text as a fixed entity rather than a 
textual space that is always undergoing revision, in part 
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because an author's name encourages a reader to regard a 
text as all of a piece, the ' expression' of a subjectivity 
coherently held" (1989 : 18); but Moloi' s My Life: Volume One 
(Ravan Press) is a very different text from My Life: 
Volumes 1 and 2 (Jonathan Ball). Perhaps in Moloi's case 
revision can be construed as repression. 
20 . These dates are approximate; Moloi would have seen the 
sword-hero movies and Westerns sometime from the latter 
part of the 30s, through to the 50s. 
21. Incidentally, women bear the brunt of all of this 
destruction for they are inevitably forced by circumstance 
to support children whose fathers have absconded; they are 
the lowest paid sector of South African society and the 
least likely to have access to education or the legal 
system. 
22. I am borrowing this pun from the title used by Julian 
Henriques et al in their book Changing the Subject. 
23. Moloi is a Sotho surname, but his family lived in 
Natal (now called Kwa-Zulu / Natal) which is the home of the 
Zulu . 
24. Mary Maboreke describes the interpellation of the 
subject in traditional black social formations: 
Africans in general and African women in particular 
identify themselves through a maze of 
relationships .... Almost all Africans see themselves 
as an integral part of a big and complex machine 
called 'the family'. The individual alone is seen as 
almost useless and certainly powerless.... Societies 
such as ours are tightly structured, stratified, 
hedged in by prescriptions, by the primacy of the 
communal good over individual rights and interests. 
(1991:228-9) 
25. The phrase "gone on before" is telling, indicating as 
it does the continuity between living and dead . Gunner 
observes that the shades are the "living dead" (1984:50). 
Zulu belief does not cut off the living from the dead; 
survivors and shades are perceived as interdependent. 
26. If one distances oneself from the narrative enough to 
consider that this might be a description of an experience 
of real terror and violence for people who had . simply 
planned a night out at a dance, then the narrator's 
excitement becomes rather macabre. 
27. Interestingly, Moloi's text attempts to repress 
suggestions that the text constructs its own truth, yet at 
times cannot help but admit to the vagaries of memory and 
of text. It resounds with its own ideological crises that 
are, as Nussbaum has remarked, "more easily discerned ln 
the newly emergent genres because the familiarity of 
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entrenched conventions has not glossed over the fissures" 
(1989:xiii) . 
28. Thomas Mogotlane argues that mapantsulas (township 
gangsters) in general, "were influenced by the American 
gangster movies of the 1950s.... Dressing in labels was 
very important. . . . [A good example is] Godfrey Moloi [who 
uses the 'American' style of dressing]... he has a 
handkerchief hanging out of his suit pocket all the time. 
Getting out of his Mercedes-Benz, wearing his Florsheims, 
very clean and smart, he is still a mapantsula of the 
1950s" (Schmitz and Mogotlane, 1991:38). 
Furthermore, I was informed by a student that most gangs 
in Soweto still to this day take names of film heroes, and 
also that the rough life that people lead in townships can 
be described as coming straight from gangster movies or 
thrillers. He argued, therefore, that Moloi is 
representing general township values and not just trying to 
act the superstar. 
29. Luthuli makes the following wry observation: 
I sometimes wonder if life is not one long series of 
surprises for the Nationalists. Most of them perhaps 
really do think that Africans are so thick-skinned and 
limited in understanding that they would not notice 
things like malnutrition, low wages, police brutality, 
or flagrant discrimination, unless an agitator came to 
point it all out.... Deep down, I wonder if they 
believe us -- left to ourselves -- capable of more 
than "Ja, Baas!" (1982:143) 
30. The narrator is disdainful of those who entangle 
themselves in politics, as he puts it (68), and is himself 
at times racist. The hero participates, without 
narratorial comment, in the riots by Africans against 
Indians in 1949: "We looted, stabbed, and fought. Because 
some Indians fought back, defending their properties, it 
was a long ordeal" (36). The narrator, to cite another 
example, says of a mulatto girlfriend, "The only snag was 
she was a very bad dresser, but I blamed her not, . she was 
coloured .... She was a smoker and I hate smoking women. 
I tried in vain to stop her smoking, but she was 
coloured ... " (125-6). 
31. Its ceasing is a significant event as the narrator 
herself explains: "In one sense, the story of growing up 
had come to the foregone conclusion. In another sense, I 
was vanishing along with my generation into the rituals of 
the tribe: the engagement party ... , the walk up the aisle" 
(145) . 
32. Juhasz conforms to the line of argument that tends to 
essentialize women (and from which I have wished to 
distance myself). Nevertheless, much of what she says is 
relevant to Gordon's Shared Lives: 
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In their form, women's lives tend to be like the 
stories that they tell: they show less a pattern of 
linear development towards some goal than one of 
repetitive, cumulative, cyclical structure.... Even 
if a woman is a professional and conducts her life 
largely according to male patterns (since most 
professions are male dominated and / or controlled), it 
lS generally not easy or usual, because she is a 
woman, for her to separate out neatly the powerful 
domestic and personal relationship-oriented strands in 
her life. Dailiness matters to most women; and 
dailiness is by definition never a conclusion, always 
a process .... 
The perspective of the diarist is immersion, not 
distance. The diary is finished when the pages run 
out, not when some denouement and conclusion are 
reached. Lives, too -- of men as well as women --
have this formal proclivity; it is one of the 
characteristics of living that people have often used 
art to try to remedy. (Juhasz, 1980:223-4) 
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